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Conversely, one could conceive of such a pleasure and power of self-
determination, such a freedom of the will that the spirit would take leave of all 
faith and every wish for certainty, being practised in maintaining itself on 
insubstantial ropes and possibilities and dancing even near abysses. Such a 
spirit would be the free spirit par excellence.  






































The “question of the animal,” as it has become known, is central—both strategically 
and in-itself—to contemporary philosophy and politics, and in my thesis, Zoogenesis: 
Thinking Encounter with Animals, I seek to further explore the ongoing deconstruction 
of the human-animal dichotomy. Therein I argue that, if we are to stall the genocidal 
machine by which various bodies are reproduced as “killable,” the reinscription of 
other animals within the domains of philosophy, ethics, and politics remains essential. 
The interruption of this murderous logic is of the utmost importance, not only for other 
animals, but also for all those millions of “other” humans who find themselves 
excluded by the regulatory norms of gender, sexuality, race, and/or class.  
Divided into five parts, and engaging with writers as diverse as Nietzsche, Derrida, 
Butler, Plato, Heidegger, Kafka, Blanchot, Rancière, William S. Burroughs and 
Bernard Stiegler, I explore the notion of an originary technicity of being within ever 
broader levels of analysis. Beginning with the apocalyptic zoo-genesis of an “animal 
encounter” which exceeds every determinable form, I then consider “improper” tropes 
which function in the opposite direction to the genocidal theatrics of “animalisation,” 
calling forth instead forbidden place-holding metonymies which hold open the space of 
invention itself. From there, I trace the implications of the “zoogenetic demand” 
through the various overlapping domains of ethics, responsibility, nationalism, 
community, and biotechnology. This demand, I argue, requires a necessarily exorbitant 
ethics of the unrecognisable other—of an excessive hospitality from which nonhuman 
animals cannot be excluded—and without which the privileging of the white Western 
heterosexual male is inevitably reinforced. In conclusion, I argue that it is excessive 
mutability which constitutes both the promised posthumanism of vigilant betrayal and 
at once the poisonous threat of a collapse into absolute nihilism—a pharmakon which 
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As the recent proliferation of academic texts, artworks, manifestos, political treatises 
and so on clearly demonstrate, the so-called “question of the animal” can no longer be 
penned within the traditional domains of biology and ethology. As a matter of life and 
death which always exceeds the lives and deaths of “mere” animals, the “animal turn” 
is rather, as will be argued throughout this thesis, central to contemporary thought and 
politics. Nevertheless, the multidisciplinary domain that has become known as “animal 
studies” and/or “posthumanism” is still very much a newly emergent and emerging 
discipline. The French philosopher and psychologist Vinciane Despret, for example, 
states that even as recently as 2006 her work would have been sidelined by way of a 
(gender-based) accusation of sentimentality—the same accusation which, far from 
coincidentally, had for so long served to bar women from access to the sciences.1 
Even now, in 2011, thinking with animals outside of the natural sciences 
nevertheless remains largely a marginalised pursuit. Refused incorporation or 
assimilation, anyone who feels unable not to “bring up” animals, anyone for whom the 
right of putting to death sticks in their throat, who cannot not see industrial murder, 
who cannot not respond to the consumption of flesh, will all too soon become familiar 
with the dismissive reply: “Why bother?” In a sense, this nonresponsive question has 
already defeated every answer, insofar as it is a question which can only take place 
from within the privileged space of humanism. The animals in question, therefore, 
must always include human animals.  
It is here, in fact, that the discourse of “animal rights” already falls down, 
moving as it does within the same or another humanism, redrawing again and again the 
same unthought lines of exclusion, the same metaphysics of either-man-or-animal. The 
utilitarianism of Peter Singer, for example, remains inevitably inscribed within the 
calculus of ends, a human mastery which thus views the animal only according to its 
enclosure within an ordered technological schema. Tom Regan’s neo-Kantian 
approach, in its turn, determines the place of the nonhuman animal only according to 
an essential human morality, and in so doing inscribes human subjectivity as the 
                                                           
1
 As recounted by Florence Burgat in her preface to Despret Penser comme un rat (2009), 4. 
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ground of the animal. In both cases then, it is man who must determine, and thus 
delimit, the animal.2 
Instead, there is only one response to the question “Why bother?,” and that is 
to always again put “the human” itself into question. Such a response is not only 
required, but it is of the utmost urgency, even for those who dismiss animal concerns 
as perhaps laudable but nonetheless most definitely secondary, maybe even somewhat 
self-indulgent or sentimental. This is because, as we shall see, the killing—rather than 
the “murder”—of nonhuman animals actually serves as the excluded support of all 
other structural excludings, namely those which exclude, extort, and distort others on 
the basis of race, gender, class, sexuality, and so on. A support, it is important to note, 
which is nonnecessary. All values constituted in and as the exclusion of their binary 
opposites must thus be understood as both historically contingent and mutually 
articulating, each one supprting the proper standing of every other.  
The question of the animal, in other words, cannot await the answer of the 
human. It cannot, that is to say, await the inauguration of a utopian human community 
before being given its turn, the very impossibility of the answer to “the human” 
serving in such a case to condemn nonhuman animals to an interminable death. One 
cannot discharge oneself of the responsibility of thinking with animals simply by 
claiming for oneself a “more important” concern with human oppression—an all too 
familiar repose marked by the delusion of a nostalgic desire for a purely human 
anything. No one would suggest that one must unfortunately support racism, at least 
until the exclusion and abjection of women is undone, or that one is free to sexually 
abuse women, at least until racism has been eradicated. Nor would anyone suggest that 
politics can and must be limited to single issues existing in isolation. When it comes to 
speciesism, however, such opinions are not only generally tolerated, but are often 
explicitly celebrated.3 However, as we shall see, it is only by tracing the interrelations 
and interarticulations of oppression that an affective genealogy becomes possible. One 
cannot, for example, put into question the privileged sexuality afforded to the ideal of 
whiteness, without an understanding of the speciesist machinery which devalorises 
                                                           
2
 Peter Singer’s Animal Liberation (1975) and Tom Regan’s The Case for Animal Rights 
(1983) are generally considered the founding texts of contemporary animal rights’ discourse. 
3
 On this privileging of oppressions, see Carol J. Adams The Sexual Politics of Meat, 200-201. 








Beginnings and ends: the human  
 
We can thus begin to understand how the exclusion of “the animal” is inseperable not 
only from a determining of “the (properly) human,” but also from questions of 
autonomy and sovereignty, of the subject and of subjection. The exclusion of the 
animal, in other words, functions to inscribe properly human ends, that is, to inscribe 
stable human meaning and to ascribe stable meaning to humanity. Hence the link, as 
philosopher Jacques Derrida insists, between the impossibility of “murdering” an 
animal and “the violent institution of the ‘who’ as subject” (“Eating Well,” 283). One 
result of this interminable quest for the ends—and the end—of “man” is the privative 
determination of “animality” which, albeit variously and fabulously clothed, pads 
mutely throughout Western philosophy. 
According to Plato, for instance, nonhuman animals lack reason and thus an 
immortal soul. Aristotle then marks out the human as zōon logon ekhōn, “the living 
being possessing language” who, insofar as she is the only animal with the ability to 
form universal concepts, thus designates the site of teleological reason. Scripture 
thereafter delivers over every nonhuman animal into the hands and mouths of men, 
refusing them freedom and reducing them to meat. Descartes then transforms these 
“mere” bodies into clockwork, simple meat machines experiencing neither pleasure 
nor pain. After this Kant, in a renewal of Platonic ontoteleology countersigned by 
Aristotle, insists that only the rational being—by which he means the human animal—
can think the unconditional law of morality. This is again repeated, mutatis mutandis, 
by Hegel, for whom only the human can possess an infinite relationship to self. 
Moving rapidly then through the twentieth century, while Freud avers that nonhuman 
animals are without conciousness and Heidegger claims they are without death and 
thus “poor-in-world,” Levinas in his turn refuses every nonhuman animal a face, and 
thus any claim to an ethical response.4  
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 For two excellent intellectual histories of “the animal” in Western philosophy, one crafted in 
meticulous detail and the other brief yet highly illuminating, see Elisabeth de Fontenay Le 
silence des bêtes: La philosophie à l’épreuve de l’animalité (Paris: Fayard, 1998) and Gilbert 
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In fact, the list of what animals are alleged to lack is at once finite yet endless, 
depending as it does upon the ever-shifting requirements of what it means to be 
“properly” human. One can, nonetheless, offer in its place a short and brutal summary: 
throughout Western philosophy—albeit with some notable exceptions—“the animal” 
is constituted as an unfeeling object under the technical mastery of man and definable 
only by negativity. One cannot murder such an animal, only kill her over and over 
again, and moreover one can do so with impunity. It is this all too human construction 
of “the animal” therefore, which holds open the space for what Derrida describes as a 
“noncriminal putting to death,” be it the site of war, of capital punishment, or of the 
unprecedented subjection and subjugation of human and nonhuman beings all around 
us today. 
Exploring the movement by which such a space is opened in which a human 
animal can be “legitimately” murdered is thus, alongside and entangled with the 
exclusion of nonhuman animals, a major preoccupation of this thesis. This movement, 
I argue, in the “animalisation” of a specifically targetted human or human grouping—
an identity the posited homogeneity of which is always imposed from outside—, 
functions to exclude the subject of its tropological displacement and, in so doing, 
constitute a non-subject that can be killed with impunity. By way of this reactive 
movement of sedimented traces—the solidified dregs of ressentiment and bad 
conscience—one can always again redefine the slave, the barbarian, the foreigner, or 
the immigrant as a “mere” animal. One thinks here of the Nazi demonisation of Jews 
as Saujuden (“Jewish swine”), but also of the photograph taken in the Abu Ghraib 
prison showing Private Lynndie England leading an Iraqi prisoner around on a dog 
leash. Indeed, to reduce a singular, nonsubstitutable living being to an essential 
identity which is in turn reconfigured as “animal” is nothing less than the economy of 
genocide. Excluded from itself through a murderous theatrics of displacement, a 
nonhuman animal or an animalised human is effectively rendered speechless, a 
subjugated body which may be killed but never murdered.  
The interruption of this murderous logic is therefore of the utmost importance, 
not only for other animals, but also for those millions of “other” humans displaced and 
thus excluded by the regulatory norms of gender, sexuality, race, and/or class. We are 
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thus faced with an extremely pressing question: are there perhaps tropes that function 
in the opposite direction, that make it unthinkable that living beings can be put to death 
with impunity? Whilst at the same time remembering that the question of what, 
exactly, is meant by “living being” is far from being resolved, it is this question which 
I attempt to answer over the course of this thesis. 
 
 
Neither beginning nor end: the undying animal 
 
“The human,” I have suggested, depends upon the exclusion of “the animal,” a logic 
which reserves the space for a noncriminal putting to death. This genocidal logic is, 
however, further complicated by the fact that this movement itself depends upon the 
finite bodies of nonhuman animals being paradoxically inscribed as undying. By this I 
mean that “the animal,” as a single undifferentiated body in opposition to the human, is 
defined both as lacking the possibility of death and as sharing a transparent pathic 
communication. With each of these reciprocally grounding the other, the murder of a 
nonhuman animal, as we shall see, becomes ontologically impossible, even as corpses 
are produced in exponentially increasing numbers.  
The apparent “fact” that nonhuman animals do not know or “have” language, 
do not know or “have” death, is simply and precisely an ideology, one which, as 
feminist writer Carol Adams notes, “ontologises animals as usable” (Neither Man Nor 
Beast, 15). Whether as untouched by the Fall into self-awareness, or as absolutely 
determined by genetics and thus infintely substitutable automata, this figuration of the 
undying animal remains central to human exceptionalism. Moreover, the ideology of 
the undying animal must be understood as an entanglement of both material and 
symbolic economies. The “question of the animal,” in other words, is a question of and 
to Capital: a question of the literal rendering of animals’ bodies, and at once a demand 
which infinitely exceeds the democratic order founded upon, and conserved by, the 
semantics of an agent-centered subjectivity and of the sovereign human subject of 
rights and duties. That the ideologically undying animal, as well as presupposing 
human exceptionalism, simultaneously reproduces the machinery of Western 
patriarchy founded upon the illusion of a freely willing human subject, can be seen 
most clearly in the context of previous justifications of slavery. Indeed, the argument 
will no doubt be familiar: the white male oppression of people of colour depends upon 
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the latter being configured as incapable of resisting their “natural” bodily 
inclinations—that is to say, incapable of overcoming their animal instincts—and thus, 
excluded from “pure” reason, are thereby fit only to be ruled.  
With this example, I am simply suggesting that nonhuman animals cannot be 
overlooked when it comes to putting into question the humanist hubris which claims 
on its own behalf an inalienable free will or, at the very least, an ontologically 
exceptional status. Rather, as I demonstrate throughout this thesis, the infinitely 
diverse ways of being—both human and nonhuman—irredeemably explode the 
illusion of a boundary dividing responsive Culture from reactive Nature. In this way, 
one hopes, the delusion of liberalism will finally be dispelled—a delusion constituted, 
as Spinoza maintained so long ago, in ignorance of the disposition of bodies, a 





Rather than seeking to prop up those tottering relics of reductive division, it will be 
argued instead that to efface originary relatedness on the basis of the destructive yet 
empty concept of “the human” serves to severely constrain what animals—both human 
and nonhuman—might become. By contrast, it is an open relation to this potential 
becoming which for me defines what I understand by the term “posthumanism.” 
Here, however, it is first of all necessary to differentiate posthumanist 
thinking from the notion of the “posthuman” or the “transhuman” as construed by a 
number of (mainly liberal) writers. For the latter, as philosopher Cary Wolfe writes, 
the “post-” prefix rather marks an “historical succession in which … the human is 
transformed and finally eclipsed by various technological, informatic, and 
bioengineering developments” (“Bring the Noise,” xi). According to my 
understanding, however, posthumanism refers rather to both the interruption that 
always already takes place before and beyond every conception of “the human,” and to 
our historical situatedness as subsequent to the deconstruction of the delimited human 
subject, be it in terms of soul, cogito, ego, or body. In short, “posthumanism” is that 
which doubly marks us as “coming after” the interruption of the human, and as such 
demands a thinking which takes place beyond any humanist metaphysics.  
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I take here as the starting point for any genuinely posthumanist discourse a 
movement beyond the traditional (Christianised) forms taken by the relationship 
between the human and the nonhuman animal. These dominant forms, as philosopher 
Andrew Benjamin demonstrates, are configured by two “original and importantly 
different determinations” (“Particularity and Exceptions,” 76). In the first 
configuration, the emergence of the human is predicated on the death or nonexistence 
of the animal, whereas in the second the human remains in a constant struggle with his 
or her own animality, an animality which must be repeatedly overcome in being 
human. These two types or configurations, as will be explored in more detail, endlessly 
reiterate a logic of dependence-exclusion. For the moment, however, we can note that, 
insofar as both determinations fallaciously define the nonhuman animal by what he or 
she lacks within a teleological dialectic, every nonhuman animal is thus figured as 
incomplete, as subhuman. Moreover, this in fact renders “the human” not a site of 
ontological exception, but rather an effect of this reiterated exclusion of “the animal,” a 
reiteration which in itself presupposes a primordial relatedness. 
Arguing that posthumanist discourse must interrupt such anthropomorphic 
hubris, however, is not to say that the movement of humanist exclusion should simply 
be inverted, positing instead some kind of homogeneous inclusive equality. While such 
a simplistic inversion would merely reinstate the human-animal dichotomy in its 
refusal, it is rather the case that a given human only “is” in an originary and complex 
relational network with nonhuman ways of being.  
In articulating just such a posthumanist thinking, I thus explore throughout 
this thesis some of the philosophical, ethical, and political implications of a rigorous 
deconstruction of the human-animal division, as well as some of its less-than-rigorous 
articulations within contemporary “posthumanist” discourses. Along the way, I aim to 
demonstrate how the figuration of the nonhuman animal as undying is essential to the 
two determinations of teleological humanism and, by extension, to figuring it a human 
right to do whatever we like to other animals.  
We can thus already begin to perceive why the giving of a death potentially 
interrupts such brutal, murderous hubris. Only initially paradoxical, such a gift, I will 
argue, returns to this nonhuman being his or her place, that is, the singularity of his or 
her nonsubstitutability. The “having” of death, furthermore, marks the exposure of 
every living being across an indissociably doubled abyss: on the one hoof, an abyssal 
technicity of language which necessarily exceeds any reduction to the verbal and, on 
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the other, an abyssal embodiment which exceeds any delimitation of the organism. A 
rigorous posthumanist thinking, therefore, must concern itself with an exposition 
which already confounds every distinction between the interior and the exterior and the 
organic and the technical. 
 
 
Zoogenesis: the apocalyptic arriving of monstrosity 
 
Returning to the central question of the thesis, that of potential tropes which make it 
unthinkable that living beings can be put to death with impunity, I would like to 
conclude this introduction by linking it with the notion of “zoogenesis.” In contrast to 
the limited anthropo-genesis explicated by Martin Heidegger, I instead seek to trace 
the movements of an excessive zoo-genetic transport virtually promised to every living 
being by an originary technicity. This originary technicity of being is, I argue, the 
condition of both that which for strategic reasons I am calling the animal encounter, 
and of the monstrous zoogenesis to which such an encounter gives rise. A priori 
excluding both vitalism and biological continuism, its difference as and at the origin of 
sense necessarily derails every judgment of absolute truth and value, undoing every 
hierarchy of proximity and any narcissistic notion of identity politics. 
Instead, originary technics demands the affirmation of an encounter with 
another whose language “I” do not recognise, an “other” with whom or with which 
consensus remains impossible. In this way, “language” (in a narrow sense) ceases to be 
the privileged site from which one can sovereignly attribute to another only a mute 
bestiality. Instead, with Friedrich Nietzsche’s help we will discover the imperative of 
active forgetting which is, in short, zoogenesis—the call of which shatters the psyche 
in calling forth unheard-of and forbidden monstrosities. 
It is this event or encounter which I trace throughout this thesis—locating it in 
the moment Franz Kafka’s investigator encounters seven musical dogs, in the 
bathroom of Jacques Derrida one morning, in philosopher Jacques Rancière’s notion of 
revolutionary performatives, in the moment the central character of J. M. Coetzee’s 
novel Elizabeth Costello is brought to the point of collapse by the impossibility of 
continuing to be, and in the event which the writer William S. Burroughs claims to 
have saved him from a deadly, pervasive ignorance. Finally, I suggest that the promise 
of zoogenesis resides in the responsibility of a vigilant Nietzschean betrayal, a 
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response which always again offers itself as a curative to the poison of a certain 
neoliberal notion of the transhuman. It is a thinking encounter with animals, in other 
words, which replaces reductive calculation with an ethics of emergence. 
 
 
* * * 
 
 
Put very schematically, I aim to explore through the five parts of this thesis the notion 
of an originary technicity of being within ever broader levels of analysis. At the same 
time, however, the thesis as a whole can, insofar as it begins with Plato and the 
inauguration of metaphysical humanism and concludes with a consideration of Bernard 
Stiegler’s recent instauration of the human-animal dichotomy by other means, be 
considered as a somewhat unorthodox journey through a greatly contracted history of 
the philosophical animal. Thus, in the first chapter I draw a line from the “birth” of 
philosophy, through the Judeo-Christian tradition culminating with Hegel, to the 
philosophy of Maurice Blanchot who, it can be argued, sets the stage for 
poststructuralist thinking. Here, by way of a reading of the Greek myth of Persephone, 
we will see how the double negation of “the animal” serves to link Blanchot with 
Plato, a relation which will make explicit the general homogeneity (with those notable 
exceptions of course) of the philosophical treatment of “the animal” over the course of 
more than two millennia. 
From there, I turn in the second chapter to Heidegger and Nietzsche, the 
philosophies of which both represent hugely important attempts to move beyond 
metaphysical humanism. Firstly, in exploring the differences and similarities between 
the existential analytic and traditional metaphysics, I demonstrate how Heidegger’s 
thinking of the hermeneutic circle functions within his commitment to a “humanism 
beyond humanism.” In this, I suggest that Heidegger’s thinking does indeed break with 
the traditional configurations of the human-animal relation but, insofar as nonhuman 
animals are unthinkingly reinscribed as essentially undying, his philosophy 
nonetheless remains enclosed within what philosopher Matthew Calarco deems a 
“metaphysical anthropocentrism.” From this, we can then see how, despite their 
enormous importance to contemporary thought, both Blanchot and Heidegger 
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nevertheless align themselves with a tradition which tacitly underwrites the global 
mass murder of animals.5  
It is, however, by way of Heidegger that the radicality of Nietzsche’s early 
text “On Truth and Lie in the Extra-Moral Sense” is brought sharply into focus. Here, 
Nietzsche’s explication of an originary technics of sense which always results in a 
stammering translation [übertragung] opens the space for a far more radical 
posthumanist understanding of the notion of being-with. Extending Nietzsche’s 
position with the help of Derrida’s key notion of iterability, I argue that it is only in 
fact through a vigilant refusal to efface the deaths of nonhuman animals that the silent 
announcing of the over-human [Übermensch] becomes possible, constituted by 
encounters across languages producing bodies “systematically mad” one to another. 
In further exploring the notion of an “animal encounter” at the limit of 
language in the second part, I argue that it is in and as such “individual” singular events 
that new, historically contingent beings are created. Every such being is, moreover, 
necessarily monstrous: a species of nonspecies which, demanding only its impossible 
possibility, exceeds every determinable form. It is just this demand, I argue, which calls 
forth those “improper” tropes which function in the opposite direction to the genocidal 
theatrics of “animalisation.” I begin by tracing the consequences of one such encounter 
in a reading of Kafka’s short story “Investigations of a Dog,” from which I then 
consider its relation to the two figures of nihilism. Here, in contrasting what Karl Marx 
calls “the spirit of revolution” with the “walking ghost” of parody, I argue that the 
animal encounter gives rise to a revolutionary spirit only so long as its zoogenetic 
monstrosity is such that it both no longer and not yet makes sense. In order to better 
illustrate this, I offer in chapter four a critical interpretation of that which for 
philosopher Jacques Rancière constitutes the political promise of the revolutionary 
performative.  
Responding to the imperative of such an encounter, however, requires a 
necessarily exorbitant ethics of the unrecognisable other, that is to say, an excessive 
hospitality from which nonhuman animals cannot be excluded. Without this, I argue in 
the third part, the normative privileging of the white Western heterosexual male is 
                                                           
5
 This of course inevitably raises the question of the relationship between Heidegger’s 
philosophy (and indeed, of Blanchot’s) and Nazi politics, and which makes for some extremely 
uneasy readings when one considers how the human-animal dichotomy functions within Nazi 
ideology to de-humanise the Jews. This is considered in more detail in chapter 8. 
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inevitably reinforced. Engaging with feminist philosopher Judith Butler’s Bodies That 
Matter in chapter five, I thus demonstrate first of all how the constitution of the human 
subject in fact depends upon a normative network of inculcation which excludes 
animals, women, and people of colour. Indeed, it will transpire that “the human” is 
itself yet one more regulatory norm. A norm, moreover, through which all other norms 
must pass. In order to stall this process, I argue that an “unconditional” ethics must 
open itself to the chance of those encounters which call forth improper metonymies, 
and in so doing hold open the place of an impossible, apocalyptic hospitality. In 
responding to such a call, however, one must simultaneously undergo the risk of being 
judged socially non-viable and thus nonhuman. It is, in other words, to affirm, as we 
shall see by way of the fateful and fatal encounters of Elisabeth Costello and Venus 
Xtravaganza, the risk of becoming a stranger or a foreigner at home, an internal exile or 
even a domestic terrorist.  
In chapter six I further explore the need for a dangerous ethics rooted in an 
excessive hospitality through readings of the “post-encounter” texts of the novelist 
William S. Burroughs. Here I demonstrate that, while for Burroughs the timelessness of 
the wild makes possible an animal-Love which transcends pain and conflict, the 
restriction of love to some, but not all, nonhuman animals in fact rearticulates 
contemporary structures of oppression. Such a restricted concept of ethics is, I argue, 
the inevitable result of drawing a simple division between the wild and the tame, a 
claim further supported by a critical reading of Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari’s 
famous notion of “becoming-animal.” 
As a consequence, I argue in the final chapter of this part that the beginning of 
ethics thus resides within the detested figure of the Burroughsian centipede. By 
welcoming its monstrosity within the shared space of the domestic, I thus shift 
Burroughs’ thinking of the posthuman beyond its imperialist logic in a movement 
which will help us to better approach the notion of a “community beyond the human,” 
the subject of the fourth part of this thesis. 
Prior to thinking through some of the implications of such a “community,” 
however, it is first of all necessary to consider the constitution of “the human 
community” it purports to move beyond, which I do in chapter eight through a reading 
of Carl Schmitt’s The Concept of the Political. One might of course suggest that such a 
community is simply the totality of common humanity. However, insofar as “who,” 
“what,” or “which” counts as the properly human remains always open to negotiation, 
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the question must thus turn instead to the functioning of the circumscription of a 
supposedly “common” or “universal” humanity. This then leads to a consideration of 
nationalism and Nazism, and of how the notion of “community” relates both to 
hospitality and sharing, concepts with which it seems inextricably bound. Here, I 
demonstrate how the founding and conserving of “the nation,” and thus the 
nationalistic, employs the very same economy of dependence-exclusion by which “the 
human,” and thus the humanist, constitutes itself. Furthermore, we will see that the 
“fully realised” body of humanism is in fact indistinguishable from that of the pathic, 
undying animal against which it seeks to found its essential difference. I then propose 
my own definition of community, that of the shared condition of not-being-able to 
share. An aporetic formulation which, I suggest, serves to echo the inability and 
insufficiency which already marks every hospitable encounter.  
Finally in this part, I explore Nietzsche’s notion of the posthuman as an animal 
with the right to make promises. This “right,” I argue, is the promise of a betrayal 
which in fact is the very condition of community, that is to say, of an unending and 
unlawful betrayal of the notion of “humanity” which renders crimes against the human 
status impossible. Such a betrayal, moreover, is at once the condition of vigilance, 
responsibility, and loyalty, and takes as its paradoxical figure that of the nomad, the 
lone wanderer ever seeking community and commonality. Such, I argue, is the 
ceaseless movement of a futural being with the strength to outlive “the human.”  
This notion of a promise to betray is further examined in the concluding part 
of the thesis, in which I explore its relation to the neoliberal promise of the 
“transhuman.” Beginning with a consideration of the uneven movement from industrial 
to postindustrial capitalism, I argue that this marks a shift from the idea of a determined 
linear temporality to that of an undetermined movement of reversibility and 
“recapacitation.” This rupturing of linear determinism, literally embodied by Dolly the 
sheep, necessarily interrupts traditional notions of patriarchy and genealogical descent, 
promising instead a “transhuman” immortality. Despite this, the biotechnological 
promise of the transhuman nonetheless remains dependent, both for its moral 
justification and in order to efface the threat of its very indeterminism, upon a rhetoric 
of determinism which represents “the animal” as both pathic and undying. Against this, 
I argue that what Dolly demonstrates is rather a writing of and on the body, and which 
as such is necessarily subject to dissemination.  
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This in turn permits a detailed engagement with Bernard Stiegler’s ongoing 
attempt to reinstall a secure human-animal distinction, whereby through a reworked 
notion of Stiegler’s core concept of “epiphylogenesis” I will further explore the 
promise of biotechnology. Finally, I will then relocate this promise within the wider 
concerns of excessive mutability, thus allowing me to draw the various threads of the 
thesis together. Here, I suggest that excessive mutability is a redoubled pharmakon, 
offering on the one hand both the remedy of an immortal transhuman assemblage and 
the poison of life-consuming disease and, on the other, at once the remedy of a 
posthumanist vigilance and the poison of a collapse into absolute nihilism. Moreover, 
the cure of one constitutes the poison of the other. As a result, the promise of excessive 
mutability must ever again be renegotiated. 
Such I will argue is the demand of a thinking encounter with animals, an 
encounter which can interrupt instrumentalisation and exploitation, putting in its place 
a vigilant and responsive ethics of emergence which rests upon the excessive 
hospitality of a giving finitude. 
 
 
Two final notes 
 
Firstly, I will follow throughout the text the example of Carol Adams and use “she” to 
refer to any nonhuman animal, alive or dead, whose sex is unknown. I will, however, 
retain “it” both when citing or paraphrasing another if appropriate (marked by sic 
where necessary) and when referring to a generic concept rather than to specific human 
or nonhuman animals. 
 
Secondly, the notion of “living,” insofar as it can never be rigorously differentiated 
from “nonliving,” is thus used throughout this thesis as a kind of shorthand which, if 
not for its awkwardness, should really always be placed within scare quotes. 
Furthermore, it should be remembered that “living being” does not—or not only—
refer to living organisms, but rather to bodyings or materialities which, always already 




Part One: Formations 
 
1: Persephone Calls 




We must not expose the scientific investigation of any subject to a 





Introduction: Calling Persephone 
 
Let us begin, as is only fitting in considering the domination of the human-animal 
dichotomy throughout the Western tradition, with an ancient myth.  
One fine day, while collecting Spring flowers, Persephone is spied by Hades 
who, inflamed with love and desire, kidnaps her and carries her off to his underworld 
kingdom. Demeter, Persephone’s mother and mother to the earth, is inconsolable, 
searching the earth and heavens for her daughter. Eventually, she encounters a river 
nymph who, for fear of Hades, suggests only that Persephone has been taken inside the 
earth itself. Enraged, Demeter inflicts a devastating infertility upon the land. A second 
nymph, however, tells Demeter not to punish the earth, for she has seen Persephone 
with Hades in the Underworld. Deeply shocked, Demeter begs Zeus to arrange the 
return of her daughter to the upper world. Zeus agrees, with but a single condition: her 
daughter must have eaten nothing whilst in the Underworld. Persephone, however, has 
already partaken of a single suck of pomegranate pulp, and so a compromise is offered: 
Persephone must spend half of every year in the Underworld until Spring arrives and 
restores her to her mother for the remaining months. Somewhat pacified, Demeter 
thereafter returns fertility to the earth. 
So goes the myth of Persephone, an allegory of rebirth, of the eternal 
movement of the seasons, and of the casting of the seed inside the earth. It is a myth 
too, both of feminised Nature as reproduction, subject to the desires of men, and of the 
promise of resurrection, Persephone’s fate offering consolation to anyone anxious 
about the afterlife. In short, it tells tales of transcendental return. It is in this sense, as 
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we shall see, that Socrates, in dialogue with Meno, evokes the name of Persephone in 
support of his claim that the soul of man is immortal.  
The tale of Persephone’s return, however, is also marked by a prior detour 
through the earth, moving briefly from the eternal concerns of gods to the finite world 
of men. Exhausted from her search, a disguised Demeter is forced to rest upon a stone 
for nine days and nights. On the tenth day, an old man happens by and offers Demeter 
compassion and hospitality. Upon reaching his home, however, Demeter discovers the 
man’s son Triptolemus is desperately ill, and thus proceeds to heal him. When she 
places the boy in the fire, however, his mother snatches him away, unwittingly 
preventing his transformation into an immortal. As a consolation, a newly-revealed 
Demeter promises instead to teach the boy the unknown art of agriculture, a knowledge 
which he in turn will teach across the earth. For this act of original pedagogy, 
Triptolemus later founds the worship of Demeter, erecting a temple in the city of 
Eleusis on the site of the stone upon which she sat, and staging there the famous 
purification rituals known as the Eleusinian Mysteries.6 
This is a less well-known part of the myth of Persephone, telling of the 
singular gift of the art or technique of agriculture. Here, I will argue, rather than a 
Socratic recollection as the proof of transcendental reason and thus of the immortal 
soul, we find instead an original act of learning. An act, moreover, directly linked to 
the Mysteries, the very same rites which Meno is unable to attend. Indeed, Socrates 
evokes the Mysteries in the Meno in order to suggest an analogous relation between the 
revelatory initiation into divine secrets such as experienced by Triptolemus and during 
the Mysteries, and the equally revelatory initiation into philosophical truths offered by 
Socrates himself. It is this, however, which is impossible, insofar as it is the former 
which puts the latter into question. 
                                                           
6
 There are of course an enormous number of texts dealing with Greek myths, either in their 
entirety or with specific cycles. In the context of our argument here, see Carl Kerenyi Eleusis: 
Archetypal Image of Mother and Daughter trans. Ralph Manheim (New Jersey: Princeton 
University Press, 1991), which focuses on the relation of the Persephone myth to the 
Mysteries. On the Mysteries themselves, see George E. Mylonas Eleusis and the Eleusinian 
Mysteries (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1961). For good contemporary readings of 
the Persephone myth, see Elizabeth T. Hayes (ed.) Images of Persephone: Feminist Readings 
in Western Literature (Florida: University of Florida Press, 1994), as well as Tamara Agha-
Jaffar Demeter and Persephone: Lessons from a Myth (Jefferson, NC: McFarland & Co., 
2002). On the dwindling importance, and eventual exclusion, of the notion of “the goddess” 
from Western culture, see Anne Baring and Jules Cashford’s huge The Myth of the Goddess: 
Evolution of an Image (London & New York: Penguin, 1993), and David Lemming & Jake 
Page Goddess: Myth of the Female Divine (New York: Oxford University Press USA, 1996). 
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For Plato, as we shall see, the name of Persephone authorises the transport of 
transcendental return, and yet, as the price of divine consolation, she thus becomes a 
figure of all too human disavowal. While the revelatory initiation into divine secrets 
undoes the Socratic return of immortal truths, this is not, however, to suggest that the 
rites practised at Eleusis might somehow partake of the divine. Rather, I will argue, 
these rites are the obverse of this human disavowal insofar as they seek too, in their 
own way, to purify the human of its animal baseness. Whether Meno chooses to be 
initiated into the teachings of Socrates or into the Mysteries of Eleusis, either way his 
initiation will come at the expense of other animals.  
Here, I will argue, philosopher Maurice Blanchot too calls on the name of 
Persephone, not with Socrates on behalf of transcendental reason, but rather in 
articulating his own variant of the initiation rituals of the Mysteries. For Blanchot as for 
the Eleusinian initiates, the animal is ritually sacrificed twice over, firstly as the 
human, and then again in the name of man. More precisely, the myth of Persephone 
figures the anthropogenetic movement of double death we find in Blanchot: a 
redoubled death first of the external animal which marks the becoming man of man, 
and then of a second, exclusively human death that is the act of mastery that condemns 
all other animals to the hecatomb. 
It is with these twinned offerings, these Persephone calls, that Plato’s 
inaugural disavowal of the nonhuman animal is drawn out across millennia of 
Christianised humanism in a line which, ever renewed, ties the Platonic dialogues to 
the “posthumanist” discourse of Blanchot. With these two purifications, the natural and 
the supernatural, the empirical and the transcendental, I aim to render explicit the 
constitution of those exclusively human properties—soul, reason and language—which 
have, since the “beginning” of philosophy, served to exclude other animals as beings 
without memory, without trace, and without death. Along the way, I will introduce 
Derrida’s “quasi-concept” of iterability which, in deconstructing exactly these 











Before Plato, the idea of an essential immortal soul existing independently of its 
corporeal incarnation was not generally a part of Greek thought.7 Facing a variant of 
the “trick argument” in the Meno (80e), however, Socrates finds himself obliged, in 
order to save philosophy from sophistry, to have recourse to just such an idea if he is to 
prove that adequate knowledge can indeed be achieved. Meno’s “trick argument,” as 
summarised by Socrates, runs as follows: man can never discover what he knows 
because either, (a) he already knows and thus has no need to discover it, or else (b) he 
does not already know and hence cannot even know what to look for or, indeed, if he 
has found it.  
Before he can stage his reasoned defence of philosophical knowledge, 
however, and immediately prior to the famous geometrical demonstration of 
transcendental reason, Socrates is compelled to set the scene by calling upon two 
nonphilosophical substantiating sources. First of all, he recalls the discourse of “priests 
and priestesses,” and then, by way of Pindar’s “divine inspiration,” invokes the goddess 
Persephone to his cause (81b-c). Both, suggests Socrates, say that the soul of man is 
immortal, forever reborn within new corporeal incarnations.  
One quickly understands the need for such a theological authorisation, insofar 
as it immediately transpires that for Socrates it can only be on the basis of corporeal 
reincarnation that knowledge and truth can be recollected, that is, recovered or reborn. 
At this point, however, the soul or spirit has not yet left the body: “the soul, since it is 
immortal and has been born many times, and has seen all things both here and in the 
other world, has learned everything that is” (81c). As a result, Socrates argues, a man 
can indeed recover, rather than discover, full knowledge insofar as, once he “has 
recalled a single piece of knowledge—learned it, in ordinary language—there is no 
reason why he should not find out all the rest” (81d). It is this which Socrates sets out 
to prove by engaging a slave boy in a discussion of geometry. Here, knowledge 
available for recollection has been learned through prior experience over a great 
extension of time and number of incarnations, and it is not the case that the soul always 
already possesses full knowledge.  
                                                           
7
 The reading of the Meno which follows is indebted to Bernard Stiegler who, in a lecture at 
Goldsmiths in February 2009, spoke briefly about the Meno and the Phaedrus. See also 
Stiegler Technics and Time, 1: The Fault of Epimetheus, 97-100.  
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The problem then arises that, if future knowledge is necessarily the re-
collection of previous experience, how will one have first learned that of which 
knowledge is necessarily a recollection? The demonstration of the slave boy’s 
recollected knowledge only serves to highlight this aporia: the boy can recollect 
geometry only because he has already learned it, so how will one have first come to 
learn that geometry that all men can subsequently recall? 
At this point, Socrates appears to hesitate. It is a hesitancy, an uncertainty, 
that finds its fore-echo when earlier he talks of reincarnation only as a clerical and 
mythical “they-say” (81a-b).8 Indeed, throughout this earlier part of the dialogue, and 
in contrast with the certain movement of the later demonstration, there is no knowledge, 
but only an uncertain reiteration of hearsay and opinion. At times, it even seems to take 
on the ironic tone characteristic of the Socratic style in which a thesis is apparently 
affirmed only then to be taken apart, stingray fashion. However, its leading of the 
witness to confess the collapse of common opinion, of the “they say,” never 
materialises. Rather, as we shall see, there is only an absent question, a passing over in 
silence. Despite this, following the slave-boy’s performance this uncertain hypothesis, 
that of a redoubled knowledge learned both here and there over multiple incarnations, 
becomes instead a certainty which, in so doing, departs from the body to become a 
supernatural apparition, evoked from out of this world. 
Having drawn a number of transcendent geometrical truths from the mouth of 
the slave boy, Socrates then presses Meno: 
 
Either then [the boy] has at some time acquired the knowledge which he 
now has, or he has always possessed it. If he always possessed it, he must 
always have known; if on the other hand he acquired it at some previous 
time, it cannot have been in this life … if he did not acquire them in this 
life, isn’t it immediately clear that he possessed and had learned them 
during some other period? (85d-86a). 
 
There is, in this suspension, an obscurity hidden within its clarity—“isn’t it 
immediately clear that he possessed and had learned them?”—, the moment which 
marks in silence the shift from knowledge as empirically learned to knowledge as 
essential possession. When Meno concedes that the slave-boy must indeed have 
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 This position is taken up again and explored more fully by Plato in the Phaedo, beginning 




“possessed and learned” the recollected knowledge during another period, Socrates 
then insists, “When he was not in human shape?” to which Meno simply replies “Yes” 
(86). Whereas earlier, calling upon Persephone and the priests, Socrates suggests that 
knowledge is acquired “both here and in the other world,” he thus now insists upon 
such a possession as only being inhuman and supernatural. There is, however, no 
explanation as to why the slave-boy could not have learned geometry throughout his 
having been born many times and thus having seen all things. Meno, as is so often the 
case with Socrates’ interlocutors, merely affirms this without question.  
This disavowal of the corporeal, of the material, in seeking to efface the 
problem of the recollection of learned knowledge, concerns, as we have seen, the 
problem of the Origin and of hypomnēsis. It concerns, in other words, the first learning 
which makes possible the alētheia (revelation) that is anamnēsis (recollection), that is, 
which makes a discontinuous past available for return in the future. At this point, and 
still attempting to extricate philosophy from the Sophist aporia, Socrates can thus only 
side with knowledge as an essential possession proper to man. That is, he is compelled 
to do so if he is to avoid becoming ensnared in a second aporia—that of an originary 
site and citing of knowledge. Hence, Socrates continues to press Meno:  
 
If then there are going to exist in him, both while he is and while he is not a 
man, true opinions which can be aroused by questioning and turned into 
knowledge, may we say that his soul has been forever in a state of 
knowledge? (86a).  
 
Knowledge, in a move that Nietzsche terms nihilistic, is thus shifted beyond and before 
the sensible, constituted as an essence that always precedes corporeal being as opposed 
to being encoded in the language of its institution.  
Here though, Persephone eternally returns to haunt Socrates, in that the myth 
not only offers the consolation of supernatural rebirth, but also recounts the pedagogy 
of Demeter, who imparts to man knowledge of nature and its cultivation that is at once 
original and empirical. Where these two aspects cross, however, is with the notion of 









Socrates, as we have seen, in order to avoid becoming ensnared within twin aporias, is 
thus compelled to remove knowledge from the sensible world. Knowledge, the mark of 
an immortal human soul, cannot henceforth be learned (and thus taught), but is rather 
an essential property of the ensouled always available for reactivation. What is of 
particular interest here, is that in this calculated and arbitrary staging it is nonhuman 
animals—indeed, all other living beings—who find themselves sacrificed to 
knowledge in this unquestioned elision of the corporeal and empirical. That nonhuman 
beings might employ reason does not, according to Socrates, mark the possession of a 
soul and thus knowledge but rather, as a result of this decision on behalf of philosophy, 
only a learned nonknowledge. Animal “reasoning,” in other words, comes to mark 
instead an unknowing, that of an automatic response. Indeed, by the time of the 
Phaedrus, it becomes its fabulous figure.  
Thus, in his speech to Phaedrus on Love, Socrates insists that a man who 
surrenders to the sensible and the corporeal is “like a four-footed beast” and thus 
“unnatural” (250e-251a). At the same time, the essential state of the soul in knowledge 
is no longer a hesitant hypothesis, but has been transformed into simple dogma: “It is 
impossible for a soul that has never seen the truth to enter into our human shape; it 
takes a man to understand by the use of universals, and to collect out of the multiplicity 
of sense-impressions a unity arrived at by a process of reason” (249b-c). Truth, 
therefore, is the a priori condition for the soul which, in order to become, must first see 
Truth and then enter a human body. No soul, Socrates says earlier, can be born into a 
wild animal in its first incarnation (248d). As subsequent to Ideas but prior to corporeal 
existence, the soul thus functions as the intermediary between essence and existence, 
between Ideas and their recollection in being. In this, the soul functions much as the 
khōra in Timaeus, that is, as the nonplace which is the condition of place or, rather, the 
taking place of place which must withdraw in its having taken place, and therefore in 
the appearance of being through which the truth is empirically regained, and thus of 
temporality and historicity. The distinction between the sensible (aisthēton) and the 
intelligible (noēton) which subsequently grounds the sacrifice of the animal to reason 
has thus replaced the tragic composition of anamnēsis as hypomnēsis.  
In short then, in that the soul’s archiving of truth is the taking place of man 
proved via transcendental reason, it necessarily follows that truth, soul, space and time 
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are denied to all other animals. The soul, for Plato, can only be born into a man, 
although man can subsequently be reincarnated in an animal form (which, in a variant 
of the incest prohibition, would seem to prohibit the eating of other animals9), because 
it is only man and all men—from slave-boy to philosopher-patriarch—who can 
recollect knowledge. By contrast, nonhuman animals are, as Elisabeth de Fontenay 
writes, both “absolute animals” and “dead souls” (Le silence 71). Moreover, in this 
patriarchal gendering of knowledge, women are thus, in the same movement, implicitly 
aligned with the soulless irrationality of animals.10  
Every other living being, every single nonhuman animal of whatever stripe—
and, perhaps, every woman, a “perhaps” which marks the opening movement of the 
machinery of animalisation—, thus finds herself a priori excluded from transcendental 
knowledge. More than this, she is thus also denied access to its two correlates: virtue 
and memory (Meno 87b). “The animal,” this putatively homogeneous category of 
everything that is not man, thus lacks not only a soul, but also the taking place of 
place—of language and of being-there. She can be neither virtuous nor noble, nor can 
she recall anything, and thus her being-in-the-world lacks even the trace of existence. 
One can understand better this nonrelation of virtue and nonhuman animals 
when, in the Meno, Socrates employs the bee as an example of essential being (ousia) 
in order to clarify the distinction between the essential being of virtue and its various 
worldly modalities (72a). This analogical ontico-ontological structure thus suggests 
that the ousia of “the bee” as eidos shares a common structural discontinuity from its 
manifold ways of being-bee as that of Virtue from virtues. However, only man has the 
capacity to recollect the eidos of the bee (or the dog, or the monkey, etc.) whereas a bee 
(or a dog or a monkey or, indeed, even an anthropomorphised virtue) cannot recall its 
own essential form by which finite existence is measured. Hence when, in introducing 
the myth of the charioteer with two horses in the Phaedrus, Socrates speaks of how 
“we must try to tell how it is that we speak of both mortal and immortal living beings” 
(246b), he is referring not to soulless animals and ensouled humans, but rather to finite 
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 This question of consuming “animals-with-souls” remains a problem until, with the specific 
aim of allaying fears of postmortem vengeance, Saint Augustine disavows its possibility 
absolutely. 
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 While for the moment at least the slave stands within the enclosure of man, he or she is 
nevertheless—in that a soul can be reincarnated, but never originate, in the form of an 
animal—held out to a future in reserve and reverse, so to speak. One in which the slave, as a 




human bodies in possession of an infinite soul. As the trace of existence, the soul is 
necessarily the condition of finitude. Ultimately then, nonhuman beings are neither 
mortal nor immortal, being unable, in truth, to die. 
Hence, from the Meno to the Phaedrus, Plato sets upon the stage of tragedy, 
first through the myth of Persephone and then through the charioteer allegory, a new 
foundation which, in placing both reason and soul superior and anterior to being, 
sacrifices the nonhuman animal to the certainty of a metaphysics saved from sophistry. 
The soul, before and beyond its manifest withdrawal in and as a body, “is” infinite 
wisdom, that is, full knowledge without boundaries. This limitless knowledge, 
however, remains forever beyond the grasp of every finite incarnation. In his mortal 
incarnation therefore, man in his turn constitutes an imperfect copy of an incorporeal, 
immortal, and infinite wisdom. In this, with a call to Persephone and with the help of 
the polis priests, Plato thus pre-figures two millennia of Christianised thought that will 
only essentially come into question with Nietzsche. Indeed, it is not by chance that 
Nietzsche’s critique takes aim at both the Platonic and the Christian at once. Nor is it a 
surprise that, with explicit disregard for the Socratic advice which serves as an 
epigraph to this chapter, it is Nietzsche, as we shall see, who exposes the scientific 
investigation of any subject to a comparison with the blind and with the deaf. 
 
 
Iterability and the phantasm of Return 
 
Despite, and indeed because of, having condemned “the animal” to an irrational, mute 
and deathless nonexistence, Socrates’ difficulties with the Sophists are far from over. 
The ground now shifts again, this time with regard to anamnēsis. Whereas knowledge 
was initially re-collected by accessing the temporal storehouse of reincarnated reason 
(the hypomnēmata), now anamnēsis refers instead to the revelation (alētheia) of prior 
atemporal knowledge. As a result, the transcendental Idea—the essence or truth of the 
thing—must necessarily be always superior and anterior to its manifold appearance in 
existence, which in turn can only ever be “like” or “as,” but never identical with, its 
origin. Socratic recollection then, anamnēsia as alētheia (and seeking to evade 
hypomnēsia), is thus structured as a trope, that is, as a vehicle seeking to faithfully re-
present the anterior tenor. Indeed, this is not simply a trope, but in fact the trope of 
metaphysics: the metaphor of transcendental Return, as figured by the goddess 
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Persephone. As a metaphor, however, this notion of Return is deeply problematic, as 
Jacques Derrida demonstrates in “White Mythology” (1971). 
Insofar as metaphor “organises its divisions within syntax,” writes Derrida, it 
necessarily “gets carried away with itself, [it] cannot be what it is except in erasing 
itself, indefinitely constructing its destruction” (268). This self-destruction, moreover, 
follows one of two courses which, while different, nevertheless mime one another 
relentlessly.  
In the first, the spreading of the metaphorical in syntax “carries within itself an 
irreducible loss of meaning: this is the metaphysical relève of metaphor in the proper 
meaning of Being” (268). This first metaphorical movement is, in other words, that of 
the Socratic vehicle, one which claims to fully penetrate the tenor in order to “finish by 
rediscovering the origin of its truth … without loss of meaning, without irreversible 
expenditure” (268). The specular circularity of philosophical discourse, this loss 
without loss, thus describes, as Derrida writes with reference to Hegel, “a metaphor 
which is displaced and reabsorbed between two suns” (268). To rely on the imitation to 
“reveal” the plenitude of the origin is, however, necessarily paradoxical. Given the 
temporal discontinuity—its abyss of puckish irony—between the two realms, the 
revealed “original meaning” can only ever be an effect solely of the copy. To be 
otherwise requires that the mimeme exist in two temporal realms simultaneously: both 
completely inside (plenitude of origin, sunrise) and completely outside (imitation, 
sunset). 
Against and within this first aufhebung of the transcendental Return, the 
second self-obliterative recourse is to that of senseless metaphorical suicide. While 
similar in appearance to the metaphysical metaphor, the suicidal trope instead disrupts 
the philosophical hierarchy, wresting away its “borders of propriety” which 
subordinates the syntactic to the semantic, and unfolding in its place a notion “without 
limit” (268). In its passage through the “supplement of syntactic resistance,” the 
“reassuring relationship” of the metaphoric and the (return of the) proper necessarily 
explodes, resulting in the suicide of unisemic sense.  
The metaphor therefore always carries its own death. The “difference” 
between its two deaths, however, the apparent choice between “good” and “bad,” 
between transparency and undecidability, is rather no choice at all. By definition, 
metaphor already supplements an anoriginal absence, and is thus always syntactic and 
already carried away. Rewriting this in the terms of our discussion, in its withdrawal in 
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and as the appearing of the mortal being, the immortal Socratic soul thus marks a lack 
to be supplemented in addition to its absolute plenitude. Put another way, both to be an 
essence and to be represented, an essence must be able to properly repeat itself, and yet 
in repetition an essence necessarily ceases to be proper. As Derrida says elsewhere, 
“the presence of what is gets lost, disperses itself, multiplies itself through mimemes, 
icons, phantasms, simulacra, etc.” (“Plato’s Pharmacy” 166). No return without loss, 
the sun, infinitely exposed, shatters upon the sea. 
The translative movement in and as language in its broadest sense—i.e., that 
of making sense, as will become clear in the next chapter—is necessarily governed by 
the temporal structure of the act of interpretation, and thus discontinuous with truth. In 
summary, the tropological structure which organises the Platonic Idea must already 
bring into play, through the similarity of recollection, the play of mimēsis. That is, the 
doubling of the recollection must be faithful and true (i.e. identical), and yet, in that its 
duplication within existence manifests a necessarily inferior copy, it must already come 
to differently divide its indivisible essence. The recollection of the Idea is therefore 
already interrupted by what Derrida calls iterability: the cure for hypomnēsis is at once 
the poison of hypomnēsis.  
Inscribed as the structural characteristic of every mark, every grapheme, it is 
iterability which determines that language can never be meaningful, but rather can 
always be detached from its anterior temporal position and reiterated in another 
context, or even simply repeated a moment later in an utterance that is always already 
altered (repetition-altering). Simultaneously, it is this same possibility of repetition, 
necessarily inscribed within the mark for it to function ritualistically as language, 
which constrains language to always return and yet always begin anew (alteration-
identifying). In this way, iterability marks the similarity of recollection as necessarily 
fantastic. For Plato, the fantastic refers to a trope which pretends to simulate faithfully, 
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 Plato The Sophist 234b-235a. See also Derrida “Plato’s Pharmacy,” 286-288 note 14. 
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The deadly labour of truth 
 
This dangerous fantasticity, from which an impossibly faithful copy can (n)ever save 
us, is nothing less than the existence of every so-called “living being.” It is, in other 
words, the translative movement of be-ing. While, as noted earlier, this will be 
explored in detail in the next chapter, for the moment the point is simply to signal the 
originary interrelation of two apparently unrelated concerns. At its advent, the 
valorising of essence and noēton over and against existence and aisthēton thus 
articulates a founding disavowal of other animals together with an attempt to efface the 
monstrous phantasm of the fantastic. This phantasmic trope which is, in other words, a 
deceptive transport by which one is persuaded to mistake interpretation for truth—what 
Maurice Blanchot describes as mistaking the labour of truth for truth itself.  
I began this chapter by arguing that “man” can properly exist only by 
externalising and excluding the improper animal upon which it depends, and here, in 
this same moment and movement, we thus discover that mimēsis too, can properly be 
only by externalising and excluding the impropriety upon which it depends. These 
twinned movements, the closure of the circle of return (the organising trope of 
metaphysics) and the exclusion of the animal in and as the constitution of this closure 
(the proper delimitation of the human), are indissociable.12 Here, moreover, we are 
returned to Persephone, insofar as her consoling return figures not only the 
transcendence of the human, but also of the eternal return of the sun, and thus of a 
fruitful earth forever offering itself for man’s harvest. More than this, however, this 
myth which elsewhere stands as an allegory of the indescribable taking place of place, 
here names the phantasm of an all too human disavowal: the name called upon to 
authorise an access to the essential that is restricted to man alone.  
Meno, we are informed, is required to leave Athens prior to the celebration of 
the rites of the Eleusinian Mysteries dedicated to Persephone’s mother Demeter—rites 
engaged in the search for divine revelation which Socrates compares to the revelation 
of philosophical truths (Meno 76e). Here then, Meno’s future absence marks the text, 
an absence at once the removal from knowledge. In Ancient Greece, those initiated into 
the Eleusinian Mysteries must perform the following ritual: first, initiates undergo a 
ceremonial purification in the sea, while holding in their arms a sacrificial piglet. They 
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 On this, see Andrew Benjamin “Indefinite Play and ‘The Name of Man’” (Derrida Today 
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then walk to Eleusis whereupon they fast and, while remaining silent, sacrifice their 
domestic animals in their own stead. Finally, after a ritual handling of objects, a 
dramatic performance is staged, very possibly the myth of Persephone itself.  
In this ritual based on the return of Persephone to the sun, the animal is thus 
doubly sacrificed. First, a piglet—in a sense property but nevertheless not yet fully 
domesticated, not yet proper—is sacrificed in order to purify man, to rid man of his 
own bestiality. Second, as dispensable representatives and imperfect copies of man, 
any number of domesticated—that is, completely dominated—animals are sacrificed in 
order for man to live on, to survive beyond the constraints of finitude and appearance. 
In short, the animal within is first of all externalised, whereupon it must then take on 
the death of man in order that man can live forever. Here then, we can understand 
better why Socrates affirms an analogical relation between divine revelation of the 
Mysteries and the revelation of knowledge: any number of imperfect, improper animal 
copies are sacrificed in order to install in man alone an access to the essential.  
What remains as doubly foreclosed, therefore, is the impropriety of the 
animal, that is, of the potential interruption of an improper animal relation which is 
always prior to the exclusion upon which the delimitation of the human depends. Here 
then, a preliminary hypothesis suggests itself: given that the proper appearance of “the 
human” depends upon the exclusion of both “the animal” and “the improper,” a 
potential disruption of humanist metaphysics would therefore seem to reside within an 





The metaphysical metaphor of closure and return has enjoyed a long and various 
career, as we shall see in turning now to consider the function of “the animal” within 
the “posthumanist” philosophy of Maurice Blanchot. Here, I will argue, the myth of 
Persephone, with its relation to both finitude and nonhuman being as well as the ritual 
double death enacted in Eleusis, calls to the notions of essential solitude and 
inessential existence as articulated by Blanchot in his struggle to move beyond Hegel. 
Indeed, that Hegel should appear at this point is far from incidental, insofar as it is with 
Hegel, at the beginning of the nineteenth century, that the movement of transcendental 
Return receives its most compelling example. In the East, he writes, “rises the outward 
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physical [i.e. sensory] Sun, and in the West it sinks down: here consentaneously rises 
the Sun of self-consciousness, which diffuses a nobler brilliance.”13 It is the repressive, 
irrepressible romantic yearning to master différance which is here taken up again by 
the tēlos of Hegel’s Spirit, understood as that which reveals as it regains and retains the 
plenum (the essence of man) at last illuminated by the “true light” of the Western sun.  
While Socrates places man above the nonhuman animal by virtue of the 
capacity to transcend the sensible in the unity of useful universals, Hegel in turn 
speaks of how man makes himself master of the animals in the act of giving them a 
name. “In the name,” he writes, “its [sic] empirical being is removed from it [sic], that 
is, it [sic] is no longer concrete, no longer a multiplicity in itself, no longer a living 
entity. Instead it [sic] is transformed into a pure and simple ideal.”14 For Blanchot, 
following Hegel, it is the articulation of death, that is, the act of making mortal, which 
founds “the human” and at once marks out “the animal.” Indeed, Blanchot more than 
once cites Hegel in this context: “the life of the mind begins with death.” 
The importance of the reiterated reference to Hegel becomes evident once we 
understand of what this founding act consists. In The Space of Literature (1955), 
Blanchot writes: 
 
Can I die? Have I the power to die? This question has no force except when 
all the escape routes have been rejected. It is when he concentrates 
exclusively upon himself in the certainty of his mortal condition that man’s 
concern is to make death possible. It does not suffice for him that he is 
mortal; he understands that he has to become mortal, that he must be mortal 
twice over: sovereignly, extremely mortal. That is his human vocation. 
Death, in the human perspective, is not a given, it must be achieved. It is a 
task, one which we take up actively, one which becomes the source of our 
activity and mastery. Man dies, that is nothing. But man is, starting from 
his death. He ties himself tight to his death with a tie of which he is the 
judge. He makes his death; he makes himself mortal and in this way gives 
himself the power of a maker and gives to what he makes its meaning and 
its truth. The decision to be without being is possibility itself: the 
possibility of death (96). 
 
Man thus achieves death, and at once himself (that is, the human perspective), through 
the founding (of) mortality as a doubled articulation: being-mortal and becoming-
mortal. Being-mortal is, firstly, the meaningful articulation of mortality as the 
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possibility of not-being-in-the-world, that is, the possibility of dying. This, it should be 
noted, is at the same time the “simple” possibility of “perishing,” insofar as the latter 
could not exist without the “as” of articulation by which man constitutes himself and 
the world of and as meaning. Moreover, to know that one has the capacity not to be is, 
in one and the same moment, its redoubled articulation, its re-cognition which marks 
its taking place of and in language. The act that founds the human is thus at once the 
first human act: the taking place of language as the originary experience of being-
mortal as mortal. Hence, that I can still die is, as Blanchot writes in The Infinite 
Conversation, “our sign as man” (42).  
To be human, therefore, is, through the having taken place of language, to be 
thrown in to the inessential world of language, which is the condition of the possibility 
of language and already marked by language itself. Language, meanwhile, is itself a 
recognition and a representation of mortality, in that “death alone … exists in words as 
the only way that they can have meaning” (Blanchot “Literature,” 324). Ignoring for 
the moment the reduction of language to the verbal, in this founding of and as the 
human we thus discover in the difference of itself from itself the mark of an iteration 
which corrupts any unity of origin. To be able not to be is at once to be able to be born: 
we die, and at the same time are born, in and as language. Moreover, given that this 
movement which structures possibility is at once the movement of anthropogenesis, the 
nonhuman animal is necessarily excluded both from and by its taking place. As with 
Plato, for Blanchot too “the animal,” in being denied the taking place of place, thus 
lacks both language and the “there” of being. 
Furthermore, insofar as they are excluded from the ability not to be, nonhuman 
animals can thus not only never become mortal, but they can never be mortal and nor, 
in truth, can they be born. Every nonhuman being, in other words, is denied the 
possibility of having her own singular death, is refused the possibility of ever dying this 
death. And yet, as we shall see, for Blanchot the positing power of the human 
nevertheless depends upon the singular violent death of an essentially undying 








The memory of death  
 
Having made a preliminary comparison with the Platonic exclusion of the animal, we 
can now, with the help of Hegel, begin to approach Blanchot’s own peculiar version of 
the Eleusinian Mysteries. Having constituted in and of itself the capacity not to be, it is 
through this originary power to negate that the human thereafter avails itself of the 
power of the negative. Hence, “death seized again as a power, as the beginning of the 
mind, is at the centre of the universe where truth is the labour of truth” (Blanchot 
“Literature,” 324). It is this appropriation of negation which gives to man the power of 
a maker, the source of his activity and mastery. Indeed, death is the condition of 
possibility itself. The question thus arises as to how, exactly, this appropriation of 
death’s power might take place.  
As we have seen, the moment must concern the seizing of death that is the 
emergence of negation as possibility, and which is at once the taking place of language 
as that which, at the founding of the human, grounds the emergence of meaning and 
truth. In order to understand this movement from being able not to be that is being-
mortal to the becoming-mortal that is being-in-the-world of and as signification, it is 
necessary to heed Blanchot’s repeated enjoinders in this context to “remember the 
earliest Hegel” and, more specifically, the Hegel of the Jena System of 1803-4. Indeed, 
it is here we find that, for the young Hegel, it is precisely the seizing of the animal’s 
death in a movement of negation that, in its lifting up as the word, reserves and 
preserves the animal’s absence and, furthermore, the possibility of truth itself. 
According to Hegel, it is the extended vowel of pain that is both the dying of 
an animal and the founding act of the human. The vowel of sensuous animality, he 
suggests, transcends its singular violent death in its universal expression: “Every 
animal finds its voice in violent death; it expresses itself as a removed [aufgehobnes] 
self. … In the voice, meaning turns back into itself; it is negative self, desire. It is lack, 
absence of substance in itself.”15 In this sounding of death, Hegel argues, is given the 
pure sound of the voice, a pure sound interrupted by mute consonants that constitute 
“the true and proper arrestation of mere resonation” through which “every sound has a 
meaning for itself” (cit. Agamben Language and Death, 45). It is as a result of this 
“fact” that language becomes the voice of consciousness. Here then, the “mere” vowel 
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of animal noise is pure syntax that is negated not by the breath, but by the death of the 
animal. This death thus becomes, in a negation of the negation that preserves and 
recalls the death as it is raised up (aufhebung), the founding of man in and as meaning. 
The nonhuman animal therefore, as prior to the advent of the word, is excluded from 
the possibility of both consciousness and meaning. In his fine reading, Giorgio 
Agamben summarises the movement: 
 
“Voice (and memory) of death” means: the voice is death, which preserves 
and recalls the living as dead, and it is, at the same time, an immediate trace 
and memory of death, pure negativity. Only because the animal voice is not 
truly “empty” …, but contains the death of the animal, can human 
language, articulating and arresting the pure sound of this voice (the 
vowel)—that is to say, articulating and retaining the voice of death—
become the voice of consciousness, meaningful language (45). 
 
It is, in other words, because in death the nonhuman animal expresses its absence that 
language takes on the power of death, of the negative. It is this moment, when an 
animal voices her death and thus her absence—in what is no longer animal “noise” but 
not yet human language—which corresponds in Blanchot to the articulation of being-
mortal.  
There can thus be such a “thing” as the world for the human only insofar as 
the existence of the animal is suspended through negativity. There is world, Blanchot 
writes, only “because we can destroy things and suspend their existence” (“Literature,” 
336). In this way, being-thrown, in the taking place of language, to a world of meaning 
and truth at once constitutes the becoming-mortal of man in and as this doubled 
articulation of death that is the word. With this “second” death, the animal is negated 
twice over, first in its singular death and then again with the word or name which “is 
the absence of that being, its nothingness, what is left of it when it has lost being—the 
very fact that it does not exist” (322).  
We can now understand why it is specifically nonhuman animals who are 
sacrificed to the reclaimed power of death that is language, as written by Hegel and 
reiterated by Blanchot: “Adam’s first act, which made him master of the animals, was 
to give them names, that is, he annihilated them in their existence (as existing 
creatures) [dans leur existence (en tant qu’existants)]” (Hegel Jenenser 
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Realphilosophie; cit. Blanchot “Literature,” 323).16 The mark of the human—the 
taking place of and in language, in the negation that is this animal’s death and then in 
the annihilation of her independent existence—is thus that which always and twice 
over denies being to the nonhuman animal.  
According to Blanchot therefore, the recognition of being-mortal is both a 
human production and the production of the human. Without this recognition, 
existence remains dissolved in its “original depths.” However, recognition is at once 
negation: “The ‘existent’ was called out of its existence by the word, and it became 
being. This Lazare, veni foras summoned the dark, cadaverous reality from its 
primordial depths and in exchange gave it only the life of the mind” (“Literature,” 
326). Beyond and before the word, existence is rather “the intimacy of the unrevealed” 
which is always already lost in its being recognised: “The torment of language is what 
it lacks because of the necessity that it be the lack of precisely this. It cannot even 
name it” (326-7). This “lack” is what Derrida describes as “the wound without a name: 
that of having been given a name” (The Animal, 19). Nevertheless, it is this withdrawal 
in the wounding of its being forced to make sense as such which, as we will see, 
always remains to interrupt the metaphysics of transcendental Return. 
 
 
The work of death 
 
Before we can consider the “place” of nonhuman animals within this schema, and how 
their double disavowal reiterates the practice of Eleusinian sacrifice offered up to 
Demeter, we must lastly consider the labour of the negative as it informs Blanchot’s 
notion of essential solitude. To begin with, as the founding human event which 
constitutes the human as possibility, the plunging death in and as the word has thus 
already taken place. In this, it is necessarily “an unsituated, unsituatable event which, 
lest we become mute in very speech, we entrust to the work of the concept 
(negativity)” (Blanchot The Writing of the Disaster, 67). Here then, we see that the 
word or the name, through which death labours, is at once the work of the negating 
                                                           
16
 The German original reads: “Der erste Akt, wodurch Adam Seine herrschaft über die Tiere 
kinstituiert hat, ist, das ser ihnen Namen gab, d.h. sie als Seiende vernichtete und sie zu für 
sich Ideellen machte.” Karen Pinkus translates this last phrase as “thus he denied them as 
independent beings and he transformed them into ideals” (Agamben Language and Death, 43).  
37 
 
concept. Indeed, it is by way of this conceptual power that humans are always already 
withdrawn from unmediated existence, the latter understood as being such that it is 
only as it is. Hence, the articulation of the concept (negativity) is the decisive event 
which plunges all of creation into a total sea, the event which Blanchot calls the 
“immense hecatomb.”17 
Having posited in the name, however, an ideal, this nonexistence thence 
comes to be mistaken for an essence, as full presence delimited by the absolute 
negativity of death. This metaleptic reversal marks, in Blanchot’s terms, the 
“forgetting of forgetting” in and as the creation of value. Thus, in this crossing from 
the immobility of a resemblance (the thing absorbed by its image) which has nothing 
to resemble—through death—to the noble ideal of the value, the culmination of the 
life-giving negation of language is reached whereby the image becomes the object’s 
“aftermath.” In this aftermath, the object itself is thus withdrawn from understanding 
in such a way as to allow “us to have the object at our command when there is nothing 
left of it” (Space of Literature, 260). Such a reversal is, moreover, the condition for 
“the accomplishment of true tasks” (260). In this abolishment through reappropriation 
to the Same (those easy illusions of petrified “truths”), we thus discover a mis-taking 
of consequence for cause which Nietzsche calls the corruption of reason.  
Language can now be understood as the work of death in the world, that 
which drives—  
 
the inhuman, indeterminate side of things back into nothingness …. But at 
the same time, after having denied things in their existence, it preserves 
them in their being; it causes things to have meaning, and the negation 
which is death at work is also the advent of meaning, the activity of 
comprehension (“Literature,” 338).  
 
In summary then, it is through the animal’s death that the human is constituted as 
being-mortal, that is, as having the possibility not to be. At the same time, this singular 
nonhuman death realises the power of negativity in being seized over again as activity 
and mastery which marks the becoming-mortal of the human. This latter inheres in the 
act of naming which, constituting the power of a maker, gives to what she makes its 
meaning and its truth.  
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For Blanchot, it is therefore the voice of death which, articulating and 
preserving as both memory and absence, as the trace or space of withdrawal, marks the 
taking place of language. A taking place, moreover, which is at once the opening of the 
space of recognition and thus of the name, that is to say, of language having taken 
place. In this way death is doubled and divided, that which constitutes the world and 
its representation. In other words, these two moments—the possibility of not-being-in-
the-world and the decision to be without being—constitute the indissociable moments 
and movements of language itself, corresponding to the redoubled articulation of 
being- and becoming-mortal. Hence, it is the taking place of and in language by which 
the human finds himself cast into a world of and as image at once deprived of 
existence. In this double expropriation of death, the essential is forgotten, and the 
originary forgetting that is itself the world (to be mortal) is itself forgotten (to become 
mortal).  
In this forgetting of forgetting, existence is thus always already lost. At best, a 
human animal might sense its approach in the work of art, but its hovering appearance 
has nevertheless already escaped. Existence, by contrast, “is” “the side of the day that 
day has rejected in order to become light” (“Literature,” 328). It is this which Blanchot 
describes as “essential solitude,” an inhuman machinery with neither beginning nor 
end: “death as the impossibility of dying” (328). Only in the obliterating clarity of a 
meaningful humanity, in other words, can the work of death be found. 
 
 
An initiation into the new Eleusinian Mysteries 
 
It is only the human then, which comes to be upon the death of a deathless animal, who 
can give meaning to nonhuman existence. Only “man” stands in the light of the 
negative, only the human animal is enlightened. This, I will argue, turns us back across 
millennia to the myth of Persephone’s return to the light and, in particular, to 
Demeter’s place of rest and worship in Eleusis. As we have seen, to be initiated into the 
Eleusinian Mysteries an appellant must, in silence, first sacrifice a piglet, followed by 
any number of domestic animals. We have seen too, how this relates to the Platonic 
exclusion of “the animal” from “the human,” in which the animal within is first 
externalised, after which “it” must then bear the death of man in order that man might 
live forever. Here, with Blanchot, we discover a mirror-image of this all too human 
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movement: in place of the “birth” of an immortal human soul, however, we find instead 
the annihilating genesis of the human at the origin of the world. Instead of the double 
sacrifice which installs in man alone an access to the essential, there is the double 
sacrifice which installs in man alone an access to the inessential. 
In Ancient Greece, we recall, the initial sacrifice involving the death of a 
single nonhuman animal served to purify the human of its bestiality. That is, by way of 
this first death the human ceases to be an animal. It is in this moment therefore, that the 
human finds itself the master of nature, able to dominate and domesticate other 
animals. However, it is this mastery which requires a second sacrifice. Only the fact of 
being domesticated condemns the other animals to annihilation, to a hecatomb which 
serves only to vouchsafe the mastery of the human. This, as should be clear, equally 
describes the double sacrifice which underpins Blanchot’s own metaphysical 
anthropocentrism: “the animal” is ritually sacrificed twice over, firstly as the human, 
and then again in the name of the human. 
 
 
Doubly deceased: the mute deposition of nonhuman animals 
 
The question now arises, as to how might the taking place, or otherwise, of nonhuman 
animals arrive to potentially interrupt these sacrificial schemas imposed upon them 
from without for millennia. As suggested earlier, this potential disruption would seem 
to reside in an animal encounter marked by an improper relation. To this we can now 
add that such an encounter appears equally to require the reinscription of death within 
nonhuman ways of being. Indeed, by further considering the placeless place of the 
animal in Blanchot’s philosophy in these final sections, as well as its proximity or 
otherwise to the Heideggerian animal, we shall begin to open the space for just such an 
animal encounter to come. 
Blanchot’s animal is, as we have seen, doubly deceased, that is, doubly 
depositioned and decomposed. Nevertheless, nonhuman animals continue to keep 
getting in the way, an uncanny obtrusion which brings into the open the implicit 
humanism of Blanchot’s discourse.18 As being-in-the-world and yet deprived of the 
deluge of language that “is” death and vice versa, an animal “is” therefore mortal 
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without recognising it (and thus not, in truth, mortal). Moreover, as that which does not 
have her (own) death, she “is” necessarily senseless and meaningless being. In other 
words, insofar as she is excluded from the “unsituated, unsituatable event” that is 
language’s having already taken place, and thus from finitude that is its condition, the 
nonhuman animal necessarily exists before the annihilation of Adam’s positing power. 
At the same time, however, she nonetheless remains, indeed co-exists, after the world 
thus posited. At the very least then, she exists in some strange sense that “is” at once 
both before and after the Fall.  
Without language, and thus prior to being as such, nonhuman animals are thus 
allocated only some uncanny kind of not yet-world world. A “world,” in other words, 
which always already lacks both possibility and resemblance. At the same time, 
however, there can be no beyond or before being as such either, that is, beyond or 
before what Blanchot terms essential solitude—this latter understood as remarking the 
hiddenness of existence by the disappearance of everything that is, i.e., by the 
withdrawal of being that “is” the mark as such. For nonhuman animals, therefore, there 
is, on the one pincer, no hiddenness of existence and thus only the nonbeing that “is” 
being-in-the-world. On the other, however, insofar as there can be no “as,” no 
articulation or image, there can thus be no inessential “world” that would be the mark 
of this nonbeing. In short, nonhuman animals neither are nor are not, neither being nor 
nonbeing, but something absolutely other. They “are,” in other words, both within and 
yet outside the world at the same time as they are neither within nor outside the world: 
animal spirits or ghosts of nonhumanity.  
 
 
Spectres of Heidegger 
 
This spectrality of animals points to an initial point of both proximity and distance 
between Blanchot and Heidegger. In Heidegger’s Being and Time (1927), the animal 
barely raises her head before finding herself similarly (non)placed in negativity: not 
present-at-hand [Vorhandensein], not ready-at-hand [Zuhandensein] and, most 
definitely, not the Dasein who, as something other and more than a living being, is 
abysmally distanced from the nonhuman animal who “merely” has life and thus can 
only “perish [verenden].” Located entirely negatively, this spectral figure of the animal 
nevertheless remains to haunt Heidegger.  
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Returning to the question two years later in a seminar entitled The 
Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics: World, Finitude, Solitude (1929/1930), 
Heidegger is thus called to devote almost one-hundred-and-forty pages to a questioning 
of the “essence of animality”—a questioning which, it should be noted, presupposes an 
ignominious reduction of the vast multiplicity of “living beings” to a single 
homogeneous “essence.” Along the way, he reiterates the unbridgeable distance 
between the Dasein and the animal in much the same terms as before, asserting that, 
despite their physical proximity, “being-with [Mitsein] [animals] is not an existing-with 
[Mitexistieren], because a dog does not exist but merely lives.”19 Such a way as 
Heidegger embarks upon is most certainly not, as he makes explicit, “an animal kind of 
way,” but is rather “a going along with … and yet not” (210). Another way to say this 
would be that for Heidegger, as will be explored in more detail in the next chapter, the 
proximity of the nonhuman animal paradoxically functions to instaurate a human (or at 
least Dasein) exceptionalism.  
Given the importance of the “way [Weg]” for Heidegger’s thinking, such a 
way of going which explicitly involves not going with calls for a detailed analysis of its 
own, but in the present context it is enough to wonder about this uncanny crossing of 
proximity and distance that makes of every nonhuman animal irreducibly other. Is this 
not another crossing which is perhaps a haunting, perhaps even a possession, in that the 
Dasein would seem to share without sharing its “there” with a living being who does 
not exist?  
It is thus unsurprising that we find a similar proximal distancing of the animal 
operating within Blanchot’s discourse. Indeed, Blanchot employs a very similar 
vocabulary in order to get his metaphysics up on its rear legs and running. Men and 
only men, he writes, “are infinitely mortal, a little more than mortal. Everything is 
perishable, but we [humans] are the most perishable” (Space of Literature, 140). As 
with Heidegger, a nonhuman animal might “perish,” but she can never die—that is to 
say, she can never “be” mortal—insofar as it is precisely this which is the something 
more, the something exceptional, which marks out the human. Death appears, Blanchot 
asserts— 
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between me, as I speak, and the being I address: it is there between us as 
the distance that separates us, but this distance is also what prevents us 
from being separated, because it contains the condition for all 
understanding. … Without death, everything would sink into absurdity and 
nothingness (“Literature,” 324). 
 
Death, for Blanchot, is “a power that humanises nature, raises existence to being, and 
… is within each one of us as our most human quality” (337, my emphasis). Nonhuman 
animals, however, in being essentially deprived of death’s power which makes of man 
a mortal being, therefore exist as absurdity and nothingness. Existence, in other words, 
that is not being (and thus nothingness) and is not nonbeing (and thus an absurdity). At 
the same time, in being excluded from meaning, that is, from becoming mortal, the 
hugely divergent ways of being animal are reduced to an undifferentiated existence 
which at once lacks that which prevents absolute separation from one another. We thus 
discover a vertiginous proximal distancing which posits nonhuman animals as those 
which are cast off which cannot be separated, as those who are excluded who cannot be 
excluded. Moreover, insofar as this proximal distance instituted by the double death is, 
insists Blanchot, the condition for both community and communication, nonhuman 
animals with equal necessity thus lack both.20 
In concluding this prefatory sketch of the mirroring of ancient and modern 
philosophical constructions of the undying animal, however, it should be noted that a 
further, profound difference separates Blanchot’s formulation from that of Plato, 
insofar as Blanchot employs one of the traditional Christianised forms of the human-
animal relationship. These dominant later forms, as outlined in the introduction, are 
founded upon a teleological dialectic which posits the emergence of “the human” as 
predicated either upon the death or nonexistence of “the animal,” or else upon its ever 
reiterated overcoming. 
In the next chapter, I will consider the movement of anthropogenesis within 
Heidegger’s discourse, a consideration which will, in its turn, lead us, with Nietzsche’s 
help, to a more radical notion of zoogenesis from which nonhuman beings can no 
longer be excluded. Here, however, the corresponding movement within Blanchot’s 
“posthumanism” should by now be clear. Constituted in absolute lack—of death, of 
existence, of meaning, of separation, of community and of communication—the animal 
necessarily precedes the human, which founds its being on the negation of the animal. 
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In elaborating what is a very traditional humanist dialectical teleology, Blanchot is thus 
ultimately unable to break free from Hegel.21 
More than this, however, it is an example of a philosophy of decentred 
subjectivity which nonetheless reproduces the dominant humanist forms of the human-
animal relation—hence its exemplary position here. Indeed, Blanchot’s philosophy is 
doubly apposite in this regard, insofar as the production of the human is here predicated 
on both the death and the nonexistence of the animal in its double dis-position. Its 
modern initiation, however, simply offers another Mystery, that of the uncanny 
placeless place of “the animal” which calls again upon Persephone and the myth of 
undying Nature—that is, upon a theology and a teleology—in order to preserve for “the 
human” alone both privilege and mastery within an otherwise soulless world. It is in 
moving beyond this untenable conservation that, in the next chapter, we shall discover 
that the invention that is anthropogenesis is in fact always already zoogenesis. 
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 Along with the animal, “primitive” man, for whom “the name has not emerged from the 
thing” (“Literature,” 322), also finds himself uneasily (non)placed according to this dialectical 
movement. In this context, see Gayatri Spivak’s reading of Hegel and the native informant in A 
Critique of Postcolonial Reason, 37-67. 
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2. Animals in Looking-Glass World 
Fables of Überhumanism and Posthumanism in Heidegger and Nietzsche  
 
 
“—then you don’t like all insects?” the Gnat went on, as quietly as if 
nothing had happened. 
“I like them when they can talk,” Alice said. “None of them ever talk, 
where I come from.” 
“What sort of insects do you rejoice in, where you come from?” the 
Gnat inquired. 





In The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics, Heidegger sets out on the way of a 
comparative analysis of three guiding theses: the stone is worldless [weltlos], the 
animal is poor-in-world [weltarm], the man is world-forming [weltbildend].22 Here, in 
exploring how this analysis reveals various differences and similarities between the 
existential analytic and traditional metaphysics, I aim to demonstrate how the 
hermeneutic circle functions within Heidegger’s commitment to a “humanism beyond 
humanism” as outlined in his 1947 paper, “Letter on Humanism.” In this, I argue that 
Heidegger’s thinking does indeed break with the traditional metaphysical 
configurations of the human-animal relation. However, insofar as nonhuman animals 
are unthinkingly reinscribed as essentially undying, his philosophy nonetheless remains 
ultimately enclosed within a “metaphysical anthropocentrism” which, alongside 
traditional metaphysics, underwrites the industrialised holocaust of animals under the 
sign of Gestell.  
Despite this, I argue in the second half of this chapter that Heidegger’s 
attempt to “go along” with animals nonetheless better enables us, in turning back, to 
scent the multiple paths of animals in Nietzsche’s early text “On Truth and Lie in the 
Extra-Moral Sense” (1873). Here, I suggest, that what this text offers is a way of 
thinking our being with others who do not share our language and who are not mere 
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 In Of Spirit: On Heidegger and the Question (1987), Derrida acutely contends that the 
median character of Heidegger’s animal threatens the order, implementation, and conceptual 
apparatus of the entire existential analytic. Here, however, I am pursuing a different reading of 




reflections of ourselves, but without ever imagining the possibility of either consensus 
or disclosure. In this, I set off—albeit blindly, as we shall see—along a way to a 
thinking of inhuman genealogies which speak rather of a primordial, machinic being-
with in which invention can only ever be a nonhuman monstrosity. 
 
 
I. Fables of origin: Animals in the Mirror 
 
Via the work of biologist Hans Driesch and ethologist Jakob von Uexküll, Heidegger 
argues in the second part of The Fundamental Concepts that nonhuman animals are 
excluded from the worlding of world as a necessary result of their “captivation 
[Benommenheit],” which confines them instead within an environment (FCM, 239). In 
other words, as far as Heidegger’s animal is concerned, there can be neither anything 
beyond, nor any differentiation within, the “disinhibiting ring” which marks the 
absolute limit of her environmental capture. As a result of this essential 
undifferentiated absorption [Eingenommenheit], an animal can therefore never “have” 
her own captivation, that is, she can never apprehend her own capture within a set. 
Because of this, concludes Heidegger, she is therefore “poor-in-world [weltarm].” 
More importantly for Heidegger, however, is that this conclusion concerning 
the way of animals provides the scenery against which we might thenceforth disclose 
the essence of the human: “In the end our … analysis of captivation as the essence of 
animality provides as it were a suitable background against which the essence of 
humanity can now be set off” (282). It would seem then, that the analysis of “the 
animal’s” way of being is undertaken solely in order that the proper essence of “the 
human” can be subsequently disclosed through the negation of its negation, that is, 
through the dialectical disclosing of the essence of world. Such a methodology thus 
presupposes a categorical and teleological human-animal distinction.  
The condition of possibility of world for Heidegger, as that which is withheld 
from nonhuman animals, is the “having” of captivation as such, that is, the 
apprehension of the undisconcealedness of Being as undisconcealedness (i.e., of the 
withdrawal of Being). In other words, the human “is” only in this having of “the ‘as’-
structure [die ‘als’-Struktur],” which is the condition of the logos. This is because it is 
only in having the “as” that the human is given to apprehend being as beings—the 
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wonder that beings are which is the worlding of world—and thus, beyond the 
captivation of the disinhibiting ring, to perceive itself as an individuated being. This 
apprehension of ontological difference is, moreover, nothing less than the 
apprehension of finitude, of the possibility of impossibility, and thus at once the 
condition of the Dasein’s existential projection of its ownmost being-toward-death 
[eigenst Sein zum Tode].  
We can thus see how, in negating the ringed animal as without the revelation 
of relation and thus poor-in-world, Heidegger is thus free to posit the properly Dasein 
as that which “is” nearest to Being, and thus reserve for it alone the possibility of 
authentic existence. It is here then, with the capacity to apprehend something as 
something, that Heidegger draws the abyssal line between the human-Dasein and the 
animal, one which permits neither the possibility of a human animal nor that of a 
nonhuman Dasein. For as long as such a line remains unquestioned, Heidegger’s 
discourse (re)turns safely within the metaphysical humanist enclosure. 
The nonhuman animal remains, however, and remains a problem. Given the 
essential withholding of apprehension from the animal, it is clear that the “poverty 
[Armut]” attributed to it by Heidegger can be a “deprivation [Entbehrung]” only when 
viewed from the perspective of the human, and thus, in truth, is neither poverty nor 
privation. This, as Heidegger himself points out, would appear to disallow the positing 
of the tripartite thesis from the first, insofar as such an essential characterisation is in 
fact conceived only in comparison with man and “not drawn from animality itself and 
maintained within the limits of animality” (270). Curiously, Heidegger does not object 
to this charge: to imagine otherwise, he says, is perhaps the privilege only of poets 
(271). Is Heidegger thus staking a claim to philosophical poetry in opposition to the 
dialectic? Not objecting to the objection, Heidegger rather sets out to “weaken 
[abschwächen]” it, to set about “[r]emoving its force [seine Entkräfting]” (270). This 
he does, in fact, by affirming it. While the perhaps unassailable charge remains, he 
argues, it nevertheless “surely suffices that … [it] has led us to our destination in a 
practical fashion” (272, emphasis added). Let us defer our objection, he suggests, 
because “[i]n spite of everything it has brought us closer …’ (272, emphasis added). 
We have found our way, in other words, because the essence of animality as captivated 
and thus poor-in-world—a thesis “which follows only if the animal is regarded in 
comparison with humanity” (271)—serves us as the “negative” by which our own 
“positive … proper essence has constantly emerged in contrast” (272).  
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There is, however, no talk of sublation, no labour of the negative in what is 
only—as Heidegger repeatedly makes explicit—a comparative examination. It is 
rather the case, I will argue, that the animal in Heidegger’s discourse is less a negative 
to be negated than a mirror which reflects only the essence of being-human which 
being-human itself renders invisible. Within such a mirror “we humans” always 
already find ourselves, but without ever disclosing—if indeed such a disclosure were 
possible—the essence of animality.23 
 
 
Building frames and booking passage 
 
As is well known, Heidegger repeatedly and explicitly seeks to position his own 
discourse on the far side of the closure of metaphysics, and thus, as he makes clear in 
the “Letter on Humanism” (1947), outside of any traditional humanist expropriation: 
 
Are we really on the right track toward the essence of man as long as we set 
him off as one living creature among others in contrast to plants, beasts, and 
God? … [W]e must be clear on this point, that when we do this we abandon 
man to the essential realm of animalitas even if we do not equate him with 
beasts but attribute a specific difference to him. … Such positing is the 
manner of metaphysics. But then the essence of man is too little heeded and 
not thought in its origin, the essential provenance that is always the 
essential future for historical mankind. Metaphysics thinks of man on the 
basis of animalitas and does not think in the direction of his humanitas 
(“Letter,” 227; my emphasis). 
 
In The Open: Man and Animal (2002), philosopher Giorgio Agamben, citing the final 
sentence above (73), claims that Heidegger has ignored his own prescription—this 
prescription which for Heidegger is “above and beyond all else” (“Letter,” 227). At 
first glance, and given what I have argued above, this appears undeniable—Heidegger 
has indeed set off man in contrast to “beasts.” But this is not to say, however, that 
Heidegger has therefore “abandoned” man to the essential realm of animalitas, that is, 
to the realm of “merely” living creatures. The opposite is in fact the case: Heidegger 
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 Such captivity is both echoed and complicated by French psychoanalyst Jacques Lacan’s 
capture of animals in the mirror (stage). See for example “The mirror stage as formative of the 
function of the I” in Lacan Écrits: A Selection trans. Alan Sheridan (London: Routledge, 
1995), 1-7. On this, see also Derrida The Animal, 119-140, and Beast, 97-135. 
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rather essentially abandons animalitas in order to think the essence of man. We 
ourselves, as Heidegger says, “have also been in view all the time” (FCM, 272). 
At this point it is helpful to return to Heidegger’s comment which serves as a 
coda to his analysis of the animal: “In the end [Am Ende],” he states, “our earlier 
analysis of captivation as the essence of animality provides as it were [gleichsam] a 
suitable [geeignete] background against which the essence of humanity can now be set 
off [abheben]” (282). Any reading of the Heideggerian animal must return to, and 
negotiate around, these words, occurring as they do just prior to the first formal 
interpretation of the “as”-structure. Again, there is, “in the end,” no sublation, no 
labouring negative, but only the hesitant aestheticism of the suitability or fittingness 
[geeignete] of the background which is—albeit prefaced by the so to speak [gleichsam] 
“innocent” qualification “as it were [gleichsam]”—provided by the animal.  
Against the background of the animal, the setting off of the human is thus 
doubled. In the first place, the human “stands out,” set off [abheben] from a 
background animality that serves to focus attention whilst harmonising with its object, 
like the setting which displays a jewel to best effect. In the second, the animal provides 
the point of departure from which the Dasein might set off along the way that is proper 
to the human. It is, in other words, to take off [abheben] from the animal and, in so 
doing, to withdraw her value [abheben] in constituting the proper economy of man. 
This is therefore to draw a very different kind of line, that of an organisational frame 
which, like that enclosing a painting, negotiates with both sides in order to establish 
and delimit its focus. Moreover, as we shall see, this frame is at once a boundary wall, 
the determined limit of which is rendered invisible by its mirrored surface and which, 
while appearing to open the space of “the animal,” in fact serves to enclose “the 
human” within an infinitely regressive image of itself.  
Hence, we can begin to understand Heidegger’s insistence that the correctness 
or otherwise of his claim for an essential poverty on the part of nonhuman animals 
must nevertheless await the disclosure of the essence of (human) world. It is only then, 
writes Heidegger, that one might “understand the animal’s not-having of world as a 
deprivation after all” (272).  
Heidegger is thus booking a return passage, a reaching back to the animal 
such as is available only from within the human world, and he does so in order to 
legitimate the posited essence of animality which “founded” that world. It is a turn, 
that is to say, of and within the hermeneutic circle. We humans have thus been in view 
49 
 
all the time “whether we wanted to be or not, although not in the form of some 
arbitrary and contingent self-observation or in the form of some traditional definition 
of man” (272). Here then, in a gesture familiar from Being and Time, Heidegger sites 
his discourse outside of both the human sciences (specifically the ethology of Driesch 
and von Uexküll) and traditional metaphysics. Outside, that is, such discourses in 
which thinking the human is “abandoned” to animal physiology on the one hand and, 
on the other, outside of a humanist metaphysics in which the reproduction of man 
endlessly and fallaciously depends upon the exclusion of the nonhuman animal. 
Heidegger is thus claiming, despite the familiar, all too human attribution of 
ontological privation common to both the existential and the metaphysical, to have set 
off along a different way. Whether this in fact brings us any closer to a thinking 
encounter with animals, however, still remains to be thought. 
 
 
Turning circles with Saint Paul  
 
This other way of thinking is, of course, the turning of the hermeneutic circle that is 
the existential analytic itself. In Being and Time, Heidegger claims furthermore that 
this circle of understanding expresses “the existential fore-structure of Dasein itself” 
(195). As a result of its privileged position within the circle, it is thus only the Dasein, 
of all the beings-in-the-world, which has the “possibility of existence, [and thus] has 
ontological priority over every other entity” (62).  
It is this privilege, in other words, which gives to the Dasein alone “a positive 
possibility of the most primordial kind of knowing” (195). Hence, while a scientific 
discourse such as biology may indeed comport to entities not itself, when it comes to 
the Dasein, as the sole being for whom being-in-the-world belongs essentially, an 
understanding of Being “pertains with equal primordiality both to an understanding of 
something like a ‘world,’ and to the understanding of the Being of those entities which 
become accessible within the world” (33). We can thus see why, in his subsequent 
lecture course, Heidegger passes through “the essence of animality” in order to 
disclose “something like a ‘world’,” and why contemporary biology might provide just 
that point of departure. “Whenever an ontology takes for its theme entities whose 
character of Being is other than that of Dasein,” he insists, “it has its own foundation 
and motivation in Dasein’s own ontical structure, in which a pre-ontological 
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understanding of Being is comprised as a definite characteristic” (33). The real 
question of other beings, in other words, is always the Dasein. 
In summary therefore, it is the privileged position of the Dasein, as that which 
“is” nearest to Being, which justifies the understanding of animality on the basis of an 
understanding of the Dasein. The animal as constituted in biological discourse is in this 
sense an “empty form” from which its primordial sources have become detached, 
leaving only “a free-floating thesis” for which the hermeneutic method secures the 
access to the phenomenon that is its object. Such access, however, serves solely to 
provide “our [human] passage [Durchgang] through whatever is prevalently covering 
it up” (61). Such a hermeneutic turn is thus, as Heidegger reiterates, a turning solely 
within the human-Dasein: philosophy, he writes, “takes its departure from the 
hermeneutic of Dasein, which, as an analytic of existence, has made fast the guiding-
line for all philosophical inquiry at the point where it arises and to which it returns” 
(62). The biological discourse of animality is thus for Heidegger simply the point of 
departure—where it arises in comparison to the Dasein and to which it always returns.  
The “essence of animality” in The Fundamental Concepts is, in other words, 
the radicalisation of what the Dasein already possesses in, and which is concealed by, 
the “everyday” existentiell discourse of Driesch and Uexküll’s ethology, the 
necessarily ontical point of departure which provides the passage to an existential 
understanding of the human-Dasein. A passage or a way which, in going along with 
nonhuman animals, never encounters animals at all.  
That nonhuman animals are without the “as”-structure and thus without 
possibility is simply assumed by Heidegger at the very beginning of Being and Time, 
and necessarily so given his thinking on the indissociability of language and Being 
with the privilege of the Dasein, and thus of the latter’s identity with the human, 
during this period.24 Hence, and despite the distance claimed from both the 
contingency of empiricism and the tradition of metaphysics, Heidegger in The 
Fundamental Concepts must similarly refuse animals entry into the reserve of 
language that is the preserve of the human. As a result, while passing through the 
everyday discourses of biology and ethology, he thus grounds his reiteration of 
exceptionalism on perhaps the most traditional and “common sense” metaphysical 
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 On this, see Heidegger’s recapitulation in On the Way to Language, 30.  
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definition of all: that nonhuman animals are essentially condemned to the capture of 
“instinctual drivenness” (FCM, 237) due to their lack of (human) language. 
Moreover, in that language thus understood is the condition of possibility of 
the open, Heidegger in fact extends the traditional definition in order to deny 
nonhuman animals the world. Indeed, that Heidegger chooses to illustrate this not with 
a poet, but with Saint Paul, should certainly give pause to all poor creatures deprived 
of voice along the way. It is difficult too, not to hear in this silencing Heidegger’s 
infamous attribution just five years later—in An Introduction to Metaphysics (1935)—
of an exclusive linguistic privilege, and thus a privileged relation to Being, to those 
who inhabit the German language alone. Here too, “others” are rendered dumb in a 
further restriction of access to both world and destiny. 
 
 
Anthropos as jewel and fable  
 
In order to better understand the consequences of this anthropocentric (re)turn and, 
moreover, to think how a revolution of that circle may itself provide a way beyond the 
humanist enclosure, I will now consider Agamben’s reading of the Heideggerian 
animal in The Open referred to briefly above. A reading which, I suggest, will provide 
both counterpoint and our own point of departure. 
Seeking to problematise Heidegger’s assertion in the “Letter on Humanism” 
to have moved beyond “the manner of metaphysics,” Agamben’s reading rests upon 
the claim that Heidegger posits profound boredom as “the metaphysical operator in 
which the passage from poverty in world to world, from animal environment to human 
world, is realised” (The Open 68). This has important consequences for Agamben’s 
reading. Given that profound boredom marks the evolutional and teleological passage 
from the animal to the Dasein, it can only be that the “jewel set at the center of the 
human world and its Lichtung [clearing] is nothing but animal captivation; the wonder 
‘that beings are’ is nothing but the grasping of the ‘essential disruption’ that occurs in 
the living being from its being exposed in a nonrevelation” (68). As a result, he insists, 
the “irresolvable struggle between unconcealedness and concealedness, between 
disconcealment and concealment, which defines the human world, is the internal 
struggle between man and animal” (69). Thus, Agamben is compelled to ask, if 
humanity comes to be only through “a suspension of animality” which must “keep 
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itself open to the closedness of animality,” then how exactly does Heidegger’s attempt 
“to grasp the ‘existing essence of man’ escape the metaphysical primacy of 
animalitas?” (73).  
In reaching this conclusion, however, there occurs in Agamben’s reading a 
necessary shifting of terms, a passage-over that is a passing-onto which occurs 
precisely at the moment when Agamben himself introduces the notion of passage. 
Immediately following the description of profound boredom as “the metaphysical 
operator” in which is realised the passage from animal environment to human world, 
Agamben asserts that “at issue here is nothing less than anthropogenesis, the becoming 
Da-sein of living man” (68). In that it is only in and through profound boredom that the 
human Dasein can apprehend the wonder “that beings are,” it is indeed the case that 
the “having” of captivation as such is “nothing less than anthropogenesis, the becoming 
Da-sein.” However, as we shall see, this is not, and nor can it ever be, the becoming “of 
living man” in the sense of the passage from the “merely” living to the properly 
human-Dasein—a passage which thus passes over the nonlocalisable moment between 
the still-animal and the already-Dasein, and between the no longer animal and the not 
yet human.  
In order to better understand the stakes of Agamben’s reading, it is first of all 
necessary to once again recall those two dominant configurations of the human-animal 
relation. In the first, as we have seen, the production of the human depends upon the 
death or nonexistence of the animal (as exemplified by Blanchot’s position), whereas in 
the second, the human depends upon a repeated overcoming of his or her own 
animality. Here, I will argue, Heidegger’s explicit attempt to think humanitas outside 
of any such traditional metaphysical definition is taken by Agamben and unwittingly 
re-placed within the second configuration. This is an economy, moreover, which is not 
only common to what Agamben terms the modern anthropological machine, but is also 
one which Agamben’s own notion of a sacred community prior to the positing of 
identity is ultimately unable to escape.25  
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 The modern “anthropological machine” which produces “bare life” by “excluding as not 
(yet) human an already human being from itself, that is, by animalising the human, by isolating 
the nonhuman within the human … the animal separated within the human body itself” (The 
Open, 37), clearly depends upon this second configuration. Agamben’s utopian community 
prior to identity, meanwhile, in simply inverting the dystopian machinic production of bare 
life, necessarily remains caught within the same economy. On this, see Andrew Benjamin 
“Particularity and Exceptions: On Jews and Animals.”  
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Becoming-Dasein, that is, the Dasein “thought in its origin,” remains for 
Heidegger, I have argued, a thinking solely in the direction of humanitas insofar as the 
background from which he “sets off” is not that which is preserved and annihilated in 
the animal’s being raised up to the human, nor is it that which grounds the Dasein like 
its shadow. Rather, it is the case that such a setting-off marks out Heidegger’s 
discourse of anthropogenesis as a speculative thesis, one which offers a fantastic 
hypothesis or, “as [if] it were,” a fable. A fable, moreover, which, true to the form, has 
already sacrificed the animal to its very taking place. 
Insofar as nonhuman animals are captivated [benommen], Heidegger writes, 
the possibility of apprehending something as something is therefore withheld 
[genommen]. This possibility, moreover, is not merely withheld in the historically 
contingent here and now, but is rather “withheld in the sense that such a possibility is 
‘not given at all’” (FCM, 247). Given this a priori withholding of the “as”-structure, 
that which is most proper to the nonhuman animal is her inability to disclose the 
undisconcealed as undisconcealed, and at once therefore, neither can she ever 
apprehend concealedness which, insofar as it presupposes its opposite, remains 
essentially unavailable. As a result, an animal can never become the Dasein—the 
passage between animal and human is always already impossible.  
Hence, whereas for Agamben animality abruptly comes to signify 
concealedness, and which makes of the struggle between unconcealedness and 
concealedness the struggle between human and nonhuman animal, in fact the latter can 
be positioned at neither pole. Without relation, there can be no dialectical teleology, no 
possible negation of the negation of the animal. Instead, there is only an abyssal rupture 
that marks out “the animal” at the limit of thinking, of thinking the Dasein, and of 
thinking finitude. Thus, while Agamben’s reading of becoming-Dasein as the bridge 
from animal to human makes of Heidegger’s discourse a reiteration of the aporetic site 
of the fault-line between the animal and the human—a boundary which, as Agamben 
himself makes clear, “cannot be mended from either side” (The Open, 36)—, in fact 
there can be no crossing, no passage, and therefore no irresolvable conflict. There is, in 
short, no between of the animal and the human.  
Without relation, nonhuman animals remain for Heidegger absolutely other, 
beyond that which gives itself as food for thought and, as such, just as essentially 
excluded from concealment as they are from propriety and authenticity. Hence, it is 
rather the case that, in thinking the “having” of captivation, thinking humanitas is 
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obtained in thought by the human in order to think the human-Dasein or, more 
precisely, to think the becoming of the human-Dasein. In other words, the reiterated yet 
irresolvable struggle between concealment and disconcealment, ever denied to “the 
animal,” is only the ontological struggle between improper “being-Dasein” and proper 
“becoming-Dasein.” A struggle, that is, between being-Dasein understood in the sense 
of the specifically human undisconcealed absorption that is being-there as facticity 
[Faktizität] and falling [Verfallen], and becoming-Dasein in the taking place of the 
possibility of the human-Dasein’s resolute openness in Being-toward-death. This is 
because it is the taking place of the “having” of the “as” in profound boredom which is 
the condition for, and which always already escapes in, the uncanny experience of 
anxiety in which the Dasein is brought “back from its absorption in the ‘world’” (Being 
and Time 233). It is only in and as this shattering experience, writes Heidegger, that the 
Dasein finds itself “face to face with the ‘nothing’ of the possible impossibility of its 
existence,” carried into the authenticity of its ownmost [eigenst] Dasein in and as this 
disclosure of “uttermost possibility” (310-11).  
On the one hand then, there is the turbulent sham of “untruth” (Unwahrheit) 
which brings “tranquillised self-assurance—‘Being-at-home,’ with all its 
obviousness—into the average everydayness of Dasein” (223, 264, 233). On the other, 
there is the “truth” of existential projection in and as which, “[i]n the happening of 




Becoming and bodying 
 
Nonhuman animals, it is clear, essentially have no place in this struggle. Rather than a 
conflict between humanitas and animalitas, Heidegger puts forward a thesis which for 
him can only ever concern an entirely human struggle. While Agamben accurately 
describes the becoming-Dasein in the having of captivation, what he thenceforth shifts 
or passes on or over to the animal is the blindness of the everyday, the undisclosed in 
facticity and falling. The “absorption in itself [Eingenommenheit in sich]” of animal 
captivation can never be the “being absorbed in the world [Sinne des Aufgehens in der 
Welt]” of the Dasein, in that such captive everydayness of the latter “Being alongside” 
presupposes the very structure of significance [Bedeutsamkeit] a priori denied to 
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nonhuman animals. What then, is left for “the animal”? It can only be an all too human 
dissolution within the undifferentiation of thoughtless, instinctive reaction. 
Whereas Agamben wishes to “restore to the closed, to the earth, and to lēthē 
their proper name of ‘animal’ and ‘simply living being’” (The Open, 73), in fact the 
apprehension of the closed or the earth is rather the sense of that which exceeds sense. 
What gives the Dasein to apprehend that beings are, that is, is their appearing as closed 
in the blunt materiality of their withdrawal.26 In other words, what have being named 
closed, earth, and lēthē constitute in their blunt materiality the taking place of beings as 
such, and which can be apprehended only as meaning without sense (content) and as 
sense (sensibility) without meaning. In this affective manifestness [Offenbarkeit] as 
without sense, therefore, the Dasein comes to be always already in language. 
Becoming-Dasein thus remarks the taking place of the “as” which has always already 
escaped. When beings are apprehended as beings, the sense of that which withdraws 
has necessarily already taken place, that is, the withdrawal of meaning has already 
become meaningful in its being apprehended, and in the subsequent wonder of the fact 
that beings are we are thus already anxiously constituted within infinitely entangled 
structures of meaning.27  
Such a withdrawal of meaning, therefore, is neither meaningless nor 
transcendental, but is rather that which exceeds every structure of meaning upon which 
nevertheless depends its affective manifestness. The uncanny disposition that is its 
apprehension is, in other words, necessarily a singular, historically situated event. We 
get some sense of this in Heidegger’s notion of “mood [die Stimmung]” or, more 
precisely, “attunement [die Gestimmtheit]” which, in the decade following Being and 
Time, acquires a robust materiality beyond any reduction to the organismic. Every 
feeling, Heidegger thus affirms in the first Nietzsche lecture, “is an embodiment 
attuned in this or that way, a mood that embodies in this or that way” (Nietzsche, 
I:100). Every attunement, moreover, 
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 I have chosen the phrase “blunt materiality” rather than “brute materiality” both because it is 
generally free from an overdetermined notion of animality, and in order to better foreground 
the impersonal force of matter. 
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 In his conclusion, Agamben claims that two possible Heideggerian “scenarios” remain. The 
first involves the governance of man’s concealedness (for Agamben, his animality) by means 
of technology. In the second, man “appropriates his own concealedness, his own animality, 
which neither remains hidden nor is made an object of mastery, but is thought as such, as pure 
abandonment” (The Open, 80). In the last section of this chapter and throughout the next, I 
argue that to think the escape of the taking place of being as such, that is, of the affective 




always just as essentially has a feeling for beings as a whole, every bodily 
state involves some way in which the things around us and the people with 
us lay a claim on us or do not do so. … Mood is precisely the basic way in 
which we are outside ourselves. But that is the way we are essentially and 
constantly (99). 
 
In the third of the Nietzsche lectures two years later, Heidegger further clarifies this 
notion with the move from embodiment [das Leiben] to that of bodying [das Leibende]. 
This shift serves to highlight that “the body [der Leib]” never refers to its apparent 
“encapsulation” in the “physical mass [Körper],” but rather to “a stream of life” which 
“is transmission and passage at the same time” (Nietzsche, III:79). Bodying, in other 
words, is never that of a substantial body that is thence contingently situated, but rather 
“is” the laying claim of sense in infinite singularity. In this way, bodying is an enacting 
as bodily being. Hence it becomes possible to reread the indented citation thus: every 
laying claim of sense, every wash and tunnel, every drift and detain that is at once 
passage and transmission in both directions, is a bodying in this or that way, a being-
outside that singularly bodies.  
I will return to this notion of bodying later, the materialisation of which puts to 
work a machinery of materiality in order to reproduce an impossible contour. For the 
moment, however, it is sufficient to recall that the attunement of an essential and 
constant bodying is relation: being-exposed rather than a being that exposes itself. 
What the Dasein, in resolute being-towards-death, must ever again keep itself open to 
is not, as Agamben claims, the closedness of animality, but rather to a letting lie before 
in which being as such comes to withdraw from sense. It is this alone which remains to 
interrupt the capture of the closedness of the everyday, which remains to disrupt the 
disinhibiting ring of “the they [das Man].”  
 
 
Heidegger’s anthropomagical mirror 
 
In The Fundamental Concepts as in Being and Time, Heidegger, I have argued, does 
not in fact think animals at all. Rather, “in the end,” Heidegger offers only an extended 
animal fable, a fabulous sacrificial myth that, as (if) it were and in the background, sets 
off what is (arguably) most proper to man, that of his own very origin. In our 
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questioning, Heidegger writes, we always and inevitably “end up talking as if that 
which the animal relates to and the manner in which it does so were some being” 
(FCM, 255). In fact, it is not some being, but rather, and only, human being: none other 
than the Dasein “we” always already are. “We” end up, in other words, talking about a 
nonhuman animal as if she were a human animal, that is to say, “we” 
anthropomorphise her, and in this she is thus transformed or translated into the form of 
a fable (in this seminar, one does well to remember that Heidegger is explicitly putting 
forward a thesis, that is, putting something forward for the sake of argument, 
something Heidegger very rarely does, as Derrida has pointed out).  
Traditionally dealing with origins, the generic fable is, after all and by 
definition, an anthropomorphic mirror in which, reflected in an exemplary animal 
caricature, “we” humans are expected to recognise our ownmost proper mode of being. 
Here then, and for the sake of argument, Heidegger is proffering a fabulous drama, one 
in which is staged, as if in a mirror, the rigorously anthropocentric struggle between 
being that Dasein which has its demise [ableben] and becoming that Dasein which has 
dying for its way of Being (Being and Time, 291). In another sense, however, it is at the 
same time an anti-fable, in that, given the imperative of an always already becoming 
again that is the gift of finitude, there can be no site nor sight of the Dasein’s 
phylogenetic Origin. Indeed, as Heidegger is no doubt aware, a telling anthropogenesis 
can never be a tale of the Origin of the Species, which would inevitably reiterate its 
auto-Destruktion along that doubly “unmendable” fault-line.  
An obvious question thus remains: “who,” or “what,” comes to be human? It 
cannot be a nonhuman animal, nor indeed any other unworlding being, essentially 
denied as they are access to the “as.” There “is,” therefore, no Origin. Rather, the 
human animal alone always already comes to be following what Blanchot calls the 
deluge of language, that is to say, of being as such. “The human,” in other words, 
comes to be, and is called to Being, by being always already in language. 
In short then, human animals are thus always already following the unsitable 
site of the originary fall into the “as”-structure. We thus find ourselves left once more 
with “the “question of the animal.” Following Heidegger, insofar as they lack even the 
possibility of impossibility, nonhuman animals thus find themselves once again 




Here, however, things become slightly more complicated. Given all this, and 
given the undifferentiated absorption that is instinctive reaction, how can we make 
sense of the fact that, according to Heidegger, “[t]he animal’s way of being, which we 
call ‘life,’ is not without access to what is around it and about it” (FCM, 198)? In that 
for Heidegger such a “not without access [nicht zugangslos]” can never be access to 
being as such, it soon becomes clear that “not without access” can only be a “seeming 
to have access” understood as a “not-having-in-the-mode-of-having.” It remains 
essentially the case, Heidegger insists, that the animal only “appears as a living being 
[als seiendes Lebewesen vorkommt]” (198), and it is this mere “seeming like” or 
“appearing as” which gives rise to the mistaken claim that nonhuman animals too 
“have” the “as.” And indeed, this reference to the animal appearing as [als] a living 
being is at once to explicate that very appearing: for Heidegger, both the appearing and 
the subsequent claim are pure anthropomorphisms, a necessarily human “talking as if” 
in which each and every other animal is transformed into yet one more 
anthropomagical mirror.  
Unable to differentiate beings as beings, nonhuman animals thus only appear 
as living beings as a consequence of one exceptional animal’s “having” the “as”-
structure; an exclusive property which subsequently reduces every other being-(not)-in-
the-world to a dependence upon the existence of the human. Hence, one can now better 
understand Heidegger’s deferral of the disclosure of the essense of animality as 
something available only from within the human world. Other than as a ghosted outline 
therefore, a phantom individuation through the looking glass that is the human-Dasein, 
all other beings remain essentially absorbed in the anonymous impersonal night of the 
es gibt.  
 
 
Humanism beyond humanism 
 
Here, at last, we find ourselves in a position from which we can better understand the 
relation between Heidegger’s “decentred exceptionalism” and the tradition of 
metaphysical humanism it claims to move beyond. Perhaps unsurprisingly, Heidegger’s 
“Letter on Humanism” will provide the final key.  
On one side, the radical antihumanism of the decentred subject is indeed, and 
contrary to Agamben’s argument, other to the traditional metaphysical definitions of 
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the human. At the same time, however, its decentring of the exclusively human subject 
serves only to introduce the higher, überhumanism which Heidegger claims in the 
“Letter” is to be found within the existential analytic, the “sole implication” of which— 
 
is that the highest determinations of the essence of man in humanism still 
do not realise the proper dignity of man. To that extent the thinking in 
Being and Time is against humanism. … [But] Humanism is opposed 
because it does not set [my emphasis] the humanitas of man high enough 
(233-4).  
 
According to this überhumanism there can be no possibility of an originary human-
animal Mitsein, in that it is only ever “the human” which constitutes (“subsequent” to 
its appearing) nonhuman beings as beings, and in this sense the nonhuman animal must 
thus always come after the human. Before the human, in other words, there is mere 
“living,” but not “living be-ing” as such.  
Here then, Heidegger does indeed displace nonhuman animals outside of the 
humanist teleology of traditional metaphysics which, insofar as “the human” depends 
upon the exclusion of its “animalistic ground,” marks down every nonhuman animal as 
incomplete and subhuman. At the same time, however, he inscribes an überhumanist 
exceptionalism in its place. This is because, insofar as being comes to be as such only 
in and as the human, thereby always already excluding the possibility of a founding 
sublation of animal negativity, the constitution of nonhuman animals thereafter 
depends upon the human. Hence, while it is a radical reversal of the dependence-
exclusion of the metaphysical humanist tradition, it is one which nevertheless remains 
within its economy—as if in a mirror. Thus, in this telling of such a fabulous tale, 
nonhuman animals come to be always and only as spectral beings-for-man.28 Invoked 
from the deepest of depths, in other words, Heidegger’s animals are raised up to a 
ghostly appearance and allotted, “so to speak [gleichsam],” a brief graceless period 
before “disappearing” once again into the undifferentiation of both the general noun 
and, for the most part, the mass term “meat.”  
Such an überhumanist a priori refusal of thinking animals, in every sense, has, 
in going along with traditional metaphysics in denying death to nonhuman beings, far-
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 It is not insignificant that Aristotle in the Politics infers the new Western concept of “just 
war” from the condition that nonhuman animals are solely “beings-for-man.” In the same 
context, for Stoics such as Chrysippus all nonhuman animals are also only beings-for-man, 
from the mice who ensure humans put their things away, to the pigs whose souls serve only to 
keep them fresh to eat. 
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reaching and murderous consequences. Most important here is that, for Heidegger’s 
resolution, as for both Blanchot and Hegel and in common with Christian and 
Enlightenment tradition, nonhuman animals have no death, no possibility, and no 
meaning. They are, in other words, exscribed therein, written out in an all too human, 
all too familiar fashion as soulless mechanisms working only until they run, or are ran, 
down (although, it should be noted, the same tradition, which includes Marx, claims 
that nonhuman animals are also ontologically incapable of “work”). In reiterating the 
undying figure central to the two dominant configurations of metaphysics, Heidegger 
thus reiterates too the hubris of a human exceptionalism which, based upon the surety 
of absolute superiority, sanctions our doing whatever “we” like to other animals.  
Such putatively posthumanist thinking therefore, in its restaging of the eternal 
animal predicated upon the lack of language, in fact reproduces a symbolic economy 
serving the ends of capitalist instrumentalisation. It ensures, in other words, that the 
singular deaths of nonhuman animals, that is, this death of this (farm, laboratory, or 
feral) animal, are considered at best epiphenomenal—rendered both symbolically and 
literally as a fortuitous by-product—and, at worst, a simple impossibility, that is to say, 
such deaths are without meaning and thus unthinkable. In this sense, the divergent 
philosophies of Blanchot and Heidgger come together to further underwrite the 
material global practice of systematic violence and mass murder on a truly unthinkable 
scale. In figuring “the animal” as undying, that is, their discourse mimetically 
reproduces as “natural” the instrumental reduction of nonhuman animals to a state of 
“interminable survival” that is at once a daily zootechnical genocide.29 They serve, in 




On the far side of the looking-glass 
 
This, however, is not necessarily the end of Heidegger’s “just so” story. In a coda to 
this conclusion which will serve too as an introduction to the engagement with 
Nietzsche’s animals in the second half of this chapter, we find that, insofar as 
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 As Derrida writes, the contemporary maltreatment of nonhuman animals occurs “through the 
organisation and exploitation of an artificial, infernal, virtually interminable survival, in 
conditions that previous generations would have judged monstrous” (The Animal, 26).  
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nonhuman animals remain corralled within the Dasein’s reflection, they necessarily 
remain unthought. In other words, nonhuman animals inevitably remain, and they 
remain too for Heidegger whose rigour will not allow his reservation to remain 
unspoken. 
 
The difficulty of the problem lies in the fact that in our questioning we 
always and inevitably interpret the poverty in world and the peculiar 
encirclement proper to the animal in such a way that we end up talking as if 
that which the animal relates to and the manner in which it does so were 
some being, and as if the relation involved were an ontological relation that 
is manifest to the animal. The fact that this is not the case compels us to the 
thesis [nötigt zu der These] that the essence of life is accessible only 
through a destructive observation [Wesen des Lebens nur im Sinne einer 
abbauenden Betrachtung zugänglich ist], which does not mean that life is 
something inferior or that it is at a lower level in comparison with human 
Dasein. On the contrary, life is a domain which possesses a wealth of 
being-open [Offenseins], of which the human world may know nothing at 
all (FCM, 255; trans. modified). 
 
It remains the case then, beyond what is yet one more anthropocentric mirror—beyond, 
that is, this “fact” which compels Heidegger to speculate—, that this necessarily 
destructive observing with and to which the animal is sacrificed nonetheless reserves 
for nonhuman animals, on the far side of the abyssal rupture, the possibility of an 
unknown and unknowing being-open which remains to be differently thought. Indeed, 
it is with this in mind that I now turn to Nietzsche, and in particular to the inseparable, 







II. Fables without Origin: Animals in the World 
 
As we have seen then, it is indeed the case that Heidegger, as Derrida suggests, never 
seriously envisages the possibility of a “Mitsein with” the nonhuman animal—a 
remark which, I have argued, applies equally well to Blanchot. By turning to 
Nietzsche, however, a turning which retains the senses of both circle and dialogue, we 
are able to gain a glimpse of what it might mean to think the multiple ways of being-
animal and the destructive observation together, rather than as mutually exclusive 
conditions.30 Such a thinking together, however, requires that the deaths of nonhuman 
animals no longer be effaced. Instead, it becomes necessary to engage in thinking 
encounters shared between animals necessarily thrown in the world in and of 
language. 
This is not to suggest, however, a (slightly or greatly) more inclusive, yet 
nevertheless homogeneous, category of beings. Any such delimitation would 
necessarily remain dependent upon that which it excludes, and would, as a result, 
already be undone by the nonlocalisable moment of its fracture or fault-line. In fact, 
the opposite is the case. Just as it is not possible to efface the threshold of nonhuman-
human difference by “simply” placing (and thus excluding) animals as “before” the 
taking place of language according to some kind of genetic, evolutionary timescale, 
neither is it possible, any more than it is advisable, to evade or to efface differences 
between animals, be they human and/or nonhuman, in the sharing of that very taking 
place in and of language.  
A “body,” as Heidegger argues, is never that which subsequently encounters 
the world but rather, in its attunedness that is the essential and constant laying claim of 
sense, “is” a being-outside that singularly bodies. In this, I will argue, every so-called 
body, whether it is “one” we commonly call “animal” or “human” (or rather neither 
and both), is abysmally situated in relation. Moreover, in being exposed together 
across sense, meaning and world, it is only by way of the essential indiscernability—
the “systematic madness”—of one to an other that an “I” might ever again come to be.  
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Moving through the differences and similarities of the relation between animal and 
human being in Nietzsche’s well-known but vertiginously productive 1873 essay, “On 
Truth and Lie in the Extra-Moral Sense [Über Wahrheit und Lüge im 
aussermoralischen Sinne]” (henceforth cited as TL), we soon discover that, like 
Blanchot, Nietzsche calls “image” that originary forgetting which marks the having 
taken-place of language. Nietzsche’s “image,” however, is explicitly 
nonanthropocentric, in that “language” must be understood here as incorporating all 
production of sense. The notion of language, that is to say, must be extended to include 
the tropological functioning of perception and affection. The movement of sensation 
is, in other words, a transference or, better, a translation [übertragung] within a 
nonnecessary—i.e., creative or aesthetic—relationship.  
“To begin with,” writes Nietzsche, “a nerve stimulus is transferred 
[übertragen] into an image [Bild]” (82). In this, and right at the beginning, Nietzsche 
thus makes clear that “image” refers neither solely to human perception nor solely to 
visual perception. Rather, any and all perception and affection, any filtering of 
information whatsoever, is already a produced image, that is, always a translation.31 
Such is the image that “is” the touch of the sun’s warmth, that “is” the smell of honey, 
or that “is” the sound of thunder, and so on. Given that any such moment or movement 
of translation necessitates an overleaping [überspringen] from one sphere into a 
second, absolutely heterogeneous sphere, every image is therefore a “perceptual 
metaphor [die anschaulichen Metaphern],” image being the vehicle of the stimuli’s 
tenor.  
More than this, however, the inescapability of this discontinuity of domains 
makes every perceptual metaphor necessarily inadequate, “a stammering translation 
into a completely foreign tongue” (86). The image is, in other words, a deciphering and 
at once a ciphering which cannot help but truncate, mutilate, and make monstrous. 
Nothing less than a material laying claim in and as which a body comes to be, the 
sense-image is thus a vehicle ever lost to an errant transmission, to dissemination.  
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 In this context, see also Jakob von Uexküll A Foray into the Worlds of Animals and Humans 
with A Theory of Meaning trans. Joseph D. O’Neil (Minneapolis & London: University of 
Minnesota Press, 2010), 147ff. 
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At once then, living beings possess only discontinuous metaphors of physical 
responses, responses which themselves mark the taking place of material encounters. 
Hence, in coming to be only in and as a metaphorical vehicle always radically divided 
from the originary being-with of an encounter, an encounter which can neither be 
perceived nor known nor re-presented, it thus follows that the Kantian “thing in itself,” 
described by Nietzsche as “what the pure truth, apart from any of its consequences, 
would be” (82), is necessarily an illusion.32 Every image then, every sense by which 
being is outside itself, is thus not only a metaphor, but also always already an abuse of 
metaphor in that its analogy remains necessarily incomplete. For Nietzsche therefore, 
language in its broadest sense is the operation of catachresis.33 
Never in a relation to or of truth, the sense-image is therefore, and “at most,” 
“an aesthetic relation or disposition [ein ästhetisches Verhalten]” (86). As well as 
deconstructing the Platonic distinction between the sensible [aisthēton] and the 
intelligible [noēton], such aesthetic relating that is the production of sense is never, 
given the impossibility of independently existing entities, that of a subject-object 
relation. Furthermore, given that this being-disposed-outside that is to be attuned to a 
condition is the aesthetic production of sense, it follows that that which appears to us 
simply as “our” body, that is, the sense of a body, as well as the sense of the self, of 
self-awareness, is necessarily founded upon an a priori infolding of the outside which 
already interrupts any such delimitation.  
In other words, every passion, being a moment and movement of translation, 
is thus at once an act of interpretation, just as every action is at once dependent upon a 
passive infolding of externality. The ek-static production of sense is thus irreducible to 
the modern Cartesian notion of egological “consciousness” and at once divested of 
both anthropocentric and organismic restriction. Every nonhuman animal too is first of 
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all being outside itself, and thus it necessarily follows, and as Nietzsche insists, that all 
animals come to their senses only in and as metaphoric perceptions.  
Furthermore, in focussing on the tropology of sense, and hence of a technics 
at and as the origin of life in contrast to both biologism and vitalism, the self-
proclaimed last of the Stoics (meaning that henceforth there can be no more) 
irredemiably fractures any secure distinction between the “natural” and the “artificial.” 
Rather, Nietzsche discloses the dark machinations of power that blind us to even the 
most transparent perception. In describing the movement of translation in The Birth of 
Tragedy (1872), Nietzsche writes of a kind of inverse blinding in which “the bright 
image projections [are] … as it were, luminous spots to cure eyes damaged by the 
gruesome night” (67). In this way, he gives us to think ourselves, avant la lettre, in the 
sightlessness of Heidegger’s captivated animal, essentially blind when faced with 
beings we can never apprehend as such. Moreover, in following the traces of 
Nietzsche’s text it soon becomes clear that any attempt at continuing to draw such a 
bold (Aristotelian, Cartesian and Heideggerian) dividing line between an “animal” 
reaction and a “human” response is ultimately untenable.34 
This blinding, deafening, benumbing production of perceptual metaphors 
necessarily places “us”—i.e., “us” beings that translate stimuli into images—always 
already “in” language. We are, in and as the transfer—and thus in and as existence 
itself—already in and as trope, inhabiting and being-inhabited by machines for 
generating meaning. In this, every living being, nonhuman or human, neither or both, 
is a subject: “a nonexistence” into whose emptiness, to paraphrase Michel Foucault, 
comes the unending outpouring of language.35  
Obviously, such practices of sense-production are not, or not only, language 
in the narrow sense of the written and spoken word. Nor is it the case, as we will see, 
that the image is a necessarily intermediate stage between nerve stimulus and 
intelligible word-concept. It is not the case, that is to say, that the image is not yet 
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 Also see The Gay Science, §333. Derrida seeks throughout his writings to deconstruct this 
traditional distinction which, from Aristotle onwards, has been employed to reduce “animality” 
to a mechanical instinct in opposition to which the would-be autonomous human response can 
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excluded as beings without language. In this context too, see Bruno Latour’s deconstruction of 
the division between facts and values corresponding to the modernist Constitution which 
renders incommensurable the houses of (nonhuman) Nature and (human) Culture in “A New 
Separation of Powers” in Politics of Nature, 91-127. 
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 Michel Foucault Essential Works 2: Aesthetics, 148. 
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“language proper,” lacking only its teleological fulfilment.36 As a result, and without 
denying differences, Nietzsche neither places “the animal” in a median position 
between non-life (entities which do not translate stimuli into imagery) and being-
human (or being-Dasein), nor does he mark out animals for an exclusion predicated 
upon their death or overcoming which would therefore prohibit the possibility of an 
animal-human Mitsein.  
 
 
Eccum sic, absolutely 
 
Despite Heidegger’s refusal of language as such to nonhuman animals, it is 
nevertheless here, in terms of the metaphorical “image,” that his writings and, after 
him, those of Jacques Derrida, enable us to better understand what is at stake in its 
disposition. For Nietzsche, as we have seen, the image is a truncated translation of a 
response marking a material encounter. The image that remarks every perception is 
thus always an inadequate interpretation of a relation. Given this, and as will become 
increasingly clear, it can only be that the experience which Nietzsche calls the “first” 
image—a “unique and entirely individual original experience” which, being “without 
equals,” is thus “able to elude all classification” (TL, 83, 84-5)—is the perception of a 
singularity. Never a sense of the impossible thing-in-itself, the experience that is the 
“first” image is the perception of being as such: the “entirely individual original 
experience” that is the immediate perception of this uniquely situated relation of being. 
The “as” of “as such” here marks the excessive and discontinuous transport of 
metaphor, the discontinuous aesthetic (non)relation that remarks our exposure such 
that it is only as it is.  
In other words, the as such “is” the moment and movement of language 
“itself”: the posit(ion)ing being and being posit(ion)ed of and in language. In The 
Coming Community (1990), Giorgio Agamben describes the event of singularity as 
follows:  
 
I am never this or that [substance], but always such, thus. Eccum sic: 
absolutely. Not possession but limit, not presupposition but exposure. … 
Whereas real predicates express relationships within language, exposure is 
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which, given that the criteria is “which animals are the most human?,” the human will always 
come out on top, followed by a descending scale of (human) value. It is just such a thinking to 
which Donna Haraway ultimately falls prey in When Species Meet, cf. 236f. 
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pure relationship with language itself, with its taking-place. It is what 
happens to something (or more precisely, to the taking-place of something) 
by the very fact of being in relation to language, the fact of being-called 
[into language]. … Existence as exposure is the being-as of a such. … The 
such does not presuppose the as; it exposes it, it is its taking-place. … The 
as does not suppose the such; it is its exposure, its being pure exteriority 
(97-8). 
 
In order to better understand this notion of the “first” image as the possibility of 
immediate perception as such, it is necessary to read in Nietzsche’s text a grammar 
marked not by the will, but by a primordial passivity which contaminates all activity. 
In this, the unique, individual and original relation that is the singularity of the as such 
“is” the taking place of language. A taking place which is, as we saw with the 
apprehension of the closed or the earth in Heidegger, the singular laying claim of blunt 
materiality which withdraws in the relation that “is” being as such.  
This “original” relation, however, can never be perceived as such, that is, it 
can never be the translative production of an image, insofar as it is precisely this 
immediate relation which must escape in the translation into the discontinuous domain 
that is its interpretation, its sense. The X of the original individual “acquaintance” 
always remains, as Nietzsche writes, “inaccessible and undefinable for us” (83). In 
short, the image that is to perceive can only ever mark the escape of the originary 
individual relation as such in its being-sensed, the translation having always already 
taken place of and in language.37 
The word or concept “language” presents something of a problem here, 
however. Inevitably carrying its burdensome anthropocentric history before it, it tends 
unwittingly to limit its recall to the verbal, and thus to an exceptionalism which 
language here serves to put out of the question. The petrified anthropo-logic that 
inheres in the term “language,” in other words, elides the sense of nonhuman animals. 
For this reason, I suggest that the originary relation of being as such is perhaps better 
understood simply as that in which the transfer of sense can take place. In this, the 
open that “is” being as such is precisely the taking place of the encounter of sense 
which escapes in its necessary translation, a moment and a movement which, in and as 
perception, has always already taken place. Here, “sense” is chosen insofar as it 
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retains, across the discrete domains of translation marked by sens and Sinn, its 
irreducibility to either the sensible or the intelligible. Rather, each always invests the 
other: entangled (common and uncommon) sense and sensibility, meanings without 
sense and sense without meaning. Sense [Le sens] is thus, as Jean-Luc Nancy writes,  
 
the element in which there can be significations, interpretations, 
representations … it is the regime of their presentation, and it is the limit of 
their sense [sens] … Our world is a world presented as a world of sense 
[monde de sens] before and beyond any constituted meaning [sens 
constitué] (L’oubli de la philosophie, 90-1).  
 
Sense thus carries an imbrication of the material and the semiotic that always exceeds 
any reduction to the words spoken by human animals alone. The taking place of sense 
is at once the opening of and as language, and an opening to a necessary movement 
which, in the proximal distancing of the “as,” installs technicity as and at the origin of 
sense. It is this, as we shall see, which renders untenable any further recourse to the 
myth of a “natural” pathic (and telepathic) animal communication, and which 
ultimately renders unacceptable the murderous ideology of the undying animal. 
 
 
Zoogenesis (1): the whir of technological being 
 
Translation having always already taken place, this necessary falling away into the 
metaphoricity of sense—a fall which is also a surfacing, a coming to one’s senses and 
thence to one’s “self”—thus gives us to understand a “having” of the “as”-structure 
common to all perception, rather than being the exclusive property of the Dasein. 
Metaphor being, by definition, the taking of something as something else.  
The “first” image to which Nietzsche draws our attention, the sense of this 
singular being as such, must thus be read as the coming to be that is the remarking of 
the taking place of the “as” which has always already escaped. Here, it is necessary to 
understand that such numerical markings as employed by Nietzsche are grammatical, 
and not genetic.38 The “original, unique and individual experience” is, in other words, 
that alien, uncanny transport that gives a being to apprehend the wonder that beings 
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 By contrast, Vanessa Lemm in Nietzsche’s Animal Philosophy reads Nietzsche’s ordinals as 
genetic, rather than grammatical. Such a reading, however, necessitates the erroneous 
reduction of Nietzsche’s notion of memory, which he explicitly extends to all living beings (as 
further evidenced by the following footnote, which is also cited by Lemm), to that of human 
memory alone (and which is thus “inseparable,” according to Lemm, from the “transposition 
(Übertragung) of an intuited metaphor into a word” (135, emphasis added). 
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are in the blunt materiality of their withdrawal. Such is a zoo-genesis in which the 
attunement of Heidegger’s “profound boredom”—a sense only of the reserve of being 
as such in the withdrawal of sense, that is, of being considered in its being that is the 
defining movement of philosophy—is one shared potentially by every being.  
Moreover, as the condition of possibility for the abyssal generalisation of the 
image, this sense of that which escapes is necessarily a pure performative: referring 
only to itself and thus to its fantastic masking of the abyss. This follows necessarily 
from the fact that, for any translation-perception to “make sense,” that is to say, for an 
image to be apprehended or, better, recognised as an image, it must, upon its “first” 
appearance, always already be repeated. A repetition, moreover, which thus differently 
divides its indivisible essence in a double movement of protention and retention. In 
this, the necessary iterability of a recognised sense—“an idealisation that permits one 
identify it as the same throughout possible repetitions” (Derrida Spectres, 200)—at 
once marks a sense of the temporal, with “sense of time” being understood as the 
multiplicity of local economies which constitute the “time of sense.”  
Thus, what for Nietzsche is the metaphoricity of sense is perhaps better 
understood as the re-cognition of sense: “cognition,” the process of knowing in the 
broadest sense, here serving to recall the tropological movement by which sense is 
produced, a production which the recursive prefix remarks as already a reproduction. 
In summary then, the singular encounter as such is such that always already escapes in 
the necessary re-cognition of the perceptual metaphor as image, that is, in the sense of 
sensation as sensation—the sense that is tropologically produced as perception and 
affection.  
Following from this, recognition in and as image therefore presupposes its 
siting within a co-originary structure of differential relations, insofar as an image 
necessarily “means” only in and as its difference (to recognise the image of redness, 
for example, is always already to recognise not-redness). In presupposing a 
multiplicity of countersignatures, in other words, recognition is thus always already a 
repetition that is a falling into temporality, and at once what Heidegger calls a 
“destructive observation.” This is because, in its being reiterated, an image is always 
already becoming “sedimented,” in that perception must necessarily ignore differences 
between singularities in order to recognise an image as an image, to recognise sense as 
sense. A recognition which, as Nietzsche tells us, in equating by forgetting or 
“omitting the aspects in which they are unequal” (TL, 83), marks its movement as 
already an habitual and conventional perceptual response. Thus, the stammer of 
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recognition dissimulates what it shows and that it shows—is, in a word, writing, and 
thus a sensography.  
All of this leads us to the conclusion that there can be no recognition as such. 
Insofar as the giving (of the) as such to recognition is already a calculation, there can 
thus be no recognition of recognition as such, no sense of the reproduction of sense, 
and thus no absolute distinction between the sensible and the intelligible. That it gives 
is given up in the recognition of its been given, which is at once the giving of finitude, 
of death. In every sense then, that which is encountered is defaced as it at once defaces 
that which encounters, its destructive observation reproduced behind our backs, so to 
speak. A machinic rumbling both before and beyond, it now becomes clear why Avital 
Ronell describes “boredom”—that profound zoogenetic operator—as an “affect closest 
to the isolated whir of technological being” (Test Drive, 232). Differentially sited and 
cited, perception is thus always already apperception, which is nonetheless irreducible 
to cogitating activity.  
Here then, we have two distinct but indissociable sites of non-sense. On the 
one hand, there is the necessary withdrawal of being as such that is the condition of 
possibility for the production of sense (the taking place of language). On the other, 
there are the singular differences of a given perception which are necessarily and 
violently effaced in its recognition (language always already having taken place). We 
can see, in other words, only because we are blind, can hear and feel only because we 
are deaf and unfeeling. This distinction is extremely important, in that it is the former 
which retains the potential to interrupt the latter, and is central to my thinking in the 
next chapter.  
For the moment, however, it is necessary only to note that it is the iterability 
of the image which, in its having taken place (again), always already situates beings in 
and as language. It is iterability, in other words, which “lets the traces continue to 
function in the absence of the general context or some elements of the context” 
(Derrida “Strange Institution,” 64). Futhermore, it is iterability which ensures the 
reproduction of materialisation. Heidegger, as we saw earlier, introduces the notion of 
bodying [das Leibende], which refers not to physical bodies, but to the reproducing or 
performing of material form in an as which “what we call the body” comes to appear 
(Nietzsche, III:79). As I suggested, this materialisation is the putting to work of a 
machinery of materiality through which a contour is reproduced—a contour and thus a 
distinction which is, I should now add, already the reinscribing of a limit.  
Finally, it is only in and as the habitual effacement of difference, that is, 
through the idealisation of iterability by which historicity is constituted, that beings are 
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able to be. As Nietzsche insists, it is only “the petrification and coagulation of a mass 
of images” which produce the relatively stable contextual elements which allow a body 
(or, better, a bodied), whether “human” or “animal,” to “live with any repose, security, 
and consistency” (TL, 86). This is because, insofar as the recognition of an image 
presupposes its positing within a differential relation of images, that is, within 
contingent machines for generating meaning, the becoming-sedimented that is the 
image is at once the becoming-sedimented of reiterated combinations of component 
images (or component combinations thereof) in a complex rhizomatic network.39  
In summary then, an image, the tropological making sense of sense, is a 
singularly situated contraction of reiterated habitual sense-components within a 
relational structure. Such metonymies consist of a utilitarian and conventional 
selection or cutting out, that is, an habitual interpretation of meaning, according to its 
use within dominant social relations. Sense, as a result, presupposes relations of power.  
 
 
Politics of sense 
 
Making sense, in other words, is already political. Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari 
make this clear in their gloss on the notion of opinion—a notion which, understood in 
the context of this text, can never belong exclusively to the human, and which will be 
further developed when I turn to Nietzsche’s definition of truth: 
 
We pick out a quality supposedly common to several objects that we 
perceive, and an affection supposedly common to several subjects who 
experience it and who, along with us, grasp that quality. Opinion is the rule 
of the correspondance of one to the other. … It extracts an abstract quality 
from perception and a general power from affection: in this sense all 
opinion is already political (Deleuze and Guattari What is Philosophy? 144-
5).  
 
How being, and a being, makes sense can thus be considered sociopolitical. In this, 
moreover, the non-sensing of singular differences of an encounter, just as much as its 
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habitually recognised sense, constitutes an active-passive reproduction of power and of 
power’s limits, that is, of the production and reproduction of norms.  
The recognised image is therefore already what we might call an “image-
concept.” This is because, as Nietzsche says, after it “has been generated millions of 
times and has been handed down for many generations … it acquires at last the same 
meaning … it would have if it were the sole necessary image and if the relationship … 
were a strictly causal one” (TL, 87). It is just such an habitual regulation of “making 
sense” which, as Nietzsche is at pains to point out, orders human and nonhuman 
animals alike.  
For all such beings then, tropes are necessarily machines of calculation and 
repetition that, beyond and before any “I,” habitually order the sense of the world. It is, 
in Heideggerian terms, that of being-thrown and falling into the everyday, into doxa. 
Hence, in being always outside ourselves—and to be otherwise would constitute an 
eternal present—every active-passive recognition that is “to sense” presupposes 
bounded and bonded structures of meaning, presupposes archives and relays, 
backloads and rhizomatic connections. It presupposes, in short, the machinic operation 
of power. Always both inter- and intra-action, “making sense” is, in other words, an 
interpretative act of passion at once both singular and habitual, and inhabited by power 
that informs and conforms all knowing.  
The “having,” in the sense of its having always taken place, of the perceptual 
metaphor is thus to be already excluded from the “unique and entirely individual 
original experience” of the such that it is only as it is. Hence, the tropology of sense is 
not substitution, but rather constitution, of being: an aesthetic relation without relation 
as the result of an exclusion from which nonhuman animals cannot therefore be 
excluded.  
On the one side (of a line that can in fact no longer be drawn), it is undeniable 
that nonhuman animals are able to live socially with “repose, security, and 
consistency,” and yet such repose can only be granted by iterability. Hence, if one 
accepts that nonhuman animals are, as a result, gifted with response and thus respond-
able and responsive, then being-exposed in an encounter presupposes asymmetrical 
relations that cannot be determined in advance. On the other, if human hubris insists 
upon downgrading nonhuman response-ability to “merely” instinctive reactions to 
sedimented perceptions, must one not also read in the much-vaunted human response 
rather the captivation within the disinhibiting ring of the destructive conventional 
reaction? As Derrida writes, “what would ever distinguish the response, in its total 
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purity, the so-called free and responsible response, from a reaction to a complex 
system of stimuli? And what, after all, is a citation?” (The Animal, 53-4).  
This response-reaction dichotomy has a long and illustrious philosophical 
history, but for the moment it is sufficient to gesture towards just one consequence of 
its ongoing deconstruction, one requiring a vast and painstaking analysis to unpack. To 
no longer be able to posit nonhuman animals as reactive mechanisms is necessarily to 
refuse the “premeditation” that determines a responsible, that is, a guilty subject and 
which grounds humanist-juridical discourse. If animals respond, or humans react, then 
the “responsible” intentional subject before the law becomes indeterminable. One can 
thus understand the considerable significance invested in its maintenance, as well as 
the centrality of the nonhuman animal to its ongoing deconstruction. 
 
 
The truths of men 
 
It remains to ask Nietzsche, however, as to the difference, if any, between human and 
nonhuman metaphoricity of sense, and the predominantly human sense of verbal 
language.40 For Nietzsche there is indeed a difference between “man” and “animals”: 
that of the mark of marking out, of excluding and externalising “the animal” upon 
which man depends in the production of the proper, albeit empty, concept of “Man” 
itself.  
As we have seen, nonhuman animals cannot be excluded from the iterated 
image that is its metaphorical displacement from the as such and, as a result, from the 
coagulated mass of images and combinations. Such images and combinations permit 
not only repose and security, however, but also the positing of sociopolitical castes and 
degrees, that is, of subordinations and clearly marked boundaries. Nevertheless, this 
would seem to be exactly how Nietzsche describes that which marks out the nonhuman 
from the human animal: “Everything which distinguishes man from the animals 
depends upon this ability to volatilise perceptual metaphors in a schema, and thus to 
dissolve an image into a concept” (TL, 84). It is such schemata, he continues, which 
then allow “the construction of a pyramidal order according to castes and degrees, the 
creation of a new world of laws, privileges, subordinations, and clearly marked 
boundaries … the regulative and imperative world” (84). Reading this section more 
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 It should be noted that even the distinction of “verbal” language alleged to be uniquely 
human is increasingly being erased, resulting in a number of dramatic u-turns among eminent 
linguists such as Noam Chomsky. 
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closely, however, in the hope of chasing down the difference which situates a man’s 
mode of translation as different to that of an animal, one discovers this difference does 
not in fact consist of man’s having the word, and thus the concept, but, quite simply, in 
man’s having of truth.  
At first sight, such a division appears to unambiguously reiterate the long 
familiar metaphysical gesture which allocates, and in so doing defines, man and man 
alone as the site of teleological reason. This is, however, impossible according to 
Nietzsche’s logic for several reasons. To begin with, in that the word “is not supposed 
to serve as a reminder of the unique and entirely individual original experience to 
which it owes its origin” (83), the word is therefore already a word-concept and thus 
excluded from the singular “truth” of being as such. As with the image, the word is 
rather the site of an habitual recognition that ignores difference in order to let “the 
traces continue to function in the absence of the general context.”  
Moreover, within the bonded structures of meaning, within the machinery of 
habitual recognition inhabited by power, word-concepts are inseparably entangled with 
image-concepts, the latter composing the overwhelming majority of a human animal’s 
tropological functioning of perception and affection. Think, for example, of kinesic 
and paralinguistic communications such as expression, tone of voice, movement and 
stillness, respiration, muscle tensity, even peristalsis—all of which, in that they are 
iterable and/or are read as such, function at the nonverbal “animal” level of the 
Nietzschean image and which are, in the main, irreducible to the conscious Cartesian 
“I.” This strongly argues against the claim that human language in the narrow sense 
evolved to replace crude so-called “animal” language in that, if indeed this were the 
case, then the evolving of this new, more efficient method would have resulted in the 
decay and disuse of “animal” language among humans.41  
Given this, the “second stage” which for Nietzsche marks out the human—
and again, it should be clear that the ordinal is solely a grammatical marker, and at 
once a mark of grammar’s “unconscious domination”42—does not therefore bear the 
mark of a teleological progression. Rather, it must be thought of as another way or 
another mode of inhabiting and being-inhabited by generative structures of meaning. 
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 Indeed, it can be argued that verbal language also serves to distract from, or mask, kinesic 
and paralinguistic dissemination, and can do so only because it is considerably less efficient. 
Emil Menzel has shown, for example, that not only are chimpanzees “masters of gestural 
subtlety,” but also that the most dramatically humanoid of their gestures are made only “by the 
most infantile and inexperienced animals”—the use of which decreases as the young chimps 
gain experience, and thus subtlety (Noske Beyond Boundaries, 148). This is not to suggest, 
however, that verbal distraction is a uniquely human trait. 
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 Nietzsche Beyond Good and Evil, §20.  
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That is to say, being-human is simply being a way of inhabiting the abyssal technicity 
of language which remains always discontinuous with the multiplicity of other ways of 
being-animal, but which is nonetheless shared across overlapping zones of 
indecipherability or undecidability. One might think here of the recognised “meaning” 
that is this encounter of an aspirated breath, for example, or of a stillness. Hence, to 
use an exemplary nonhuman from amongst Nietzsche’s extensive bestiary, while 
being-gnat-in-the-world remains discontinuous to the plurality of ways of being-tiger, 
being-bird, or being-plant (or rather, being this “tiger,” this “bird,” or this “plant”), 
there is nevertheless no ontological difference dividing living-beings-in-the-world, no 
difference in essence between “the human” and “the animal” as there is for Heidegger. 
“[I]f we could communicate with the gnat,” writes Nietzsche, “we would learn that he 
likewise … feels the flying center of the universe within himself” (TL, 79).  
Being dis-placed in metaphor, there can “be” only correspondence without 
correspondence, relating without relation, a co-responding which necessarily interrupts 
every essence, which disrupts every sovereign self. There can “be” no taking place, but 
only and ever—and which is neither “only” nor forever—an already taken place and an 
always not yet taken place: no presence but only and ever difference and deferral. As a 
result, living beings “ek-sist” in a relation without relation that can never be “natural.” 
Hence, following Nietzsche’s logic and at once moving beyond it, “natural,” whether 
considered as a concept or a word, as a signifier or a signified or a referent, necessarily 
finds itself transformed into its opposite, into something fantastical, some fantastic 
thing which is not a thing, which is, and is nothing.43  
For this reason, and contrary to the thought of both Heidegger and Blanchot, it 
necessarily follows that nonhuman animals, both similarly and differently to man, 
apprehend a world. Rather than a “natural,” or rather supernatural, unmediated 
“animal” communication, there is the rapid dissemination of sense across large groups 
of living beings, be they human, nonhuman, or both and neither. By contrast, in its 
fabulous effacement of dissemination upon which would-be “animal” telepathy is 
constituted, the myth of “nature” serves only to reproduce an all too humanist ideology 
of the undying animal. 
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 At times, however, Nietzsche suggests that anthropogenesis “takes place” only when man 
(who is not yet “Man”) banishes “the most flagrant bellum omni contra omnes [war of each 
against all]” in order to live socially (TL, 81). In this, Nietzsche in fact falls foul of the nature-
culture dichotomy which his own text is in the process of rendering inoperative. As Donna 
Haraway acutely remarks, ‘[t]he naturalistic fallacy is the mirror-image misstep to 
transcendental humanism’ (When Species Meet, 79). 
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More than even this, however, not only can there be no human exceptionalism 
on the basis of language and world, nor is it possible, as Nietzsche’s philosopher-gnat 
would tell us, even to justify an anthropological privilege: 
 
the insect or the bird perceives an entirely different world from the one that 
man does, and that the question of which of these perceptions of the world 
is the more correct one is quite meaningless, for this would have to have 
been decided previously in accordance with the criterion of the correct 
perception, which means, in accordance with a criterion which is not 
available. But it any case it seems to me that “the correct perception”—
which would mean “the adequate expression of an object in the subject”—
is a contradictory impossibility (86).44 
 
The word-concept then, is another way of being in language, and thus of being in 
difference, but it is neither prior nor subsequent to, neither before nor above, nor 
(spatially or temporally) further than, as we shall see, any other translative dis-
placement. And even here too the question, and the nonhuman animal, remains. In 
reiterated giving voice, in the call calling for a response, in declaration and in warning, 
but also in the gesture of a paw or claw, do not certain animals “name” or “sign” an 
image recognised, and thus shared, by an other?  
It is clear that we have not yet located the “truth” which marks the human out 
from other animals. Both the word and the image are necessarily dissimulations, 
habitual formations which, in permitting repose and security to human and nonhuman 
animals alike, allow us to live and work together, that is, to “lie with the herd.” 
Nevertheless, it is exactly here that the difference is found, albeit without being 
founded, in that it is only man who invents— 
 
a uniformly valid and binding designation … for things, and this legislation 
of language likewise establishes the first laws of truth. For the contrast 
between truth and lie arises here for the first time. The liar is a person who 
uses the valid designations, the words, in order to make something which is 
unreal appear to be real. … He misuses fixed conventions by means of 
arbitrary substitutions or even reversals of names. If he does this in a selfish 
and moreover harmful manner, society will cease to trust him and will 
thereby exclude him (81, emphasis added). 
 
“Truths” are thus habitual duties “which society imposes in order to exist,” to wit “to 
be truthful means to employ the usual metaphors” (84). It is thus only from these 
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necessary habits that there “arises a moral impulse in regard to truth” (84), and it is this 
which marks the difference. Only with the appearance of a moral impulse to truth, and 
thus of the moral exclusion of the lie, does “man” appear, and as different from the 
nonhuman animal. Whereas a nonhuman animal may “make something which is unreal 
appear to be real,” may misuse fixed conventions and perhaps be socially ostracised as 
a result, he or she cannot, however, lie in an immoral (or indeed, moral) sense, but 
only in an extra-moral [aussermoralischen] sense. 
The truths of men are, in short, “illusions which we have forgotten are 
illusions” (84), in that dissimulation is the condition of possibility for reason itself. 
Upon the abyss, “rational man” thus legislates, he universalises and, in so doing, 
constructs “values”—values which exclude and demonise, which serve only to mark 
out. For Nietzsche then, the difference between human and nonhuman animals is the 
difference between the Law and making sense, between the reactive legislation of 
(illusory) moral truth and the aesthetic constitution of meaning.  
Being-animal is thus to be exposed within bounded structures generative of 
meaning, and yet without (or before) the Law in a double sense: that of the sovereign 
who is not subject to the Law but who, precisely because she is not a recognised 
subject of Law, finds herself nevertheless utterly subjected.45 A nonhuman animal, in 
other words, stands before the Law not like Franz Kafka’s man from the country, but 
rather as a prisoner-supplicant of Kafka’s penal colony who must learn man’s law by 
her wounds, by its being written over and into her body.46 Thus, given that “man” is 
nothing but the appearance of the lie within the concept of truth, it is not simply truths 
that are illusions, but also the phallogocentric superiority of “Man” himself. Lacking 
any foundation, man necessarily builds his edifice of concepts only “from himself,” 
thus constructing a world “more solid, more universal, better known, and more human 
than the immediately perceived world” (TL, 84). Man’s truths, in other words, are 
“thoroughly anthropomorphic,” and thus can never be “really and universally valid 
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 On this double sense of “outlaw,” see Derrida The Beast and the Sovereign (2008). 
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 For Kafka, the Law, inscribing innumerable yet indistinguishable deaths between which the 
“ignorant onlooker would see no difference,” remains indecipherable to the end, and whose 
monument is a death-machine that can no longer be maintained (“In the Penal Colony,” 170). 
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Zoogenesis (2): encountering the Übermensch 
 
It remains to be seen, however, as to what this might mean for Nietzsche’s philosophy. 
Given that nonhuman animals similarly require an “inventive intermediate sphere and 
mediating force” (86), they are necessarily no closer to the immediate perception of 
this uniquely situated relation of being, no more “originary” than the rational man with 
his moral schema. As a consequence, Nietzsche is by no means advocating a “return” 
to some kind of preverbal, quasi-natural state. This would be to advocate a movement 
which is both impossible, insofar “the human” takes place only in and as the 
legislation of “truth,” and nonsensical, insofar as it would be to move only from a 
cooler lie to a fiery lie, both of which relate only to one another and which are always 
“equally” displaced from the unique, individual and original relation (although no 
calculation, of course, could ever measure this incommensurable proximity and 
distance of equality). In that one absolutely discontinuous vehicle can be no more 
truthful than a second, and thus there can be no judgments of absolute truth and value, 
there remains, in short, difference (or différance) without privilege.  
It is thus clear that what Nietzsche seeks is not a simple inversion of 
exceptionalism which rather valorises the animal over the human, and which would 
thus only serve to reinscribe the human-animal division. Rather, and this is absolutely 
central, what Nietzsche’s text gives us to think is a way of being (human) with others 
who do not share our language, who are neither Socratic nor Heideggerian reflections 
of ourselves, but are rather those others with whom or with which neither consensus 
nor essential disclosure is possible.  
Every interpretation, that is, every sense is, as we have seen, always a 
misrecognition, insofar as it entails the necessary non-recognition, and thus the 
effacement, of the singular as such. Nevertheless, while the tropological movement can 
never be identical without ceasing to be interpretation, neither can it ever leave that 
which it interprets without ceasing to be its vehicle. The reproduced sense must 
remain, so to speak, always touching (on) the sensing-sensed encounter. In other 
words, it must, albeit at some immeasurably proximal distance, always be with, and in 
this the effaced materiality as such always remains to interrupt its habitual recognition.  
However, when necessary habit petrifies into dogma, into legislation, then, 
rather than an encounter of bodies constituted in and as relation, a mis-recognition 
comes to predetermine the sense of an encounter. That is to say, the attunement that is 
being-exposed is misrecognised in the strong sense, insofar as one holds to a 
recognised (sedimented) sense of the encounter prior to that encounter, and as such the 
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encounter is essentially prevented from taking place: I see without having being seen, I 
touch without having been touched. Detached from that which gives itself to be 
interpreted, interpretation ceases to be interpretation and thus becomes Law. It is this 
latter misrecognition which, according to Nietzsche, is the mark of the human: the 
falling always already into the transcendental.  
The comparison with Hegel is instructive here. Like Nietzsche, Hegel too 
argues that the concept “exists in the animal,” but that only the human concept can 
exist “in its fixed, independent freedom,” that is, as a transcendental ideal.47 The 
difference, however, lies in the fact that, for Hegel, it is precisely the animal who is 
necessarily “sick” and “anxious” as a result. As a coda to this, however, and following 
the argument explored here, it should be noted that “misrecognition,” understood as 
the predetermining and thus prevention of the encounter, is necessarily confined 
neither to human or nonhuman egological consciousness, nor to human verbal 
language. Indeed, to do so in the latter case would serve only to reinstall a traditional 
human-animal distinction based upon a properly human belief in God.  
The specific difference outlined by Nietzsche then, is that of the moral 
legislation of truth common to human ways of being, rather than misrecognition per 
se, although even here it is by no means possible to rule out a priori another way of 
being thus “morally impulsive” amongst nonhuman ways of being. As Derrida points 
out, “where there is transgenerational transmission, there is law, and therefore crime 
and peccability” (Beast, 106).48 
It is in the face of this falling-surfacing of language that Nietzsche, whose 
well-known assertion that to believe in grammar is still to believe in God is one to 
which we must never cease to respond, posits his notion of recursive artistic conduct. 
Such conduct is defined by the vigilance of an affirmative response to the inartistic, 
reactive violence of misrecognition. Such is that responsive and responsible way of 
being-with which always again preserves the possibility of an uncanny zoogenetic 
transport which gives (a) being to apprehend that beings are in the blunt materiality of 
their withdrawal, its chance and necessity preserved in the singularity of every 
encounter.  
Responsible conduct, in other words, affirms in the face of blind universals 
that responsive touching–being-touched which, exceeding the transcendental, remains 
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 In fact, it is possible to read Nietzsche’s entire essay as a revaluing of this sentence from the 
Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences in Outline and Critical Writings (cit. Benjamin 
“What if the Other were an Animal?” 67).  
48
 A consideration of transgenerational nonhuman transmission runs throughout this thesis, and 
will take on a specific focus in the discussion of Bernard Stiegler in the final chapter. 
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always to come. Such is a sense only of the taking place of sense prior to its 
recognition, which thus marks the opening of what Nietzsche describes as both a 
“forbidden metaphor” and an “unheard-of relation.” The singularity that is the 
Nietzschean individual does not live, does not exist, but rather “is” that which exceeds 
every determinable form. It “is,” in short, that which out-lives [überleben].49 Here, 
Werner Hamacher’s reading of the “over-” or “outhuman” in his “‘Disgregation of the 
Will’: Nietzsche on the Individual and Individuality” is particularly illuminating, and 
will be considered more fully when this notion of the forbidden, unheard-of metaphor 
is further explored in the next chapter. Rather than “being a social or psychic form of 
human existence,” Hamacher notes acutely, “the individual—exceeding type and 
genus—is the announcement of the Über-mensch” (159). Nietzsche’s überhuman, in 
other words, is a call and a demand which, remaining always already to come, thus 
withdraws from all recognition and, as such, exceeds all specular delimitation. In this, 
it interrupts the staging of Heidegger’s fabulous anthropo-magical mirror in and as a 
silent announcing which necessarily out-lives any enclosure of the properly “human.”50 
Artistic conduct is thus a way of being-with-in-the-world. A conducting towards that 
response which, in its having always already taken place, constitutes a creative 
forgetting of being in encountering the way in which something comes to be that 
which it is as such. “Invention,” as Nietzsche writes, “beyond the limits of experience” 
(“The Philosopher,” 53). 
Being “clever beasts,” humans invented knowing and thus invented the 
division between humans and animals. Here then, we are returned to the inescapable 
destructiveness of any observation concerning nonhuman animal existence, of a 
“talking as if” in which the other of nonhuman being is, in a stammering catachresis, 
written over by way of all too human (pre)conceptions.51 Nothing, as Derrida says of 
this or that animal, “can ever rob me of the certainty that what we have here is an 
existence which refuses to be conceptualised [rebelle à tout concept]” (The Animal, 9). 
Here, I take Derrida’s ironic statement to mean that ways of being are in themselves 
the rebellious refuting of conceptualisation, indecipherable and undecidable spaces in 
the putatively secure edifice of the certain world.  
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 On Nietzsche’s notion of überleben, see Beyond Good and Evil, sections 210-212. 
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 In addition to Hamacher on outliving as living-on (sur-vivre), see Jacques Derrida “Living 
On” in Harold Bloom et al. Deconstruction and Criticism (New York: Continuum, 1979), 75-
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 The emphasised of is here being made to do double genitive duty, both subjective and 
objective: the other of nonhuman being that which both “belongs” to a nonhuman animal (in 




Ways of being in language are such that they can never be securely delimited, 
but are rather ways of being disposed outside that presuppose as their condition the 
overlapping zones and jagged edges that reserve the space of ethical response. Such 
are the violent infolded encounters which, in constituting newly-opened spaces 
asymmetrically inhabited by power, are by definition so deformed as to be 
unrecognisable. While simple, remainderless “communication” remains impossible, 
there nevertheless remains differential ways of being-with, that is, of being-together 
primarily related in difference. To conduct one’s self in an artistic encounter is to be 
open to the incalculable, to be exposed to that which exceeds sensible recognition. It is, 
in short, to say “Yes!” to the chance and necessity of life’s ever again. Not only is it to 
be exposed to the creative withdrawal of being as such, it is, moreover, to rejoice in the 
encounter, as indeed Lewis Carroll’s Gnat, the untimely cousin of Nietzsche’s gnat-





In a different direction then, upon a different path, it thus becomes imperative to 
disclose another way to give death, and to the giving of dying, to animals. To give 
death to other animals. Such is to give death as gift, the gift of and the giving that is the 
shared finitude of living beings, a gift which renders impossible the monstrous hubris 
of an unthinking utilisation and consumption of fetishised—and thus doubly 
disembodied—flesh and corpses. It is this gift-giving which Heidegger rejects out of 
hand in his excising of the “merely living” from living being as such.52  
Whereas finitude is the condition of possibility for a thinking encounter, it is 
finitude which is elided, that is, rendered imperceptible, made nonsense, by an a priori 
unthought “truth” which overwrites other bodies. Such is the paradoxical ellision which 
calculates nonhuman animals as undying and, as a result, killable. Against this, 
Heidegger’s exclusive corral must be interrupted. To give this death is to bear witness, 
to attest. It is to be always inadequately response-able to this death of this other animal. 
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 On the centrality of the hand for Heidegger’s philosophy, see What is Called Thinking? 
trans. J. Glenn Gray (New York: Perennial, 2004). Also, see Derrida’s 1985 critique of this 
position in “Geschlecht II: Heidegger’s Hand” in John Sallis (ed.) Deconstruction and 
Philosophy: The Texts of Jacques Derrida (Chicago & London: The University of Chicago 
Press, 1987), 161-196. 
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Despite the secular salvation dreams of the Enlightenment’s instrumental 
experimental thinking, no animal (in the broadest possible sense) can die in the place of 
the other, and in this sense it is indeed the case that dying can be neither given nor 
taken away. Nevertheless, as Derrida rightly insists, it is a “fact that it is only on the 
basis of death, and in its name, that giving and taking become possible” (Gift of Death, 
44). This is a death which must necessarily pass through, in being exposed across, an 
indissociably doubled abyss which confounds every interior-exterior and organic-
technological dichotomy: on the one paw an abyssal structure of language which 
necessarily exceeds any reduction to the verbal and, on the other, an abyssal bodying 
which exceeds any organismic delimitation.53 The doubled abyss, in other words, that 
is the repeatability of language and the singularity of being-there. 
In refusing to elide the deaths of animals, being with nonhuman animals thus 
becomes possible. It is to recognise that language is not the reserve and the preserve of 
the human and, infinitely more than this, is never solely a “human” experience. Rather, 
being as such is already shared, constituted by encounters across languages which, in 
Jean-François Lyotard’s phrase, produce bodies “systematically mad” one to another. 
Unlike Heidegger’s specular fable, the fable with which Nietzsche begins is both 
nonfable and counterfable: thrown outside of ourselves and hence excluded from the 
myth of original plentitude, the shared finitude of beings in and as metaphors which 
mark our originary being-with necessarily demands a response. Such thinking moves 
beyond both traditional humanist and Heideggerian überhumanist metaphysics, and 
towards the necessity of always again rethinking that destructive observation which is, 
of course, the very interpreting of something as such that Heidegger a priori denies to 
his fabulous animal.  
In concluding this first part, I suggest therefore that, if we are to become both 
responsive and responsible, no matter how inadequately, within the midst of a largely 
unremarked global slaughter, it is absolutely imperative that posthumanist philosophy 
think both the finitude and the nonsubstitutable deaths of other animals. Such is to 
think the sharing of each other and of the world, always already separated by the 
greatest possible proximity.  
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 On this doubled abyss of language and body, see Cary Wolfe’s ““Flesh and Finitude: 
Thinking Animals in (Post)Humanist Philosophy” in SubStance #117, 37:3 (2008), 8-36.  
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We discovered in the previous chapter that, in analysing “the essence of animality,” 
Heidegger in fact stages a fabulous anthropo-magical mirror in an attempt to render 
visible the essence of human being which being-human itself renders invisible. In so 
doing, he constructs a specular introspective relation outside of which nonhuman 
animals are reduced to phantom individuations which, constituted as beings only in the 
anthropomorphic looking-glass of the Dasein, are brought-to-appearing for no other 
reason than as puppets that man gives itself to see. In this specular captivity of the 
Same, the way of being-human thus remains corralled within a circle that excludes 
every other “who” or “which” who does not share “our” language. As such, Heidegger 
forecloses any potential opening to a radical alterity: becoming-other, by definition, 
being a moment and a movement in which “I” can no longer recognise “my” 
reflection.  
Enclosed within this humanist economy of the Same, such destructive 
misrecognition necessarily delimits “the human” in a double sense. In other words, it 
both circumscribes the proper and precludes that evental opening to an other other 
necessary for the uncanny disposition within which the Dasein comes to be. It is thus 
imperative that we move beyond the mirror, and beyond the human-animal dichotomy 
upon which it depends—an extramoral imperative to which, as we shall explore in 
more detail in this part and throughout, Nietzsche’s thinking of “active forgetting” 
responds.  
Demonstrating the impossibility of a humanist enclosure constituted by the 
exclusivity of access to the “as”-structure, Nietzsche’s originary technicity of sense 
affirms precisely that excess which Heidegger seeks to constrain within an exclusively 
humanist frame. Constitutive technicity, in other words, affirms that that alien creative 
transport which gives a sense only of the reserve of being as such is a transport 
potentially shared by every living being: never anthropogenesis but always zoogenesis. 
Moreover, it is this same originary technicity which, as we have seen, not only derails 
every judgment of absolute truth and value and interrupts any hierarchy of proximity, 
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but also excludes a priori both vitalism and biological continuism, as well as the 
possibility of an essential distinction which divides any one species from all others.  
The implications of this are enormous. In contrast to Hegel and Blanchot, for 
example, naming for Nietzsche can never be an act in the name of the master, can 
never name in the name of essence and exclusion. Put another way, difference as and 
at the origin of sense necessarily puts out of the question any notion of 
representationalism, and thus any narcissistic form of identity politics which posits an 
a priori essence in seeking to inscribe a determining homogeneity within impermeable 
borders.  
Rather, originary technics demands, and in so doing affirms, only an 
encounter with another whose language “I” do not recognise. This unrecognisable 
other is, moreover, every other, an other with whom or with which not only is essential 
disclosure but also consensus always impossible. Hence, originary difference 
simultaneously interrupts both the liberal contractual argument and the related 
arguments of “tolerant” multiculturalism, both of which depend upon an exclusion 
which functions to animalise all those others whose language “I” (or “we”) do not 
recognise.  
At the same time, language ceases to be the privileged site from which one 
can, in sovereign fashion, exclude the Other on the basis of lack, that is, by way of an 
attribution of mute bestiality. In contrast, as we shall see, the imperative of active 
forgetting is nothing less than invention, a creative event the call of which shatters the 
mirror and at once the psyche. It is to this zoogenetic event alone which the term 
animal encounter will be hereafter reserved, and which constitutes the focus of this 
part. This should not, however, be understood as a call to dutifully “encounter 
animals” in the sense of “bettering oneself” by taking responsibility for an animal, nor 
should it be understood as a prescriptive instruction to somehow “commune with 
nature,” both of which presuppose a prior substantive human subject, and thus an 
unthinking human-animal distinction. 
Rather, remaining with the notion of responsive conduct in relation to what I 
have described as the sense only of the taking place of sense, we can now better 
understand why Nietzsche insists that man “grows dumb” before such “intuitions.” As 
necessarily prior to recognition, there can therefore “exist no word” with which to 
name such an encounter (TL, 90). Nevertheless, continues Nietzsche, all is not lost: 
chance may yet call forth a “creative correspondance [schöpferisch zu entsprechen]” 
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which shatters the conceptual barriers of habit (90). Having being rendered dumb, 
stripped bare of habitual concepts by an animal encounter, this shatteringly creative co-
respondance can thus only come into being, as Nietzsche insists, “in forbidden 
metaphors [verbotenen Metaphern] and in unheard-of combinations of concepts 
[unerhörten Begriffsfügungen]” (90).  
The question which will occupy this part is therefore quite simple: how might 
this unheard-of relation be approached, a relation which, while not yet even sensed, is 
paradoxically already forbidden? How, in short, might one recognise the 
unrecognisable? It is in the context of this question alone that I will engage here with 
the otherwise disparate discourses of Nietzsche, Franz Kafka, Jacques Derrida, Karl 
Marx and Jacques Rancière. 
Nietzsche’s notion of forbidden, unheard-of figures which are called forth in 
and as the uncanny zoogeneses of animal encounters is hugely important here. These 
are inventions “beyond the limits of experience” which, as we shall see, necessarily 
take place in the spacing, in the play, between the twin pillars of nihilism. Between, 
that is to say, the positing of suprasensory ideals and the parodic play of self-interest. 
Such, I argue, are those monstrously “improper” metonymies which announce 
themselves as the deafening yet inaudible fanfare which throws Kafka’s young dog 
from his senses, as the “world-historical necromancy” which exalts the struggles of 
what Marx calls “the spirit of revolution,” and as the “cross” or “wrong” name of 
Rancière’s revolutionary performative.  
As prior to every name, every word, and every recognisable sense, however, 
such an “improper” metonymy can thus only ever be a prosthesis, a bandage and a 
mask of disconcealment which holds the place of that which cannot be recognised. In 
this, it does not make sense, as we shall see, but rather only makes sensible. Such an 
improper dressing is, moreover, the chance of address: the staging of a correspondence 
which inscribes an aberration within the order of things, although only for as long as it 
remains between sense(s).  





3. Making Sense beyond Species:  
Investigating Dogs with Kafka and Nietzsche  
 
 
A more advanced physiology will surely confirm that the artistic force 
inheres our becoming, not only in that of the human being, but also in that 
of the animal. 




The Word of Dog 
 
In an attempt to account for a life largely spent seeking to understand the caesura 
passed over in silence between, on the one paw, how one desires to live and, on the 
other, how one is actually compelled to live by the laws and institutions that bind the 
socius, the elderly canine of Franz Kafka’s “Investigations of a Dog [Forschungen 
eines Hundes]” (1922) is first of all compelled to recall the compulsion which 
underlies his own research [forschung] and his ceaseless desire for understanding. He 
must, in short, call forth the event of his own coming to be: the moment in which a 
young dog comes to be thrown outside of himself into the “peculiar openness” of 
critique. Insofar as this young dog is, and yet is not, the investigator himself, the 
autobiographical narrative which follows is thus equally an heterobiography, that is, an 
accounting and a recounting of an other that I am.  
The transformation of young dog to investigator offers here an exemplary 
example of the maddening, zoopoetic, zoogenetic displacement which I seek to trace in 
this chapter, and which in turn will call forth parodic ghosts and revolutionary spirits, 
will call last men to account and corpses to outlive. While this chapter will focus on 
this creative encounter “itself,” one should remember throughout that such an 
encounter can never be restricted to the human animal alone, a recollection which the 
term “animal encounter” will hopefully repeatedly invoke. This is of central 
importance, as will become increasingly clear when I consider the place of the animal 
in the texts of William S. Burroughs and of Deleuze and Guattari in a later chapter, 
insofar as it exactly such encounters which the ideology of the “undying animal” seeks 
to efface. Related to this, moreover, is the fact that the uncanny displacement of the 
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dog-investigator is, at the same time, necessarily an example of that which can 
essentially have no example. It is an exemplarity, nevertheless, which allows one to 
tell, to narrate, a story. It therefore constitutes for this chapter yet another exemplary 
fiction: a fable, so to speak.  
Only a careless reading, however, would classify Kafka’s text within the 
traditional genre of the fable. In fact, such an anthropocentric reading is explicitly 
undone from the start. Dismissive of the other “wretched, limited, dumb creatures who 
have no language but mechanical cries” (279), the investigator reduces all other 
animals to an homogeneous mass bound only by “the basest [gemeinste] of interests” 
giving rise to “conflict and hatred” (279). Hence humans too, essentially lacking 
canine language and thus those canine social institutions geared towards being together 
beyond all division, are necessarily “wretched.” This explicit canicentrism, and the 
anthropocentric outrage it provokes, thus parodically calls into question that very 
anthropocentric hubris which presumes the possible reduction of animal figures to the 
simple, remainderless anthropomorphisms of moral education.  
This interruption of the specular humanist economy, which underwrites the 
traditional genre of the fable, in this way already calls to the encounter to come, to an 
animal encounter which is, as we shall see, at once call and demand, proclamation and 
manifesto. In such an encounter, a being is called upon to become other by a radical 
alterity which remains always to come, and as such its call necessarily refuses all 
recognition and thus exceeds all specular delimitation. It marks, in other words, a 
refusal and an excess of the proper, be that the properly human or the properly canine. 
Tracing only an unspeakable wound, a discontinuity, the animal encounter is, in short, 
an as yet unnameable disposition which proclaims only its own monstrosity. 
Recounting his becoming, the investigator recalls a youth like any other. Prior 
to the interruption of another, or perhaps the same, caesura passed over in silence, his 
younger self leads an unremarkable and pleasurable life in the senselessness of the 
everyday, “blind and deaf to everything” (“Investigations,” 280). Happily lacking any 
sense, in the dark, one day however, the youth becomes the sudden focus of an 
unimaginable brightness. Within this brightness, the young dog finds himself abruptly 
recalled to his self, that is, to the singular situatedness of his being-there, whereupon 
seven strange dogs appear before him, conjured as if out of the darkness and 
accompanied by terrible, unrecognisable sounds. These dogs, insists the investigator 
on behalf of his youth, are doubtless “dogs like you and me,” and yet they are not dogs 
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at all. Rather, and this will become clearer later, they can be better described as a 
species only under the species of the nonspecies: 
 
I regarded them by force of habit simply as dogs … but while I was still 
involved in these reflections the music … literally knocked the breath out 
of me and swept me far away from those actual little dogs, and quite 
against my will, while I howled as if some pain were being inflicted upon 
me, my mind could attend to nothing but this blast of music which seemed 
to come from all sides, from the heights, from the deeps, from everywhere, 
surrounding the listener, overwhelming him, crushing him, and over his 
swooning body still blowing fanfares so near that they seemed far away and 
almost inaudible. And then a respite came, for one was already too 
exhausted, too annulled, too feeble to listen any longer; a respite came and I 
beheld again the seven little dogs carrying out their evolutions, making 
their leaps (281-2, my emphasis).54  
 
Here, between the young dog he was and the investigator he will become, is the 
interval as such, the extreme passivity of its apocalyptic instant marked by a rupture in 
and of the first person narrative. Thrown from his self by the music of everywhere, 
nothing remains of the youth but the violent seizure of attunement: my mind, the seat 
and site of the “I,” displaced otherwise to the “he” or “it” of an overwhelmed listener, 
an auditor, that of the third-person par excellence.  
Driven “out of my senses” (284) and thus an intoxicated interval between 
first-persons, in this moment Kafka’s narrator is necessarily other to any and every “I.” 
As a result, for the “I” that comes to be only following the event, its founding 
intervallic being cannot be recalled, but can only be called and called forth as another, 
that is, as he or, better, as it. This momentary displacement into the third-person thus 
marks an absolute discontinuity. The investigator can never say “I am other,” but 
rather “I” is other, is another, the “is” retaining the mark of an undetermined neutrality. 
No longer a youth, the investigator is born anew: I was a child, ich war ein Kind, 
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 The German text reads as follows: [M]an beobachtete sie gewohnheitsmäßig, wie Hunde … 
viele von solcher oder ähnlicher Art kannte ich, aber während man noch in solchen 
Überlegungen befangen war, nahm allmählich die Musik überhand, faßte einen förmlich, zog 
einen hinweg von diesen wirklichen kleinen Hunden und, ganz wider Willen, sich sträubend 
mit allen Kräften, heulend, als würde einem Schmerz bereitet, durfte man sich mit nichts 
anderem beschäftigen, als mit der von allen Seiten, von der Höhe, von der Tiefe, von überall 
her kommenden, den Zuhörer in die Mitte nehmenden, überschüttenden, erdrückenden, über 
seiner Vernichtung noch in solcher Nähe, daß es schon Ferne war, kaum hörbar noch 
Fanfaren blasenden Musik. Und wieder wurde man entlassen, weil man schon zu erschöpft, zu 
vernichtet, zu schwach war, um noch zu hören, man wurde entlassen und sah die sieben 
kleinen Hunde ihre Prozessionen führen, ihre Sprünge tun (“Forschungen eines Hundes”). 
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recalls the investigator of his new, posthumous self. For the “I” that is other, therefore, 
the inside of the inside is the outside, its passage marked only by a caesura.  
As Maurice Blanchot explains, what Kafka teaches us “is that storytelling 
brings the neutral into play … kept in the custody of the third-person ‘it’ [il], an ‘it’ 
that is neither a third person nor the simple cloak of impersonality” (Infinite 
Conversation, 384; trans. modified). It is the neutral, he continues, which permits us to 
feel that the accounting is not being recounted by anyone and which, moreover, 
interrupts the subjects of the action, causing them to “fall into a relation of self-
nonidentification” (384):  
 
Something happens to them that they can only recapture by relinquishing 
their power to say “I.” And what happens has always already happened: 
they can only indirectly account for it as a sort of self-forgetting, the 
forgetting that introduces them into the present without memory that is the 
present of narrating speech (384-5). 
 
The “it,” adds Blanchot in a footnote, “designates ‘its’ place as both the place from 
which it will always be missing and that will thus remain empty, but also as a surplus 
of space, a place that is always too many” (462n2). This it is, in short, a mark or a 
placeholder of “the intrusion of the other … in its irreducible strangeness” which 
Blanchot calls both spectral and ghostlike (385). It is this intrusion, as we shall see, 
this imposition of an empty surplus, which marks the Kafkan encounter beyond any 
sense of species. Such is the intervallic demand in and as which a young dog ceases to 
be in having always already become an investigator.  
Coming to his senses and yet sensing only a senseless call, the investigator is 
compelled to offer assistance to the seven actual dogs. He is constrained, that is, both 
to answer the call of the encounter and to answer for it. With “good manners” that are 
at once “good morals [guten Sitten],” he greets the dogs, and in doing so recognises 
them as dogs. Recognition that is, however, refused. This, the greatest offence to 
custom and habit, places the dogs not only beyond all sense but, and as a result, 
beyond even the certainty of specie: “Perhaps they were not dogs at all? But how 
should they not be dogs?” (“Investigations,” 283).  
In this monstrous affront to proper sense, another constraint at once imposes 
itself upon the investigator: “a labyrinth of wooden bars … arose around that place, 
though I had not noticed it before” (282). Upon coming to be other, in other words, a 
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previously insensible limit has become manifest to the investigator as a limit, as a 
sensible constraint. He senses, that is to say, the limit of good sense, of its “proper” 
reproduction. In this way, the contingent limit of sense comes to be sensible precisely 
as contingent, and all sense certainty is necessarily lost as a result: “it is too much to 
say that I even saw them, that I actually even saw them” (281).  
In a momentary respite from the violence of the encounter, overcome by the 
anxiety of absolute uncertainty and at once forcefully constrained by this terrible and, 
it transpires, criminal affront to proper sense, the investigator calls desperately upon 
God to restore divine order: the dogs, he exclaims, are “violating the law [das Gesetz]” 
(283). Falling back in a moment of anxious recuperation upon the certain gaze of 
judgment, the investigator thus attempts to refuse the refusal of recognition, 
disavowing their monstrous affront to good sense as symptomatic of their shame 
[Schuldgefühl]. Falling back upon precisely that sense traditionally refused to all 
animals but one, the investigator thus attempts to dispel his intense anxiety by way of 
ressentiment. He seeks, in other words, to externalise the uncannily intimate alterity of 
the encounter, reducing the refusal of recognition to a manifestation of the dogs’ 
shame in having their sinful nakedness witnessed, a gaze which serves to mark them as 
fallen beings expelled from plenitude.  
We shall return to this peculiarly human notion of nakedness shortly, but for 
the moment we find that it is just as the investigator is in this way attempting to efface 
the madness of the encounter that the terrible music irresistibly imposes itself once 
more. Arising “without variation from the remotest distance” (284) which, as we 
know, is at once the most near (“fanfares so near that they seemed far away”), this 
dreadful music spins the world on its axis. In so doing, it sweeps away all possibility, 
if not the hope, of the investigator being returned to the deafened and deafening respite 
of the everyday. “Was the world standing on its head?” he cries. “Where could I be? 
What could have happened?” (284).  
It is right here, as we shall see, in being anxiously impelled across the furthest 
proximity to make sense of that which is without sense, and thus to construct an 
autobiographical narrative which must precisely narrate its own impossibility, that the 
cries of the investigator call forth an intensive correspondence with certain 
“biographical” texts of Friedrich Nietzsche and Jacques Derrida. He calls, that is, to 
Nietzsche’s preacher of the overhuman, who cries in his turn, “What is happening to 
me? … What? Has the world not just become perfect?” (Zarathustra, 288), and to the 
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little female cat whose bottomless gaze is fixed upon Derrida’s nakedness. In exploring 
these animal encounters, and as the investigator’s account exemplifies, I will thus 
argue in the next section that they necessarily can only take place, as Derrida writes, 
“under the species of the nonspecies, in the formless, mute, infant, and terrifying form 




Thinking through great nausea 
 
Here, we begin to approach our central question, this Kafkan, this Nietzschean 
question: how might the unrecognisable, unheard-of relation be recorded? how might 
the senseless interval come to make sense, perhaps even to create sense? How might 
the as yet formless form of monstrosity come to be reenacted, insofar as its sense can 
only be that of the taking place of sense prior to its recognition? How, in short, might 
one recognise the unrecognisable, think the unthinkable?  
For Nietzsche, as we know, it is a question of an affirmative response to the 
inartistic, reactive violence of habit and of moral calculation. Such is the unheard-of 
correspondence which marks the “unique and entirely individual original experience” 
(TL, 83) that “is” being as such in an announcing which exceeds every determinable 
form. Such “originality” is never creation ex nihilo, however, but rather that of a 
forbidden metonymy remarking an unheard relation. Such is the becoming perceptible 
of that which “has no name as yet and hence cannot be mentioned although it stares us 
all in the face” (The Gay Science, §261). It is the demand, in short, of that which habit 
serves to render insensible: the irruptive return of the effaced and the defaced. 
Such an announcing which calls forth a creative co-responding is located, 
Nietzsche tells us, in the spacing, the play, between the two forms of nihilism. 
Between, that is, the rational man who negates the world in positing suprasensory 
utopian ideals, and the last man who, recognising that truth and value are all too 
human constructions, negates the world in advocating the parodic play of cynical self-
interest.55 Moreover, its interval, its interruption, at once moves before and beyond the 
“great nausea” of nihilism (Genealogy, II:24) in and as the moment which a being 
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opens itself beyond itself, thus giving itself to that which has been excluded in the 
production of sense and thus value. Such is the becoming-together of a forbidden 
phrasing, of an unheard-of metonymy which shatters the habitual conceptual shackles 
which order the sensible world.  
The event that an unheard-of combination remarks is thus, in being prior to 
anything recognisable, an opening to that upon which the two forms of nihilism 
depend. As an announcing which opens a space and a time for the coming into being of 
previously foreclosed relations, the Nietzschean ethical aesthetic thus refuses to allow 
life to harden into one sclerotic possibility and in one configuration, it grants life, as 
Heidegger says, “its inalienable right to become” (Nietzsche, II:126).  
The question then—the question which, for Kafka’s canine investigator too, 
as we will see, is the mark of responsible conduct—is the question of an autocritical 
imperative that returns eternally, that is, of a permanent revolution that ever questions 
and which, in so doing, creatively transforms. It is this intensive creative tension 
between being and becoming, between the habitual and the forbidden or foreclosed, 
which calls forth a response by which a being outlives and thus affirms.  
Given that the positing of a previously unheard-of combination reinscribes 
that which has been elided by habitual recognition, any such positing must thus 
perform a rupture within the familiar. It must, that is to say, disclose a lacuna within 
the known, and in this way it necessarily interrupts the proper ordering of a certain 
state of affairs. One thus understands why it is at once both insensible and forbidden, 
and why it is necessarily monstrous in the sense of an aberration within the order of 
things.  
This is not to suggest, however, that the encounter which for strategic reasons 
I am calling animal—the singularity of that encounter as such—is thus in some 
“sense” disclosed. Rather, as we shall see, being as such must always already withdraw 
in and as a call which announces only an unnameable monstrosity, and which, insofar 
as it remains unnameable, can call forth only a meaningless metonymy in its place. 
This placeholding figure explicitly refuses any and all identity in bringing to its senses 
the delirious mute call of that which the habitual reproduction of sense renders 
insensible. In being called forth to hold open this space of the “new,” however, such an 
improper placeholder is nonetheless constrained to “materialise” in the borrowed 
costume of the old—constrained, that is, to dress improperly. It is this constraint 
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which, as we will see, is both the condition of every revolutionary invention and that 
which ensures its parodic, nihilistic recuperation. 
Furthermore, I will argue, it is exactly this creative becoming of an animal 
encounter which renders it unthinkable that living beings can be put to death with 
impunity. That is, in contrast to the dissimulating “nakedness” of the “pure” concept, it 
is only in the thickness and impropriety of its dress that the chance address from an 
other might arrive to interrupt the murderous theatrics of animalisation.56 Such is the 
improper dress and address of an animal. 
“Nakedness,” as we have seen, implies the reactive authority of judgment for 
Kafka’s investigator, and indeed, it is the “nakedness” of truths which function to place 
the apodicity of authority beyond question. Finally, the possibility of being naked 
constitutes yet one more of those “propers” which supposedly separate the human from 
the nonhuman animal. Playing on these figures somewhat, I suggest that only 
inasmuch as the revolutionary placeholder remains between senses, that is, only as 
long as it remains improperly dressed, it is therefore “animal,” only becoming 
“human” insofar as its obscure thickness congeals to form that apparent transparency 
common to both habit and parody. Such transparency which is, in other words, the 





As we have seen, the tropology of sense is not substitution but rather constitution of 
being. Every passion, being a moment and movement of translation, is at once an act 
of interpretation, just as every action is at once dependent upon a passive infolding of 
externality. This blinding, deafening, benumbing reproduction of sense necessarily 
places every living being, who is never an organism nor even necessarily organic, 
always already “in” language. Moreover, making sense presupposes machines of 
habitual recognition inhabited by power that are both constitutive of bodyings and 
coextensive with the reproduction of materialisation. Feminist philosopher Judith 
Butler very clearly demonstrates the operation of the latter in her exploration of the 
indissociability of the materiality of sex and the discursive construction of gender. In 
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contrast to a simple conflation of “matter” with “reality,” Butler rightly insists that we 
should not think of matter “as site or surface, but as as process of materialisation that 
stabilises over time to produce the effect of boundary, fixity, and surface we call 
matter” (Bodies that Matter, 9; my emphasis). In this we can better understand the 
indissoluble imbrication of language, power, and bodyings, with iterability as its 
shared condition. While the fixity of a body is indeed fully material, as Butler 
continues, materiality must rather be thought “as power’s most productive effect” (2). 
Indeed, the very materiality which reiterates the common sense boundary of “the 
organism” is itself one such effect as well as the gauge of its investiture with power 
relations (37).  
In this idealisation of iterability, the singularity of a given being is thus 
necessarily and violently covered over, elided in its very making sense. It is this which 
constitutes the possibility of “disciplining” a body. In that dominant structures of 
meaning determine both that which does and which does not “make sense” in a given 
context, everyday being-in-the-world must thus be understood as an exclusion or 
excision from the means of making sense, an alienation from any will to recognition, 
as it is precisely by way of this prior exclusion from the means of making sense that 
the “agential” subject is constituted.57 At the same time, however, the immediate 
perception of this uniquely situated relation of being, that which Nietzsche calls the 
“entirely individual original experience” (TL, 83), equally necessarily reserves itself as 
withdrawn, and in so doing remains to haunt every ideality as the spectral trace within 
every repetition. Such is the “pure reserve” of unlivable excess which outlives every 
determinable form.58 
Here we find the two distinct but indissociable sites of non-sense briefly 
alluded to previously. On the one hand, the necessary withdrawal of being as such 
which is the condition of the production of sense (the taking place of language) and, on 
the other, the singular differences of a situated encounter which are violently elided in 
the recognition of its sense (language having always already taken place). In one sense 
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then, while the impossible event of infinite being as such necessarily withdraws in the 
everyday finite state of affairs, it is nonetheless the former which effaces itself in 
giving itself in and as the latter. At the same time, however, these two sites are 
absolutely heterogeneous in that the making sense of every being, and thus of the 
violent exclusion of singularity, precisely remarks a sense of the temporal, that is to 
say, an historically contingent time of sense. In the former then, being as such is 
already no longer perceptible in its being recognised, whereas in the latter being as 
such is always not yet perceptible, the reserve of pure potentiality.  
Given power’s investiture in the habitual effacement of difference that 
constitutes the possibility of making sense, the unlivable excess of pure reserve can 
necessarily be “actualised”—as we saw with both Heidegger and Nietzsche in the 
previous chapter—only as withdrawn. It manifests itself, that is to say, as meaning 
without sense (content) and as sense (sensibility) without meaning. As the sense only 
of being without sense, of the singular laying claim of being as such, it is thus a purely 
formal telling only of itself, one which exceeds every structure of meaning upon which 
its affective manifestness nevertheless depends. In this, the call of an impossible, 
singularly situated encounter potentially comes to be heard. A call which compels a 
becoming-other which cannot be predicted from within the everyday state of affairs it 
interrupts, and which in so doing violently dis-locates the certainty of being the “I” 
that “is,” the latter referring both to the secure sense of self as self, and to the surety of 
repose within the world.  
We are now better placed to understand why it is that that intervallic 
encounter in and as which Kafka’s investigator comes to be simultaneously throws this 
newly investigative “I” outside of “the ordinary, calm, happy life of every day” 
(“Investigations,” 286). Moreover, the canicentric interruption of an exceptional hubris 
enacted by Kafka’s autoheterobiography recalls us to the fact that, given that this “I” 
potentially marks any being constituted in and as recognition, the violent interruption 
of sense does not presuppose human consciousness as its condition, nor indeed any 
form of egological consciousness.  
Rather, withholding itself in giving itself, the encounter is that which 
necessarily exceeds all recognition and which is at once always already prior to 
recognition. Never the impossible truth of the object therefore, the madness or insensé 
of originary composition is rather the spectre of pure potentiality haunting every 
actualisation. The spectre, in other words, of all that has been foreclosed by the 
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contingent reproduction of a caricatured materialisation (the blinding clarity of 
iterability) coextensive with its investiture with power, and at once of the truth of 
originary composition prior to any recognition as truth.59 Always prior to the end effect 
of “Man” as the appearance of the lie within the concept of truth, being as such thus 
remains essentially other to truths and values, and thus to exclusion and demonisation. 
The spectre haunting every actualisation “is,” in short, the unlivable which outlives.  
In the violent dislocation of sense without sense, the self-certain I is thus 
disposed to anxiety in being exposed in and as what Giorgio Agamben in his reading 
of Heidegger calls “the suspension and withholding of all concrete and specific 
possibilities” (The Open, 67). This is not, however, the experience of the disconcealing 
of pure potentiality as Agamben claims, but rather pure potentiality as such, and thus 
precisely that which “I” can never experience. Originary being-with prior to any 
recognition, and thus always prior to the consitution of the “human” or the 
“nonhuman,” “is” (and is not) absolute inter, no longer and not yet. Put more simply, 
in the infinite materiality of pure potentiality nothing can possibly be. The reserve of 
infinite not yet in its taking place which, in having already taken-place, is always no 
longer in every actualisation. In this, being as such is the im-possibility of being.  
 
 
Following the apocalypse 
 
As the impossibility of possibility, infinite materiality is thus necessarily atemporal, 
ahistorical: untimely. The other of time, and thus heterogeneous to every state of 
affairs in which an “I” comes to be thrown, the disposing of being as such “is” 
therefore a maddening interlude from which an “I” can only return to anxiety, but 
never experience as such.  
It is this “moment” of being thrown from infinite senseless madness to the 
“there” of a previously unrecognisable “I” which Derrida attempts to recall in a well-
known passage from The Animal That Therefore I Am (2006). Here, he relates the 
story of how, naked in his bathroom one morning, he encounters the “bottomless gaze 
[regarde sans fond]” of his female companion cat in “an instant of extreme passion” 
(12) which— 
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offers to my sight the abyssal limit of the human: the inhuman or the 
ahuman, the ends of man, that is to say, the bordercrossing from which 
vantage man dares to announce himself to himself. And in these moments 
of nakedness, as regards the animal, everything can happen to me [tout peut 
m’arriver], I am like a child ready for the apocalypse. I am (following) the 
apocalypse itself [je suis l’apocalypse même], that is to say, the ultimate 
and first event of the end, the unveiling and the verdict (12). 
 
While there have been a number of recent interpretations of this passage,60 they have 
generally tended to focus on the gaze, whilst overlooking the interrelation of the “I” 
and the apocalypse in the play of “am [suis]” and “follow [suis].”61 Such an omission, 
however, elides the very trace of that encounter which is otherwise being sought. In 
this animal encounter (in the double sense of an animal encounter with a nonhuman 
animal), the nonsubstitutable singularity of this female cat opens itself beyond itself in 
giving itself outside of the constitutive outside of the properly human. It is in this 
instant of extreme passion, of absolute receptivity, that everything can happen but 
within which no one possibility, no one configuration can be actualised.  
The encounter, that is to say, “takes place” in the pure potentiality of the not 
yet taken place, within the apocalyptic suspension of every actualised possibility, but 
as such can only be called forth by an “I” insofar as its encounter “is” no longer. In 
other words, insofar as I am the apocalypse [je suis l’apocalypse], this necessarily 
precludes every “I” [je], and inasmuch as I am [suis] this possibility, “I” can thus only 
ever follow [suis]. An “I,” in short, comes back to find itself only in the anxious trace 
or mark of the encounter’s having already taken place, hence “I” necessarily follows 
the apocalypse [je suis l’apocalypse].62  
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Moreover, this marking, this trace of absolute disposition, thus remarks, that 
is, makes manifest, that which was previously foreclosed: a manifesto in its most literal 
sense. Such is its unnameable proclamation and appeal as yet without meaning, a sense 
as yet without sense, one which nonetheless violently calls forth its own monstrous and 
terrifyingly unknowable coming to be. A sense of without sense is, in other words, the 
trace of that which cannot be made sense of within the dominant structures of 
intelligibility-materialisation. Responding to this call, the “I” that comes back to itself 
is therefore an other, obligated in being exposed in and as a call which demands a 
response that exceeds all knowledge, which refutes every certainty and surpasses self-
understanding. Following the apocalypse, in other words, the force and the forces of 
the world undermine every attempt at capture. 
Moreover, having withdrawn in proclaiming its mark of the habitually 
unheard and forbidden, the violent encounter ever again reserves itself as infinite 
potentiality. It forever remains to come, to eternally return, insofar as it gives itself in 
tracing itself only as a future present: that which will have been attested to by the 
anxiety of its “sense without sense.”  
Hence, in Nietzsche’s parable of the eternal return “At Noontide” 
(Zarathustra, 287-9), Zarathustra is, like Kafka’s investigator, similarly thrown both 
from and to his senses in a violent seizure of attunement. “I know not how,” admits 
Zarathustra, “it inwardly touches me … it compels me.” Such is the strange, utterly 
disorientating intoxication that is to fall into the well of eternity, into the “serene and 
terrible noontide abyss” that “is” the apocalyptic eternity of the world’s singular 
perfection, “is” the “golden round ring” of being as such. Returned to his senses, 
Zarathustra finds himself transformed, all prior certainty destroyed: “I spoke once and 
thought myself wise. But it was a blasphemy: I have learned that now.” 
It should be noted, moreover, that there is nothing human to be found here, 
but only that which always remains to exceed the limit of “the Human.” That which is, 
Nietzsche writes, “[p]recisely the least, the gentlest, lightest, the rustling of a lizard, a 
breath, a moment, a twinkling of the eye” (288). Hence, those abyssal encounters 
between Zarathustra and his animals always take place in the infinite instant of 
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midday, “in” that very interval between moments which Heidegger describes as 
“unleash[ing] an essential image-generating force” (Nietzsche, II:46).63 
In summary then, the announcing of an animal encounter marks the chance 
relating of this bodying to this other bodying, a relation which has been foreclosed 
within a given state of affairs. As such, its demand necessarily exceeds the ability of a 
given way of being to “make sense,” that is, it exceeds its capacity of recognition. That 
which cannot be heard, which is “unheard-of,” “forbidden” and “unmentionable,” must 
therefore announce itself in and as the return of the “I” only as a sense of the without 
sense. It proclaims, in short, that the fact that this other being has no sense is in itself 
an issue. In this way, the foreclosure or forbiddenness of its sense is performed. It is a 
performative, moreover, which at the same time discloses the limit not only as limit, 
but as contingent limit. Enacting thus the prison of enclosure and delimitation, its 
questioning of enforced limits is therefore indissociable from its remarking of the 
evental withdrawal of being as such.  
 
 
Invention of monstrosity, monstrosity of invention 
 
Having thus explored how an unrecognisable other comes to impose itself within a 
given state of affairs, we focus in this section on the necessary monstrosity of its 
coming. Irreducible to any species other than that which Derrida describes as “the 
species of the nonspecies,” such monstrousness is, as we shall see, nothing less than 
the mark of invention. In the final section of this chapter, I will then consider the 
implications of such creative monstrosities for liberal ideology and for the staging of 
animalisation, before concluding with a deafening yet inaudible dance, one which 
throws a young dog into the “peculiarity” of critique. 
As we have seen, the trace of an encounter in its having taken place is the 
sense only of exclusion. Such is the mark of a present-absence or absent-presence, a 
ghostly apparition which announces the coming into being of spacing and articulation. 
Put another way, its sensible void marks the opening of a space of invention by which 
what is foreclosed can potentially be recognised, an invention which at the same time 
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is always haunted by the spectre of pure potentiality which withdraws in its coming to 
be. As the coming of something unrecognisable, of something unthinkable which 
cannot be, invention can only be monstrous, absolutely alien to all that is.64 It is this 
which for Nietzsche constitutes the supreme creative event: in and as the active 
forgetting of extreme passivity, a monstrous proclamation demands its unheard-of 
coming to be.  
In this uncanny animal encounter, this manifesto of making manifest, a new 
transductive being is created. That is, the “elements” of its unheard-of combination do 
not precede their relating, but rather can only be discerned retrospectively.65 It is 
compounded, in other words, of not the I that I was, and of not the other that he/she/it 
was. This is exemplified for us by the encounter which, as we have seen, creates 
Kafka’s investigator, an encounter compounded of neither the young dog that “I” was, 
nor the “actual” dogs that they were. Not only then, is the exposing of its demand 
irreducible to its elements, as indeed is the case in every attunement by which beings 
are always already outside themselves, but also that its elements as elements do not 
exist prior to its singular ex-appropriation, that is, prior to their being-with. Rather than 
preceding its call, the “I” is always constituted anew in and as the address, just as that 
which is made manifest in being so marked does not preexist this relation as such.  
Beings, in other words, do not precede the originary being-with that “is” 
being as such and which, as the condition of possibility for all individuation, 
necessarily precedes identity and substance.66 This “other I” thus bodies (in the 
Heideggerian sense of passage and transmission) a transformed relationality, an 
intensive, maddening relation of forces which (a) being seizes and is seized by.67 In 
and as the encounter, be it with the regarde sans fond of a “little cat” or with the shine 
upon an eye that is elided by that gaze, the “other I” thus becomes “animal” in the 
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sense that there can be nothing recognisable, nothing properly human (or, indeed, 
properly canine) in the attunement of an intensive composition which has no meaning. 
Such a composition, moreover, may irretrievably exceed a future reinscription of 
meaning, as we will discover in chapter five. 
One only ever calculates the human, that is, “the human” is made calculable 
by way of a discursive abstraction constructed through the forgetting of differences 
that transfers radical particularity into that Nietzschean land of “ghostly schemata.” By 
contrast, an animal encounter is precisely that which interrupts its most proper of 
properties: a nonhuman moment that exceeds every stable delimitation of the self and 
any fixed contour of the body, and at once an inhuman movement through the 
technicity of language. In and as the encounter, a new yet historically contingent being 
is created: a monstrosity “under the species of the nonspecies” that demands only its 
own impossible possibility. Hence, we can better understand Nietzsche’s claim to 
“write for a species that does not yet exist” (Will to Power, §958). Here too, the 
distinction between “nonhuman” and “inhuman” is clear: “nonhuman” refers to all 
those billions of singular living beings, constituted by the making of sense, who are 
other than human, whereas “inhuman” refers to the radically a-human machinery of 
sense, the structure of language, which constitutes every living being.  
The animal encounter which calls forth a radically new being must thus 
interrupt our regulative economies which otherwise determine a response (or, rather, a 
reaction). An inscription of pure language in and as its withdrawal, it necessarily 
cannot be said nor shown as it “is,” but rather can only be indicated precisely where 
and when it is not. In this, the call without sense is both apostrophe and ellipsis: a 
catastrophic interruption and at once a mark of withdrawal and of a disclosure by 
concealment, a wound in the economy of the Same.  
The trace of the encounter is thus the giving of spacing and articulation, an 
opening of a space of recognition to-come and an opening in and of everyday time. An 
opening, that is to say, which disrupts the linear temporality reproduced by that 
idealisation of iterability which permits the identification of the same throughout 
possible repetitions, and which is indissociable from the sedimentation that constitutes 
historicity. In this, the trace of the withdrawal of being as such constitutes a temporal 
irruption within the everyday spatialisation of time (i.e., temporality constructed as a 
linear series of discrete and bounded “now’s”).  
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As a result, its irruption is forced, as we will see, to don a prothestic from the 
past in order to preserve this untimely becoming-time of space and becoming-space of 
time. In so doing, moreover, it necessarily stages an intensive metonymic 
correspondence as the result of its catachrestic positing within improper contexts. This 
inventive interruption of the linearity of time is, in other words, the becoming-sensible 
of that which is not possible, in being excluded from “making sense,” within a given 
state of affairs. As such, it puts into question both the calculability of linear time, and 
the previously apodictic propriety of the prevailing order.  
Once again, however, it must be recalled that what I insist on calling the 
animal encounter can never be restricted to the human animal: both as that which 
always already exceeds “the human,” and as that from which a nonhuman in her, his, 
or its ways of being can never be excluded, just as she, he, or it can be excluded neither 
from time nor from historicity.68 Such is the habitual making of sense, as explored in 
our earlier discussion of Nietzsche, and which he also calls memory: “the quantity of 
all experiences of all … life, alive, self-ordering, mutually forming each other, 
competing with each other, simplifying, condensing and transforming into many 
different unities. There must exist an inner process, which proceeds like the formation 
of concepts [Begriffsbildung] out of many singular cases [Einzelfällen].”69 Put simply, 
something new comes into being without as yet making sense. While this something 
new could be an encounter which transforms this “Derrida’s” way of being, or this 
“Investigator’s” way of being, it could equally well be something new which 
transforms this cat’s or this troupe of elephants’ ways of being within a given state of 
affairs. Either or both, such inter- and intra-species encounters may call the new into 
the ways of being this nonhuman animal without ever encountering a human way of 
being, and vice versa, or neither, or both. 
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Exclusions and inaugural citations 
 
Where then, does this notion of monstrous invention leave us as regards the place of 
nonhuman animals in relation both to the economy of animalisation, and to the 
ideology of liberal individualism? Most obviously, its mute announcing addresses 
itself to those founding exclusions upon which the “inclusive” ideology of liberal 
“consensus” depends and, more generally, to that which is habitually excluded in the 
order and the ordering of a given state.  
More than this, however, its anarchic call to disorder in fact makes 
perceptible the whole murderous theatrics of animalisation, that is, the machinic 
reproduction marshalling that which, in the Introduction, I called the economy of 
genocide. Animalisation, as we have seen, consists of the reductive reconfiguration of 
a constructed “identity” as “animal” which, figured along a humanist teleological 
dialectic, is thus considered synonymous with “subhuman.” It is, in other words, the 
institutional reproduction of materialisation, determined within dominant relations of 
power, by which singular situated “bodyings” are written over and thus excluded from 
making sense. An economy, moreover, which in the modern era is in large part 
reducible to the demands of Capital. In this, as we shall see in the final chapter, the 
animal encounter is necessarily anti-capital, be it national or international, intellectual, 
biomedical, or the “simple” economics of subsistence.  
Within the terms laid out in this thesis, this movement of sedimented traces by 
which other bodies are constituted as killable can thus be understood as a reactive 
ordering of the sensible. In this, an habitual misrecognition is produced which, in 
dogmatically predetermining the sense of an encounter prior to its taking place, 
essentially prevents that encounter from taking place, whilst at the same time 
reproducing the “proper” limit of the human collective. In contrast to the tropological 
displacement of animalisation, however, the call without sense is the call of and to 
tropes which function in precisely the opposite direction. Rather than reductive 
metaphors and anthropomorphisms of “proper” identity, they mark instead the coming 
to be of improper animal relations which make it unthinkable that other living 
beings—whether human or nonhuman—can be put to death with impunity.  
These tropes will be explored in detail in the next chapter, but we can already 
begin to understand how it is the creative-destructive positing of Nietzschean irony 
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which permits the untimely call without sense to become sensible, that is, which makes 
it possible to constitute an effect. As that which does not mean what it says, only an 
ironic figure can perform, and thus form, materialise or manifest, that terrifying 
demand and meaningless compound which marks only the sense of exclusion. 
Furthermore, as inaugural and citational, the impossibility of such tropes is the im-
possibility of invention itself, that is, of being necessarily a repetition in order to make 
sense and at the same time absolutely other to that which is possible within a given 
state of affairs.  
For an example of this impossibly improper figure, a figure whose very 
impropriety in another sense renders every example impossible, we need only to return 
to the neutral “it” of Kafka’s overwhelmed listener, exposed in the zoogenetic interval 
between dog and investigator. As we have seen, the narrator of Kafka’s 
heterobiography comes to be only following an intoxicated interval between first-
persons. Hence, the investigating “I” can only call forth the encounter with what may 
or may not be seven dogs by way of the placeholding marker of the neutral third-
person. Prior to sense, this caesura “is” thus a nonmoment which essentially does not 
take place, and thus there can be no sense of the encounter in and as which the 
investigator has always already come to be.  
Nevertheless, this is not to say that the encounter henceforth remains 
indescribable. Rather, I have argued, its call without sense is precisely the opening of a 
space in which the unnameable—that unmentionable which stares us in the face—may 
come to being. How then, does the investigator-narrator reenact the event? This is 
indeed our question for the remainder of this chapter and all of the next. How, in other 
words, does a body reconstitute its purely formal trace of nothing that is being, and 
which is not nothing? How to re-articulate that which, in its calling forth or conjuring 
up of a nonmoment in and as which “I” is other, is both the condition of possibility of 
autobiography and at once its impossibility?  
The investigator, we discover, can recall the encounter only in calling up an 
impossible simultaneity: that of a violently inaudible blast of sound, of determined 
silence and strident, ear-rending music. 
 
[The seven dogs] did not speak, they did not sing, they remained generally 
silent, almost determinedly silent; but from the empty air they conjured 
music. Everything was music, the lifting and setting down of their feet, 
certain turns of the head, their running and their standing still … this blast 
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of music … seemed to come from all sides … blowing fanfares so near that 
they seemed far away and almost inaudible (“Investigations,” 281-2). 
 
Just as the neutral “it” holds the impossible grammatical place of the (non)subject, we 
thus find that the animal encounter takes on an improper metonymy which holds and 
marks the place of the impossible (non)event. It is, in other words, to “clothe” an event 
which has neither spatiality nor temporality and which disrupts without limit the 
autobiographical narrative. Here then, is the borrowed costume, the senseless 
“dressing” of an improper metonymy: such is the silent and at once clamorous music 
without which “the creative gift” of the canine race cannot come to make sense, cannot 
be heard (281). The improper, placeholding metonymy, in other words, marks a 




4. “We are all German Jews”:  





The question of this chapter, as we know, concerns the way in which the untimely call 
without sense takes on a borrowed metonymical costume in order that its demand 
might constitute an effect. This question will be explored directly through an 
explication of the political force of the impossible performative “We are all German 
Jews [Nous sommes tous des juifs allemands]” enacted in France in 1968, paying 
particular attention to its relation to what Jacques Rancière calls assujetissement or 
“subjectivisation.”  
Put simply, I will argue that it is only by taking on the “technical prosthesis” 
of just such a borrowed costume that an encounter’s demand comes to be preserved, a 
preserving which makes possible the chance of fighting a dominant power for the past. 
Historically contingent, the ghostly announcing of the encounter in this way takes on a 
material form. A coming to being which, through its staging of an intensive 
metonymic corresponding with the past which refutes all historicist reduction, enables 
it to have an effect in and upon the world by putting to work otherwise the machinery 
of sense. It is in this way, as we shall see, that such tropes function in precisely the 
opposite direction to animalisation, interrupting its genocidal economy. 
Following the apocalyptic encounter which interrupts the linear time of the 
everyday, while it is the mute call which marks its opening as the taking place of time, 
it is by contrast the “preserving” metonymy which, in having always already taken 
place, constitutes its own time and space. In this way, that which the prevailing order 
must exclude comes to be reinscribed as the outside of that order and thus, outside of 
consensual reflection, as a division within that ordered state of affairs. This is not to 
suggest, however, some kind of transcendence of the everyday. Rather, the 
revolutionary positing of an improper, placeholding metonymy, as a catachrestic 
reinscription which refuses complete subsumption to the Same, is necessarily 
immanent to sedimented power relations. This is simply because the necessity of our 
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passive being-thrown must already preserve just such a chance encounter of material 
imposition, a necessary chance which interrupts the habitual reproduction of sense.  
 
 
Rancière: proximity and unbridgeable distance 
 
One of the few political theorists to take serious account of deconstruction, Jacques 
Rancière too is concerned with the staging of a revolutionary performative which 
allows those who do not “count” within a given state of affairs to make sense. In this, 
Rancière’s position is, as we shall see, closely allied to my own. In other ways, 
however, our positions are diametrically opposed. First of all, the place of the 
encounter is, for Rancière, an essentially human domain dependent upon “the desire to 
engage in reasoned discourse” which thus disqualifies nonhumans as potential 
participants.70 Secondly, and perhaps as a result of these differing starting points, we 
reach different conclusions regarding the relation of the event to the revolutionary 
performative, as this chapter will show. Nevertheless, the proximity of Rancière’s 
position will hopefully serve here to further clarify my own.  
For Rancière, and in contrast to the police order which “arranges that tangible 
reality in which bodies are distributed in community,” political activity is “whatever 
shifts a body from the place assigned to it or changes a place’s destination. It makes 
visible what had no business being seen … it makes understood as discourse what was 
once only heard as noise” (Disagreement, 28, 30). One can thus clearly understand 
why for Rancière the task of philosophy is necessarily political when he asserts that 
thinking is always a “rethinking,” that is, “an activity that displaces an object away 
from the site of its original appearance or attending discourse” (“Dissenting Words,” 
120).  
Political philosophy, in other words, is concerned with active restaging, or 
assujetissement (subjectivisation), a process by which, in and as the enactment of a 
revolutionary performative, those “outcasts” who are “denied an identity in a given 
order of policing” thus come to be perceived as viable discursive beings (Rancière 
“Politics,” 61). In short, politics, as opposed to policy, consists of making sensible that 
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 This was Rancière’s response to the question as posed by Jane Bennett at a conference at 
Goldsmiths College in 2003. See Bennett Vibrant Matter: A Political Ecology of Things 
(Durham & London: Duke University Press, 2010), 106.  
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which is insensible within a given state of affairs. Hence, political activity is the 
coming to be sensible of any and all bodies rendered invisible and voiceless within a 
given police order. The question then, is how, and under what conditions, those 
“bodies” which, reproduced as invisible, senseless noise according to a historically 
contingent “distribution of sensible,” thus come to make sense.  
According to Rancière, such a process of politics can never consist of “an act 
of an identity,” but is rather “the formation of a one that is not a self but is the relation 
of a self to an other” (60). The “process of disidentification” (61) is, in other words, 
dependent upon a trope “that links the name of a group or class to the name of no 
group or no class, a being to a non-being or a not yet being” (61). Things are not so 
simple, however, in that this “does not mean the assumption of a different identity or 
the plain confrontation of two identities” (62). In other words, it can neither be a 
metaphorical claim to another’s identity (whether directly or as their representative), 
nor the unfamiliar juxtaposition of two previously recognisable (“proper”) identities, a 
calculated relation whose very unfamiliarity, as we know, depends upon the prior 
sense of the elements being recognised.  
Rather, writes Rancière, such an “impossible identification” takes place only 
as “an interval or gap: being together to the extent that we are between—between 
names, identities, cultures, and so on” (62). It is then, a being-together in and as a 
relation to an other that is not, or not yet, that is, the “heterological enactment” of an 
improper metonymy whose elements do not precede their relation in that it is at once 
“the denial of an identity given … by the ruling order of policy” (64). The condition of 
possibility for this heterological enactment is precisely iterability. This is because it is 
iterability which ensures that the dissemination of a “series of words” cannot be 
controlled, insofar as any such series is “equally available both to those entitled to use 
it and those who are not” (“Dissenting Words,” 116).71 
The enactment of an improper metonymy is, as Rancière asserts, nothing less 
than the “creative activity of invention that allows for a redescription and 
reconfiguration of a common world of experience” (116). For him, this is exemplified 
par excellence by the affirmation in 1968 of an impossible identification with a 
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which ensures such dissemination and at the same time reserves it for the human alone. See 
“Dissenting Words,” 115. 
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number of Algerians beaten to death and dumped in the Seine by the police seven 
years earlier. “We could not,” writes Rancière, 
 
identify with those Algerians, but we could question our identification with 
the “French people” in whose name they had been murdered … we could 
act as political subjects in the interval or the gap between two identities, 
neither of which we could assume. The process of subjectivisation had no 
proper name, but it found its name, its cross name, in the 1968 assumption 
“We are all German Jews”—a “wrong” identification (“Politics,” 61). 
 
Here, there are obvious similarities between that which Rancière understands as the 
process of assujetissement, and that unrecognisable being-with which I have described 
as an animal encounter, as shown most clearly in the example of Kafka’s young dog. 
The latter, as we recall, is thrown from his self into an interval between the youth he 
was and the investigator he will become. Nevertheless, a number of difficulties remain 
concerning Rancière’s accounts of the political positing of an impossible identification.  
In the first place, Rancière does not give us to understand exactly how that 
restaging comes to be, nor of the efficacy of its becoming. He does, however, suggest 
that assujetissement consists not simply of “unentitled” speech acts, but also of a 
mimicking of the existing discourse of power, for which the secession of the Roman 
plebeians serves as his primary example. Thus, states Rancière, it is “necessary to 
invent the scene upon which spoken words may be audible, in which objects may be 
visible, and individuals themselves may be recognised” (“Dissenting Words,” 116). 
Such an invention, he argues, establishes another distribution of the sensible by 
executing “a series of speech acts that mimic those of the patricians” (Disagreement, 
24).  
It is difficult to know if this is exactly the same process of subjectivisation as 
“We are all German Jews,” but it is nonetheless clear that it similarly involves the 
invention of an improper metonymy, the positing of the same “we are and are not.” 
Such a performative, however, points to a prior coming to one’s senses otherwise 
which, only in its having already taken place, at once calls forth the mime. That is to 
say, the plebeians’ coming to a sense of themselves as beings whose “right” to make 
sense has been previously elided, and thus of a division within the State, must have 
already taken place. It is rather the case that the posthumous, post-apocalyptic sense of 
being without sense is precisely the call and manifesto—the assujetissement—which 
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precedes any such placeholding “prosthesis.” It is, in other words, the prior condition 
of the borrowed costume that is the “cross” name.  
Hence, whereas a restaging for Rancière is that human speech act which shifts 
a body outside ordered distribution by its making sensible the previously insensible, I 
would argue that such political restaging is rather the preservation of the encounter’s 
call. The meaningless metonymic placeholder, in other words, constitutes the time and 
space of an encounter which has already taken place, and which is staged by a being 
who has already come to be outside of an ordered state of affairs. I shall endeavour to 




“We are all German Jews” 
 
In order to understand the efficacy of the improper metonymy “We are all German 
Jews,” it is thus necessary to focus not solely on its positing, but also on that which 
constitutes its condition of possibility. First of all, its chance paradoxically resides in 
the very relations of power it puts into question. This is because the excess of an 
encounter is always and only that which exceeds the proper identification demanded 
by institutionalised, yet historically contingent, recognition. Here then, a singular 
encounter with the abject materiality of the dead Algerians comes to dislocate the 
recognisable “I.” In other words, the anxious call of both its insensibility and at once 
the sense of its sense having being effaced, thus dis-locates the sense of a delimited 
self exposed within a shared community affect, in this instance “the French people.” 
This “sense without sense” can necessarily mark only its absence of content in its 
being prior to any possible referent and thus, in its interruption of the habitual 
interpretations inhabited by dominant relations of power, “I” comes to be other, falling 
in the interval between two identities: no longer a recognisable “I” and not yet a 
recognisable other. Hence, that which Rancière neatly describes as “the paratactic logic 
of a ‘we are and are not’” (“Politics,” 62) can be understood as synonymous with the 
phrase “I is other.”  
In short then, being this being encountering an excessive withdrawal of sense 
in the singularity of its being-there-in-relation to the murdered Algerians, forces its “I” 
from the self-certainty of familiar repose, and to that anxiety which marks, and is 
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indissociable from, the impossible irruption of the as such, of the taking place of sense, 
within the everyday.  
All this then, is prior to the actual positing of an improper metonymy which 
rather preserves that monstrous call of a time and space to come. A preserving, in other 
words, of “the advent of thinking for those who were not initially destined to think” 
(Rancière “Dissenting Words,” 121). Insofar as the encounter can be apprehended only 
as meaning without sense (content) and as sense (sensibility) without meaning, its 
making sense permits only and always an inaugural citation, an ironic positing 
whereby the unheard-of combination becomes sensible. Explicitly put in the place of 
that unnameable which withdraws, such a meaningless placeholder explicitly refuses 
identity, mimesis and surrogacy. Instead, it preserves the having come to being of a 
space and a time of becoming which, while (the) outside of a given state of affairs, 
nevertheless resonates within that state of affairs.  
Monstrous and unnameable, the call without sense must thus take on a 
borrowed costume in order to be. It must, in other words, take on the languages, senses 
and conventions of the old in order to compose an improper past-future metonymy 
which marks the irruption of the new in its positing within contexts where it has not 
previously belonged. In so doing, its inaugural citation necessarily interrupts the 
economy of substitution, that is, of metaphor as understood within the discipline of 
rhetoric as an identification of one thing with another (this is that). Only in this way is 
an opening of the time-space of the new preserved.  
In this, “We are all German Jews” is an intensive, nondialectical 
corresponding with the past, that is, it possesses neither a proper nor a figurative sense 
but only the intensity of beings improperly resonating together, past and future. The 
dislocating trace, in order to preserve its own time and space to come, thus calls to an 
untimely deterritorialisation of sense which, dependent upon the fact that the context of 
a phrasing is never fully determined, thus functions as a catachrestic reinscription.72 
The “impossible” sense of the enactment “We are all German Jews” thus constitutes at 
once an intensive relation and a restaging, and it is through the prosthesis of such a 
borrowed costume that the necessary countersignatures of recognition are gained.  
Dressed thus in an improper metonymy, the mute manifesto of a content-less 
relation, which Rancière describes as “being together to extent that we are in between” 
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(“Politics” 62), comes to being, becomes manifest. Hence, the “borrowed costume” 
can be neither an imitation nor a calculation “for the benefit of” or “on behalf of” that 
with which it comes to be, which would presuppose a preceding identity. In Rancière’s 
words, it is neither the “assumption of a different identity [n]or the plain confrontation 
of two identities” (62).  
In order to understand the efficacy of this preserving, however, it is necessary 
to leave Rancière for a moment and turn instead to what Karl Marx calls, in contrast to 
the walking ghosts of nihilistic parody, the recovery of the spirit of revolution. Here 
too, we discover a point of contact, a co-respondence, with Nietzsche and the 
announcement of the overhuman which outlives every determinable form. 
 
 
The spirit of revolution 
 
In the famous opening passages of The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte 
(1852), Marx writes of those bodies which, never the liberal subjects of free will, 
instead find themselves only in being displaced, never making history “under 
circumstances they themselves have chosen, but under circumstances directly 
encountered, given and transmitted from the past” (146).73 The relation of a body to 
the world is, in other words, delimited by the idealisation of iterability, that is to say 
historicity, and thus the making of sense always precedes the exposing in and as which 
a being comes to be. As a result, “making history” is at once the necessity and the 
impossibility of the new:  
 
The tradition of all the dead generations weighs like a nightmare on the 
minds of the living. And, just when they appear to be engaged in the 
revolutionary transformation of themselves and their material surroundings, 
in the creation of something which does not yet exist, precisely in such 
epochs of revolutionary crisis they anxiously conjure up [beschwören sie 
ängstlich] the spirits of the past to their service; they borrow from them 
names, slogans and costumes so as to stage the new world-historical scene 
in this venerable disguise and borrowed language (146-7). 
 
Employing the example of The French Revolution’s catachrestic donning of Roman 
costume, Marx here describes the necessity of borrowing the costumes of the past in 
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113 
 
order for that transformation to be staged. A borrowing, moreover, which is 
subsequent to the revolutionary transformation which has already “appeared.” In other 
words, in order for the new to stage its until then only potential efficacy in the world, it 
must improperly take on, i.e., restage, costumes borrowed from the past. Prior to this 
necessity, which is another way of noting the impossibility of the appearing coming to 
be as such, any “engaged” living beings only appear to have been transformed, 
without producing any material effect.  
The material transformation thus occurs only with a reconfiguration of both 
an earlier time and another language, that is to say, with a reactivation of spectral 
sediments in an anxious process of “world-historical necromancy 
[Totenbeschwörung]” (147). In these revolutionary restagings, 
 
the resurrection of the dead served to exalt the new struggles, rather than to 
parody the old, to exaggerate the given task in the imagination, rather than 
to flee from solving it in reality, and to recover the spirit of the revolution, 
rather than to set its ghost walking again (148). 
 
Here then, Marx points to two different ways of restaging the past. On the one hand, 
we find a recourse to the ghost of parody which flees the task of the new and, on the 
other, an anxious conjuration from unnameable monstrosity to a resurrected corpse 
which recovers the revolutionary spirit insofar as it exalts the new. I will return to this 
notion of parody in the next section, but for now we see that, for Marx, it is only with 
the latter that that which is not yet might come to be. 
With this lively restaging of a corpse, and of the need to dress the 
revolutionary spirit in the clothes of the old and dead, we are thus recalled to 
Nietzsche’s affirmative response. As we have seen, such a response improperly stages 
the singular, unheard-of relation which does not live but rather only out-lives 
[überleben] every determinable form. It is this response which materialises the silent 
announcing of that which survives the properly human, and which Werner Hamacher 
acutely contends comes to be “only in the form of one who, having outlasted the death 
of its type, has returned to haunt the living: a living corpse” (“Disgregation,” 159; 
emphasis added). The posthumous, posthuman corpse thus out-lives its type and genus 
insofar as it exceeds its proper sense and limit. Having finitude as its condition, and 
hence a technics as and at the origin of life, we recall its “dangerous” reiteration is that 
which interrupts all life, and by which life out-lives itself.  
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In this, we can better understand how the affirmative turn of the phrase “We 
are all German Jews,” in that it returns as a living corpse, comes to interrupt the given 
state of affairs. It announces, in other words, the return of the repressed Algerian 
corpses in their being raised (again) and catachrestically posited within contexts where 
they had not previously belonged. In this way, they “out-live” their proper sense, that 
is, they outlive their habitual actualisation in a given state of affairs. Hence, it is the 
death machine of living being which, as both the condition of possibility of proprietary 
norms and of their “out-living,” thus enables the shattering return of the oppressed. 
Such is a conjuration from unnameable monstrosity to resurrected corpse as a calling 
upon death to summon the future and invent the impossible. 
 
 
Ghosting the revolution 
 
It remains, however, to understand the distance and at once the proximity of this 
revolutionary necromancy to the walking ghost of parody. Here, it becomes necessary 
to recall with Marx Nietzsche’s specular figures of nihilism.  
Perhaps unsurprisingly, given both the tropological machinery of sense and 
the elliptical apostrophe of the call marking in anxiety the zoogenetic translation, the 
key to the difference between Marx’s revolutionary spirit and that of the walking ghost 
lies in their tropes. On the one side, we have the living corpse of catachrestic repetition 
and, on the other, parody. Parodic citation is, as we have seen, one of the two forms of 
nihilism Nietzsche seeks to move beyond. Figured by the “last man” as the advocate of 
the cynical play of relativism, parody consists of a play with habitual values in such a 
way as they become ghostly remains, albeit remains always haunted by the spirit of 
revolutionary invention they elide. In this, parody plays with recognised sense in a 
calculated game of exquisite corpse. It is this ghost of parody which Marx locates in 
the bourgeois society of post-revolutionary France:  
 
Bourgeois society was no longer aware that the ghosts of Rome had 
watched over its cradle, since it was wholly absorbed in the production of 
wealth and the peaceful struggle of economic competition … And its 
gladiators found in the stern classical traditions of the Roman republic the 
ideals, art forms and self-deceptions they needed in order to hide from 
themselves the limited bourgeois content of their struggles and to maintain 




Parody, a game which plays with ghosts so as to always reproduce an ashen corpse, is 
that which remains when the revolutionary restaging comes to be a part of, rather than 
apart from, a given state of affairs, its sense having being reinscribed. Moreover, it is a 
reinscription which must, given the necessary idealisation of iterability, always already 
accompany the recovery of the revolutionary spirit in coming to be as a living corpse. 
Hence, given that this “‘still undrained, still unexhausted decay’ lives on” (Hamacher 
“Disgregation,” 160), we are returned to the Nietzschean imperative of an eternally 
returning autocritique. Here then, economic interest, that sedimented investiture of 
power effaced in actualisation, not so much takes on as necessarily congeals into a 
parody of revolutionary spirit. In this way, the last man and the walking ghost, through 
the ideality of iterability, together figure the utilitarian sedimentation by which a 
dominant power conserves its position.  
For Marx, having witnessed “the ghost of the old revolution” which, from 
1848 to 1851, “knew no better than to parody” (Eighteenth Brumaire, 148, 147), the 
circumvention of the indissociability of the revolution and its ghost could thus only be 
that most urgent of all concerns if the working class revolution was to permanently 
succeed. In this early stage of Marx’s project then, there is a fundamental difference 
between his conception of “ideology” and Nietzsche’s notion of “metaphysical 
fictions.”74 It is this which places Nietzsche in opposition to the young Marx: whereas 
Marx’s world is hopeful for the future but joyless in the present, Nietzsche’s world, 
given that the overhuman remains always to come, is bereft of hope for the future but 
potentially filled with joy in the present. Opposites yes, yet both worlds are filled with 
fetishes and illusions it is necessary to over-come (Marx) or under-go (Nietzsche). 
Concerned thus with how the revolutionary spirit might somehow maintain its 
exalting automanifestation in the world without succumbing to a parodic hollowing-
out disguising cynical self-interest, the young Marx thus turns to the example of 
language itself. It follows from our argument thus far that, in order to avoid the 
reiteration by which the revolutionary citation becomes its own ghost, the improper 
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metonymy of the successful revolution to come must be utterly discontinuous with the 
past, that is, it must thus refuse the possibility of reiteration. Hence Marx speaks of the 
language of revolution, arguing that while “the beginner who has learned a new 
language always retranslates it into his mother tongue,” such a language “can only be 
said to have appropriated the spirit of the new language and to be able to produce in it 
freely when he can manipulate it without reference to the old” (146-7). The improper 
metonymy by which the future revolution preserves itself must, in other words, no 
longer relay the old, must no longer be haunted by the past from which it is excised in 
being transformed.  
In this way, the power of a revolutionary positing must be utterly, i.e., 
permanently, discontinuous with any possibility of making sense within the given state 
of affairs it interrupts. It can, in Marx’s words, “only create its poetry from the future, 
not from the past. … There the phrase transcended the content [die Phrase über den 
Inhalt]; here the content transcends the phrase” (149). The problem, however, is that 
for the “phrase” to be effective in the world, for it to make sense, it must relay the past, 
inasmuch as the making of sense in fact depends upon the indissociability of spirit and 
ghost, which is precisely the condition of its being-constituted. The “phrase,” in other 
words, is the having taken on of a materiality, an expropriation of form which, as with 
all forms, constitutes a mask. Such is the manifest dissimulation necessary to effect an 
efficacious restaging, and in this the improper metonymy must always transcend the 
content.75  
Hence, whereas for Marx the revolutionary transformation is appropriated 
when “the new” is no longer marked in its difference and deferral, it is rather that this 
appropriation marks the cooptation, or reinscription, of its interruption within a state of 
affairs. It is the moment, in other words, when the idealisation of the phrasing allows 
for its parodic manipulation. Once again then, in becoming “naked”—becoming 
“human” in the figural sense I am employing it here—its excluded sense is disguised 
by an apparent transparency. Such is the walking ghost, a congealed clarity which 
dissimulates the impropriety of the address of an “animal” encounter. 
In summary therefore, the revolutionary phrasing is the preserving of an 
encounter which, in borrowing the old clothes of the past, enacts a restaging in which 
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the new-old language refuses to make sense. Insofar as it remains between senses in 
this way, it both no longer and not yet makes sense, but rather constitutes a time-space 
of intensive correspondence. The sense of the materiality which exceeds its 
placeholder is thus, in Marx’s terms, the content outliving as its phrase. Its power, in 
other words, resides in the between of sense, an indecipherable intervallic zone 
between negation and sublation which ruptures any possibility of synthesis.  
However, whereas this inaugural improper metonymy is the interval, the 
between of dis-identification of which Rancière speaks, this disposition which marks 
the intensity of its coming to be must nonetheless inevitably become its own ghost. 
Becoming naked, transparent, the intensity of its improper clothes fades into 
nothingness, losing itself to the nihilistic parody of the last man. Derrida puts this 
succinctly when, in Spectres of Marx, he notes that as “soon as one identifies a 
revolution, it begins to imitate, it enters into a death agony” (144).  
 
 
Viral micropolitics and genealogical conflagrations  
 
Returning to Rancière, we can now understand why the phrase “We are all German 
Jews,” “the validity of which … rest[s] entirely on the capacity to overturn the political 
relationship between the order of designations and that of events” (Rancière 
“Dissenting Words,” 114), exists only as an intensive corresponding. It is not, in other 
words, a synthesis, but rather a placeholder whose invention marks, and is marked by, 
its intensity in holding open the “place” of the interval from and to which a being is 
recalled otherwise. Hence, as Rancière argues, the name always finds itself, that is, 
finds its “cross” or “wrong” name (“Politics,” 61).  
The improper metonymy is, in short, a prosthesis, a bandage and a mask of 
disconcealment which, making no sense, rather enacts an intensive resonance that is a 
making sensible. The assujetissement which Rancière locates with its constitutive 
declaration is precisely that which is called forth by the disorientating withdrawal of 
the animal encounter, its improper dressing that which effectively stages an intensive 
metonymic corresponding with the past. Constituting in this way its own time and 
space, it thus reinscribes as its divisive outside that which the prevailing order must 
exclude. It is, in other words, the staging of an unmentionable relation which, as 
Rancière attests, “is not a place for dialogue or a search for a consensus” (62).  
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In contrast to a reasonable application on the basis of prior identity, the 
performative affirmation of an improper metonymy demands only those affirmative 
countersignatures by which that exclusion is recognised. Its phrase resonates, 
intensifying and coalescing in an opposition, imposing its own sense differently and at 
once interpellating other beings which come to be in sharing the disorientating call of 
its encounter. This transformative force is not linear, it does not “catch fire.” Rather, its 
efficacy is the chance affect of a feverish disposition which may flare up in local 
conflagrations in and as an inhuman multitude inflamed by the prevailing order’s 
refusal to recognise its sense. Aesthetic in the Nietzschean sense of before and beyond 
any notion of taste and judgment, it is thus always already political in that it is other to 
the dominant culture of recognised value. It is, in short, the coming to be of a 
nonreactive, affirmative micropolitics which allows for a political ethics insofar as it 
operates without any kind of transcendence, that is, without any overarching control 
from above. 
Moreover, the resonance of the phrasing is at once the opening of the space of 
a Nietzschean genealogy, of its mapping of a site of exclusion, in that the coming to be 
sensible at once marks its prior nonsensibility. That is, it makes legible its prior 
exscription from sense as an—hitherto imperceptible—operation of power. Thus, the 
inscription of and as the new is at once the possibility of a genealogical rearticulation 
which, in that making sense of a prior exclusion makes perceptible the economic 
interest concealed within the parodic citation of habitual values, calls others to an 
encounter with the force of the reinscribed exclusion.  
In this way, the phrasing “We are all German Jews” is not only the 
placeholder of a new encounter, but also a genealogical opening in which can be made 
legible the investment of power in the prior exclusion of the newly sensible Algerian 
bodies. It potentially makes perceptible, in other words, the local theatre of 
animalisation, and thus the machinery of constitutive exclusion. In short, the 
placeholding improper metonymy enacts a restaging which constitutes both the 
resonance for further encounters to come, and a genealogical opening for a rethinking 
or restaging within historiological discourse. Heretic genealogies can thus be said to 
become perceptible in and as moments of time and repetition, reinscribing thus the 
temporal irruption within the everyday spatialisation of time through an account of its 
prior effacement. In this way such genealogies bear witness to that which remains 
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Conclusion: from a happy life to a joyful one 
 
That which I have called an animal encounter can thus be summarised as a movement 
in two directions. On the one paw, it is the opening of a space and a time of 
recognition to come and, on the other, the opening of the past as the future by thinking 
what takes place today. To understand the efficacy of “We are all German Jews,” for 
example, or of the most proximal silence of the furthest deafening fanfare, it is 
therefore necessary to respond to the demands of its coming to being: What investment 
of reproduction, its silent, deafening compulsion, rendered its prior insensibility? What 
use does such an elision serve? Which figures organise the effect of foreclosure? and 
so on.  
The space of genealogy is thus the chance to interpret and evaluate, in 
Deleuze’s words, the “truth of a thought … according to the forces of power that 
determine it to think and to think this rather than that” (Nietzsche and Philosophy, 97). 
As such, in disclosing “what forces are hiding themselves in the thought of this truth, 
and therefore what its sense and value is” (97), the genealogical space thereby offers a 
radical political historiology in that the making sense of the previously insensible 
demands an oppositional stance to the state of affairs that reproduced its exclusion. It 
is, in short, the redoubled space of respond-ability: the excessive recursivity between 
concept and singular experience, between deafness and the inaudible clamour of being-
with. Only here, in and as this redoubled space, resides the potential of an emergent 
trajectory of escape. 
At last then, in concluding this part let us consider once more the example of 
Kafka’s investigator which which it began. The investigator, we recall, having come to 
his senses following the intoxicating expropriation of the “I,” comes to a self that 
senses itself constrained by previously insensible limits. As a result of this, however, at 
the same time as the youth becomes an investigator he also finds himself irredemiably 
displaced from the “happy life” of the everyday. The animal encounter, in other words, 
calls forth the investigator as it at once demands from the investigator an indefatigable, 
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unending pursuit that is nothing less than an unending critique of theology, economics, 
politics and philosophy. 
No longer insensible to the impositions and exclusions of knowing, the 
investigator is thus marked out by his disorientating encounter: “my peculiarities 
[Sonderbarkeiten],” he writes, “lie open to the day” (“Investigations,” 279). Thereafter, 
the investigator can maintain with his silence neither the nostalgic reactive longing for 
ecstatic communion nor the quietism of harmonious consensus which serves only to 
maintain the status quo. Rather, in becoming he is paradoxically compelled to always 
seek instead those irresistible [unwiderstehlich] encounters which “drive us again and 
again, as though by sheer force, out of our social circle” (280). He is compelled, in 
other words, to open his self to those encounters which drive us out beyond our all too 
canine, all too human limitations, and which make demands upon us beyond and 
before every proper delimitation of species. What is more, as Nietzsche would no 









The “unrecognisable,” I shall say in a somewhat elliptical way, is the 
beginning of ethics, of the Law, and not of the human. So long as there is 
recognisability and fellow, ethics is dormant.  
Jacques Derrida The Beast and the Sovereign 
 
 
Whoever heard of an ironic ethics? Not an unserious question, for it may be 
the case that ethics can only be ironic, untimely, disguised and failing.  





Introduction: the fatal risk of the untimely  
 
In the preceding chapters, we have seen that, like every concept, “the human” is a 
discursive abstraction constructed through the forgetting of difference and, as such, is 
reproduced to a degree as necessary and uniform. As a consequence, as Nietzsche tells 
us, “humanity” is “actually made calculable,” a calculability which has as its most 
fruitful effect “the sovereign individual, like only to himself” (Genealogy, II:2). This 
indissociability of the violence of making-calculable and the effect, and the efficacy, of 
sovereignty, should certainly give us pause. Another way of saying this would be that 
to be human is to come to being within, and as a consequence of, the vast machinery of 
making-sense-ability which conditions the visibility and viability of each and every 
social being. All social beings are, in short, the result of habitual practices of long-
standing cultural formations congealed in and as the languages they inhabit and which 
inhabit them. This “already-there” which, prior to its effect, already divides the 
indivisibility of the sovereign “I” thus ensures the active-passive production and 
reproduction of norms determined by dominant relations of power. At the same time, 
however, such a notion of the already-there must be decoupled from a normalising 
anthropocentrism which unthinkingly identifies its machinery with human language, 
human culture, and human history alone.  
This technics at and as the origin of sense, the “already” of the “there,” is, as 
we have seen, the reserving of the space of ethical response, of the calling forth of 
improper, transforming metonymies which, asymptotic with the fight for rights, breach 
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the enclosures of property and propriety. Ethics, it has further been argued, begins only 
in a movement beyond what can be determined. For the human animal, for example, 
ethics can begin only in a disidentification with the radical alterity of a nonhuman or 
inhuman being which marks, and thus interrupts, the measure and the limit of 
humanity.  
More specifically, however, “the ethical” is that which, enacting bodyings as 
and at the limit of sense and of existence, necessarily withdraws in the opening of a 
politics as its actualised supplement. In this, the politicity of an animal encounter 
resides in the impossibility of preserving its call without redressing its insensibility 
within the clothes of the sensible, this latter being a reactive concealment which 
paradoxically marks its becoming naked. In contrast to Rancière then, a phrasing 
remains political only insofar as it no longer and not yet makes sense, thus making 
explicit the impropriety of its costume and hence the unnameable absence it names. In 
that the already-there nevertheless remains as its condition of possibility, however, 
there is as a result no guarantee that such a placeholder will gain, at the intersection of 
convention and consent, the necessary countersignatures of recognition. 
The excess of the ethical, in other words, at once opens to the risk of 
becoming-unrecognisable within the structures of meaning which reproduce viable 
ways of being, and it is this risk, of a potentially fatal refusal or withdrawal of 
recognition, which will be explored throughout the first chapter of this part. This 
withholding, it will be argued, neutralises the ethical encounter through a redoubling of 
“outsides.”  
As we have seen, the materiality of the atemporal outside imposes itself in the 
chance of an animal encounter, and in this opens to the unnameable outside of a given 
state of affairs which nevertheless resonates improperly within that state. In contrast to, 
and yet indissociable from, such an encounter, the withdrawal and withholding of 
making-sense-ability displaces and confines the maddening event to an “outside” 
constituted within a given state of affairs. In this way the internal “outside” serves as 
both the limit of normativity and the limit to normativity. It is, in other words, a 
conserving reaction which doubles and at once disavows the animal encounter by 
reinscribing it “inside” an “outside” constituted by a given state of affairs, and which 
constitutes the limit and the legitimate of that state.  
Such reactive socioeconomic, political and material displacings range from 
social exclusion, ridicule, prejudice and hatred on the one hand, to the full-scale 
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mobilisation of the juridico-medical machinery with its physical confinements and 
judgments of criminality, deviancy, pathology and madness on the other. Being judged, 
whether officially or not, to be “mad,” as lacking the ability to make sense and thus 
“outside” of the social constraints determined by the already-there, is thus to be 
displaced within an “outside” constituted only in opposition to the “inside” of a given 
state of affairs. In this, the neutralising displacement of the encounter to the confines of 
the “outside” of reason can be seen to mirror the maddening displacement and extreme 
passivity of the encounter’s apocalyptic interval.  
More than this, it is here, within this contested space of recognisability, the 
unrecognisable, and the withdrawal of recognition, that I aim to demonstrate in this part 
an essential link between the neutralisation of an animal encounter, the necessary 
dormancy of any so-called ethics based upon similarity and familiarity, and the 
genocidal economy of animalisation which serves to exclude other beings from the 
ability to make sense.  
The discourse of madness is here linked, moreover, to domesticity, to the 
home and to the everyday, in that madness is in one sense the foreign, the 
unrecognisable, within the familiar. In Plato’s The Sophist, for example, the Foreigner 
fears that, in being outside of common (i.e., communal) sense, he will be judged mad. 
Doubling the immigrant’s fear that he or she will be unable to make sense in the 
language of another, the Foreigner in particular fears that he will be judged mad insofar 
as he represents a challenge to the paternal logos by suggesting that nonbeing, that 
whose being is not there, nevertheless is (or has) being. He fears, in other words, being 
judged as contrary to its truth of being-there.  
This notion of “the effects of ‘foreignness’ in domesticity, the foreign in the 
same,” whether in the domestic space of the home, of the nation, or of language, 
necessarily relates, as Derrida suggests, to hospitality and to the question of its 
unconditionality (Of Hospitality, 158). Responding to the demand of an animal 
encounter, a response that is the challenge of a fidelity to its call, is indeed, I suggest 
here, to risk being judged mad. It is, in other words, to risk becoming a stranger or a 
foreigner at home, an internal exile or even a domestic terrorist. It is to risk becoming 
an asylum seeker and at once to risk the asylum. 
However, as I aim to demonstrate in this part, every living being is always 
already seeking asylum within the domestic, and yet each is constitutively foreign to the 
“there” of its singular being. Consequently, every living being demands hospitality 
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and yet, insofar as hospitality demands an autonomous sovereign decision, every living 
being is incapable of offering it or, rather, is able to do so only inadequately. It is an 
inability and an insufficiency, moreover, which in addition renders both unjust and 
unjustifiable the liberal-Aristotelian contractual argument which seeks to exclude 




Butler meets Burroughs 
 
In the first chapter of this part, I will explore in more detail the notion of redoubled 
“outsides,” further enabling us to understand why the inside-outside topos, with its 
suggestion of a simple line or lines of division, is both problematic and unavoidable. 
Beginning with Judith Butler’s work on what she calls the “killing ideals of gender and 
race” (Bodies that Matter, 124-5), I argue that a subject does indeed come to be as the 
result of reiterated practice propagating sameness and identification as and at the 
junctures of multiple “outsides.” The “subject” is, in other words, the singular nexus of 
a network of inculcation, constituted along “vectors of power” which “require and 
deploy each other for the purpose of their own articulation” (18). In this way, the 
property and propriety of the white European heterosexual human male depends for its 
hegemonic privilege upon the entanglement of internally constituted “outsides” within 
which animals, women, people of colour, and the poor come to be inscribed as 
excluded.  
In contrast to Butler, however, I argue that “the human” is never the simple 
cumulatory effect of regulatory reproductive power, but rather is itself a regulatory 
norm. Indeed, I argue that all other norms—of race, gender, class, sexuality, and so 
on—must in fact pass through species difference in order to reproduce themselves as 
“natural.” The privileged sexuality accorded to the ideal of whiteness cannot, for 
example, be approached without an understanding of the machinery which devalorises 
people of colour by way of a negative displacement which shifts nonwhite sexuality 
towards “animality.” From this, we can then better understand the ethical risk which 
inheres within every animal encounter. The risk, in short, of an unbearable existence 




In chapter six I trace some of the implications of this through various related 
readings of the wild-tame and timeless-timebound dichotomies. My primary reference 
here will be the late texts of the North American novelist William S. Burroughs. They 
have been chosen not only because of their explicit engagement with human-animal 
relations but, more importantly, because they follow from an animal encounter which, 
claims Burroughs in a phrase reminiscent of Kafka’s Investigator, saved him from “a 
deadly, pervasive ignorance” (Cat Inside, 46). In this way, I aim to demonstrate that, 
without an excessive hospitality, the entangled hegemonies of oppression are inevitably 
repeated and thus reinforced. I thus argue that, while for Burroughs the valorised 
timelessness of the wild makes possible an animal-Love which transcends pain and 
conflict, in fact the restriction of love to some, but not all, nonhuman animals 
inevitably serves only to reiterate a logic of domination, as evidenced too in the 
complementary reading of Deleuze and Guattari’s notion of “becoming-animal.” 
Such a logic or logos is, in short, dependent upon the exclusion of the alogon. 
It depends, that is, upon the entangled exclusions of madness, of animals, and of the 
foreign within the domestic. Consequently, I argue in the final chapter of this part that 
the beginning of ethics resides within the detested figure of the Burroughsian 
centipede. Moreover, only in being-with the being-there of this monstrosity within the 
domestic does it become possible to move Burroughs’ thinking of the posthuman 
beyond its masculinist, imperialist logic, a movement which will then lead us to a 




5. Domestic Scenes and Species Trouble:  
The Nexus of Exclusion, Or, the “I” of the Storm  
 
 
For women in patriarchal culture, additional concerns arise as well. For we 
have been swallowed and we are the swallowers. We are the consumers 
and the consumed. We are the ones whose stomachs do not listen—having 
no ears—and we are the ones who seek to be heard from within the 
stomach that has no ears. 




Phantasms and ghosts: in the “I” of oppression  
 
The strategic value of encounters with animals for interrupting habitual interpretations 
that serve to conserve capitalism’s material and symbolic economies becomes even 
clearer when we consider that such encounters necessarily place one’s self socially at 
risk beyond the improper marking of its place. To understand this, however, it is 
necessary to understand the process by which the “phantasmatic ideals” of regulatory 
norms are naturalised. The “activity” of gendering, for example, both precedes the 
apparently willing subject and is, as Judith Butler explains, simultaneously “the matrix 
through which all willing first becomes possible” (Bodies that Matter, 7). Consider, 
Butler writes, 
 
the medical interpellation which … shifts an infant from an “it” to a “she” 
or a “he,” and in that naming, the girl is “girled,” brought into the domain 
of language and kinship through the interpellation of gender. But that 
“girling” of the girl does not end there; on the contrary, that founding 
interpellation is reiterated by various authorities and throughout various 
intervals of time to reenforce or contest this naturalised effect. The naming 
is at once the setting of a boundary, and also the repeated inculcation of a 
norm (7-8). 
 
Here, in contrast to Louis Althusser’s notion of “interpellation,” whereby the 
ideological subject is constituted by the law’s specular address, the subject for Butler is 
rather the singular yet ventriloquised nexus of a network of inculcations, constituted in 
the intersection of phantasmatic ideals reproduced by various, mutually articulating 
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regulatory norms. As a result, “the materiality of the body will not be thinkable apart 
from the materialisation of that regulatory norm” (2).  
Equally important to us in this discussion of gendering “activity,” however, is 
the need to also consider, and not as something external or separate, that “other” matrix 
through which the majority of nonhuman animals are refused that shift to gendered 
being. Only once consideration is extended in this way does it become possible to 
understand the meshed machinery which opens the possibility of a refusal or 
withdrawal of gender, and which simultaneously determines that such a refusal or 
withdrawal from a human body necessarily “relegates” that excluded human being to 
the status of an animal. While Butler does indeed touch on this animalising 
displacement, insofar as nonhuman animals are, however, largely absent from her 
consideration, the economy underlying the negative displacement remains obscure.76 
Nonetheless, central to Butler’s thinking is that for norms to be successfully 
reproduced they must all reinforce and re-enforce one another. The practice of 
gendering, to stay with Butler’s example, thus requires that it simultaneously redeploy 
racialising and heterosexualising practices. Mutually supporting, there exist no 
independently articulated norms but only imbricated “hegemonies of oppression” 
(132). As a result,  
 
[a] convergent set of historical formations of racialised gender, of gendered 
race, of the sexualisation of racial ideals, or the racialisation of gender 
norms, makes up both the social regulation of sexuality and its psychic 
articulations. … Hence, it is no longer possible to make sexual difference 
prior to racial difference or, for that matter, to make them into fully 
separable axes of social regulation and power (181-2).  
 
In short, reiterated practice is reproductive power: “the power to produce—demarcate, 
circulate, differentiate—the bodies it controls” (1). It is this regulatory activity which 
both precedes and enables the materialisation of the willing subject, permitting Butler 
to claim that “the matrix of gender relations is prior to the emergence of the ‘human’” 
(7). This, however, is not the case, in that such a claim in fact effaces that reiterated 
practice Butler seeks to disclose. 
 
 
                                                           
76
 Butler returns to consider nonhuman animals, albeit again only in passing, in Frames of 
War: When Is Life Grievable? (2009).  
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Effecting the human 
 
Being-there, it must be repeated, is to inhabit language(s) in the broadest sense of the 
already-there, that is, to inhabit a vast network of bounded and bonded structures of 
habitual sense, and is never the preserve of the human subject. Hence, instead of “the 
human” being the simple cumulatory effect of regulatory reproductive power, it is 
rather the case, as Butler indeed gestures towards in her discussion of Plato’s khōra, 
that “humanity” is itself a regulatory norm. “The human,” in other words, is a reiterated 
practice of human-ing which both requires and deploys every other norm for the 
purpose of its own articulation. Only in this way is the possible refusal or withdrawal 
of gender preserved, and only by way of mutual articulation might such a withdrawal 
simultaneously withdraw human status.  
Indeed, a naturalised “species difference” is in Butler’s text the unmarked-but-
marking receptacle through which all other norms must pass, and which, in so doing, 
constitutes this apparent effect of “the human.” This is not, however, to make species 
difference prior to, or more fundamental than, sexual, racial, or any other regulatory 
difference. To do so would be to fall prey to the very same error of exclusive priority 
which Butler discloses in Luce Irigaray’s “miming” of Plato (in this case, the exclusive 
prioritising of the feminine). It is rather the case, as we shall see, that while the logon-
alogon distinction of species difference serves to “ground” all the others, it is at the 
same time “grounded” by each of those others. We must, therefore, explicitly extend 
Butler’s convergent sets of historical formations beyond the imbrication of gender, 
sexuality, and race so as to include such convergent sets as the animalisation of 
racialised gender, the gendering of animalised race, the humanisation of racial ideals, 
the racialisation of human norms, the normative sexualisation of animality, and so on.  
It is indeed the case that various “attributions or interpellations contribute to 
that field of discourse and power that orchestrates, delimits, and sustains that which 
qualifies as ‘the human’” (8). It is also the case, however, that, unless we attend to the 
imbrication of a speciesist reproduction of species difference along and within the 
codetermining reproduction of sexism, racism, classism, and homophobia orchestrated 
by patriarchal Western practices of gendering, racialising and heterosexualising, we 
necessarily risk reproducing just those “hegemonies of oppression” which such 
discourse seeks to challenge. Indeed, just such an unwitting reiteration of oppression is 
129 
 
to be found, as we will see, not only in Butler, but also in the texts of William 
Burroughs and of Deleuze and Guattari.  
Returning to the possible refusal or withdrawal of gender, Butler acutely 
contends that “the examples of those abjected beings who do not appear properly 
gendered” demonstrates “most clearly” that “it is their very humanness that comes into 
question” (8). For Butler, this serves only to demonstrate that “the human” is therefore 
the effect of reproductive power. It is, however, rather the case that, together with other 
regulatory norms with their own constitutive outsides, the inculcation of “humanising” 
norms, that is, of viable ways of being-human or, better, of ways of being acceptable to 
power, reproduces “the human” by way of the constitutive outside of “the animal.” 
Only this explains why the impropriety of gender puts humanness into question, as the 
question of humanness is always a question of the nonhuman, of the animal. Similarly, 
only by way of the constituted opposition between the human and the animal can we 
better understand, and thus question, the sexualisation mutually articulated by the 
“killing ideals” of race, for example, as with the privileged sexuality accorded to 
“whiteness.”  
Returning to Bodies That Matter, Butler thus writes,  
 
the construction of gender operates through exclusionary means, such that 
the human is not only produced over against the inhuman, but through a set 
of foreclosures, radical erasures, that are, strictly speaking, refused the 
possibility of cultural articulation. Hence, it is not enough to claim that 
human subjects are constructed, for the construction of the human is a 
differential operation that produces the more and the less “human,” the 
inhuman, the humanly unthinkable. These excluded sites come to bound the 
“human” as its constitutive outside, and to haunt those boundaries as the 
persistent possibility of their disruption and rearticulation (7-8). 
 
This notion of boundary haunting, of those who, being-excluded, nevertheless illegally 
remain, crossing borders like ghosts so as to enter our space against our will, is central 
to this whole part. Nevertheless, insofar as Butler can think “the human” only in terms 
of a cumulative effect, what she thus leaves unmarked within the foreclosed domain of 
the inhuman, and in the differential reproduction of “the more and the less” human, is 
precisely the nonhuman animal, at once synonymous with irrationality, with dumb 
nature—with the alogon.  
In her introduction to Bodies That Matter, however, Butler attempts to pre-
empt just such criticism when she states that “any analysis which foregrounds one 
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vector of power over another will doubtless become vulnerable to criticisms that it not 
only ignores or devalues the others, but that its own constructions depend on the 
exclusion of the others in order to proceed” (18). A future criticism she then counters 
with the point that “any analysis which pretends to be able to encompass every vector 
of power runs the risk of a certain epistemological imperialism which consists in the 
presupposition that any given writer might fully stand for and explain the complexities 
of contemporary power. … [T]hose who claim to offer such pictures become suspect 
by virtue of that very claim” (18-19).  
Here, however, I do not make any such claims to certainty and/or 
completeness, but only aim to demonstrate that, if we wish to even begin to approach 
the complexities of contemporary power, one cannot not include the question of 
species difference. This is because it is “the animal” as constitutive outside which both 
enables and haunts the production of the properly human, a differential operation 
indissociable from the gendering, racialising, sexualising—and all too often 
marginalising—activity of the “more and the less.”  
The animal-alogon is, in other words, essential to the hierarchical functioning 
of this “more and less.” This is because “the animal” is always the least of the less, the 
negative pole to be overcome, more and less, along a humanist teleology which 
reaches its apotheosis in the phantasmatic ideal of the white human male. Hence, the 
complex differential articulation of regulatory ideals necessarily constitutes women, 
people of colour, lesbians, gays, bisexuals, transexuals, the poor, and so forth, as 
“more” and “less” human, that is to say, as “less” and “more” animal.  
Hence, just as the reproduction of heterosexuality will take various forms 
“depending on how race and the reproduction of race are understood” (167-8), so too 
will this reproduction depend upon how “humanness” and the reproduction of “the 
human” are understood, inseparable from the animalised or abjected categories of race 
and of sexuality. In another direction, the naturalisation of heterosexuality depends 
upon the normative sexualisation of animality, one which paradoxically utilises an 
unremarked biological continuism. Or again, the alleged misandry of the lesbian—in 
which “a lesbian is one who must have had a bad experience with men, or who has not 
yet found the right one” (127)—crosses with the alleged misanthropy attributed to 
anyone concerned with the exploitation, torture and extermination of nonhuman 
animals (animal activists, it is invariably alleged, must hate humans as a result of 
social deficiency). Following Butler, such diagnoses presume, on the one hand, that 
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lesbianism “is acquired by virtue of some failure in the heterosexual machinery, 
thereby continuing to install heterosexuality as the “cause” of lesbian desire” (127) 
and, on the other, that animal concern is acquired by virtue of some failure in the 
machinery of anthropocentrism, thereby continuing to install human exceptionalism as 
the “cause” of animal concern. One thinks here, for example, of love for a companion 
animal being reconstrued as deflected biological, and feminised, desire for a human 
child.  
In this way, both humanist and heterosexual desire are always constructed as 
“true,” whereas animal concern and lesbianism are “always and only a mask and 
forever false” (127). Within this economy too is found the reactive subordination in 
which concern for nonhuman suffering is deemed offensive to man, as degrading to 
both his exceptionality and to his interiority, and which is thus dismissed as an 
immoral deflection of “more pressing” human concerns.  
That species difference is left unmarked in Butler’s text thus has serious 
consequences, as acknowledged by Butler herself, albeit only in the context of sexual 
difference. It is, she writes, the claim of a fundamental priority for sexual difference 
over racial difference which, 
 
has marked so much psychoanalytic feminism as white, for the assumption 
here is not only that sexual difference is more fundamental, but that there is 
a relationship called “sexual difference” that is itself unmarked by race. 
That whiteness is not understood by such a perspective as a racial category 
is clear; it is yet another power that need not speak its name. Hence, to 
claim that sexual difference is more fundamental than racial difference is 
effectively to assume that sexual difference is white sexual difference, and 
that whiteness is not a form of racial difference (181-2). 
 
In the same way therefore, to claim an equal and fundamental primacy of racial and 
sexual differences presupposes that the relationships named in this way are themselves 
unmarked by species. This effectively assumes that sexual and racial differences are 
human sexual and racial differences, and that humanness is not a form of species 
difference. It is to assume, in other words, that the constitution of the “more or less” 
human (and simultaneously of the “more or less” animal) is itself unmarked by racial 
and sexual differences. In short then, the humanist ideals of the West are assumed to be 
prior to, and thus untouched by, racial, sexual, and species differences, an assumption 
which, as we will see in the next part, thus reiterates the xenophobic Platonic economy 





The foreign in place and the madness of power 
 
Butler most clearly discloses the stakes of this exclusive operation in her critique of 
Luce Irigaray’s reading of the place or nonplace of khōra (or chora) in Plato’s 
Timaeus. Nor is it by chance that this is the only place in Bodies That Matter where, to 
my knowledge, Butler attends, if only briefly, to nonhuman others. Whereas Irigaray 
identifies the “elsewhere” of “the” chora with the founding exclusion of the feminine, 
Butler points out that Irigaray therefore excludes all those “other” others similarly 
excluded from the economy of masculinist reason: 
 
Plato’s scenography of intelligibility depends on the exclusion of women, 
slaves, children, and animals, where slaves are characterised as those who 
do not speak his language, and who, in not speaking his language, are 
considered diminished in their capacity for reason. … This domain of the 
less than rational human bounds the figure of human reason, producing that 
“man” as one who is without a childhood; is not a primate and so is 
relieved of the necessity of eating, defecating, living and dying; one who is 
not a slave, but always a property holder; one whose language remains 
originary and untranslatable (48). 
 
For Plato, as Butler makes clear, it is the speechless (alogon), and thus the irrational 
(alogon), who must be excluded in crafting the “imaginary morphology” of 
masculinist reason. In this, the dumb animal (alogon) is thus the utterly other, the 
absolute outsider. Indeterminate and undecidable, the outside of the outside and thus 
both continuous and radically separate, the “eating, defecating, living and dying” 
animal thus becomes the perpetual site of a contestation, the test of a dangerous and 
dreaded proximity the overcoming of which the limit of the human is judged. We will 
discover this testing animal again in the next chapter, a test, moreover, which shatters 
the purity of love.  
For the moment, however, we can better understand how the reproduction of a 
domain of intelligible “human” bodies depends upon exclusion. A reproduction which 
must simultaneously reproduce “a domain of unthinkable, abject, unlivable bodies” 
(xi), of which the living and dying animal is the absolutely unthinkable, the absolutely 
abject, the absolutely unlivable. The spectre, in other words, of an indecipherable and 
unmasterable materiality, of a dreaded unintelligibility. Terrifying, monstrous, “the 
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animal” never stands before us in the relation of a simple reversal of intelligibility, but 
rather marks an “illegible domain that haunts the former domain as the spectre of its 
own impossibility, the very limit to intelligibility” (xi). 
In this way, the undecidable limit that is “the animal” falls back upon those 
“other” human animals, an economy indissociable from the constitution of the 
(non)subject. Thus, while Butler points out that the “materialisation of reason … 
operates through the dematerialisation of other bodies, for the feminine, strictly 
speaking, has no morphe, no morphology, no contour, for it is that which contributes to 
the contouring of things, but is itself undifferentiated, without boundary” (49), the 
figure of the abject nonsubject without which this dematerialisation could not be 
reproduced remains always that of “the animal” as undifferentiated, undying Nature. It 
is this, moreover, which always again reserves the potential to render “other” humans 
as “animal,” and thus killable, in displacing them “backwards” along the familiar 
humanist teleological dialectic. 
Bringing us back into the vicinity, the proximity, of madness, it is thus the 
animal which, even more than the idiot, “points to a deprived relation to language, a 
constitutive disorder in memory” (Ronell Stupidity, 253). Without the “as,” without 
memory, there is no idiot without “the animal,” without this apparently idiotic animal 
who “unleash[es] only muffled signals of original erasure. Idiocy commences in 
disfigurement, as the mutilation over which the philosophers tried to write in an 
attempt to restore the proper, the literal, what is proper to man” (253). 
Outside, yet undecidably so, of the exclusive property of the human, this 
constitutive “idiocy” of the animal, the “irrationality of the beast,” relates directly to 
the domain of the domestic. The “xenophobic” Platonic exclusion, writes Butler, 
operates through the reproduction of “those considered less rational by virtue of their 
appointed task in the process of laboring to reproduce the conditions of private life” 
(Bodies that Matter, 49). Here, Butler thus draws attention to the animalisation of both 
reproductive and domestic labour. In the former category, we find the exclusion from 
masculinist reason of women within the domain of the domestic, within the 
reproduction of the Same, figured by the animality of reproduction. Here it should be 
recalled that, for Plato, the feminine khōra is the receptacle through which the Father 
reproduces only versions of itself, unmarked by their passage in a “transfer of the 
reproductive function from the feminine to the masculine” (42). In the latter, 
masculinist reason excludes all those other beings who, outside and yet within the 
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domestic arena, are thus construed as foreign to reason, i.e., slaves and immigrant 
workers, children and certain other (so-called “food” and “working”) animals. 
Labouring only to reproduce, yet without leaving their mark, the twinned categories of 
the domestic and the domesticated are thus constituted by way of nonhuman animals 
as that which, being excluded, improperly and unintelligibly resides within the domain 
of the properly human precisely as the condition of its reproduction.  
As we have seen, the domain of the animal is constituted as the absolutely 
unlivable domain, that of the “merely” living (and dying) nonsubject, and which 
“constitute[s] that site of dreaded identification against which—and by virtue of 
which—the domain of the subject will circumscribe its own claim to autonomy and to 
life” (3).77 Nevertheless, “the animal” must thus always remain within the properly 
human as the trace of “its” denial, as the foreign within human property, excluded 
within the uniform and calculable reproduction of the Same. Already within the 
domestic scene through which the human is reproduced, “man” has no choice but to 
share his home, his place, with “the animal,” and indeed, as we shall see in the next 
chapters, with nonhuman animals. “The animal” is, in short, the absolutely foreign in 
the domestic, the most distant in the closest proximity, recalling us otherwise to that 
“proximal distance” found in both Blanchot and Heidegger. Exceeding all recognition 
and yet sharing our space and taking our time, animals are thus the always with us that 
are (constitutively) not “us.”  
For this reason, it is with animals that the question of ethics must begin. 
Indeed, it is here in this unlivable domain, this domain of the absolutely abject, of 
absolute rejection, where in the next chapter we shall later unearth the centipede, this 
most ancient of ancient animals to whom, and perhaps first of all, we owe 
unconditional hospitality. Such affirmative hospitality is not, however, to suggest we 
are talking about inviting centipedes into one’s home (which is not to say that it might 
not be about that). Rather, it is question of sharing our space and our time as far as 
possible without contempt, or hate, or fear. It is indeed to rejoice in insects, as we have 
heard the Gnat suggest to Alice. An affirmation freed from an exclusive hierarchy by 
which the value of other beings is unthinkingly rejected and abjected, rendered 
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instrumental and instrumentally rendered in the production and reproduction of profit 
and power. It is a question, in short, of an opening to the ethical and thus the political 
which disrupts the domination of the economic. 
In summary then, I have argued that the norms or “phantasmatic ideals” of 
sexual and racial recognition must at once pass through the regulatory norms of 
“humanness,” norms which differ according to the singular being-there as the nexus, as 
the eye and the “I,” of what Butler calls the “hegemonies of oppression.” As a result, 
putting “humanness” into question—a question which is nothing less than the question 
of recognition—at once constitutes a challenge to these hegemonies of oppression. 
Hence, and returning to the epigraph with which this part began, an ethics which 
presupposes “the human” as at once its condition, effect, and unmarked category is an 





Before we can turn to the beginning of ethics, which we shall do in the next chapter, 
we must first of all consider more fully this question of recognition. More specifically, 
it is necessary to demonstrate why it is that an animal encounter, in opening itself to 
the unnameable outside which interrupts the conservative machinery of recognition, is 
at once to risk becoming unrecognisable. Why, in other words, it risks the withdrawal 
of viable subject status and, indeed, of one’s very “humanity.” A withdrawal, 
moreover, which marks the encounter’s effective neutralisation.  
Given that regulatory practices are aimed both at everyone and to no one 
(there being no preexisting subject), they are thus general, structural, and therefore 
recurrent, requiring endless reiteration in order to be, in order to naturalise their power 
and efficacy. A norm, as Butler writes, is “a constant and repeated effort to imitate its 
own idealisations” (Bodies that Matter, 125). Yet that which guarantees the ongoing 
efficacy, that is, the recontextualisation that defines practice, is also that which already 
undermines it, insofar as the excess of iterability ensures that the context of an 
utterance is never fully determined. It is this, as we know, which preserves the 
possibility of it functioning as a catachrestic reinscription within contexts where it has 
not previously belonged. It is, in other words, a reproduction already beset by the 
anxiety of a violent, unforeseeable transformation, of the crossing between I and Other. 
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As we also know, however, norms do not exist in isolation, but are rather 
mutually articulating. Multiply and thus singularly positioned, the subject is 
constituted, as Thomas Keenan writes, to the extent that such addressees and 
respondants “interfere with one another, interfere incommensurably and radically, and 
do not add up to one thing. There are effects of ideology and of responsibility, of legal 
and ethico-political agency, only thanks to these asymmetrical addresses and 
untotalizable responses” (Fables of Responsibility, 25). On the one hand then, being 
always already subject to recognition, the singularity of an encounter—the putting to 
work of a machinery of materiality—always remains to violate the proper limit of 
identification. On the other, however, it constitutes a violation which, in threatening to 
disclose, to denaturalise, the founding-conserving network of norms, places one’s self 
at risk in that the already existing state of affairs is compelled to seek its neutralisation.  
In short then, the “I is other” comes to be outside of a given state of affairs in 
placing one’s self at risk. As Judith Butler says in her recent reading of Michel 
Foucault, 
 
To call into question a regime of truth, where that regime of truth governs 
subjectivation, is to call into question the truth of myself and, indeed, to 
question my ability to tell to truth about myself, to give an account of 
myself. … It also turns out that self-questioning of this sort involves putting 
oneself at risk, imperiling the very possibility of being recognised by 
others, since to question the norms of recognition that govern what I might 
be, to ask what they leave out, what they might be compelled to 
accommodate, is, in relation to the present regime, to risk unrecognisability 
as a subject or at least to become an occasion for posing the questions of 
who one is (or can be) and whether or not one is recognisable (Giving an 
Account, 22-3) 
 
It is this risk, not only of social censure and/or physical confinement but also the risk 
of coming to being unable to be, of finding one’s self incapable of continuing to exist, 
which remarks the opening of the ethical space. Recalling our previous chapters, this 
post-evental “I” is “other,” utterly alien to the “I” prior to the untimely encounter, the 
apocalyptic nonplace across which the world of the “already there” changes 
irretrievably.  
Consequently, the trace of the ethical encounter necessarily calls forth the risk 
of the political supplement, in that its “I” is other to the dominant culture of recognised 
value. A bodying, in coming to be other outside of a given order and yet nonetheless 
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having to exist, thus constitutes a being that is incapable of not being (other) and at 
once incapable of continuing to be: “I” must affirm this, in that “I” cannot not bear this 
and thus “I” bear it freely, taking responsibility for it and being responsible to it, this 
decision “I” have not taken. The “subjectivation” of an animal encounter is thus a 
fidelity to the to-come, but also, in marking the beginning of ethics, to a vigilant 
passivity which opens ever again to an animal encounter, to its force of undecidability 
in contrast to the dogma of faith. An ever-again demanded by the fact that fidelity is 
always an inadequate language, already congealing, solidifying, setting and ordering, 
and thus never sufficiently responsible to the demand.  
The potentially fatal risk of being unable to continue to exist remains, 
however, insofar as that which cannot not be borne risks becoming unbearable, the 
risk—suicidal or murderous—of an enforced cessation. It is in the hope of clarifying 
this complex movement of opening and closure that, in the final sections of this 
chapter, I offer two examples of this risk, one “fictional” and one “documented.” 
 
 
Having to exist, unbearably 
 
The experience of Elizabeth Costello, respected Australian writer and the eponymous 
central character of J. M. Coetzee’s 1999 “novel in eight lessons,” is our first 
example—an example which, like every example, is explicitly didactic.78 Transformed 
by an unspoken encounter after which, incapable of recognising “meat” rather than 
corpses (or, better, incapable of not recognising “meat”) and thus incapable of 
recognising the humaneness, the humanness, of the human, Costello finds herself 
brought to the point of collapse by the impossibility of continuing to be. An 
impossibility which is at once the affirmation of the encounter: 
 
“Is it possible, I ask myself, that all of them are participants in a crime of 
stupefying proportions? Am I fantasising it all? I must be mad! Yet every 
day I see the evidences. The very people I suspect produce the evidence, 
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exhibit it, offer it to me. Corpses. Fragments of corpses that they have 
bought for money.  
 “It is as if I were to visit friends, and to make some polite remark about 
the lamp in their living room, and they were to say, “Yes, it’s nice, isn’t it? 
Polish-Jewish skin it’s made of, we find that’s best, the skins of young 
Polish-Jewish virgins.” And then I go to the bathroom and the soap wrapper 
says, “Treblinka—100% human stearate.” Am I dreaming, I say to myself? 
What kind of house is this? 
 “Yet I’m not dreaming. I look into your eyes, into Norma’s, into the 
children’s, and I see only kindness, human kindness. Calm down, I tell 
myself, you are making a mountain out of a molehill. This is life. Everyone 
else comes to terms with it, why can’t you? Why can’t you?” (114-5)  
 
Displaced outside of the everyday, Costello thus finds her self thrown into a “there” 
she is potentially unable to endure, no longer able to come to terms with the “life” of a 
given state of affairs. As such, she becomes aware of having to exist as an “other,” or 
else cease to exist. Indeed, either way “I” has already ceased to be. This is not, 
however, a choice, not a decision. It is an injunction, as Derrida writes, “that I do not 
see coming, that never leaves me in peace and never lets me put it off until later. … It 
is what is most undeniably real. And sensible. Like the other” (Rogues, 84).79 It is, in 
other words, both the most undeniable and the most material: an interruption by the 
Real which is the giving of that singularity which can no longer be missed and not yet 
mis-taken.  
Here too, we find the place of the encounter being held only by an improper 
phrasing: “animal Holocaust.” As we will see in chapter eight, this phrasing, which 
tends to provoke such outrage, resonates in unexpected directions, coalescing in and as 
the sharing of its disorientating call. It manifests itself, that is to say, in opposition to 
the dominant reaction of recognised value which seeks to neutralise it, which refuses to 
recognise its sense and thus betrays the map of its site of exclusion.  
It is thus not by chance that Costello finds herself abruptly marginalised, 
externalised, (further) excluded from masculinist reason and thus from the domain of 
the properly human. A movement which produces within her a fear that she must be 
delusional, that she must, in fact, be “mad.” This can be seen most clearly in the 
reaction to a lecture given by Costello at a respected North American university, a 
reaction in which “vectors of power” require and deploy each other in order to exclude 
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“Elizabeth Costello” from the domain of intelligibility. Even before the lecture, 
however, Costello’s “opinions” concerning animals are denounced, in what is an 
interesting slur given the context, as a “hobbyhorse” by her son (an assistant professor 
in the natural sciences) (60), and dismissed by her daughter-in-law Norma (a 
philosopher-of-mind and reviewer of primate language-learning experiments) as 
“jejune and sentimental” (61). After snorting and sighing throughout Costello’s 
“rambling” lecture, Norma insists that Costello should not “be allowed to get away 
with it! She’s confused!” to which her husband replies wearily, “She’s old, she’s my 
mother” (81). Ultimately, Costello is accused of lacking the clarity of reason, a lack 
which makes her at worst senile and, at best, “a kook” (81). 
Costello in fact oversteps the proscribed limits precisely by performing in 
public what are construed as the private concerns of a sentimental, confused old 
woman astride her hobbyhorse. A public performance, moreover, which takes place in 
a university, sanctuary for the clarity of (masculinist) reason. In placing herself outside 
of the domain of the domestic in this way, Costello thus commits the feminine sin of 
leaving her mark upon the reproductive function: “If she wants to open her heart to 
animals,” her son wants to know, “why can’t she stay home and open it to her cats?” 
(83).80 Indeed, the accusation of sentimentality, that is, of irrational feminine emotion 
in contrast to clear masculine reasoning, has long been a tried-and-tested tactic in 
opposition to nonhuman animal concern.81 Furthermore, as we will see in the next 
chapter, Coetzee here strikes an eerie echo of Deleuze and Guattari’s contemptuous 
equation of the domestic with that of a foolishly sentimental old woman who 
“cherishes” her “petty” little cats.  
By asserting publicly, within reason, that “womanly sentimentality” which it 
is deemed should be confined to the privacy of the home, that is, to the domestic 
setting in which nonhuman animals figure only a feminine reproductive lack, as 
supplementing the absence of labour, Costello is thus deemed suspect by the 
regulatory machinery, her “reason” and by consequence her “humanness” put into 
question. Costello has, in short, become foreign to the domestic relation insofar as she 
calls forth animals within the properly human domain of reason (in her lecture, she 
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compares herself to Red Peter, the ape who makes “A Report to an Academy” in 
Kafka’s tale). “Not her métier, argumentation,” according to her scientist son, 
unchanged by this passage through his mother: “She should not be here” (80).  
Irrespective of her recognised professional position then, insofar as Costello 
puts into question the limits and the proper place of the human subject she at once puts 
at risk her own “properly” human place. The risk, in other words, of finding oneself 
marginalised in being displaced “backwards” along the humanist teleological dialectic. 
Reconfigured as sentimental and irrational, as an old and possibly senile woman who 
should have remained in her proper place at home, her right to the status of responsible 
subject is thus placed in doubt. She is displaced, in other words, within an internally-
constituted “outside” which serves to neutralise the very fidelity she affirms. We shall 
see, moreover, when we come to the murder of Venus Xtravaganza in a moment, just 
how extreme this risk of neutralisation can be.  
To summarise, in contrast to the affirmative space of invention no longer and 
not yet making sense and held open by the meaningless placeholder, we instead 
discover here a different withdrawal or withholding of recognition—the negative order 
which de-faces that which exceeds it. In this, the dominant order in fact repeats the 
schematic tyranny of misrecognition, not in this case to constitute the subject, but 
rather to withdraw that status in a conserving of its stasis and its State, of its law 
founded in violence.  
At the limit, improper bodyings thus risk being condemned in being 
reinscribed, reproduced as the outside of making sense-ability through an exclusion of 
an inside: as nonsense, as madness. As such, they are reduced to the silence of the 
alogon by the reciprocal rearticulation of the hegemonies of oppression, that is, by way 
of the very machinery of animalisation it disrupts.  
Here then, is disclosed an essential link between the neutralisation of an 
animal encounter and the genocidal economy of animalisation, that of the refusal of the 
ethical opening by way of constitutive outsides which seek to reinstitute the property 
of the Same. It is not incidental that with Costello one can see in miniature what is 
happening to animal activists at the macrolevel. Following the opportunistic post-9/11 
power grab of the USA PATRIOT ACT of 2001 and then the Animal Enterprises 
Terrorism Act (AETA) of 2006, for example, animal activism in the United States has 
been ranked (and thus produced) as the number one domestic terrorist threat. In this 
animal activists too, branded as irrational, frenzied anti-progress and anti-
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Enlightenment crazies and positioned on a par with those other all too familiar “figures 
of evil,” fall prey to the exclusionary economy of animalisation. All such “evils,” 
however, are specifically domestic threats, that is, are threateningly foreign to the 




Crossing out the animals 
 
Directed and produced by Jennie Livingston, Paris is Burning (1991) documents the 
Harlem drag balls between 1987 and 1989. In these balls, African-American and 
Latino men compete in a variety of categories, such as “executive,” “schoolboy/girl,” 
and “town and country,” in which they are judged according to a standard of 
“realness.” Described by one of the balls’ participants as the attempt to become “a real 
woman, or a real man—a straight man” by “erasing all the flaws, the mistakes,” 
“realness” is thus an effect, as Butler writes, determined by “the ability to compel 
belief, to produce the naturalised effect” through the reiteration of norms (Bodies that 
Matter, 129). In successfully but “improperly” reproducing this “naturalised” effect, 
however, this ability to “pass” as “real” must thus at the same time denaturalise those 
very same norms. And it is here, at and as this intersection, that the figure of Venus 
Xtravaganza emerges as a compelling focal point of what is a problematic but 
nevertheless fascinating film.82  
A light-skinned Latina who “passes” as both white and female, Venus seeks 
above all a comfortable white domesticity with white goods and a white wedding 
dress. Rich white girls, she says, get everything they want, and for Venus the only way 
of accessing this idealised domestic scene is by transforming herself into a “complete” 
woman: “I want a car, I want to be with the man I love, I want a nice home, away from 
New York where no one knows me [i.e., in middle-class white suburbia]. I want my 
sex-change. I want to get married in church in white.” It is not enough, that is to say, 
for Venus to “pass” as white and female only at the Harlem balls, but rather, if this 
domestic ideal is to be fulfilled, she must be able to “pass” all the time and in the most 
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intimate of situations. This passionate yet mundane desire, which is the desire not to be 
excluded as foreign or unnatural, not to be placed out-of-place—the desire to be, and 
to desire the desires of, a wealthy white heterosexual woman rather than a Latino 
homosexual transvestite—contrasts shockingly with the revelation of her murder at the 
end of the film.  
Presumably killed by a male client upon discovery of her male sexual organs, 
Venus is murdered, in other words, for her supplemental “incompleteness,” for the 
foreignness having always already invaded (the dream of) the domestic. The 
manifestation of which puts at risk her viability as a human being at the hands, both 
literal and symbolic, of a patriarchal order: Venus is discovered strangled and stuffed 
under a bed, the place of an animal, in a cheap hotel room.  
Her murder thus all too clearly bears on the gap between the phantasmatic 
constitution of “realness”—“crossing” the limits of both race and gender—performed 
during the balls, and the “morphological ideal” reproduced by the inculcation of 
oppressive hegemonic norms, a gap which is in fact the constitutive exclusion of the 
former by the latter. Hence, as Butler writes, this is a “killing that is performed by a 
symbolic that would eradicate those phenomena that require an opening up of the 
possibilities for the resignification of sex” (131). Nevertheless, it is not only a question 
of sexuality: 
 
If Venus wants to become a woman, and cannot overcome being a Latina, 
then Venus is treated by the symbolic in precisely the ways in which 
women of colour are treated. Her death thus testifies to a tragic misreading 
of the social map of power, a misreading orchestrated by that very map 
according to which the sites for a phantasmatic self-overcoming are 
constantly resolved into disappointment. If the signifiers of whiteness and 
femaleness—as well as some forms of hegemonic maleness constructed 
through class privilege—are sites of phantasmatic promise, then it is clear 
that women of colour and lesbians are not only everywhere excluded from 
this scene, but constitute a site of identification that is consistently refused 
and abjected in the collective phantasmatic pursuit of a transubstantiation 
into various forms of drag, transsexualism, and uncritical miming of the 
hegemonic (131). 
 
It is not enough, Butler thus makes clear, merely to mime the hegemonic, albeit 
illegitimately—an assertion which recalls our earlier discussion of political eventuation 
in the context of the mimicking by the Roman plebeians of the existing discourse of 
power. It remains unclear, however, in what way the positing of what Butler calls 
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“resignification” can be differentiated from just such an uncritical miming other than 
by taking account, retrospectively, of its effects. And yet, as we have seen, the moment 
in which the “significance” of a phrasing’s inaugural citation—its improper metonymic 
reiteration—becomes accountable, becoming naked in being clothed in the 
transparently sensible, is rather the mark of its parodic recuperation. Accountability, in 
other words, marks the neutralisation of the phrasing by the dominant order, the marker 
that it has ceased to manifest itself, has ceased to matter. By contrast, the revolutionary 
mark of an encounter is not its resignification, but rather the anxious obduracy of its 
being between sense.  
Moreover, what Butler leaves unmarked here is the question of what 
constitutes viable ways of being human. Yet again, given the mutual articulation of 
regulatory norms, the denaturalisation of both race and gender enacted by Venus at 
once denaturalises, as it must, the constructed domain of the properly human. 
Paradoxically, Venus falls prey to the murderous reactive judgment, both homophobic 
and misogynistic, of “unnaturalness” (of being a “freak” of nature), which thus falls 
back upon an unremarked biological continuism. As we have seen, the naturalisation of 
human heterosexuality depends upon the normative heterosexualisation of animality 
(long used by men to excuse anything from rape to hunting). Hence the exclusion of 
homosexuality from “humanness” by way of an alleged “unnaturalness” depends 
therefore upon an allegedly “natural” human animality or, rather, depends upon the 
reproduction of sexual activity as essentially animal, and thus, in a sense, not “human” 
at all.  
The reproduction of Venus as “unnatural,” in other words, paradoxically 
depends upon her exceptional humanness so as to withdraw from her that very status of 
“humanness.” At the same time, however, the conservative judgment which ends with 
her murder or, more accurately perhaps in this context, her slaughter, depends equally 
upon a human-animal distinction which denies to humans a “natural” animal sexual 
and reproductive activity, that is to say, the potential retained by certain nonhuman 
animals to change their “biological” sexuality so as to gain social advantage. In this, 
Venus Xtravanganza thus finds herself, between the “naturalness” and the 
exceptionalism of the “human,” doubly displaced. 
Venus is thus murdered both for her unnaturalness and her animality, an 
“unnatural animality” which fatally crosses with white, masculinist notions of her 
being a prostitute and both (and neither) a Latina and a woman. In potentially putting 
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into question what it means to be properly human and, consequently, properly animal, 
Venus—described by her House mother as being too wild, as always taking too many 
risks—thus at once risks performing an abject and “unnatural animality.” One which, 
displacing her inside the “outside” of the human domain, withdraws from her all 
“human rights.” As Butler writes, 
 
The painfulness of her death at the end of the film suggests as well that 
there are cruel and fatal social constraints on denaturalisation. As much as 
she crosses gender, sexuality, and race performatively, the hegemony that 
reinscribes the privileges of normative femininity and whiteness wields the 
final power to renaturalise Venus’s body and cross out that prior crossing, 
an erasure that is her death (133). 
 
Such a displacing renaturalisation, however, one which moves Venus from unequal 
sexual partner to dead animal stuffed under a bed, cannot be performed by the 
constituted abjection of race and sexuality alone. Rather, its “crossing-out of the 
crossing” must simultaneously cross, must pass through and cross out, the nonhuman 
animal.  
One can now better understand the degree of risk inhering in and as the animal 
encounter’s denaturalisation of the phantasmatic constitution of “humanness.” 
Nevertheless, it is only here, in this nonplace where “I” is no longer and not yet, that 
ethics, and thus politics, begins. It is always, in other words, a question of the foreign in 
the same, of that which is with us but is not “us,” and of our reaction or response. This 
question, as we shall see in the next chapter, always passes by way of nonhuman 
animals, and of the “domesticity” of “the animal.” Unless we remain vigilant to our 
originary relatedness, however, these crossed-out, and thus paradoxically unmarked 





6. The Wild and the Tame:  
The Death of a Queer Centipede 
 
 
They say only love can create, so who the fuck could love up a centipede?  






Introduction: stepping back 
 
In the previous chapter I argued that ethics centres on the question of hospitality. It 
concerns, that is to say, the space and the time of the foreigner who arrives, who takes 
place “within” our most intimate property and, indeed, who takes our place, and to 
whom we must respond no matter the risk to our self. Here, I aim to further 
demonstrate that such hospitality must always remain excessively and vigilantly 
nonhuman, if we are not to take an unthinking step backwards, as I would suggest 
Judith Butler does in the conclusion to the recent Giving an Account of Oneself. 
Here, Butler in fact offers a succinct description of this ethical imperative. 
Ethics, she writes,  
 
requires us to risk ourselves precisely at moments of unknowingness … To 
be undone by another is a primary necessity, an anguish, to be sure, but also 
a chance—to be addressed, claimed, bound to what is not me, but also to be 
moved, to be prompted to act, to address myself elsewhere, and so to vacate 
the self-sufficient “I” as a kind of possession (136).  
 
As it stands here, I agree fully with Butler’s definition. The difficulty arises however, 
hidden for the moment behind that ellipsis, wherein Butler reinscribes the ethical 
moment, this risk of being dispossessed “when what forms us diverges from what lies 
before us,” as the properly human property or possession in claiming that it constitutes 
nothing less than “our chance of becoming human” (136).  
In this, Butler opens herself to the very same critique which she levels at Luce 
Irigaray more than a decade previously in Bodies That Matter. Irigaray, she writes 
there, “fails to follow through the metonymic link between women and these other 
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Others [slaves, children and animals], idealising and appropriating the ‘elsewhere’ as 
the feminine. But what is the ‘elsewhere’ of Irigaray’s ‘elsewhere’? … what and who is 
excluded in the course of Irigaray’s analysis?” (49). In idealising and appropriating the 
“elsewhere” that are “moments of unknowingness” as the solely human, Butler has 
already given us the answer to the question of what and who is excluded in the course 
of her own later analysis. In what sense, it could be asked, is this properly human ethics 
an ethics of the unrecognisable other, an address to that which “I” encounter which is 
not me and which forms an “I” that is other than that which can be recognised by the 
dominant structures of meaning?  
If ethics is the becoming of the human, then the human is an (indeed, any) 
animal with the addition of ethics, whereas the “animal other” “is” pure or simple being 
without supplement—ontologically deprived of ethics and thus essentially outside of 
the ethical domain. Here then, Butler is reiterating Levinas’ claim that only the human 
can be ethical because only the human breaks with the “pure being” of simple self-
preservation. We discover, in other words, that in “having” access to the ethical, “the 
human” once again comes to be only in dialectically overcoming and thus ceasing to be 
an animal, a variant of the all too human ascension from “base nature” to “higher 
culture.”  
In this, Butler thus impels us to recognise ethics as risking “our” selves in and 
as moments of unknowingness which put into question the norms of recognition, whilst 
at once reproducing the most proper of recognisable norms: that of ethics, and thus 
responsibility, as the limit and the proper of the human. Here, Butler recognises the 
imperative of an ethical unknowing, of the call and the demand of unrecognisability, 
and yet nevertheless reinscribes the structurally unrecognisable as another that is 
properly—similarly, familiarly—narcissistic.  
In order to put out of the question this and other similarly reactive moves, 
these unthinking backward steps, I introduce in this chapter the centipede against 
whom, according to the novelist William S. Burroughs, love—and thus the mirror—
must shatter. By opening the chapter in this way, I aim to further clarify why, without 
the opening of an excessive, hyperbolic animal ethics, the entangled hegemonies of 
oppression are unavoidably reinforced.  
To do this, however, we must engage further with the notion of the domestic 
and, more specifically, with its function within various contemporary reiterations of the 
wild-tame and timeless-timebound dichotomies. Here, we will discover the “walking 
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ghost,” the dead zombie flesh, of the instrumentalised animal, which I argue constitutes 
the inverse of the “revolutionary spirit” of the living corpse that returns. Whereas the 
latter stalls the machinery of animalisation, the former, I will argue, reproduces a 
symbolic logic of oppression which serves to constitute subjugated beings “deserving” 
of their oppression. This will in turn allow us to distinguish a third machine of 
tropological displacement, one which works in concert with the two we already know: 
that which reconfigures “other” humans as “animal,” and that which withdraws a 
recognisable human status. Moreover, I will argue, this third machine, in orchestrating 
a displacement from living embodiment to inferior copy, serves to retroactively 
naturalise the other two.  
 
 
The poor rejected Pede 
 
Having published the semi-autobiographical Junkie in pulp imprint Ace Books in 1953, 
William S. Burroughs’ first major novel, Naked Lunch, appeared in full for the first 
time in 1959 following the successful resolution of an obscenity trial. He followed this 
in the 1960s with several texts based on the “cut-up” method, in which a variety of 
heterogeneous texts are randomly sliced up and juxtaposed, which he developed with 
his friend and mentor Brion Gysin, before going on to publish a number of important 
novels including The Wild Boys and the Red Night Trilogy throughout the 1970s and 
80s, continuing to write and publish until his death in 1997. In this chapter, I have 
chosen to focus on three of Burroughs’ later texts: the novel Ghost of Chance (1991), 
the collection The Cat Inside (1986, 1992), and his final journals, which were 
published as Last Words in 2000. These texts not only explicitly explore the ethics of 
human-animal relations, but also, and more importantly for us here, they follow on 
chronologically from an encounter with cats which, according to Burroughs, saved him 
from a fatal ignorance, offering pure love in its place. 
It is clear from this chapter’s epigraph, however, that, despite this encounter, 
the centipede remains for Burroughs a creature beyond all possibility of love or 
creativity. The reason for this, he writes, is that “the centipede was a step to a snake, a 
lizard, a furred lizard, an animal … this is [the] basis for a centipede being rejected 
more than any rejection: looking down on the fall we might have taken, except for that 
repugnant, momentary ledge” (Last Words, 129-130). Here, Burroughs is clearly 
148 
 
invoking Darwin’s authority in order to posit a linear, teleological ladder (or, rather, 
staircase) of being, as opposed to a thinking of evolution as entanglement and 
reciprocity.83 In this Christianised schema, evolutionary ascent reaches it apotheosis, its 
latest and greatest step, with “Homo Sap,” and which at the same time inevitably 
relegates centipedes—those unimaginably and almost unbearably ancient living 
beings—to the beginning and thus to the bottom, to the lowest of the low.  
Such a reductive history of life, however, is complicated somewhat by 
Burroughs’ refusal of both nonhuman history and nonhuman time. Consequently for 
Burroughs, centipedes have not evolved since their paradoxical appearing at the 
“beginning” of nontime, and thus this “once” is indeed an “all at once.” Indeed, it 
follows that this must be the case for all those “other” beings who, once having attained 
their respective and comparatively lowly steps along the tēlos of life, must remain there 
eternally hereafter. While we will come back to this shortly, and ignoring the fact that 
centipedes, this one and that one, have of course repeatedly both transformed 
themselves and being transformed, for the moment it is enough to note that, for 
Burroughs, the centipede is thus the rejected of the rejected, the abject being par 
excellence in a hierarchy of being: “For the poor rejected Pede, the ledge was 
permanent” (130). 
We can only understand the absolute abjection of this creature, however, by 
understanding his or her exclusion as an inhospitable refusal of a place that has 
nonetheless already been taken. An exclusion, in other words, of the absolutely foreign 
within the domestic. To do this, it is necessary first of all to track the dichotomy of the 
wild and the tame as it organises and, indeed, fails to organise Burroughs’ thinking of 
nonhuman animals. This distinction, while apparently affirming the ways of being of 
nonhuman animals, in fact serves only to reinscribe the exceptional humanist privilege 
it appears to disavow, thus remaining enchanted within a narcissistic privileging of the 
reflected human self. To further underscore the narcissistic functioning of this 
dichotomy, it will be shown too how this same schema serves to “ground” both the 
deep ecological perspective, and that which for Deleuze and Guattari provides the 
privileged access to becoming, namely “becomings-animal [devenirs-animaux].”  
                                                           
83
 Interestingly, Plato also places the centipede at the foot of his hierarchy of living beings. In 
the Phaedrus, he orders animals into three groups—birds at the top, then quadrupeds, and 
finally those who crawl on or under the earth. In the Timaeus, moreover, it is the centipede 
who is specifically marked out (92a-b). 
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The division into the wild and the tame, as we shall see, serves to constrain the 
entire Burroughsian bestiary within the absolute conditioning of an enchanted 
wilderness uncontaminated by the imposition of a properly human time, a temporality 
which in turn presupposes language as the proper of the human. It is here, moreover, 
that the differences and the similarities between Burroughs’ posthuman becomings-
animal and those of Deleuze-Guattari become visible. In similarly positing a potential 
human entry into the essentially timeless wild-animal nature from out of the tame and 
timebound culture of a given state of affairs, both Burroughs and Deleuze-Guattari end 
up condemning nonhuman being to the nonexistence of “reality” without sense. A 
gesture, moreover, which marks becoming-animal as a uniquely human property.  
Moving through these exclusive neighbourhoods of the wild and the tame as 
they are shared, in being not shared, by Deleuze-Guattari and Burroughs, I argue that 
such exclusivity both inhibits the beginning of ethics and naturalises the interests of 
capitalism. Nevertheless, it is from here, from an ignorance and a saving that is the 
necessity of the méconnaissable, that the larger question of the ethical opening, and of 
the risk that is the refusal to its placeholding phrasing of a countersigning recognition, 
can be more clearly addressed. In this, the centipede, this being of the step and the 
beginning and of steps and repetition which for Burroughs stands before and beyond 
any possibility of love, will ascend to the stage of ethics and, once there, will stage an 
ethics of the unrecognisable other in which “the human” potentially comes to be 





On the borders between fiction and documentary, between autobiography and political 
theory, and between philosophy and literature, the putting to work of language in 
Burroughs’ texts serves to render explicit the impossibility of any such securely 
delimited domains. As with Lee’s passage into the interzone of Naked Lunch, they 
leave in their wake only a convulsively negating Guard faced with the impossible task 
of reconstructing what was once imagined to be the unapproachable border of an 
unnameable frontier.  
Despite this, however, and despite the later valorisation of certain nonhuman 
animals (cats and lemurs in particular), it is in fact language itself, the very structure of 
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which determines the impossibility of closure, which for Burroughs, in his own 
convulsive negation, constitutes the very last secure frontier at once indivisible and 
non-negotiable. At once frontier and evolutionary ledge, language is that final step 
before which every nonhuman living being eternally remains, essentially innocent of 
“contact” and thus of “the pain and fear and the final death” by which such contact is 
defined (Cat Inside, 70). In spite of this, insists Burroughs, contact with animals 
nonetheless preserves the singular possibility of human knowledge and salvation: 
“August 9, 1984, Thursday. My relationship with my cats has saved me from a deadly, 
pervasive ignorance” (46). 
Such a contact, affirms Burroughs with the very last words of his Last Words, 
is the chance of a “pure love” for nonhuman animals, one which moves humans beyond 
the contested spaces of conflict and pain: “Only thing can resolve conflict is love, like I 
felt for Fletch and Ruski, Spooner and Calico. Pure love. What I feel for my cats 
present and past. Love? What is It? Most natural painkiller what there is” (253). This 
undetermined, indivisible purity of love has, however, already been corrupted, 
shattered by a testing animal which necessarily marks the limit of love. A limit, 
moreover, that it would seem is only reached by Christian love, by a love of one’s 
neighbour, and inscribing at its heart an ineffaceable contestation: “A centipede can be 
seen as a test upon which Love, like St. Francis used to make, would shatter” (252).  
Indeed, anyone familiar with Burrough’s writings cannot fail to be aware of 
the fearful hatred repeatedly heaped upon the abject centipede. And yet, it is not only 
centipedes, and not only insects such as scorpions and spiders, in whom or with whom 
Burroughs refuses to rejoice: “I don’t care much for rabbits. They aren’t cute at all, 
even the little ones. All they do is make stupid, galvanic attempts to get out of your 
hands, and big rabbits can give you a very nasty bite” (Cat Inside, 27). Perhaps then, 
the problem with centipedes is a combined lack of “cuteness” and refusal to reciprocate 
human affection—except that this clearly cannot be the case in that the other nonhuman 
species most often subject to Burroughs’ ire is none other than the dog. In this, and 
despite the repeated avowals of pure cat-Love, Burroughs squarely aligns himself, as 
we shall see, with Deleuze-Guattari and their infamous declaration that “anyone who 
likes cats or dogs is a fool” (Thousand Plateaus, 265). Dogs, it becomes clear, are 





The red fox, the silver fox, the bat-eared fox of Africa … all beautiful 
beasts. Wolves and coyotes in the wild condition are acceptable. What 
went so hideously wrong with the domestic dog? Man molded the domestic 
dog in his own worst image … self-righteous as a lynch mob, servile and 
vicious, replete with the vilest coprophagic perversions … and what other 
animal tries to fuck your leg? Canine claims to our affection reek of 
contrived and fraudulent sentimentality. […] I am not a dog hater. I do hate 
what man has made of his best friend. The snarl of a panther is certainly 
more dangerous than the snarl of a dog, but it isn’t ugly. A cat’s rage is 
beautiful, burning with a pure cat flame […]. When you see [a dog] snarl 
you are looking at something that has no face of its own. A dog’s rage is 
not his. It is dictated by his trainer. And lynch-mob rage is dictated by 
conditioning (Cat Inside, 62-3; emphasis added). 
 
With the dog, we can now better understand the contempt reserved for the rabbit, as 
well as the hierarchy which underlies it: the dog is hated for his or her closeness—her 
proximity, familiarity and similarity—to the human. She is hated, in other words, 
precisely for having being dominated, for having been molded in the worst image of 
“Homo Sap, the Ugly Animal” (Ghost of Chance, 48). The rabbit too, is disliked for the 
stupidity of her machine-like inability to escape her enforced “petting”—uncared-for 
precisely because of her inability to resist oppression. Both big and small cats, 
meanwhile, are beautiful only insofar as they retain their danger and their rage—their 
“wildness,” in short.84  
Here then, the tamed are hated (by humans) for having being tamed (by 
humans), for not being free. They are thus hated, might it not already be suggested, for 
suffering under a form of colonialisation subsequently reproduced as “natural”? One 
thinks here of the colonised subject who must resemble the coloniser to a degree, but 
nevertheless not too well, as we have seen with Venus Xtravaganza. 
Such contempt then, is the contempt of the bound by the free. And yet, 
according to Burroughs, it is only the human animal who comes into being already 
inextricably bound. As such, it thus becomes clear that this contempt is precisely a 
properly human derision reserved for all those other, unbounded beings who have 
nevertheless been contaminated by these bonds. It is contempt, in other words, for 
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 Here, Burroughs thus places the various species of fox much closer to the cat rather than the 
dog. Positioning foxes, especially the red fox (vulpes vulpes), into a close proximity with dogs 
is in fact by far the more common strategy—for reasons which will become clear—both on the 
level of species (which has subsequently been challenged) and along the traditional wild-tame 
dichotomy. Thus, with Burroughs, the red fox would seem to share in a privilege more usually 
reserved only, and if at all, for the “exotic” species. However, as we shall see, I do not believe 
that the red urban fox would be included by Burroughs in this list of “beautiful beasts.” 
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those nonhuman animals who have been contaminated by their proximity and similarity 
to the human. A corruption, as we will see, which comes in the sharing of the space, so 
to speak, of human time—of a temporalising and spatialising movement which has 
language as its condition of possibility. Put briefly, it is a contemptuous condescension 
for those other beings whom a properly human extension has overwritten.  
Hence, Burroughs’ scorn for “pets” is a consequence of humans having, 
through the technicity of language, imposed time upon their “naturally timeless” ways 
of being, a contamination rendering them unworthy of the purity of Love. It is here 
then, that we discover the notion of a deadly human touch which is never that of 
“contact.” This touch, a touch without touching, an excluding enclosing within the 
extension of human spacetime, is, in other words, that which renders impossible a 
saving encounter with the finitude of the other. Human touching, in short, kills the 
chance of contact by dispossessing that which is touched of its naturally wild state: “I 
have eulogised the fennec fox, a creature so delicate and timorous in the wild state that 
he dies of fright if touched by human hands” (Cat Inside, 63). Despite, or because of, 
the deadly effacement of finitude, this properly human touch is the contaminating touch 
of time.  
 
 
Viruses, afflictions, contaminations 
 
In the short novel Ghost of Chance (1991), Burroughs gives us the story of Libertatia, a 
revolutionary pirate settlement founded by Captain Mission in Madagascar. Learning 
of a threat to the settlement, Mission takes an overdose of a yagé-type hallucinogen 
named indri and enters into a vision through which is revealed the origin and prehistory 
of the land. One-hundred-and-sixty-million years before, Mission discovers, the “long 
rift” of Madagascar had split from the African mainland, leaving “a gaping wound in 
the earth’s side” as it “moved majestically out to sea” like “a vast festive ship launched 
with fireworks” (16). Thereafter, Madagascar had “lain moored in enchanted calm,” the 
home to a harmonious coexistence of species with no natural predators and providing 
“a vast sanctuary for the lemurs and for the delicate spirits that breathe through them” 
(15-16). As a result, the autochthonous Lemur People think and feel differently to 
153 
 
human animals, being both confused and repulsed by the concepts of time, sequence, 
and causality.85 
This enchanted calm is shattered, however, with “the appearance of man on 
earth,” an appearance synonymous with “the beginning of time” (15). This “appearing” 
that is an “arriving” must be understood, however, in two different ways. Firstly, this 
arrival is the originary appearing of the human species, and thus the “arrival” for the 
first time of time necessarily takes place in time, that is to say, along a temporal, 
evolutionary narrative. Secondly, the arriving of man is at once a colonisation of 
extension: “Man was born in time. He lives and dies in time. Wherever he goes, he 
takes time with him and imposes time” (17). Temporality is thus that in which Man 
appears and at once that which Man must take with his self—a human property but 
nonetheless not properly human. Humanity thus imposes time upon an originary 
nonhuman space at the same time as time marks the displacement of the human outside 
of this space. Outside, that is, of an impossible timeless and deathless spacing that 
somehow remains undifferentiated, that is, remains without space. As a result, time for 
Burroughs is the mark of an inhuman violence which has always already alienated the 
human animal from nature. Hence, in coming to be, the way of being human is 
precisely to mark time, remarking an originary division which, in constituting the 
human, at once displaces and encloses it: “Time is a human affliction; not a human 
invention but a prison” (16).  
“Time,” in other words, which begins with the human and in which and with 
which the human arrives, is thus necessarily imposed by the human animal alone upon 
a “previously” timeless environment. In this way its fairytale enchantment is 
contaminated by the arriving of human/time, a coming to being which paradoxically 
imposes itself upon other beings as a dispossessing lack of time—imposing the 
violence, conflict and pain which will ultimately render countless numbers of other 
animals extinct. Recalling here the “all at once” of the Burroughsian hierarchy of 
being, we can now better understand why the world before the human (in both its 
spatial and temporal sense)—that timeless time before time—must exist therefore in an 
harmonious balance of permanent changlessness in which species neither evolve nor 
become extinct (and ignoring thus the great disappearance announcing the end of the 
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 The Lemur People, one must assume, are thus incapable of understanding this mythic 
narrative as it is telepathically transmitted to Mission and thus at once translated for Mission. 
See, for example, Mission’s interpretative reading of the landscape, 15-16. 
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Palaeozoic era, as well as the mass extinctions of the late Triassic, the Jurassic and, 
again, the late Eocence). Indeed, within “The Museum of Lost Species” Mission 
recalls—always for the “first time” in human time—the (non)memory of this perfect 
stasis, rediscovered “first of all” in the museum’s timeless memorials displaying “all of 
the species … alive in dioramas of their natural habitats” (51).  
It will be necessary to make a return visit to Libertatia’s museum—a museum 
that is “not exactly a museum” (51) insofar as encountered therein are living corpses 
rather than zombie flesh—in the next chapter. Back outside in the heat of the pirate 
settlement, however, we discover that it is precisely its u-topos within the relation of 
the time-bound and the timeless which gives to Libertatia its revolutionary aspect. 
Appearing “already timeless as houses in a fairyland” (3), Libertatia constitutes an 
inadequate point of contact between lemurs and humans that calls to this Edenic time 
before time. Thus refusing the quasi-Hegelian narrative of a prerecorded human future 
predicated upon conflict, sequence and causality, Libertatia’s having taken place—a 
demonstration “for all to see that three hundred souls can coexist in relative harmony 
with each other, with their neighbours, and with the ecosphere of flora and fauna” 
(8)—marks instead a rupture within the prediction of historical time which is nothing 
less than the definition of revolution.  
As such, it is perhaps not by chance that the lemur is valued above all other 
animals, in that prosimians are thought to be the earliest primates, dating back some 
sixty million years and thus predating Homo erectus—and thus paradoxically 
“predating” the appearing of time as such—by at least fifty-eight of those millions.86 In 
the peculiarly Burroughsian sense of (pre)existing in an eternal stasis that has 
nevertheless somehow ended in becoming an evolutionary step on the way to the 
human, lemurs are thus “proto-” and “arche-typically” prehuman, insofar as they are at 
once the most similar and the most distant from man. A close family “contact,” in other 
words, across the furthest reaches of time and thus beyond time itself—humans through 
the looking-glass, so to speak.  
This inter-familial division, however, is for Burroughs in fact prior to the 
annihilating arriving of the human, an emergence into bondage which can never cease 
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 The visionary Captain Mission would presumably contest this dating, insofar as lemurs must 
have appeared “at once” and at one with Madagascar’s split from the mainland if The Lemur 
People are to remain suspended throughout its “timeless” 158 million year period—an 
oxymoronic syntagm which to a degree encapsulates our problematic.  
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to inhabit and impose the inhuman violence of time, in that this bondage has as its 
condition the division of the (not yet) human by language. More precisely, “the human” 
is the abyssal coming into being of language and thus time. Time, in other words, is not 
the taking place of the human, rather, being-human is being-temporal insofar as 
language is the taking place of the temporal-human’s having taken place. What 
distinguishes humans from “other animals,” writes Burroughs, is that only humans— 
 
can make information available through writing or oral tradition to other 
Sap humans outside his area of contact and to future generations. This 
distinction led Count Korzybski to call man “a time-binding animal,” and it 
can be reduced to one word: language (48).  
 
Clearly, “language” for Burroughs is reducible to human verbal language, that is to say, 
to “the word.” It thus becomes impossible for Burroughs, despite the Mugwumps who 
project pictograms and the Reptiles who communicate through the movements of green 
cartilage fans in Naked Lunch, to consider nonhuman languages even within his own, 
relatively broad definition of language as “the representation of an object or process … 
by something it is not” (48).  
This is not, however, simply an unquestioned speciesism, and nor does this 
lack of the as such condemn “the animal” to a comparative poverty, as it does for 
Heidegger. It is rather the case, as we shall see, that nonhuman animals cannot “have” 
language because, for Burroughs, the revolutionary reversal and displacement that is 
the “rubbing out of the word” is the possibility of an human entry (and indeed, an 
impossible reentry) into the mythical “wordless world” of the prehuman order of being 
(50). It is a distinction, in other words, which preserves for Burroughs and for humanity 
alone the possibility of entering a world with neither language nor time. The 
revolutionary possibility, that is to say, figured always inadequately (in that it takes 
place in and of language) by Libertatia, of accessing the wordless worldless world of 
and as the posthuman animal. 
As we have seen in our previous discussions of Blanchot and Heidegger, 
however, just as there can be no time—and no finitude, sense, language, becoming, or 
historicity—without a priori iterability, equally importantly there can be no iterability 
without finitude, sense, time, becoming, and historicity. And thus, in positing a 
timeless—hence undying and undifferentiated—preoriginary domain of animality, 
Burroughs denies all of this to nonhuman animals. Within this economy, as we have 
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seen time and again, the zootechnical genocide committed every day in the pursuit of 
profit is thus naturalised, insofar as the nonsubstitutable deaths of nonhuman animals 
continue to be rendered meaningless and thus unthinkable. Even more than this, 
however, is that, in going by way of an apparent affirmation of a “wild” Nature from 
which “Man” is excluded, Burroughs in fact further serves the death machines of 
capitalism in specifically devalorising those particular nonhuman groups systematically 
oppressed by contemporary economic structures. This expression of “pure animal 
Love,” in other words, this singular reiteration of the biblical and Promethean 
traditions, carries with it a further, absolutely devastating consequence: the expulsion 
from the sanctuary of “Nature” of all those contaminated “others” with whom we 
willingly or unwillingly share our space.  
It is in fact this contested space of temporal contamination which for 
Burroughs organises the distinction between the wild and the tame. In that time 
presupposes language, so the imposition of temporality constitutes the corruption of a 
certain “domestic” group of essentially speechless (and thus undifferentiated) animals 
by language. The “language virus,” which divides the human against itself and marks it 
as a temporal being, in this way contaminates those nonhuman animals that are 
“touched” by the human hands of inhuman time. Hence, for Burroughs, dogs represent 
a particularly “hideous” translation, having been “remolded,” written over by man in 
and as man’s “own worst image,” they cease to be animals (Cat Inside, 63). Consumed, 
interiorised by the virus, the face and the rage of “the domestic dog” are thus violently 
effaced, overwritten with a human metaphor.  
Here, there are obvious parallels with Deleuze-Guattari’s molarised “pets,” 
those “sentimental bow-wows” kept captive in the kennels of analysts (Thousand 
Plateaus, 32), “each with its own petty history … draw[ing] us into narcissistic 
contemplation … the better to discover a daddy, a mommy, a little brother behind 
them” (265). The Burroughsian dog too has been deprived of his or her natural state of 
wildness, made over into a material anthorpomorphism. Despite this, and again in 
common with Deleuze-Guattari, the Burroughsian “domestic” dog perhaps retains a 
virtual wildness. Burroughs does not, he writes, hate dogs, that is, he does not hate the 
original, virile wild dogs that supposedly existed prior to their mutual entanglement 
with human animals. Rather he claims to hate only what has been made of them and 
what has been done with them, a hatred which implies there can be no possibility of 
mutual (ex)change. Cats, it thus becomes clear, are privileged by virtue of being the 
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sole companion animals who, insofar as they retain their own face and rage and thus 
their originary being, have nonetheless resisted human subjugation. 
In summary, the “pet” can thus be defined as a nonhuman animal who submits 
to, or is subjugated to, the time of human extension, a submission and subjugation for 
which they are treated with scorn and contempt. The “sentimentality” attributed by 
Burroughs to human animals by way of the mirror of “contrived” canine mimēsis is, 
nevertheless, a charge at least as likely to be levelled at those humans who value their 
feline companions. Deleuze-Guattari, for example, in equating the “domesticated” with 
the “foolish,” the “petty” and the “sentimental,” have nothing but scorn for the “elderly 
woman who honors and cherishes” her “little cat or dog” (Thousand Plateaus, 270). 
 
 
Uninvited: the other racism  
 
The scorn reserved by Burroughs for the domesticated transforms into hate, however, 
into absolute rejection, when the foreigner, uninvited, takes their place in the place of 
the domestic. The imposition, that is to say, of “other” beings upon human extension: 
those beings with whom one is compelled to share one’s time and space but who are 
not “us.” It is here, as we shall see, that the absolute unworthiness of the centipede, that 
test which shatters Love, thus finds—or rather loses—his or her place according to this 
schema of the wild and the tame.  
Occupying the limit of the liminal space dividing tame from wild, the limit-
other that is the centipede is at once the most distant and most close: the illegal, 
nondomesticated alien within the domestic, within the familiar and the familial. In this 
sense, the centipede is for Burroughs the polar opposite of the cat. Whereas cats retains 
their timeless wildness despite the “touch” of death that is human extension, those 
unbearably ancient centipedes, arthropod kin to scorpions and cockroaches, remain 
always beyond such oppressive “touch” whilst nevertheless placing themselves within 
the domestic domain—and thus taking our time—against all human attempts to the 
contrary. Hence centipedes (again, like cockroaches) can never be considered “wild” 
according to the dominant, spectacular sense of the term.  
In contrast therefore to the exoticism of the (impossibly) distant Other, the 
centipede marks the furthest limit of the foreign within the domestic, illegally 
occupying the “home” of Man (a property albeit only recently acquired). Constituted 
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thus as the worst of the worst—worse even than his colonised canine compatriot—this 
hatred of the centipede thus discloses as its condition a hatred of the illegal immigrant 
conjoined with a romantic, spectacular exoticism. Rather than the beginning of ethics 
therefore, the affirmation of the “wild,” depending upon the exclusion of those “others” 
who share our place but who are not, however, “us,” reiterates instead a conservative 
valorisation of the self-same. It is founded, in other words, not upon the affirmation of 
the other, but upon hatred and narcissistic spectacularisation. Nonplaced within the 
capitalist machinery of the wild-tame dichotomy, such insect ways of being on the 
threshold, insistent, illegal, and unassimilable, are thus included as excluded, as that 
which is beyond hospitality. And yet, returning to our central point, it is just such an 
absolute exclusion from closeness, an exclusion designated by hate and murder, which 
serves exactly to efface our originary relatedness. 
Figured as that which “contaminates” the purity of domestic property, be it the 
body, the home, or the nation, this group of beings placed-out-of-place—lice, 
cockroaches, rats, foxes, flies, fleas, slugs, snakes, even gnats, and so on—thus find 
themselves collected within categories marked for extermination, excluded thus as 
“feral,” “vermin” or “pests.” Never fully determined, however, such categories are 
rather always open to negotiation, a porosity which always betrays their limit 
“otherness” with the marking of historical contingency, and thus with the demands of 
Capital. One thus understands the particular importance placed upon the 
maintainenance of such slippery categories as “vermin” (generally a hindrance to 
commodification and a non-respecter of property boundaries), and “feral” (generally 
useless to commodification but protected to some degree by proximity to either or, 
more usually, both, the categories of “pet” and “wild”).  
Furthermore, as we saw in the previous chapter, the reproduction of such 
internal “outsides” cannot be dissociated from other regulatory ideals. One thinks here 
most obviously of blood-and-soil nationalisms, of the aggravated narcissism of the 
racist desire to “purify” the “body” of the nation of contaminants, of Jews reconfigured 
as both “lice” and “rats” in Nazi Germany, of the Hutus in Rwanda referring to the 
Tutsis as “cockroaches,” of the Palestinians similarly considered “cockroaches” by the 
Israeli army, and so on.87 This too recalls us to the earlier discussion of Butler’s Bodies 
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That Matter, in which it was argued that women as well as (nonwhite) non-nationals 
are ultimately reproduced as foreign to the domain of the properly human. They are, 
moreover, foreign only to the degree that they are constituted as foreign within the 
Same by reference to the absolute outside of the alogon animal. In this way, women too 
are “domesticated,” written over by a dominant patriarchal order which treats with 
contempt its “feminine (out)side.” The nonwhite “other,” meanwhile, finds itself 
constituted as the fearsomely “feral”—i.e. unassimilable—immigrant in contrast to the 
safe “exoticism” of the impossibly distant cultural spectacle. This is not, however, to 
suggest an analogical relation between these constructions. Rather, they all rearticulate 
each other, reproducing the subject at and as the nexus of multiple vectors of power. 
Moreover, it is not simply fortuitous that, amid this wild-tame dichotomy 
maintained by the liminal otherness of the foreign in the domestic, a further grouping 
of nonhuman animals for all practical purposes disappears. Neither sentimental “pets” 
nor burning with the rage of the “wild,” so-called “food,” “work,” and “laboratory” 
animals find themselves almost completely effaced, whilst nonetheless partaking of the 
construction of “the woman” and “the immigrant.” As we shall see, the reproduction of 
these other “other” animals as senseless simulacra thus reserves the possibility of their 
value-free instrumentalisation, even as the “purity” of the wild-tame binary is 
reiterated. Silently situated somewhere between the domesticated and the unassimilable 
foreigner, the so-called “common-sense” attitude towards instrumentalised animals 
thus moves from contempt to despisal, whilst stopping short of hatred. 
Hence, returning to Burroughs’ Ghost of Chance, we discover that industrially 
commodified animal species, while occasionally and derisively dealt with in passing, 
for the most part remain silent and invisible, and this in spite of the novel’s explicit 
concern with the negative impact of human instrumentalist thinking upon other species, 
and on lemurs in particular. The exploitation of nonhuman species, for example, is both 
marked and unremarked in a short passage describing a group of (presumably “native” 
Madagascan) herdsmen who are busily engaged in providing for “their worthless 
zebus, a small black hump-backed breed of ox” (32). Here then, the native zebus used 
by the herdsmen are absolutely without value according to Burroughs’ schema. Small, 
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black and deformed, and thus ugly, inferior copies of the “original” ox, the only worth 
of these zebus is their use-value and, presumably, their exchange value solely among 
the men of the herd. Their instrumentalisation, in short, has rendered them worthless as 
living beings, made over into mere metaphors of the life they have lost.  
These same herdsmen, whilst foraging for fuel to maintain their worthless 
possessions, accidentally release the exhibits of the Museum of Lost Species. 
Containing examples of every species whose chance has been lost—presumably as a 
result of human extension—and therefore including viruses as well as animals, these 
various viral strains completely exhaust the abilities of the scientists hired to deal with 
them. “As one viral strain burned itself out,” writes Burroughs, “or in rare instances 
when the scientists finally perfected a vaccine or treatment, then another plague would 
take its place. Back to square one, Professor” (37). Precisely how scientists perfect 
such vaccines, however, is a question which for Burroughs, despite his “pure Love” for 
the wildness of primates and felines, apparently does not arise.  
We can now better understand why the division of nonhuman animals into 
either the “wild” or the “tame” is, above all, a question of familiarity, that is to say, of 
dogmatism: of the disavowal of the opening of ethics which slumbers within an 
apparent affirmation of “other” others. Indeed, Barbara Noske is quite correct when she 
describes the prioritising of wild animals over their “domestic” kin as “the other 
racism” (Beyond Boundaries, xii). It is, in short, the support of contempt, despisal, and 
hatred—a “pervasive ignorance” with absolutely devastating consequences. To further 
illustrate this, I thus turn in the next section to the somewhat more subtle wild-tame 
dichotomy which underwrites Deleuze and Guattari’s key notion of “becoming-
animal,” only to find there the same “grounding” exclusion of the foreign within the 
domestic. We will find too, the same categorical contempt reserved precisely for the 
victims of their own schema. 
 
 
The human privilege of becoming-animal 
 
Famously (or infamously), in the chapter of A Thousand Plateaus entitled “1730—
Becoming-Intense, Becoming-Animal, Becoming-Imperceptible …,” Deleuze and 
Guattari divide nonhuman animals into three categories: Oedipal animals, State 
animals, and demonic animals. Oedipal animals are “individuated animals, family pets, 
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sentimental”—those animals which Burroughs argues have been moulded in Man’s 
own worst image—, whereas State animals are those animals treated so as “to extract 
from them series or structures, archetypes or models.” Finally, the valorised category of 
demonic animals are those “pack or affect animals that form a multiplicity, a becoming, 
a population, a tale [à meutes et affects, et qui font multiplicité, devenir, population, 
conte]” (265).  
Having nothing to do with filiation, such a “pack” or “band” rather 
presupposes contagion: “affects and powers, involutions that grip every animal in a 
becoming just as [non moins] powerful as that of the human being with the animal” 
(266). At first reading, it would appear that Deleuze-Guattari are here giving to 
nonhuman animals an access to a “becoming” that is equal, in power, in affect, to those 
becomings open to the human animal. Indeed, this is one of the main reasons for the 
recent interest in Deleuze-Guattari’s philosophy evinced from within animal studies. 
Upon closer reading, however, it soon transpires that the equality marked by that “just 
as” is just as quickly refused. Indeed, in being “just as” or “no less” [non moins] 
powerful, an implicit division between a nonhuman animal-becoming and a human 
becoming-animal is already remarked. 
Before moving on to that discontinuity, a discontinuity which in fact serves to 
prohibit nonhuman becoming despite its commensurate powerfulness, it should first of 
all be noted that these three categories, Oedipal, State and pack, are far less secure and 
far more complex than is generally taken to be the case. To begin with, these divisions 
are divisions only of degree and of contingency:  
 
There is always the possibility that a given animal … will be treated as a 
pet [soit traité comme un animal familier] … it is also possible for any 
animal to be treated [être traité] in the mode of the pack … Even the cat, 
even the dog. … Yes, any animal is or can be a pack, but to varying degrees 
of vocation that make it easier or harder to discover the multiplicity, or 
multiplicity-grade [de teneur en multiplicité], an animal contains (actually 
or virtually according to the case) (265-6).  
 
Moreover, we can see that what have been thus divided are not “actual” nonhuman 
animals. They denote, that is, neither a zoological classification nor even what for 
Deleuze-Guattari constitutes the reality of nonhuman animals. Rather, the categories 
represent the three possible ways in which nonhuman animals might be treated [traité], 
that is, in which they might be constituted in relation to humans: a dog can be treated 
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as a pack, a panther can be treated as a “pet” or as a model. In short, Oedipal, State and 
demonic are not three ways of being-animal, but rather three ways in which humans 
may produce other animals. We are thus contained within an (actual or virtual) human 
domain, constrained within the anthro-tropo-logical machine of human recognition and 
of the proper and improper ways of re-presenting a nonhuman being. Whether that is as 
a “pet” or as a “pack,” this exceptional tropological function, this solely human “as,” is 
itself symptomatic of what by now is an all too familiar human-animal discontinuity.  
What then, do Deleuze-Guattari consider the “reality” of nonhuman animals, 
outside of their categorisation? Only in answering this question does it become possible 
to understand the privilege accorded to the category of the demonic, a category which, 
first of all, is not in fact that of a band or pack of animals (plural). Rather, for Deleuze-
Guattari the animal—that is, this singular animal, this nonsubstitutable living being 
more commonly defined as a single, autonomous organism—is always already pack: 
“We do not wish to say that certain animals live in packs [vivent en meutes] … What 
we are saying is that every animal is fundamentally [d’abord] a band, a pack” (264). 
“The pack,” they continue, is “animal reality” (267). In other words, every individuated 
nonhuman animal is, first of all, is at first [d’abord], a pack. This is “its” mode, “its” 
way of being rather than simply a quality or a distinguishing mark: “it [sic] has pack 
modes, rather than characteristics, even if further distinctions interior to these modes 
are called for” (264, translation modified).  
Every nonhuman animal thus “is” in a mode of being-pack, rather than “pack” 
being simply or only a mark, constituted by an human-animal relation, of and as 
“animal reality.” Every animal is a pack then, but not every animal is treated as a pack. 
In being treated or constituted as an Oedipal or State animal, this being-pack that an 
animal contains is rendered merely “virtual” in that her “multiplicity-grade” is 
necessarily hard to discover. By contrast, those animals constituted as demonic pack-
animals, insofar as the metaphorical vehicle that is such a relation properly signifies, or 
at least corresponds, to the essential “reality” of nonhuman animals, therefore retain in 
and as that relation the “actuality,” the sense, of their “proper” way of being. It is just 
such a “vocation” which keeps them at the greatest distance from both “petty” human 
“sentimentality” and the reduction to state characteristics. A proper vocation which, in 
short, ensures they remain both “wild” and “real.” 
Demonic pack animals, as we have seen, form a multiplicity presupposing 
contagion rather than filiation, presupposing involutions rather than hereditary 
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production and sexual reproduction. “Bands,” Deleuze-Guattari write, both “human 
and animal, proliferate by contagion, epidemics, battlefields, and catastrophes” (266). 
However, it is in following this catastrophic contagion or contamination that we 
discover, in what is perhaps the central passage of the “1730” plateau, the positing of 
an absolute separation: 
 
These multiplicities with heterogeneous terms, cofunctioning by contagion, 
enter certain assemblages [agencements]; it is there that human beings 
effect their becomings-animal [opère ses devenirs-animaux]. … The pack 
is simultaneously animal reality and the reality of the becoming-animal of 
the human being; contagion is simultaneously animal populating 
[peuplement animal], and propagation of the animal populating [or 
“stocking”] of the human being [et propagation du peuplement animal de 
l’homme] (267, translation modified). 
 
Being-pack therefore is the reality of animal, the way of being of animals is the 
entering of assemblages by the contagion that is animal populating. At the same time, 
the pack is the reality of human becoming-animal, in contrast to being-human, insofar 
as the human being can effect [opère] a becoming-animal by entering the being-pack of 
a certain assemblage that is a contagion which propagates or passes over the animal 
populating of the human. The way of being-pack that is animal populating can, in other 
words, be passed on or over to human beings, enabling them to enter the assemblages 
which effect their becoming. Only in this way can the human being become animal. 
This is not to say, however, that the human enters the reality of the animal. Rather, as 
we shall see, this “reality” of every other animal remains absolutely discontinuous with 
human being. 
Despite their scorn for “ridiculous evolutionary classifications à la [Konrad] 
Lorenz, according to which there are inferior packs and superior societies” (264), 
Deleuze-Guattari not only reduce all other animals to the general category of “the 
animal” in opposition to “the human” (albeit while calling for further “internal” 
differentiation), they in fact place human culture over against “the true Nature [la vraie 
Nature]” of every other living being. This “true Nature”—the totality of “[u]nnatural 
participations” of nonhuman becoming—, “spans the kingdoms of nature” (266-7, 
translation modified). Becoming, in other words, the entering of assemblages by 
contagion, is precisely the reality of all nonhuman being. “Each multiplicity,” they 
write, “is symbiotic; its becoming ties together animals, plants, microorganisms, mad 
particles, a whole galaxy” (275). Thus, whereas for Deleuze-Guattari “the human” 
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retains the potential to enter becomings-animal (which is not an animal becoming), the 
nonhuman animal “exists” in a permanent becoming, “in” this “truly natural” mode of 
being-pack that “is” the One-All of Life.  
It thus follows that the human is always already outside of the “true Nature” of 
permanent becoming. Consequently, as we shall see, humans are necessarily 
condemned to the “stupidity [bêtise]” of language, and henceforth to relating to animals 
as animals, be that as Oedipal, as State, or as demonic. We are now better placed to 
understand the valorisation—the higher degree—of the demonic as category, insofar as 
the determination of the categorical animal predicate relates precisely to human entry, 
or its refusal. Always already outside of “Nature,” the human being nevertheless comes 
to approach true Nature from which it is disposed through an anthropomorphic 
positing of the demonic. In other words, the metaphorical relation—the as such which 
at once remarks the displacement of the human from Nature—between the “demonic” 
and the multiplicity-grade that “is” the reality of animals performs and, in so doing 
discloses, its discontinuity from human being. A disclosure, moreover, which is at once 
the possibility of entering a properly human becoming.  
This opposition between becoming and being, in a vertiginous oscillation 
between figure and figured, is represented on one side by the “demonic” wolf, and by 
the molarised Oedipal dog on the other. Whereas even within the anthropomorphising 
relation the wolf retains, in her distance from the molarised human, her essence as an 
“actual” animal, the essential reality of the dog has, by contrast, become merely virtual, 
and has become so, yet again, as a result of “contamination” by a properly human 
iterability and thus temporality.  
Moreover, it is this oscillation, this undecidability, which permits the making-
virtual of the reality of an animal in relation to the human: dogs can be pack in that 
they are pack, but as (anthropomorphic molarised) dogs this being-pack is effaced. An 
effacement which ensures the impossibility of disclosing a potential human becoming 
by way of an encounter with an Oedipal or State animal. A dog, however, this 
nonsubstitutable dog, has pack as his or her way of being, a reality which as such 
cannot be expropriated without her ceasing to be a dog. Without, in other words, this 
dog ceasing to be nonhuman and thus becoming human instead—an impossible 
expropriation within Deleuze-Guattari’s human-animal division. For Deleuze-Guattari, 
therefore, the question of the animal is always and only a question of how “animals” 
are treated (traité) within a discourse which remains essentially human.  
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Given the contempt displayed by Deleuze-Guattari for “actual” so-called 
“pets,” however, it would nevertheless seem that the proximity to the human does 
somehow, albeit impossibly, impinge upon the way of being-animal. An 
anthropomorphism made literal, made flesh, so to speak, dogs and cats are thus 
somehow humanised in spite of their essential becoming. Within the reading being 
attempted here, however, both the “tame” and the “wild” are necessarily pure 
anthropomorphisms, a hierarchical ranking only in relation to the potential disclosure 
of human becoming. Nonetheless, this division of a putatively homogeneous “animal 
reality” solely for human purposes—as the means of a theoretical disclosure of human 
ends—has devastating results for those nonsubstitutable living beings who fall outside 
of the valorised category. As we saw with Burroughs, such contempt for the “pet” and, 
to an even greater extent, for those unmarked categories of “instrumentalised” animals 
and of the undomesticable within the domestic, thus amounts to a simple prejudice for 
the victim of its own posited schema. 
Insofar as it discloses—as a purely anthropocentric concern—becoming as 
such, with “the Animal is pack” the entire economy of Deleuze-Guattari’s becomings 
thus finds its centre. Becomings-animal, they write, “are segments occupying a median 
region. On the near side, we encounter becomings-women, becomings-child … On the 
far side, we find becoming-elementary, -cellular, -molecular, and even becomings-
imperceptible” (274). Between the betweens in that it occupies the privileged place of 
entry, such a placing necessarily cannot be a horizontal measure of closeness or 
distance to the molarised human being. At the same time, however, insofar as the 
undifferentiated “existence” of nonhuman animals “is” permanent becoming, neither 
can it be positioned along a vertical hierarchy.88 There can, in short, be neither measure 
nor order precisely because nonhuman being is becoming. A permanent becoming 
which is at once the paradox of timeless stasis, in that there can be no rupture, no 
revolutionary coming to be in its absolute dissolution. In other words, a nonhuman 
animal cannot come to be other because “the animal” is becoming. Being human, 
therefore, is precisely to reserve for itself alone the potential for becoming other, for 
which “animal reality” provides the entry and the vehicle.  
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Becoming-animal is thus for Deleuze-Guattari an essentially human affair. 
Having nothing to do with animals, becoming is rather a human property: the becoming 
human of human being. Furthermore, for Deleuze-Guattari “the Animal”—and indeed, 
“the true Nature” that is the totality of nonhuman being, of the One-All of Life—is 
always already excluded from this circular movement from anthroprojection to point of 
entry that is access to the being of becoming from within the molarised everyday. Here 
then, we discover a similar structural disavowal, albeit substituting “becoming” for 
“knowing,” as that which for Heidegger, as we have seen, gives to the human Dasein 
alone both the “possibility of existence” and “a positive possibility of the most 
primordial kind of knowing” (Being and Time, 62, 195). The “demonic” animal in this 
sense provides for Deleuze-Guattari their own point of departure. And yet, it still 
remains to ask, how is a permanent becoming possible? How do such becomings take 
place, yet without making sense? 
It is here that we find a certain hesitancy when, in their discussion of Lévi-
Strauss, Deleuze-Guattari raise the question of what, or who, an animal comes to be in 
becoming: “Lévi-Strauss is always encountering these rapid acts by which a human 
becomes animal at the same time as the animal becomes … (Becomes what? Human, 
or something else?)” (262). Given the “reality” of permanent nonhuman becoming, the 
question remains necessarily unanswerable. “Becoming,” write Deleuze-Guattari, 
“produces nothing other than itself” (262). However, “in” the pure potentiality as such 
that is permanent becoming, and as we have seen in the previous chapters, nothing can 
be produced (or, rather, reproduced) in that it necessarily consists of the suspension and 
withholding of all actualised possibilities, and is thus precisely that which “I” can never 
experience. And indeed, as will become clear, it is precisely this “I” which is refused 
by Deleuze-Guattari to all but human being, thus dissolving nonhuman being within the 
impossibility of possibility that is Nietzsche’s well of eternity.  
Hence, as both entry and model for becoming, animals initially appear as 
valorised above the human animal, and yet, this is a would-be valorisation which takes 
the very thing being valorised away from nonhuman animals and reserves it for the 
human alone. Animals remain suspended in the senseless undifferentiation of 
ahistorical stasis, a permanent fluid (non)assemblage of eternal (non)becoming.  
Animals, in other words, lack the becoming-space of time and the becoming-
time of space. In contrast, it is only the time-bound human—time-bound in being 
disposed outside the “true Nature” that is perpetual becoming—who can thus enter into 
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an assemblage. “The human” becomes, in other words, only at the borderline between 
“being-human” and “true Nature.” The human, that is to say, comes to be at and as the 
limit of finite “human being” and infinite being as such, on the border between the 
possible and the impossibility of possibility. In becoming, write Deleuze-Guattari, “the 
demon[ic] functions as the borderline of an animal pack into which the human being 
passes or on which his or her becoming takes place, by contagion” (272, emphasis 
added). Here, Deleuze-Guattari are once again differentiating between the contagion 
that is “animal populating” and the “propagation” of the “animal populating of the 
human being” (267). Between, that is to say, the way of being of nonhuman animals 
and at once that on which human becoming takes place. Here then, there is an absolute 
discontinuity between Man and Nature, with the latter the eternal background upon 
which, at the border, human animals alone can affect their becomings-other by way of 
the demonic.  
 
 
Deeply ecological Deleuze-Guattari 
 
This distinction between humanity and true Nature thus places Deleuze-Guattari’s 
project in proximity with the essentialist definitions of “wild nature” as posited by deep 
ecologists such as Arne Naess, George Sessions, and Bill Devall.89 Such deep 
ecological representations of nature, as Barbara Noske writes, 
 
tend to be part of a wilderness ethic which totally overlooks sentient 
individuals in favour of species, collections of species and habitats of 
species [one thinks here too of Burroughs, and of those deathless, timeless 
museum exhibits]. Deep ecologists give narrow and essentialist definitions 
of nature. The only nature worth talking about is wild. As a result, 
domesticated nature, feral nature, or anything which does not constitute 
“the wild”—including humans themselves—tends to be disqualified as 
nature. It is not the real thing. … For deep ecology the dichotomy between 
humanity and nature is final (Beyond Boundaries, xi; emphasis added). 
 
One can thus begin to understand why a reading of Deleuze, with or without Guattari, 
which aligns his project with that of deep ecology is not necessarily a misreading. 
Robert Hurley, for example, detects the connection even in Deleuze’s early text 
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Spinoza: Practical Philosophy (1970), claiming that Deleuze in fact offers a model thus 
far lacking in deep ecologist “modalities of interaction” (“Introduction,” ii).  
With a clear reference to Deleuze’s later work with Guattari, Hurley describes 
this model as “the composition of affective relations between individuals, together with 
the ‘plane of consistency’ on which they interact, that is, their ‘environment’” (ii, 
emphasis added). While this notion of “individuals” (inter)acting “on” or upon their 
“environment” already suggests a very traditional dichotomy, Hurley touches on the 
specific problematic being traced here when he affirms that this “environment” is “not 
just a reservoir of information … but also a field of forces whose actions await 
experiencing. In a human sense, it can be called the unconscious, or at least the ground 
on which the unconscious is constructed” (ii). Here then, the “unconscious” is the 
properly human, and is constructed upon the (natural) environment.  
I will return to this notion of the Deleuzian unconscious shortly, but first of all 
a few prefatory remarks are required. As we have seen, for Deleuze-Guattari and for 
Hurley, “true Nature” is relegated to a timeless background of permanent becoming 
from which only humans are excluded and which, in being entered in those exceptional 
encounters Deleuze-Guattari call becomings, can only ever be written upon. Compare 
this then with Devall’s definition of deep ecology, and in particular with its 
presupposed human exceptionalism: deep ecology, he writes, seeks “a new 
metaphysics, epistemology, cosmology, and environmental ethics of the person/planet” 
(cit. Wolfe “Old Orders,” 23; emphasis added).  
In the opposite direction, one can similarly detect something of deep ecology’s 
“macho ethic” in the structure of Deleuze and Guattari’s becomings, insofar as 
nonhuman animals provide the site for an active human entry into becoming, effecting 
itself upon the receptacle that is true Nature in what is at once a masculine, phallicised 
penetration and (be)coming over of the exoticised timeless wild. Man never exists-in-
relation with other animals, but rather and necessarily enters (a presumably feminine) 
Nature from outside. Here we find the same essentialist romantic topos which both 
underlies Aldo Leopold’s liberalist “land-ethic” and which organises the deep 
ecological defence of hunting.  
Given the entangled vectors of power we are continuing to track here, it is not 
by chance that such a defence, in at least one of its major variants (what Marti Kheel 
calls the “holy hunter” defence), depends upon the claim that the nonhuman animal 
chooses to end her life for the benefit of the (generally male) human hunter. A claim 
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which “has no more validity than the idea that a woman who is raped ‘asked for it’ or 
‘willingly’ gave herself to the rapist” (Kheel “License to Kill,” 104).90  
Returning to Robert Hurley’s deep ecological reading of Deleuze, we find that 
Hurley reaffirms without question the decentring of consciousness by the unconscious 
as a solely human property. Indeed, it is precisely this traditional exceptionalism which 
“grounds” Deleuze’s relegation of the nonhuman world to that of a timeless 
background. It is thus far from incidental that, in his reading of the place of bêtise 
(“stupidity”) in Deleuze’s Difference and Repetition, Derrida refers to an 
“unconscious” which is “inconsistent.”91 For Deleuze, as Derrida shows, bêtise is “a 
problem of thinking” that is proper to man alone, indissociable from its relation to 
individuation as such which operates, as groundless ground (Ungrund), beneath all 
forms (“Transcendental ‘Stupidity’,” 49). Animals, by contrast, “are in a sense 
forewarned [en quelque sorte prémunis] against this ground, protected by their explicit 
forms” (Deleuze Difference and Repetition, 190; cit. Derrida “Transcendental 
‘Stupidity’,” 51). It is only the human, therefore, who “remains nevertheless as an 
undetermined freedom in relation with this groundless ground, and that’s where [a] 
properly human stability comes from” (“Transcendental ‘Stupidity’,” 56).  
Proceeding to put this distinction into question from both sides, Derrida 
argues, first, for the necessity of a nonhuman relation to this ground that is “as abyssal 
as with man” and, second, as to the impossibility of an absolute distinction between 
explicit (animal) and implicit (human) forms. In so doing, he ultimately discloses the 
very traditional gesture underlying the Deleuzian human-animal distinction: that of the 
properly human capacity to constitute itself as an “I,” and thus of the identity of bêtise 
and “the thing of the I, of the ego” (58). Thus, writes Deleuze,  
 
Stupidity is neither the ground nor the individual, but rather this relation in 
which individuation brings the ground to the surface without being able to 
give it form (this ground rises by means of the I, penetrating deeply into the 
possibility of thought and constituting the unrecognised in every 
                                                           
90
 On the philosophical/mysticism of what Kheel calls “holy hunters,” see the works of deep 
ecologists Holmes Rolston, Paul Shepard and, in particular, Gary Snyder.  
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 See the fifth and sixth seminars collected in The Beast and the Sovereign and, in a slightly 
different English language version, in “The Transcendental ‘Stupidity’ (‘Bêtise’) of Man and 
the Becoming-Animal According to Deleuze” (2002). As Derrida himself demonstrates 
throughout, the translation of bêtise by stupidity is far from satisfactory (as indeed is the point 
made, in different ways, by both Derrida and Deleuze), and hence in the following it will for 
the large part be left untranslated. 
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recognition) (Difference and Repetition, 190; cit. Derrida “Transcendental 
‘Stupidity’,” 57) 
 
As we have seen, however, nonhuman animals cannot be excluded from this 
“transcendental stupidity” which constitutes “the unrecognised in every recognition,” 
in that such a bêtise is precisely that of the trace, the technicity at and as the origin of 
all living being by which life outlives itself. 
 
 
Burroughs with Deleuze, the fault  
 
Central here is that the structure of iterability—and of the indissociability of the taking 
place and the having taken place that is this “relation in which individuation brings the 
ground to the surface without being able to give it form”—refused to nonhuman 
animals by Deleuze in 1968 remains to organise Deleuze-Guattari’s human-animal 
distinction in A Thousand Plateaus. As with Burroughs, and by way of the wild-tame 
dichotomy, Deleuze-Guattari also reserve for humanity alone the possibility of 
encountering the timeless immediacy of “true Nature” at and as the limit of language. 
And again, as with Burroughs, Deleuze-Guattari posit an undying and undifferentiated 
preoriginary domain of animality—an essential dissolution of Life which renders as 
senseless the singular deaths of nonhuman animals. Finally, Deleuze-Guattari too 
exclude from the “truth” of “Nature” all of the nonhuman beings improperly 
contaminated by the anthro-tropo-logical machine of human recognition. 
Moreover, because for Deleuze-Guattari nonhuman animals exist in 
permanent becoming, we can now understand why they must leave open the question 
of who or what a nonhuman animal becomes in becoming. Insofar as an animal cannot 
become human, which is precisely the exception from, and the lack of, the eternal 
becoming that is the reality of the animal, she or he can therefore never become 
anything or anyone at all. Indeed, for Deleuze-Guattari an animal—this dog or that 
wolf—is never an “I,” never a “who” or even a “what,” never a “he” or a “she” or an 
“it.” Furthermore, “the human” may enter a (properly human) becoming only because 
he or she is excluded from the reality of the animal, an exceptionalism which 
presupposes the constitution of the human in originary lack. It is this “lack” which, 
insofar as it constitutes the plane of transcendence, reserves the possibility of human 
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becomings-animal or, better, of becoming-other than human being. In short, the 
human, and the human alone, is constituted in and as the lack that is bêtise, in and as 
the unrecognisable, the méconaissance, which exceeds all recognition.  
In being refused entry into language and thus finitude, as we saw with the 
reading of Burroughs, nonhuman ways of being thus lack everything predicated upon 
this properly human lack: not only technics, language, time, and historicity, but also 
society, politics, ethics, law, and historiology.92 This notion of an originary human lack 
is, of course, very familiar, belonging as it does to what Derrida calls “the tried and true 
biblical and Promethean tradition” (The Animal, 122). That we should discover this 
tradition as supporting the valorisation of the wild in writers as different from one 
another as Burroughs and Deleuze is perhaps not that surprising however. Indeed, as 
Derrida writes, one finds “the same dominant” throughout Western philosophical 
discourse, “the same recurrence of a schema that is in truth invariable” (45). A schema, 
Derrida continues, in which— 
 
what is proper to man, his subjugating superiority over the animal, his very 
becoming-subject, his historicity, his emergence out of nature, his sociality, 
his access to knowledge and technics, all that, everything (in a nonfinite 
number of predicates) that is proper to man would derive from this 
originary fault, indeed, from this default in propriety—and from the 
imperative necessity that finds in it its development and resilience (45).  
 
Positing an entry into becoming which effects itself upon the timelessness of the wild, 
whether that “wild” is called “enchanted innocence” or “true Nature,” thus reproduces 
this dominant schema. A schema which dissolves the vast diversity of nonhuman 
animals in a becoming-Nature which necessarily lacks both responsibility and respond-
ability. An absolute senselessness, in other words, from which a line of flight is 
ontologically impossible. Despite the positing of a “pure animal Love” therefore, 
despite the potential for nonhuman animals to be gripped by a becoming “just as 
powerful as that of the human being with the animal,” the subjugating superiority of 
Man’s emergence from Nature, and hence humanist exceptionalism, is necessarily left 
unchallenged. Put simply, the apparent valorisation of the (wild) animal remains 
essentially within the neighbourhood of “the human.” 
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Shadow animals, zombie flesh: the economy of/and mimēsis 
 
As a consequence of human contamination, as we have seen, the proper ways of being-
dog have been, for Burroughs, displaced by a narcissistic imaging, rendered merely 
virtual according to Deleuze-Guattari, and disqualified as “unnatural” by deep 
ecologists. Dogs, therefore, in Noske’s telling phrase, are not, or are no longer, “the 
real thing.” In this, as I will argue in this section, they in fact all reiterate a logic of 
colonialism which serves to constitute subjugated beings who are precisely deserving 
of oppression—an oppressive logic which tends to contaminate any number of animals, 
both human and nonhuman.  
This contamination is, in short, a displacement of nonhuman animals by and 
within human language, a tropological “touch” which renders nonsubstitutable beings 
mere simulacra. Indeed, Burroughs’ allusion to a supposedly “non-hideous” canine 
prior to the timely human “touch” exemplifies the “common sense” of a dominant 
anthropocentrism. One which inscribes both domesticated and instrumentalised animals 
within an economy of mimēsis both Platonic and Biblical. It is, moreover, this economy 
of tropes, acutely deemed the “other racism” by Noske, that will return us once more to 
the “vectors of power” and to their mutually articulating imbrication.  
The reproduction of certain animals as “not real,” that is to say, as “pale 
imitations” of their idealised wild counterparts and/or forebears, is at once 
Christianised discourse and imperialist logic. Put simply, its economy of mimēsis 
ensures that colonised beings must become, as a result of their oppression, somehow 
dull and stupid and thus (albeit ex post facto), materially and economically deserving of 
being exploited and oppressed. It is according to this same tropology that the native 
zebus of Burroughs’ Libertatia come to be derided as “worthless” non-animals, 
shadowy ghosts unmarked but for their corruption by human proximity and by a 
putting to work which interrupts the timeless wild dioramas.  
In this too we can understand the paradoxical semi-timelessness of Libertatia 
itself: responding to the timeless call of the wild, those revolutionary but necessarily 
time-bound settlers find only a coexistence of “relative” harmony not only with each 
other but also with “the ecosphere of flora and fauna.” They can find, in other words, 
only an imitation, a simulacrum, of the timeless wild. Coexisting only to a degree, the 
nonhuman animals who share the time of the settlers are but inferior copies, the poor 
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relations of those “wild” beings suspended in the Edenic dioramas of true Nature which 
can be observed—always following the Fall into the distance of time—only within The 
Museum of Lost Species.  
One of the best examples of the dominant, “common sense” valorisation of the 
wild, one which makes explicit its Biblical heritage as well as marking a nexus of the 
entangled hegemonies of oppression being tracked here, is the first “chapter” of Julian 
Barnes’ novel A History of the World in 10½ Chapters (1989). Rewriting the story of 
Noah’s ark (Genesis, 6-9) from the perspectives of the various animals, “The 
Stowaway” is narrated by a woodworm who, by virtue of being both illegal and 
“unclean” (and thus all too obviously among the abject category of the foreign within 
the domestic), is fully aware of the futility of applying for asylum from Noah. The 
futility, that is, of asking Noah for hospitality, or of attempting to justify why he or she 
is “worth” saving—a request for hospitality from the human which thus crosses with 
the impossibility of salvation. While ostensibly seeking to refute the “clean” and 
“unclean” distinction imposed upon animals (Genesis, 7:2), it soon becomes clear, 
however, that the narration nevertheless remains complicit both with Noah and with 
God, and thus against certain “other” animals.  
Initially, the woodworm-narrator, sexed being (his or her companions risk 
disclosure through their sexual activity) and illegal immigrant, seeks to reverse the 
traditional human-animal privilege. She or he does so, however, only on the condition, 
yet again, of every animal’s timeless dissolution. Man, s/he writes, “is a very 
unevolved species compared to the animals … you are, as yet, at an early stage of your 
development. We, for instance, are always ourselves: that is what it means to be 
evolved” (28, emphasis added). Upon disembarkation, however, this absolute animal 
self-presence is contradicted in the reinscribing of another version of the clean-unclean 
distinction: that of the wild and the tame, of the effervescently exotic and the corrupt 
oppressed. Noah, the woodworm recalls, offered water and food during shortages to 
any animals willing to stay close to “New Noah’s Palace.” He offers them, that is to 
say, a place within the economic order: base reproduction of life in exchange for a 
plentiful supply of flesh. Noah, capitalist and colonial, offers, in short, mere day-to-day 
survival in exchange for the labour of their bodies, raising on their backs a profit for 
himself and his fellow colonials: his “people.” Precisely at this point the collective 





some of them—not the cleverest ones, it has to be said—stayed around …. 
The pigs, the cattle, the sheep, some of the stupider goats, the chickens … 
We warned them …. As I say, they weren’t very bright, and were probably 
scared of going back into the wild; they’d grown dependent on their gaol, 
and their gaoler. What happened over the next few centuries was quite 
predictable: they became shadows of their former selves [and yet how can 
this be, given that such animals are “always” themselves, absolutely?]. The 
pigs and sheep you see walking around today are zombies compared to 
their effervescent [and yet “stupid”] ancestors on the Ark (26-7, emphasis 
added).  
 
In the space of a few paragraphs, so-called “food” animals are thus transformed into 
ghosts, insubstantial shadows that are mere copies of their originary selves. In 
reiterating the Platonic logic of mimesis, these inferior, fallen copies thus lack the 
animating Idea, dead bodies as opposed to the living voice, and hence mutate into the 
pure animal remains of the “zombie.” Without anima, in short, pigs, “cattle,” sheep, 
goats, and chickens are reproduced as nothing but walking dead flesh.  
In this way “food” animals cease to be living, vibrant beings, cease to be “the 
real thing.” Moreover, the spectral disembodiment through mimetic displacement thus 
paradoxically permits their transformation into “pure” corporeality, bodily-shaped 
collections of dead zombie flesh ready to be disarticulated into “meat.” In this way, the 
instrumentalised animal, the “walking ghost,” is the inverse of the living corpse that 
returns, that “revolutionary spirit” which, as we have seen in the discussion of 
Nietzsche and Marx, “out-lives” its actualisation in being raised (again) within contexts 
where it had not previously belonged. Hence, whereas the latter interrupts the 
hegemonies of oppression, stalling the machinery of animalisation, the Platonic 
devalorisation of the simulacrum in the former thus reproduces a symbolic logic of 
oppression which serves to constitute subjugated beings who are “in fact” deserving of 
oppression:93  
 
The capitalist exploiter of the coloured workers … consigns them to 
employments and treatments that [are] humanly degrading. In order to 
justify this treatment the exploiters must argue that the workers are innately 
degraded and degenerate, consequently they naturally merit their 
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condition. … This, then, is the beginning of modern race relations. It was 
not an abstract, immemorial feeling of mutual antipathy between groups, 
but rather a practical exploitative relationship with its socio-attitudinal 
facilitation (Nibert Animal Rights/Human Rights, 17; emphasis added). 
 
We can thus more clearly understand Noske’s contention that the devalorisation of 
instrumentalised animals, the unmarked “other” of the negative pole in the wild-tame 
dichotomy, constitutes the “other racism.” Just as there is nothing “natural” about the 
capitalist exploitation of coloured workers, in the same way the antipathy towards 
instrumentalised, and thus commodified, nonhuman animals—and indeed, towards the 
foreign in the domestic—is nothing natural. Rather, it comes to be “naturalised” as a 
result of “a practical exploitative relationship with its [reproduced] socio-attitudinal 
facilitation.” This entanglement of vectors of power can perhaps be seen operating 
most clearly in the contemporary slaughter factory, with its interrelated “devising and 
employing” of speciesism, race prejudice and sexual abuse for the pursuit of profit. For 
this reason, we shall return to these killing floors in the concluding chapter of this 
thesis.94 
We are now in a position to distinguish between three different, mutually 
rearticulating machines of tropological displacement. First, there is the reductive 
reconfiguration of “other” humans as “animal” (active displacement to the status of 
animal); and second, the withdrawal of recognised human status (reactive displacement 
from the domain of reason). Both of these depend upon what I have called the theatrics 
of animalisation, that is, a displacing along an ontoteleological humanist dialectic. 
Finally, there is the displacement from living embodiment to inferior copy, which 
serves to retroactively naturalise both these processes of animalisation.95  
Moreover, we can now see how the “clean” opposition of the wild and the 
tame serves to conceal its other others—the commodified and instrumentalised; the 
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antipathy for economic gain. For millenia, the culpeo had existed peaceably alongside humans, 
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“sports” hunters. However, around 1915, as Martin Wallen writes, “ranchers began to increase 
their flocks of sheep, at which time the culpeo … suddenly came to be considered a pest. The 
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 The same machinery of animalisation thus reduces a particularly situated nonhuman animal, 
such as a fox, to the category of subanimal (the foreign in the domestic), and as such refused 
even the minimum protection generally accorded to other “wild” animals. That a fox is 
categorised as “vermin,” yet remains close to the “pet” category (as between a cat and a dog), 
is a major reason for its affective position.  
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slave; the illegal, potentially terroristic immigrant; the asylum seeker; the woman 
naturally deserving of domestication—, all contained within a silent space of fear and 
exploitation.96 Nor is it difficult to perceive in this erasure the operation of economic 
interest.  
This excluding entanglement of the animal, the woman and the slave circulates 
endlessly throughout the history of philosophy. Jean-Jacques Rousseau, one of the few 
writers to even consider nonhuman animals, insists for example in his Discourse on the 
Origin of Inequality that, in “becoming domesticated, [man] … grows weak, timid, and 
servile; his effeminate way of life totally enervates his strength and courage.”97 This 
linking together of the domesticated, the servile, and the feminine which, in their 
mutual articulation, constitutes a threat to manly virtues which must thus be 
constrained and excluded so as to avoid contamination, is far from incidental. Crossing 
too with this articulation of domesticity, women, and reproduction, the forced 
penetration and reproduction of female animals through which originary patriarchy 
reproduces only itself recalls us of course to the khōra of both Plato and Irigaray.  
Indeed, it is here that the timeless enchantment of Burroughs’ animal harmony 
overlaps most significantly with the discourses of both Deleuze-Guattari and Deep 
Ecology. The idealising of the naturally wild, unconstrained by time and 
uncontaminated by feminine domestication, accords, as Karen Davis writes, “with the 
‘masculine’ spirit of adventure and conquest” which in the West looks down on those 
beings constituted as “unnatural, tame, and confined.” In this, Davis continues, the 
“analogy between women and nonhuman animals overlooks perhaps a more 
specifically crucial comparison between women and farm animals” (“Thinking Like a 
Chicken,” 193). One thinks most obviously here of reproductive rights, or the curtailing 
thereof by means of forced conception, be it by physical force—rape in whatever form 
or species—or by way of the prohibition of contraception and/or abortion.  
On one side of the human-animal border therefore, the domesticated, the 
instrumentalised, and the foreign within the domestic, contaminated by patriarchal 
time, all cease to be nonsubstituable living beings, becoming instead masculine 
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of their domestication-interaction, that is, their anthropomorphic contamination, whereby their 
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 “The Social Contract” and “Discourses” trans. Cole, Brumfitt, & Hall (London: 
Everyman’s Library, 1973), 57; emphasis added. 
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artefacts, the property of man who thus represents the power of reason. On the other 
side, contaminated by human time, the domesticated, the instrumentalised, and the 
foreign within the domestic all cease to be nonsubstituable living beings, becoming 
instead human artefacts, the property of man who thus holds the power of life over 
death. Artefactual animals being, in other words, already on the side of death, always 
living a death which is, in a double sense, a living death: both as living artefacts and as 
living beings whose existence has been stripped of everything but that which is useful 
to the profitable reproduction of death and of dead zombie flesh.  
Furthermore, it is impossible to conceive of this unmarked displacement of 
other others from the nonhuman wild-tame dichotomy without understanding its 
coextensivity with other vectors of power. Once again, Karen Davis is helpful here. 
“Not only men,” she writes, “but women and animal protectionists exhibit a culturally 
conditioned indifference toward, and prejudice against, creatures whose lives appear 
too slavishly, too boringly, too stupidly female, too ‘cowlike’” (196-7). It is this 
entanglement of difference which gives us one way of understanding that which 
Derrida has famously termed “carnophallogocentrism.”98 Within its network of 
inculcation, the gendering of singular nonhuman animals is thus of the greatest 
importance, in every sense. 
Returning to Burroughs, and in particular to those hated dogs and abject 
centipedes, we are now better placed to hear that which is left unsaid. Referring to 
“ugly” and yet faceless snarl of the dog, it is not merely by chance that Burroughs 
describes it as “a redneck lynch-mob Paki-basher snarl … snarl of someone got a “Kill 
a Queer for Christ” sticker on his heap, a self-righteous occupied snarl” (Cat Inside, 
63). The “worst of the worst” is, for Burroughs, a murderous hate which excludes 
closeness, thus preventing an unconditional relation to another. Hatred is, in other 
words, that which prohibits the potential “animal contact” which gives of itself a Love 
beyond all conflict and pain. Hatred prohibits, in short, the giving of one’s self in 
unconditional hospitality. However, it is precisely this murderous hate which returns, 
devastating Burroughs’ discourse from within, in the affirmation of only some 
nonhuman animals. In an echo of “Kill a Queer for Christ,” in a late diary entry 
Burroughs writes:  
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March 18, 19, 1997. Wednesday. They say only love can create, so who the 
fuck could love up a centipede? He’s got more love in him than I got. Now, 
killing a centipede makes me feel safer—like, one less (Last Words, 126)  
 
The spectres of speciesism, sexism, and racism, in being mutually rearticulated in the 
valorisation of a timeless wild nature, here come to mark Burroughs’ own “lynch-mob 
rage” in its echo of the racist, mysogynistic and homophobic exclusion of closeness 
which manifests itself in hate speech such as “kill a queer for Christ” or “killing a 
queer makes me feel safer, like one less.” While for Burroughs those “worst of the 
worst,” figured by a “lynch-mob” of faceless dogs, are the queer killers, the neutralisers 
of those who denaturalise sexuality, who are foreign to heterosexual patriarchal 
domesticity, Burroughs himself nevertheless “feels safer” killing those other “others” 
who are foreign in and to the domestic, those queer centipedes who denaturalise the 
proper place of the human. 99  
To summarise then, the apparent valorisation of the (wild) animal nevertheless 
remains essentially within the neighbourhood and the spectacle—the mirror—of “the 
human.” Such is the high-walled enclave patrolled by the convulsively negating 
Guardians with which this chapter opened, safeguarded by immigration police and 
“pest”-controllers tasked with defending the indivisibility of the border and of the 
impossibility and impassability of the Interzone. In this sense, “immigration police” 
and “pest-controllers,” in seeking to conserve an imaginary space of order by 
displacing “Others,” can be considered metaphors of each other, mutually rearticulating 
an inviolable property and propriety constructed upon the refusal of hospitality. The 
“proper” of the human, in other words, depends upon the exclusion both of the already 
“domesticated” and of the foreigner within, depends upon withholding the offer of 
hospitality to all those who share our space and take our time but who are not “us.” 
This obviously has serious implications for a thinking ethics which, insofar “it has to 
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 Centipedes in fact offer a particular challenge both to the naturalisation of heterosexuality 
and to the fixity of heterosexual reproduction. Arthropods (phylum Arthropoda), and thus kin 
to cockroaches and scorpions, there exist an estimated 8000 species of centipedes. Some 
species live up to six years, with periods of gestation and infancy varying widely from species 
to species. Most species lay eggs, but some give birth to living young, and some nurse both 
their eggs and the young centipedes to maturity. While usually the males produce a 
spermatophore for the female to take up, some centipede groups are, however, all female, with 
reproduction by parthenogenesis. Finally, some species of Scolopendromorpha are matriphagic 
(the offspring consume their mother). In this context, see also Rosi Braidotti’s work on insect 
figurations within a feminist thinking of sexual difference in Metamorphoses: Towards a 
Materialist Theory of Becoming (2002). 
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do with the ethos, that is, the residence, one’s home, the familiar place of dwelling … 
ethics is hospitality” (Derrida “On Cosmopolitanism,” 16-17). Ethics, in short, 
concerns the giving of hospitality to those who exist within the home and yet are 
nonetheless excluded from it. 
 
 
Conclusion: denaturalising “the human” 
 
In 1990, a biography of William S. Burroughs by Ted Morgan was published, entitled 
Literary Outlaw. Burroughs, however, would later complain about the title, saying that 
he could not be inscribed within the opposition presupposed by “outlaw” because of the 
fact that he had never been “within” the law. What philosophers such as Michel 
Foucault, Jacques Derrida, and Judith Butler, among others, have made clear, however, 
is that this is simply not a choice. “I,” insofar as I am, is constituted within or, rather, 
before the law. It is a law, moreover, which gives us to understand that animal 
encounters are not the privilege, the proper, of the human, but rather the 
denaturalisation of “human,” and this is precisely its risk—the risk of Elizabeth 
Costello, of Venus Xtravaganza, and indeed, of William S. Burroughs.  
There can be no timeless dioramas of nonhuman becoming, no utopian dreams 
of a harmonious pre- or posthuman wilderness, an animal encounter is always and only 
that which calls itself forth in dangerous conflict with the hegemonic identifications of 
a given social state of affairs of whatever species. As for “the human,” such encounters 
are a “becoming animal” or a “becoming mad” only in the sense of coming to be 
unrecognisably (post)human, only in the risk of being excluded as “animal” and/or as 
“mad.” That which Burroughs names “Love” is not the capitalised end of conflict but 
rather its beginning and its return, a beginning ever again. It is to hold one’s “self” 
exposed in and as the place without place: the space of invention. 
It has been argued throughout these last two chapters that the construction of 
speciesism—with “species” (and here I am re-employing Judith Butler’s formulation) 
understood in part as a production of the history of speciesism—is indissociable from 
racism, sexism, homophobia, animalisation, and so forth. There are indeed, as Butler 
writes, “quite pressing and significant historical reasons for asking how and where we 
might read not only their convergence, but the sites at which the one cannot be 
constituted save through the other” (Bodies that Matter, 168). At the same time, 
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however, this is not to reduce the irreducible differences between them. It is not, in 
other words, to suggest a biological continuism, which, along with the equally 
unacceptable option of metaphysical discontinuity, I attempted to put out of the 
question over the course of the first two parts of this thesis.  
One major difference is that, in contrast to those human animals marginalised 
or “animalised” by way of patriarchal and ethnocentric discourse, whether capitalist or 
fundamentalist (and if indeed these can in fact be separated), it is unlikely that many, or 
perhaps even any, of those billions of other beings condemned to the abjected category 
of “the animal” seek to identify themselves with the phantasmatic ideals of human 
hegemonic norms. This is not to say, of course, that there is no nonhuman identification 
with nonhuman phantasmatic norms within given social communities. Again, this is a 
question of habituation, of domestication, and thus of the chance and the necessity of 
singular encounters, of risky transformations from which nonhuman be-ings cannot 
therefore be excluded. However, as regards what I am calling the animal encounter at 
and as the limit of “the human,” one question still remains: what’s in it for nonhuman 
animals? What potential benefit, in other words, accrues to “actual” other animals in 
terms of the strategy being outlined here?  
To answer this question it is necessary to recall that, in effect, the inaugural 
citation of an improper phrasing, the ethical opening of the political space of invention, 
is always and indissociably doubled. In interrupting the devalorisation of “other 
humans,” its crossing necessarily interrupts the devalorisation of “other” animals. The 
phrasing called forth by an animal encounter, that is, must at once interrupt the 
unthinking instrumentalising relation to animals. In other words, an im-possible 
disidentification with the radical alterity of nonhuman or inhuman being—the 
necessarily chance demand of the foreign in the domestic, of the improper in the 
proper—calls forth a bodied phrasing which, in marking and thus interrupting the 
measure and the limit of humanity, necessarily displaces “animals” from within the 
“abject” category. Hence, the denaturalisation of hegemonic human norms at once 







7. Burroughs and the Untimely Posthuman Animal: 
Beginnings or Ends of Ethics? 
 
 
What challenge does that excluded and abjected realm produce to a 
symbolic hegemony that might force a radical rearticulation of what 
qualifies as bodies that matter, ways of living that count as “life,” lives 
worth protecting, lives worth saving, lives worth grieving? 
Judith Butler Bodies that Matter 
 
 
Introduction: displacing the fairytale 
 
The beginning of ethics, I suggest in the previous chapter, demands, in some way, the 
giving of hospitality to all those who share our space and take our time but who are not 
“us.” One must, in other words, begin by being able to respond to those excluded 
within the domestic. Following from this, and by way of the promised return visit to the 
Museum of Lost Species, I will further argue in this chapter that the ethical beginning 
in fact resides within the detested figure of the Burroughsian centipede. Ethics, in short, 
begins with being-with the being-there of such monstrosities. Such is a way of being 
which, as we shall see, moves Burroughs’ posthuman beyond its masculinist liberal-
Aristotelian logic and towards a more generous notion of “community.” Such a 
community, we discover, is united not by an exclusive contract, but rather by the fact 
that every living being demands unconditional hospitality from every other, and yet is 
simultaneously incapable of giving it. Moreover, I will argue, it is only upon such a 
basis that the improper cat-human creature of Burroughs’ dreams becomes possible, 
bringing with it the chance of being together beyond the human. 
For Burroughs, as we have seen, the advent of language displaces the human 
animal, contemporaneous with its coming, outside of nature. A divided being therefore, 
the human thus comes to its “self” as an outsider within time: 
 
Man sold his soul for time, language, tools, weapons, and dominance. And 
to make sure he doesn’t get out of line, these invaders keep an occupying 
garrison in his nondominant brain hemisphere. … A rift is built into the 
human organism, the rift or cleft between the two hemispheres (Ghost of 
Chance, 48) 
 
This “cleft,” this caesura which ensures human distance even as it corrupts every 
nonhuman being it touches, is thus built right into the human brain, a physiological 
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abyss which, in separating left from right, thus divides human from animal. With this 
properly human “rift,” this linguistic displacement marked by an alienating, inalienable 
temporality, the Madagascan creation myth is thus rewritten as a metaphor of the 
Origin of the human species. Its majestic island birth, launched with fireworks, thus 
becomes an allegorical fable, a fable of a fable of an originary division:  
 
I draw a parallel between this rift separating the two sides of the human 
body and the rift that divided Madagascar from the mainland of Africa. One 
side of the rift drifted into enchanted timeless innocence. The other moved 
inexorably toward language, time, tool use, weapon use, war, exploitation, 
and slavery (49). 
  
The violent rupture which isolates Madagascar thus allegorises the Origin of Man, 
offering itself as a mythic representation of the rift in the human brain, of the 
Epimethean fault which is the appearing of language and of technics in general. At the 
same time, in that time is not yet, this arriving of the human can be the result of neither 
a spatial (geophysical) nor a temporal (evolutionary) shift, but rather only and always 
again the alien-divine lightning bolt that is the invasion of what Burroughs calls the 
“word virus.”  
With the imposing of time by language which launches the human, the 
innocent plenitude of its prosimian prehistory is torn away, leaving in its wake a gaping 
wound at the core of the human. To be wounded by this rift is to be human, and thus to 
be removed from the timeless Eden of interspecies harmony. In this, and along with the 
nonhumans who “go along” (in the Heideggerian sense) with them, humans too are 
similarly the victim of its dominance, its enslaving exploitation. The abyssal border is, 
in short, the “split between the wild, the timeless, the free, and the tame, the time-
bound, the tethered, like the tethered goose that will forever resent its bondage” (Ghost 
of Chance, 13).  
The central point, however, is that for Burroughs the archaic animal that is 
Madagascar, moored in enchanted calm for millions of years, nonetheless remains 
secreted within the human as its “other” hemisphere. The impassability and thus 
impartibility of its border guarded, dominated, by the inhuman—and yet properly 
human—machinery of linguistic domination. One reading of this passage, therefore, 
founds the origin of the human upon the death or the ceasing to exist of the animal (a 
cessation which is at once the enslavement and extinction of animals). Such a reading 
thus reiterates one of the two dominant—and by now very familiar—versions of the 
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humanist dialectical teleology. Coincidental with this reading, however, is one in which 
the sanctuary of the Lemur People coexists outside-within “us,” repressed but retaining 
its inevitable trace of repression and thus the possibility of thinking differently, that is, 
of existing outside of sequence and causality.  
Irrespective of this potential, these two sides—the nondominated (and thus 
nondominating) freedom of the wild as opposed to the dominated (and thus 
dominating) enslavement of the tame—must remain discontinuous by virtue the 
impassable and impartible caesura that is language’s taking place. Hence, it follows 
that, for Burroughs “any attempt at synthesis must remain unrealizable in human 
terms” (48, emphasis added). Insofar as “merging the two is not viable,” he continues, 
one is indeed “tempted to say, as Brion Gysin did, ‘Rub out the word’” (49). 
Confronted, in other words, with the a priori impossibility of negating the negation, 
Burroughs is tempted to affirm the possibility of a simple reversal, of a return that is a 
human turn to a “wordless world”: “What would a wordless world be like? As 
Korzybski said: ‘I don’t know. Let’s see’” (50). This is indeed a temptation, a utopian 
desire: a posthuman version of the homosexual utopia roamed by “packs of wild 
boys.”100  
Such a romantic, fairytale reversal, predicated upon the traditional 
metaphysical distinction between eternal nature and human culture, offers little, as we 
have seen, to a thinking of ethics, remaining as it does within the very dichotomy it 
seeks to undermine. It is a temptation, however, which Burroughs ultimately refuses, 
insisting in his final journal that the “promised land” of utopian figures is “bullshit” 
(Last Words, 112). Instead, Burroughs attempts to refine and clarify Gysin’s lure, and 
in so doing a possible opening to the ethical indeed begins to emerge. An opening 
which, it will be argued, reconnects both with the cut-up as originally delineated by 
Gysin and, moreover, with notions of “animal contact” and “pure Love” from which 
the centipede not only cannot be excluded, but who in fact stages the beginning of an 
impossible, unavowable community.  
Burroughs is tempted, as we have seen, to suggest that we “rub out” the word, 
but that—“perhaps”—would be a mistake: 
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 On this, see William S. Burroughs Wild Boys: A Book of the Dead (1971), especially the 
languidly beautiful chapters “The Wild Boys” and “The Wild Boys Smile.” 
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perhaps “rub” is the wrong word. The formula is quite simple: reverse the 
magnetic field so that, instead of being welded together, the two halves 
repel each other like opposing magnets. This could be a road to final 
liberation, as it were, a final solution to the language problem, from which 
all human “problems” stem (Ghost of Chance, 49-50) 
 
Rejecting the utopian erasure of the trace which would be to become One with the 
timelessness of eternity, Burroughs thus suggests instead a further forcing open of the 
division. A radical displacement, that is to say, of the human-animal discontinuity. It is 
only this, I argue, which permits, with all its attendant risk, the denaturalisation of the 
phantasmatic constitution of “humanness.” The denaturalising, in other words, of the 
very arriving of the human.  
Rather than the simple reversal of a “rubbing out,” we thus find instead the 
reversal of force and at once the displacement or a distancing from inhabituation, that 
is, from our inhabitation within the habitual domination of language in its broadest 
sense. Or, put another way, revaluation and rearticulation. It is in this sense a 
movement beyond the properly human, a movement which reiterates exactly that which 
Judith Butler describes as a “crossing.” Always a forced distancing from inhabituation, 
such a “crossing,” writes Butler, necessarily goes by way of repetition “in directions 
that reverse and displace the originating aims” (Bodies that Matter, 123). Such a 
reversal-displacement of speciesism, however, is never a one-time only “final solution” 
(a phrase which, in this context, attempts just this movement which, as such, must 
never, ever be “final”). Rather, in this coincident double operation of reversal-
displacement which is at once the gesture of deconstruction, the “gap between the two 
operations must remain open, must let itself be ceaselessly marked and remarked” 
(Derrida “Outwork,” 6). 
It is here that we must make the promised return visit to “The Museum of Lost 
Species,” wherein one might lovingly contact a living corpse rather than merely 
reproduce the walking dead. As we have seen, its timeless dioramic exhibits may be 
observed only from within the distance of time. This distance, this divisive temporality, 
is precisely the iterability of language which imposes itself upon the so-called harmony 
of the wild. Always already opening the space of conflict and pain, it is that which not 
even the saving and salving power of animal Love can thus overcome. Instead, it 
demands a forced displacement of the displaced, the call of the atemporality of being as 
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such calling into being a placeholder which marks and thus holds open the interval 
between the no longer and the not yet. 
 
The Museum of Lost Species is not exactly a museum, since all of the 
species are alive in dioramas of their natural habitats. Admission is free to 
anyone who can enter. The coinage here is the ability to endure the pain 
and sadness of observing extinction and by so doing to reanimate the 
species by observing it (Burroughs Ghost of Chance, 51). 
 
Paradoxically then, these living artefacts are no longer and at once not yet. They retain, 
that is to say, the potential to be “reanimated” by the regard of anyone who can share 
their space—indicating that this is not a choice, but rather the chance and necessity of 
being-there—, by an “observing” which rather constitutes “contact.” This mourning, 
which reverses in displacing the destructive touch of time, thus re-members those 
“others” whom language has annihilated, rendered partial and finite. The “coinage” 
which must be paid by such contact—contact which reanimates or enlivens a corpse, 
creates or invents a posthumous monstrosity which thus out-lives its type and genus—
is the ability to endure an exposure to “the pain and sadness of observing extinction.”  
Here then, Burroughs points to the essential link between the animal encounter 
and finitude, of an encounter at and as the limit which, no longer and not yet, is the 
condition which interrupts all life by which life out-lives itself. Indeed, it is always the 
finitude, that is, the nonsubstitutabilty, of every “other” which must always come again 
to interrupt a “deadly, pervasive ignorance” (Cat Inside, 46). Cats, affirms Burroughs, 
“are living, breathing creatures, and when any other being is contacted, it is sad: 
because you see the limitations, the pain and fear and the final death” (70). However, 
given that in and as such an encounter the “I” which comes to be must have the ability 
to endure the anxiety at and as the limit, we must thus recall too the risk that is the 
potential inability to endure such an exposing, as experienced by Elizabeth Costello. In 
short, to reverse the destruction of life, to displace the commodification of zombie flesh 
which marks both the arrival and the way of being human, one must cease being human 










The aim of the infamous textual experiments christened “cut-ups” was to escape the 
domination of language, and thus to chance upon an animal contact exceeding the 
constraints of sequence and causality or, more precisely, exceeding the historically 
contingent horizon of the possible. Premised upon a random chopping up and placing 
alongside of generically heterogeneous texts, Burroughs describes it is a movement 
which, in cutting into the present, allows the future to leak out, thus interrupting the 
control mechanism ensuring the apparent “transparency” of language. An inaugurating 
moment or movement, in short, which in its taking place at once escapes in opening 
itself to an unforeseeable other.  
Composed as they are through the disjunctive repetition of random fragments 
and obsessive phrases, Burroughs’ texts thus explicitly oppose a certain closure of 
meaning attempted by traditional narrative to an unrelenting stammer that discloses the 
emptiness of all such attempts. From the “cut-ups” through to the chance dislocations 
that mark his final diary entries, Burroughs’ entire project constitutes, in other words, 
an unceasing attempt to open language to an improper phrasing. One which, displacing 
as well as reversing the killing ideals of race, gender and species, could not be 
predicted from within what Foucault calls the “regime of truth.” An opening, in short, 
which interrupts the oppression of habit in calling forth that which remains to come.  
This way of working language, of working it over, doubling and redoubling it, 
is a way of working which Gilles Deleuze locates in both Heidegger and Alfred Jarry, 
making them both “unrecognised precursors” of Burroughs even as the “wildness” of 
Burroughs’ writing machine forms a rhizomatic connection with that of Deleuze. 
 
[Heidegger and Jarry] work in principle with two languages, activating a 
dead language within a living language [hence a dead phrasing outlives 
itself in being posthumously reanimated within a context it had not 
previously belonged], in such a way that the living language is transformed 
and transmuted. … The affect (A) produces in the current language (B) a 
kind of foot stomping, a stammering, an obsessional tom-tom, like a 
repetition that never ceases to create something new (C). Under the impulse 
of the affect, our language is set whirling, and in whirling it forms a 
language of the future, as if it were a foreign language, an eternal 





While the contrast between “dead” and “living” languages in Burroughs is not the 
literal contrast to which Deleuze refers (which, in the case of Heidegger for example, is 
that relation of ancient Greek and modern German which reserves for Germany its 
privileged destiny), it is nevertheless this interval which marks the stammer of an 
inaugural citation as foreign to a given state of affairs, as a “living corpse.” This is 
neither a human-animal, left-right synthesis, not a merging of the two, nor is it a 
rubbing out of the word, the impossible erasure of language which is precisely to cross 
out the crossing. Rather, this posthumous monstrosity—a felinthropos to come, as we 
shall see—potentially disclosed by this stomping, stammering repetition is that which 
outlives every determinable form and thus outlives the human. Only in this way, I 
argue, is it possible to think of “posthuman contact.”  
Nevertheless, in the relentless stutter of his texts, Burroughs in fact attempts to 
force, even to mime, the chance and necessity of an animal encounter. As we have seen, 
however, the risk of reiteration carries a double risk: not only the risk of becoming 
unrecognisable, but also the risk of reiterating precisely those hegemonies of 
oppression such a miming seeks to destroy. As Butler writes,  
 
precisely because such terms have been produced and constrained within 
such regimes, they ought to be repeated in directions that reverse and 
displace their originating aims. One does not stand at an instrumental 
distance from the terms by which one experiences violation. Occupied by 
such terms and yet occupying them oneself risks a complicity, a repetition, 
a relapse into injury, but it is also the occasion to work the mobilising 
power of injury … to acknowledge the force of repetition as the very 
condition of an affirmative response to violation (Bodies that Matter, 123-
4). 
 
In fact, as we have seen with Nietzsche, the necessary movement of parody inheres in 
every repetition, making every affirmative posthumous phrasing always already a 
“mime,” a walking ghost complicit with the hegemonies of oppression. By contrast, 
Elizabeth Costello, to return to our earlier example, in simply reversing the traditional 
mind-body distinction throughout her lecture, thus maintains complicit with that very 
distinction. However, even with the double movement of reversal-displacement this 
double risk is unavoidable, and is thus never a “risk” in the sense of a possibility. 




Here then, we can better understand that the imperative of an animal 
encounter, its revolutionary spirit, is preserved only insofar as it reserves the im-
possibility that is its insensibility. Only, in other words, insofar as it withdraws in and 
as the material thickness of its improper costume, of its obscurity in no longer and not 
yet making sense. For Burroughs, however, to seek the animal outliving of the human 
whilst at once placing conditions upon openness, that is, whilst refusing hospitality to 
certain “other” animals, is a sovereign gesture fully complitious with the injury of 
enslavement. It reduces, in other words, the other to the same, to the recognisable, thus 
prohibiting a possible encounter insofar as it repeats the structural exclusion.  
Sovereignty, as Derrida teaches us, if it is indeed sovereign, presupposes an 
indivisible power, and thus a violent exclusion of others. Hospitality, therefore, is 
incommensurable with sovereignty, with impassability, insofar as unconditional 
hospitality is the impossibility of the private and the autonomous, the sovereign, of the 
decision or law based on property. The act of hospitality, however, nevertheless 
presupposes a sovereign decision, that is, an autonomy which permits the decision to 
open one’s self or one’s home. The host, in other words, must “freely” choose to open 
herself to the other, a decision which therefore cannot be an obligation, neither 
convention nor duty. It cannot, in short, be habitual. Paradoxically then, there can be 
no hospitality, as Derrida says, “without sovereignty of oneself over one’s home, but 
since there is also no hospitality without finitude, sovereignty can only be exercised by 
filtering, choosing, and thus by excluding and doing violence” (Of Hospitality, 55). 
Hospitality therefore, if it is indeed hospitable, must be unconditional, it cannot impose 
conditions upon the “who” or “what” which comes, cannot impose limits upon the 
granting of asylum. Its opening, that is, cannot be determined by the “already there,” 
cannot be predicted from within a given state of affairs. Hospitality is, in a word, im-
possible. It can neither be expected nor prepared for, and hence the “I” is 
constitutively—and always habitually—unprepared for the (be)coming of the other, 
structurally incapable therefore, of the sovereign decision hospitality otherwise 
demands of it. Hospitality as such is thus posthumous. 
In this, hospitality is intimately related to what I am calling the animal 
encounter, as we can hear in Derrida’s description of the “taking place” of hospitality 
as that in which “the impossible becomes possible but as impossible. The impossible, 
for me, for an “I,” for what is “my own” or is properly my own in general” 
(“Hostipitality,” 387). The example “par excellence,” according to Derrida, is the 
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“visitation” of Yahweh to Abraham that is at once an “announcement,” an example 
which similarly exemplifies the animal encounter: “This is indeed hospitality par 
excellence in which the visitor radically overwhelms the self of the ‘visited’ and the 
chez-soi [the “one’s-home” or “house” but also the “with-self”] of the hôte” (372).  
Moreover, given the originary technicity of all living being that is the trace, 
the constitutive unpreparedness, the chance and necessity of being “radically 
overwhelmed” by an other, is, as we have already seen, a “fault” necessarily shared 
across each and every living being. At the same time, it is this same shared “fault,” this 
originary division or différance, which ensures that every such being “is” at once 
irreplaceably singular (“being-the-there”) and always already disposed outside of its 
self. “We” are all, in short, foreign to the properly “at-home,” dispossessed, exiled from 
the domestic by the already-there which already prohibits the sovereign decision. Every 
living being therefore, is obliged by the machineries of being to forever seek asylum 
within the domestic, whilst always remaining, in its singularity, irredeemably foreign to 
the “there” of being.  
In a single phrase then—a phrasing at once an echo and a synonym of 
Rancière’s “We are all German Jews”—we are all asylum seekers. What this means, 
therefore, is that every living being demands hospitality and, insofar as hospitality 
demands a sovereign decision, every living being is constitutively incapable of offering 
it. Or rather, we are all able to do so always and only inadequately, always 
insufficiently. It is a capacity, in other words, only insofar as it is always already an 
incapacity.  
This is, however, by no means to reduce the singular suffering of “actual,” 
historically contingent, asylum seekers. Rather, it discloses instead that the hatred of 
the foreign is precisely a hatred of the other that I am (and that I follow), a suicidal self-
hatred of what is “not itself” which is, as Nietzsche writes, “of the essence of 
ressentiment” (Genealogy, I:10).101 Furthermore, the liberal-Aristotelian contractual 
argument, which Rosi Braidotti describes as practically “the trademark of liberal 
individualism and its idea of moral responsibility” (Transpositions, 111), is rendered 
both unjust and unjustifiable. According to this contractual argument, nonhuman 
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 It would be interesting here, if only time and space permitted, to explore Nietzsche’s 
thinking (in section 11 of the first essay of On the Genealogy of Morals) of the “wildness” of 
the enslaved men of ressentiment who, “once they go outside, where the strange, the stranger 
is found, they are not much better than uncaged beasts of prey.” 
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animals must be excluded from the ethical domain on the basis that, as they cannot 
offer hospitality, they are therefore not entitled to receive any in return. However, we 
discover instead that every living being demands unconditional hospitality from every 
other, and yet is simultaneously incapable of giving it.102  
Such is the reciprocity which paradoxically is the very condition of hospitality, 
and thus of ethics. Human animals can offer neither humans nor nonhumans 
hospitality, just as nonhuman animals can offer hospitality neither to nonhumans nor to 
humans—no one animal, in short, can offer hospitality to an other. This is, in other 
words, the condition of finitude, that of the doubled abyss—the repeatability of 
language and the singularity of being-there—which divides and shares each singular 
and nonsubstitutable living being from, and with, every other.  
In his arthropodic ressentiment, Burroughs is thus attempting, in sovereign 
fashion, to exclude the utterly other, the illegal occupier, on the basis of a double 
evolutionary fault (and a doubly teleological fault, therefore, a lack of evolution that is, 
as the most unbearably ancient, at once an excess of time). He reinscribes, that is to 
say, the ontological division of the “repugnant ledge” which serves to attribute a mute 
bestiality to the centipede. As we have seen, however, the constitutive technicity of the 
already-there demands the affirmation of encountering an other whose language we do 
not recognise while, in exactly the same movement, language ceases to be the 
privileged site from which one can, in just such a sovereign fashion, exclude the Other 
on the basis of lack.  
Such an attribution of mute bestiality, in other words, is a mime which serves 
to reproduce everyday domination. By contrast, the animal encounter is that which 
displaces and disposes the possibility of just such a sovereign “I.” Moreover, it is only 
here that we can better recognise the temptation of an attempted “rubbing out” of 
language, in that its temptation is precisely that of the mime. The security and 
simplicity of mere reversal is, in other words, the walking ghost of a conservative 
illusion of sovereignty, an inverted Platonism which serves only to cross out the 
revolutionary rupture. Never an erasure, the interruption is rather a caesura within 
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 This entire part could in fact be considered as a critique of Aristotle’s position in the 
Politics in which he argues that “it is the sharing of a common view in these matters [of 
morality] that makes a household [oikia] or a city [polis]” (Politics, I:2). Common-sense 
morality is thus, for Aristotle, the condition of community, its conservation of the Same being 
the very test which a priori excludes the foreigner. For a related critique, see also Cary Wolfe 
Animal Rites: American Culture, the Discourse of Species, and Posthumanist Theory 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2003), 107-109.  
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language in its broadest sense. There is, therefore, no language for the encounter, the 
maddening event, but only the stutter or the stammer that is improper metonymy, the 
burring, clamorous silence of a phrasing which tears a hole in the sovereignty of sense. 
As we have seen then, sovereignty and hospitality are incommensurable and 
yet indissociable, an aporia marked by the “is”—the coming to being—of the “I is 
other” that is never willed, never a choice. By contrast, the sovereign decision 
presupposed by the positing of the wild-tame dichotomy—its sovereignty displayed in 
the contempt expressed for the victims of the gesture—is in fact the denial of 
hospitality, and thus the closure of the ethical. Ethics being, as Derrida writes, “a 
manner of being there, the manner in which we relate to ourselves and to others, to 
others as our own or as foreigners” (“On Cosmopolitanism,” 16-17).  
Here then, insofar as ethics is a question of the foreigner, and thus of the 
foreign in the domestic, ethics can therefore be considered first of all a question of the 
centipede: a question of that which, since always, since before time, illegally occupies 
our space and thus makes demands on “our” time. Unconditional hospitality demands 
that we not impose conditions, that we not risk indebting the other, nor indeed can we 
ask anything of the other, not even, or especially not, “who?” or “what?” of this other 
who is already there within our most private of properties. And yet, insofar as ethics is 
hospitality, the ethical is always inadequate, a demand and an incapacity from which 
the nonhuman animal hôte—guest, host and enemy—cannot be excluded. Again, we 
must return to Derrida, and specifically to that which he describes as a “principle of 
ethics or more radically of justice, in the most difficult sense” and which “is perhaps 
the obligation that engages my responsibility with respect to the most dissimilar [le 
plus dissemblable, the least “fellow”-like], the entirely other, precisely, the 
monstrously other, the unrecognisable other” (Beast, 108).  
 
 
As yet unimaginable 
 
This notion of being exposed at home to the hospitality of the centipede brings us in 


















Encaged within the steel legs of the spider and further enclosed within a mesh cage, 
the seat, the space, of the human is thus sheltered and threatened twice over, at once 
protected and imprisoned by both the “industrial” and the “natural.” Here then, the 
place of the human is striated by the fear, the power and the security of becoming-with 
the nonhuman—whether “animal” or “technological.” Interesting for us here, is that 
according to Bourgeois the artwork carries “a set of maternal associations of a wholly 
positive kind, drawing on autobiographical references to connote shelter and 
protection” (Baker The Postmodern Animal, 80). Nonetheless, it remains, as Steve 
Baker points out, “undeniably open to being read entirely differently” (80). The 
question then, is a question of reading and of hospitality. Indeed, this is always the 
question of reading, and in particular of the undecidable interval between maternal 
shelter and the matriphagy of the other who already surrounds us, an unrecognisable 
other “who,” as an unpassable frontier, imprisons us and is imprisoned within our own 
property and at once breaks downs the fences.  
It is within this absolute proximity of the most distant that Anne 
Dufourmantelle locates the urgent demand of hospitality, describing it as an 
imperative—  
 
drawing the contours of an impossible, illicit geography of proximity. A 
proximity that would not be the opposite of an elsewhere come from 
outside and surrounding it, but “close to the close,” that unbearable orb of 
intimacy that melts into hate. If we can say that murder and hate designate 
everything that excludes closeness, it is insofar as they ravage from within 
an original relationship to alterity (“Invitation,” 2-4).  
 
Insofar as ethics begins where the familiar and the familial ends, we can now 
understand the urgency of an impossible hospitality, of a sharing of exile in which 
asylum is already offered to every other and which is always insufficient. In contrast to 
the self-hating hierarchy of the Same which organises every properly human ethics 
according to distance and closeness, an ethics of the spider, of the unbearably ancient 
centipede, calls us instead to the apocalyptic untimely encounter. The other, foreign to 
the domestic, always comes first.  
Never a test which shatters love, it is rather, as we saw with Nietzsche, the 
active forgetting of invention itself: an event the call of which shatters the mirror and 
at once the psyche. It is to step before and beyond one’s self, a taking and a giving of 
place before any possibility of love and thus beyond the narcissism which limits love 
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to one’s fellow. Never a calculation, passing through the idiocy of bodyings demands 
only a response and a responsibility to its call—a demand which can, potentially 
fatally, always outstrip and be outstripped. The centipede, in short, sets the stage for an 
ethics of the unrecognisable other in which “the human” comes to being subversively 
rearticulated. 
Finally, we return, once again differently, to the hospitality offered to William 
S. Burroughs by his feline companions and, in particular, to that encounter which, on 
August 9th 1984, Burroughs claims saved him from a deadly, pervasive ignorance. 
Here, we discover that, insofar as it takes place across a zone of indecipherable and 
undecidable sense, such a life-affirming and enlightening contact is necessarily a 
relation without relation, one which marks instead only the abyssal distance of 
finitude: 
 
Meeeowww. “Hello, Bill.” 
The distance from there to here is the measure of what I have learned from 
cats (Cat Inside, 90). 
 
This distance from there to here, from “I” to other, “is” (and is not) the caesura of pure 
potentiality. For Burroughs, moreover, it is the possibility of creating “a creature that is 
part cat, part human, and part something as yet unimaginable, which might result from 
a union that has not taken place for millions of years” (Cat Inside, 3). This “as yet 
unimaginable” is a phrasing holding the place of an unheard-of becoming, of an animal 
encounter in which being exposed comes to be other in being disposed together. The 
coming of the unimagined and unimaginable other, however, demands an 
unconditional, centipedal hospitality ultimately refused by Burroughs. Only then, 
however, does the refusal of abjection become possible and, unhinging the teleology of 









In this part, I will explore in detail the notion of a “community beyond the human,” 
alluded to at the end of the last chapter. To begin with, however, it will be necessary to 
consider the constitution of “the human community” it purports to move beyond, which 
I will do through a reading of Carl Schmitt’s The Concept of the Political. Such a 
community, it might be suggested, is simply the totality of common humanity, the 
kinship of the whole of the human species. However, as we have seen, the question of 
“who,” “what,” or “which” counts as the properly human remains always open to 
negotiation, always again demanding the reproduction and thus the re-closure of its 
borders. As a result, the question must therefore turn to the functioning of this 
circumscription of a “common” or “universal” humanity—of its economy and its 
essential propriety which throughout history, on both the left and the right, is reiterated 
in the guise of a positive and privileged concept. It is this concept which will be taken 
up in the first half of this chapter. Not only will one recognise, it will be argued, in the 
founding-conserving of “the nation,” and thus the nationalistic, the very same economy 
of dependence-exclusion by which “the human,” and thus the humanist, constitutes 
itself over against the phantasm of “the Animal,” but also that the “fully realised” body 
of humanism is in fact the realisation of the very pathic, undying animal against which 
it sought to found its essential difference. Furthermore, we must also attend, in addition 
to the notion of “humanity,” to the question of “community.” What, exactly, do we 
understand by this term? Is there always community, human or otherwise, whether as 
an empirical fact or a regulative Idea? Or, is there always only its impossibility?  
From there, I consider how “community” relates to both hospitality and 
sharing, concepts with which it seems inextricably bound. How might the concept of 
“community” relate to common-sense and to common-law, to law and right, and to the 
state of law? What then of “the nonhuman community” or of animal communities? 
Apartheid, writes Derrida in “Racism’s Last Word,” “is the ultimate imposture of a so-
called state of law that doesn’t hesitate to base itself on a would-be original 
hierarchy—of natural right or divine right, the two are never mutually exclusive” (379). 
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And yet, for the nonhuman animal such is every state of human law. If apartheid, the 
imposture of a law based upon a purportedly God-given, that is, natural(ised) 
hierarchy, is thus the denial by law of the common, might we not suggest, preliminarily 
at least, that the communal, the shared-in-common, can only take (its) place outside of 
racist, sexist, and speciesist states, a spacing or phrasing beyond both sovereignty and 
bestiality?  
Beginning with an unorthodox reading (based upon the conclusions drawn in 
the second chapter) of what Nietzsche describes as the right to make promises, in the 
second half of this part I aim to demonstrate that “sharing”—like “hospitality,” like 
“community”—is precisely impossible. That is, the infinite potentiality that “is” being-
shared-with constitutes being-together only insofar as it withdraws in and as every 
actualisation. Community, I thus argue, is this shared passivity: the shared condition of 
not-being-able to share. Such an aporetic formulation echoes the inability and 
insufficiency which, as we saw in the previous chapters, marks the hospitable 
encounter. An inability and insufficiency which, it should be recalled, is always the 
result of habit, of habitat, of dwelling, of remaining, and of ethos—of inhabitude, in 
short. One way to understand this is that the possibility, that is, the actualisation of 
sharing is always undone in being already with others—it is to always inhabit a 
community and thus to be excluded from that very community as a result.  
Furthermore, every time we share, that is, every time we mark our share of the 
untimely with every sharing of time, “we” must betray “our” community, or rather, 
betray a shared community affect, and thus betray the very notion of “we.” The 
question of community is thus transformed: in sharing—this notion which appears to 
be the very condition of community, this sharing and thus dividing or diluting of the 
One which is thus to share the very condition of community—is community therefore 
rendered impossible?  
It is rather, I argue with Nietzsche, that betrayal is the very condition of 
community, and thus of vigilance, responsibility, and loyalty. In this sense, only 
betrayal calls forth a being with the right to make promises, that is, to rightfully mark 
improperly, to revalue, in contrast to those “feeble windbags who promise without the 
right to so do” (Nietzsche Genealogy, II:2). This betrayal, moreover, takes the 
paradoxical figure of the nomad, of the lone wanderer ever seeking community and 
commonality, recalling us to the lifelong undergoing of Kafka’s Investigator. A 
betrayal which must nonetheless be given time, and hence a given death. Furthermore, 
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such thinking, I propose, centres upon a giving finitude which, as we saw at the end of 
the second chapter, in bearing witness, responds to the nonsubstitutable deaths of 
“living beings” in re-marking the shared proximal distance that is being-with.  
Finally, I will argue that, beyond humanity and thus beyond its domination, 
community begins—albeit only ever posthumously—with “giving” death, given time, 
to nonhuman beings: a giving of that which precisely cannot be given, and which in so 
doing always again betrays the “human brotherhood.” To become animal is, as we 
shall see, the right to constitute the future, and with the Nietzschean animal in 





8. Plus un “Holocaust”:  
Speciesism, Nationalism, and Communities of Death 
 
 
Introduction: The dignity of Man  
 
To betray, to be traitors to humanity: what, exactly, might this mean? In Eichmann in 
Jerusalem (1965), Hannah Arendt follows the French prosecutor at Nuremberg in 
identifying the Shoah not as a crime against humanity, but rather as “a crime against 
the human status” (257). This is a very important distinction, marking as it does the 
necessity of reckoning with the worst in any positing of a community beyond the 
human. Nevertheless, it will be argued, it is the vigilance of an unending and unlawful 
betrayal of the notion of “humanity” which in fact remains to render such crimes 
against the human status impossible. And yet, in the promised betrayal of “humanity,” 
what ways of being-in-common remain to be affirmed?  
Humanism, as we have seen, depends upon an exclusion of “the animal” in 
order to at once found and conserve what Claude Lévi-Strauss—perhaps but not 
necessarily referring to Kant’s Würdigkeit—describes as “the myth of a dignity 
exclusive to human nature” (cit. de Fontenay Le silence, 47), and which Derrida 
describes as “the infinite transcendence of that which is worth more than it” (“Faith 
and Knowledge,” 87).103 Moreover, Lévi-Strauss continues, it is this myth of a human 
value beyond “merely” living which, in whatever historical guise, “suffered [a fait 
essuyer] to nature itself its first mutilation from which all other mutilations must 
inevitably follow” (cit. de Fontenay Le silence, 47). What then might such mutilations 
be which, insofar as they inevitably follow, are therefore structurally or genetically 
implicated in this ideology of a “nature” which is exclusively, properly, human?  
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 On the concept of “dignity,” see Giorgio Agamben Remnants of Auschwitz: The Witness 
and the Archive (1999). In section 2.15—the importance of which will become increasingly 
clear—Agamben concludes as follows: “When referring to the legal status of Jews after the 
racial laws, the Nazi’s also used a term that implied a kind of dignity: entwürdigen, literally to 
‘deprive of dignity.’ The Jew is a human being who has been deprived of all Würde, all 
dignity: he is merely human—and, for this reason, non-human” (68). Later, Agamben notes 
how “the dignity offended in the camp is not that of life but rather of death” (70) and that, in 
Auschwitz, “people did not die; rather, corpses were produced. Corpses without death, non-
humans whose decease is debased into a matter of serial production” (72). The intertwining of 
the economy of animalisation and the logic of the slaughterhouse are in this way rendered 
explicit in the camps.  
199 
 
What has to follow, in other words, from the positing of an inalienable dignity 
of whatever stripe or mark which both constitutes, and consists in, a single animal 
species, an infinite transcendence which thus marks out one species, even before birth, 
as not-animal (rather than non-animal)? As we shall see, Carl Schmitt offers one 
answer when he asserts that the ideological construct that is this notion of the human’s 
innate and universal humanity brings with it nothing less than the end of the political, 
its displacing and thus depoliticisation of the site of politics providing instead only an 
“especially useful” instrument of imperialism. 
 
 
Purifying the political: Carl Schmitt 
 
In The Concept of the Political (1932), Schmitt argues that the concept of “humanity” 
is never political insofar as it “excludes the concept of the enemy, because the enemy 
does not cease to be a human being—and hence there is no specific differentiation in 
that concept” (54). This follows necessarily from his claim that “the political” inheres 
only in the discrimination of “friend [Freund]” from “enemy [Fiend],” the “high points 
[Die Höhepunkte]” of which—and this will become important later—being 
“simultaneously the moments [Augenblicke] in which the enemy is, in concrete clarity, 
recognised as the enemy” (67). The purest event or advent of the political, in other 
words, consists of, and is made manifest as, the instant in which “the enemy” comes to 
be recognised as “the enemy,” an instant in which “the State [Staat]” delimits itself 
whilst thenceforth always reserving for itself the possibility of war [pōlemos].  
Hence, politics is never the revelation of an essential, “natural” or even “just” 
enmity, but rather only the moment in which the production of the enemy (who is as 
yet neither friend nor enemy) as “the enemy” comes to make sense. Its material clarity, 
therefore, resides in its performance of the figure of the political, in the performing of 
its own figure. That is, in enacting the performative tautology “‘the Enemy’ is the 
enemy.” Its illumination, in other words, is the result of a technical political virtuosity 
which, in its inaugurating moment, produces the naturalising transparency of a 
meaningful performative. At the instant of its founding “high point,” however, such 
meaning must immediately succumb to a degree of obscurity, beginning its falling 
away from the summit [Die Höhepunkte] into the depoliticised darkness of its 
dissemination. Thus, lacking the specific friend-enemy differentiation which marks the 
200 
 
opening of politics, “humanity” for Schmitt cannot therefore “wage war because it has 
no enemy, at least not on this planet” (54).  
Even if, like Schmitt, we also (at least for the moment) all too obviously 
ignore the place of “the animal” on “this planet,” such a claim nonetheless finds itself 
immediately complicated by the introduction of the figure of “the Jew” as reproduced 
in Germany under the Nazis and, further, by Schmitt’s own role as self-apointed Nazi 
ideologue. The point here, of course, is that Jews under the Nazis were reconfigured as 
nonhuman (as opposed to the “primitive” humanity of the Slavs, for example), that is, 
precisely as a separate species, an ahomo sapiens and in this sense as an alien race.  
Despite Schmitt’s undeniably reductive logic and, indeed, the reactive defense 
of the nation-state which his concept of the political presupposes, a defence which 
needs to be read in the context of both its interwar production and Schmitt’s own 
political committments, one cannot thereby simply exclude his discourse from 
consideration. Of particular importance is the part played by the production of the 
“enemy” or, better, of the “foreigner” or “outsider,” in the constitution of boundaries 
not only geopolitical, but also ideological, which serve to differentiate the sovereign 
Self from absolute Other.  
Indeed, it is Schmitt’s “purification” of the political, that is, his positing of the 
political as a domain apparently purified of any and all economic, aesthetic, moral or 
religious entanglements, which marks his reactionary discourse as dangerously right-
wing. Such a “purification” in fact constitutes its own depoliticisation, insofar as it 
erases material and “religious” interest (in the broadest sense) from the political realm. 
Instead, Schmitt claims that the whole of politics inheres in the constitution of an other 
as “the Enemy,” an enemy which must remain abstract, a phantasm or spectre, against 
and by which an equally phantasmatic “homeland” thence constitutes itself. The 
production of fear, in other words, of the other and of war (whether potential or 
actual), serves both to unify a nation and to efface any thought of underlying economic 
and/or ideological interests. In this, one cannot fail to recognise the “crypto-
Schmittianism” of the Bush administration and beyond.104  
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 On this, see Simon Critchley Infinitely Demanding: Ethics of Commitment, Politics of 
Resistance (London & New York: Verso, 2008), 133-148. 
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Hence, and by way of the strange slave syllogism of Nietzsche’s man of 
ressentiment, 105 it thus remains necessary to always again render an account of the 
mutual articulation of the putatively abstract “political” (i.e. geopolitical) “enemy” and 
the doxa (or theodoxa) of evil in the conservation of both the “global” parliamentarian-
capitalism of the West and the neo-liberal humanist subject. Only in this way does the 
value of the symbolic economy of the absolute other and of radical evil find itself 
interrupted by its articulation within a resolutely material economy. That is, by the 
uncanny reinscription of material suffering in place of an apparently iconic use, an 
economy of suffering within which all living beings are implicated.106 Indeed, and as 
will be explored in more detail later, this is at least part of the reason for the hyperbolic 
reaction to the improper phrasing “animal holocaust.” A phrasing which, insofar as it 
returns the thought of the Shoah to that of vulnerable bodies and to the intensity of 
suffering rather than invoking an empty notion of “Evil,” thus recalls to cognition, 
from beyond its spectacular economy, the singular crime, ongoing, endlessly 
reiterated, that is the industrialised genocide of living beings.  
Here, Schmitt’s political commitments and extreme, lifelong anti-Semitism 
serve to focus ever more sharply the issue at hand. How is it that Schmitt, perhaps the 
theorist of the modern nation-state, became perhaps the supporter of the Nazi regime, 
given the absolute distinction between hostis and inimicus upon which he thus grounds 
his notion of the indivisible border? According to Schmitt, the external and abstract 
enemy [hostis] which, in being recognised as “the Enemy” constitutes the unifying 
community effect of “the Nation,” can and must never be that of a particular enemy 
[inimicus]. The enemy, in other words, can and must never be “my” personal enemy, 
insofar as such subjective passions can never be political insofar as they can never be 
“purified” of individual (economic, moral, aesthetic, religious, familial) interest. As a 
result, “the Enemy,” which is rather always and only “the Enemy of the State” (“of” 
thus understood in the double genitive) insofar as it functions both to determine and 
conserve the State’s own borders by way of an abstract or public difference between 
enemy and friend, can and must never be this or that (or those) particular being(s) who 
dwell with “us” within “our” borders.  
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will see in the final chapter. 
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Indeed, this necessarily remains the case even if this or that particular enemy 
would nonetheless seem to belong to the abstract category of the “public” enemy. Such 
a “seeming” would for Schmitt thus constitute a misunderstanding or, rather, a 
misreading of the political, in that such material specificity contaminates its “pure” 
figure, breaching the traditional security of its borders. The Public Enemy reproduced 
“in general” must therefore never evoke subjective passions, must never have the 
effect of inciting hatred or contempt for an enemy, whether publically or privately. The 
enemy for Schmitt (as “subjected” to and by the State), rather than of Schmitt (as a 
would-be autonomous subject), may be “Israel” or “Judaism” or “Islam,” but must 
never, however, be this Jew or this Muslim who lives amongst “us.”  
The founding identification of the enemy, and thence the friend, is thus purely 
geographical, a geo-graphy determined by a fantastic border, its spectre the nonplace 
through which both space and place come to be defined. Hence, we are returned to our 
question: how is it that Schmitt can support the elimination (in every sense, including 
its (in)digestive relation) of millions of German Jews under the Nazi regime and, 
indeed, remain a committed anti-Semite long after the collapse of the Reich? 
This is a question which cannot be answered in any detail here, requiring as it 
does a far more extensive engagement with Schmitt’s entire oeuvre than can be 
attempted here, but it nevertheless remains a question which needs to be pursued. 
Preliminarily, however, it is clear that the question concerns the possibility or 
otherwise of “purifying” the concept of the Enemy of any “subjective” enmity. It 
concerns, in other words, the separation of the public and the private.107  
To recap, the summit of the political is attained only in the performance of its 
own figure, the instantaneous coup in which the not yet friend-or-enemy comes to be 
recognised as “the Enemy.” At the same time, insofar as it is the figure of “the Enemy” 
which thence constitutes the State, and thus the community affect which marks the 
differentiation of the public from the privately subjective, the fault-line between the 
“public” and the “private” too is necessarily drawn by this same instant of recognition. 
The instant of the political, in other words, divides “the public” from “the private,” 
effacing an already existing complex of relations in the positing of a simple fantastical 
opposition which, founding and conserving the state, unifies the elements of both the 
friend-enemy and private-public dichotomies.  
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As we have seen, however, for such a re-cognition to take place it must, upon 
its “first” appearance, always already be repeated. Hence, in its engendering double 
movement of protention and retention, the “high point” of the political, the indivisible 
instant of its coup, is therefore always already “contaminated.” Inaugurated in the 
abrupt, naturalising recognition of its sense, its meaning has, in other words, always 
already gone astray, destinerred. Hence, its falling away into the habitual obscurity of 
depoliticisation. The friend-enemy and public-private divisions constituted in and as 
the “purity” of the political perfomative are thus, as the condition of their founding, 
always impure, their borders already breached. In this, the pure concepts of both 
“enemy” and “public” are already corrupted by the “friend” and the “private” and vice 
versa, the particular within tainted by the abstract without. Viewed in another way, as 
Andrew Benjamin writes in his discussion of Pascal’s Pensées, “the Jew” (or “the 
Muslim” or “the Foreigner” or indeed, and with varying degrees of constraint, “the 
Animal”) is named and thus given an identity “with which actual Jews [or Muslims or 
foreigners or nonhuman animals] would then have to live” (Of Jews and Animals, 186; 
my emphasis).  
 
 
Making Enemies, Inhuman 
 
Such problematising of the friend-enemy dichotomy thus inevitably returns us to the 
place or nonplace of the foreign in the Same, to the asylum seeker that “is” every 
living being, and to the discursive production of both nationalism and racism. 
Furthermore, it re-turns the figure of “the Animal” upon which every human 
community depends, an exclusive coming to be which, following Schmitt, opens in 
always opening itself to a future war [pōlemos] against actual nonhuman animals. 
What remains to be considered then, is what according to Schmitt is the absolute 
nonrelation between “the concept of the political” and “the concept of humanity.” It is 
here, I will argue in attempting to follow Lévi-Strauss, that “the concept of 
humanity”—and, more precisely, its unavoidable opening onto a terrifying 
dehumanisation by way of the abstract spectre of “the Animal”—in fact discloses, and 
in so doing deconstructs, the terrifying xenophobia which inheres in the Schmittian 
“concept of the political.”  
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As we have seen, the impossible “pure” abstraction that is “the Enemy”—an 
abstraction which must remain as untouched by the economic, the juridical, and the 
religious as it is by any subjective passion—rather functions to efface complexity so as 
to produce a simple binary opposition. An opposition, moreover, which, insofar as the 
impermeability of its border cannot be maintained, must then be repeatedly reproduced 
in what is a conservative re-founding of its foundation. “The Enemy,” in other words, 
is a myth, a phantasm or a spectre against which the state and State of ressentiment 
constitutes itself. In this, “the Enemy” doubles and is doubled by, supports and is 
supported by, the myth or spectre of “the Animal” against which the properly human 
status constitutes itself. Necessarily mutually articulated, Schmitt’s posited binaries 
collapse into each other in reinforcing each other. The result, as we will see, is that, 
insofar as private hatred passes through the animal, so too does the public enemy, 
contamination working in both directions: “the Animal” corrupts “the Enemy” just as 
this enemy contaminates this animal, the Enemy corrupts animals just as the Animal 
corrupts enemies, and so on. Speciesism and racism, in other words, cannot be 
dissociated in the (re)production both of the subject and of the subject’s shared 
community affect. 
To recap, the identification of the political enemy, the “high point” of politics, 
is both purely abstract and geo-graphical, the recognised spacing in which the space 
and place of both the enemy and then the friend comes to be defined. It is, in other 
words, a distinction and delimitation thus rooted to the soil, the home-land. It is the 
soil therefore, which is the “concrete” material in which is realised and which real-ises, 
that is, makes actual, the abstraction that is “the political” (Concept of the Political, 
30). Friends must belong to, and share in, the same soil. The community, the State, is 
bound, and bounded, by the soil, that of its proper ground.  
What then, if the would-be “friend” (in the abstract sense) is not bound by the 
same soil? What, for example, of the dispossessed, the diasporic, those without a 
recognised “homeland” beneath their feet? The friend must share, and share in, the 
soil, but, as we know, this ground, this soil is already contaminated, invaded by 
parasites who have already rendered impure the political body in its very founding. 
The body politic, in short, will have been already corrupted by the rootless within, by 
the parasitical homeless who will have already breached the security of its borders. 
The exemplary figure of which is, of course, “the wandering Jew,” condemned forever 
to seek a mythical promised land.  
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Here then, we discover yet again the specific bodies who inhabit the “purely” 
private relation—those of the foreign in the Same—, and who are thus subject and 
subjected to the “justifiable” hatred of the friend (inimicus) whilst at once serving to 
maintain the abstract, public Enemy (hostis). That is to say, all those actual beings 
who, having had an identity imposed upon them, then have to live it. The border 
delimiting the “purely us,” in other words, insofar as it is reproduced, must thus be 
produced from within as from without. Such private hatred of the enemy-friend, 
moreover, must pass by way of the Animal, without which the relation to the foreign in 
the Same would remain abstract, a simple, and above all passionless, question of 
territorial displacement. To understand this however, we must return to that danger 
which, as Schmitt writes, inheres in the concept of “humanity.” 
Schmitt, it should be recalled, claims that the concept of “humanity” can 
never be political as it lacks the differentiation of friend and enemy, insofar as the 
enemy, that is, the public enemy, “does not cease to be a human being” and therefore 
“humanity” cannot “wage war” (54). However, without the political—that is, the 
constitutive discrimination between enemy and friend—there can be no humanity, but 
only, for Schmitt, the extreme inhumanity which is the world of purely private interest. 
The recognition of the enemy as “the Enemy” is, therefore, the properly human. 
Humanity, in other words, is the condition of the shared yet agonistic community 
affect, and which for Schmitt is thus manifest “properly” only in the nation-state. 
Being-human is, in short, indissociable from the recognition of the enemy. To be 
human is thus to maintain the real possibility or actuality of war (pōlemos). Such a 
war, therefore, is at once a war against the enemy, a war against inhumanity, and a war 
against the foreign in the Same. “Life against life,” as Derrida, in an echo of Nietzsche, 
describes it in his reading of Schmitt.108  
The constitution of “the human” (against “the animal”) cannot be separated 
therefore from the constitution of “the enemy” (against “the inhumanity” of “private 
interest”). A proper community of friends (the nation-state) is, in other words, 
constituted against the non-human or the not-properly-human which lacks access to the 
positing of a purely abstract externality and thus the sovereign decision. A decision 
which, moreover, remains undecidable: insofar as “the friend” and at once “the State” 
are constituted only subsequent to this founding decision which gives “the enemy” to 
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be recognised, “who” or “what” posits this originary exceptional decision prior to, and 
constitutive of, both the human and the common cannot be determined. Here then, we 
find yet another question of the nonplace of the Origin.  
Returning to the claim as to the impossibility of a political concept of 
“humanity,” this is not, as Schmitt makes clear, to say that wars cannot be, and are not, 
waged in the name of “humanity.” In this latter, writes Schmitt in “The Legal World 
Revolution,” instead of a political concept, “humanity” becomes instead “an 
asymmetrical counter-concept” (88; cit. Concept, xxii). This asymmetry—an 
asymmetry which, as I have argued throughout, is indissociable, on the structural level, 
from the concept of “humanity” itself—inevitably manifests itself in its delineation, in 
the drawing of a line. A division or discrimination which, as Schmitt writes, “thereby 
denies the quality of being human to a disturber or destroyer, … the negatively valued 
person becomes an unperson, and his life is no longer of the highest value: it becomes 
worthless and must be destroyed” (xxii). We are of course very familiar with this 
process of displacement by now, this “dehumanising” or “animalising” reconfiguration 
by which the “disturber”—this parasitical contaminant displaced and nonplaced within 
the State or community of “friends”—ceases to be properly human.  
Thus, as Schmitt writes in The Concept of the Political, “[t]hat wars are 
waged in the name of humanity is not a contradiction of this simple truth; quite the 
contrary, it has an especially intensive political meaning [intensiven politischen Sinn]” 
(54). However, insofar as the reproductive shift towards animality must for Schmitt 
remain unremarked in order to repress the founding-conserving recognition of the 
animal as “the Animal”—the “enemy,” so to speak, against which “humanity,” the 
friendly community of humans thence constitutes itself in the positing of what Schmitt 
claims to be the purely political performative—Schmitt can thus only mark the 
consequences of its operation, but not the means:  
 
When a state fights its political enemy in the name of humanity [Wenn ein 
Staat im Nammen der Menschheit seinen politischen Feind bekämpft], it is 
not a war for the sake of humanity, but a war wherein a particular state 
[Staat] seeks to usurp a universal concept against its military opponent. At 
the expense of its opponent, it tries to identify itself with humanity in the 
same way as one can misuse peace, justice, progress, and civilization in 
order to claim these as one’s own and to deny the same to the enemy. The 
“concept of humanity” is an especially useful ideological instrument of 
imperialist expansion [“Menschheit” ist ein besonders brauchbares 
ideologisches Instrument imperialistischer Expansionen], and in its ethical-
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humanitarian form it is a specific vehicle of economic imperialism. … To 
confiscate the word humanity, to invoke and monopolise such an exalted 
[erhabenen] term can only be the sign of the terrifying demand [nur den 
schrecklichen Anspruch manifestieren], such as denying the enemy the 
quality of being human and declaring him to be an outlaw of humanity; and 
a war can thereby be driven to the most extreme inhumanity [zur äussersten 
Unmenschlichkeit] (54, trans. modified and emphasis added).109 
 
For Schmitt then, such a war waged against an enemy in the name [Nammen] of 
“humanity” is, in common with civil war (stāsis), not a “proper” war, but rather its 
“misuse” which destroys rather than conserves the balance of states. Its 
monopolisation of a universal concept for private gain—economic, ideological or 
territorial, or most likely all at once—corrupts the (impossible) passionless purity of a 
public enemy. As such, its impassioned demand is terrifying, inasmuch as it is driven 
by nonpolitical power, by subjective, economic, or even aesthetic desire, by moral or 
religious will, and is therefore necessarily without limit. Exceeding the concept and the 
limit of war [pōlemos], its impropriety is no longer or not yet war, and as such 
threatens to push this so-called “war” to the very extremes of destruction by way of the 
animalising movement.  
When the concept of “humanity” is invoked, in other words, there can be no 
limit to the destruction which follows. Here then, we are given to understand what 
Lévi-Strauss calls the “first mutilation”—that of the posited “dignity” of humanity—
and what inevitably follows: “in the name of the human, of human rights and 
humanitarianism, other men are then treated like beasts, and consequently one 
becomes oneself inhuman” (Derrida Beast, 73).  
What is terrifying therefore, is the depoliticising corruption of the political by 
the non-political, the contamination of the public by private interest. And yet, how is it 
that such a weakening or falling away from the “high point” of the purely political can 
have “an especially intensive political meaning”? Rather, such “intensity” exceeds the 
limits of Schmitt’s own discourse, breaching the purified domain of the political. In 
other words, the terrifying political manoeuvrings which reside within the would-be 
de-politicising “counter-concept” of “humanity”—i.e., a concept which is counter to 
the political, a-political or even anti-political and thus absolutely private—make 
explicit its imbrication with the political, that is, with the friend-enemy binary. Hence, 
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Schmitt discloses within the political-nonpolitical dichotomy an a priori impropriety 
which is the condition for, and effaced in, the inauguration of their very differentiation. 
Indeed, this is already marked by the rhetoric of “high points [Höhepunkte]” which 
thus gestures to differences of degree, and not of kind as Schmitt claims.  
Part of the network of inculcation constituted along vectors of power, the 
friend-enemy and human-animal pairings thus, as we have already seen, “require and 
deploy each other for the purpose of their own articulation” (Butler Bodies that Matter, 
18). Indeed, how could the positing of an external enemy by which a “homeland” 
comes to be not in fact have an individual, “private” affect, precisely in becoming a 
citizen of that homeland with all that that might entail, and never excluding—for 
Schmitt—the possibility of one’s own sacrifice in a conserving war against the 
“public” enemy? 
The privately-public or publicly-private enemy, that of the rootless within, is 
thus always the subject of, and subject to, the “real possibility” of “physical killing 
[physischen Tötung]” which for Schmitt is indissociable from war (pōlemos) and from 
the recognition of “the Enemy” (Concept of the Political, 33). The real possibility of 
physical killing, in other words, falls back on the private as well as the public enemy. 
It is a possibility, however, which can only be “founded” by way of the animalisation 
of the foreign in the Same, rather than by the abstract, passionless conservation of the 
State. This privately-public enemy can never be “the Enemy” in all its purity but, at the 
intersection of the domestic and the foreign, can thus only be a parasite, corrupting the 
purity of the homeland, an impure foreigner amidst the community of friends whose 
very presence contaminates the soil. Threatening the domestic, such foreigners carry 
with them the risk of civil war or revolution (stāsis), thus embodying in the specific the 
potential destruction of the State which in its turn then justifies a reactive politics of 
fear.  
According to Schmitt’s logic (and indeed, that of the crypto-Schmittianism of 
the US), a logic which values the integrity of the State above all else, such 
“parasites”—improper beings—must therefore be eliminated, for which the 
reconfiguration of Jews as “lice” under the Nazis constitutes the paradigmatic 
example. Moreover, the very phantasticity of “the Enemy” means that its founding 
constitution does not require another “actual” (constituted) nation-state, or even a 
determined geopolitical territory, in order to function. Indeed, the impossibility of 
determining and thus identifying the “actual” enemy intensifies, in its indeterminacy, 
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both the perception of the threat represented by the “enemy”—who could now be 
anywhere and everywhere, the (almost) undetectable foreigner within the Same—and 
of course the reaction such fear subsequently justifies. 
Insofar as this founding contamination is undeniable it can, as Derrida would 
say, therefore only be denied. Hence, in the moment of a phantasmatic founding 
disavowal, the body—here the Schmittian body politic but equally the properly 
humanist body, as we shall see in the next part—must remain pure, its borders 
inviolate. At the same time however, the phantasmatic nature of such borders always 
already requires their reproduction, and thus the conserving reiteration of its founding 
disavowal. Consequently, to maintain both the (spectral) purity of the State and the 
(spectral) purity of the human, and with each supporting the other, the foreign in the 
Same must ever again be excluded. An exclusion which is, as Arendt writes of the 
Shoah, “a crime against the human status” rather than a “crime against humanity” 
(Eichmann in Jerusalem, 257).110  
Hence, both animalised humans and nonhuman animals must suffer an 
endless, grossly asymmetrical war (pōlemos not stāsis) as a result of that “ultimate 
imposture of a so-called state of law that doesn’t hesitate to base itself on a would-be 
original hierarchy” (Derrida “Racism’s Last Word,” 379). Such a war thereby delivers 
the relation of “humanity” and “the State,” the valorised terms of fabulous oppositions 
which serve to unify their elements in and as the effacement of the complex of already 
existing relations, over to the most extreme inhumanity. In this, one can hear too the 
Yiddish writer Isaac Bashevis Singer when he writes that scholars and philosophers— 
 
have convinced themselves that man, the worst transgressor of all the 
species, is the crown of creation. All other creatures were created merely to 
provide him with food, pelts, to be tormented, exterminated. In relation to 
them, all people are Nazis; for the animals it is an eternal Treblinka” (“The 
Letter Writer,” epigraph to Patterson). 
 
In summary then, in and with the name of “humanity” we disclose only the 
figure of Western imperialist terror, a “vehicle of economic imperialism” imflicting 
extreme inhumanity upon its enemies. It is also to begin to understand the need to 
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move always beyond such delimitation—a move, as Jean-Luc Nancy writes, towards 
“a world offered not to ‘humanity’ but to its singular bodies” (Corpus, 41).  
 
 
The inviolate body: poetics and politics of the organism 
 
Considerations of “common humanity” or of the “human community” have occupied a 
privileged place throughout the history of philosophy. However, such a placing here of 
the notion of the “human community” together with its common-sense synonym 
“common humanity” is by no means fortuitous. Not only are these synonyms in fact 
antonyms—insofar as the latter refers to what is “common” to every individual human 
being, rather than to a common relation between all human beings, and can thus be 
more helpfully termed “universal humanity”—but also their everyday 
interchangeability in fact serves to disclose the limit, in every sense, of “the human 
community.” This exchangeability of heterogeneous terms, that is to say, remarks the 
imbrication of the organic body of ontotheological humanism with the biotic body of 
nationalism, and figured by the phantasmatic boundaries of the human and the political 
organism, and by the mythic oneness both of the common body and the individual 
bodies which compose it. The concepts of “humanity” and of “community” (which 
includes, but is not reducible to, “the nation”) thus come together in the positing of an 
immanent organism. As Jean-Luc Nancy writes in The Inoperative Community (1986), 
it is— 
 
precisely the immanence of man to man, or it is man, taken absolutely, 
considered as the immanent being par excellence, that constitutes the 
stumbling block to a thinking of community. A community presupposed as 
having to be one of human beings presupposes that it effect, or that it must 
effect, as such and integrally, its own essence, which is itself the 
accomplishment of the essence of humanness. … Consequently, economic 
ties, technological operations, and political fusion (into a body or under a 
leader) represent or rather present, expose, and realise this essence 
necessarily in themselves. Essence is set to work in them; through them, it 
becomes its own work. This is what we have called “totalitarianism,” but it 
might be better named “immanentism,” as long as we do not restrict the 
term to designating certain types of societies or regimes but rather see in it 




The immanent or totalitarian body, insofar as it must work to accomplish its own 
essence “as such and integrally,” demands first of all its circumscription. It depends for 
its existence, in other words, upon the exclusion of its other through the reproduction 
of its phantasmatic borders, coming into being as such only subsequent to the 
production of these borders and thus rendering it secondary to an originary complex of 
relations. A limit then, is the a priori condition of its positing of essence.  
Moreover, for both the immanent human body and the immanent human 
community—and here one begins to understand how the one comes to stand in for the 
other—this constitutive limit works to fuse every human being who has ever lived or 
may ever live into a single body. This, it should be noted, is irrespective of whether the 
“essence of humanness” being put to work is posited as internal to the individual 
human organism over against the nonhuman animal, or else as inhering within every 
relation between individuals over against the monad, that is, as either infra- or 
intersubjective. In the same way, the fascistic nation works to fuse into a single body 
every citizen who has ever lived or may ever live. One thinks here of those reclaimed 
“national heroes” who come again to represent the “essence” of the nation, to 
spectrally embody the spectral body, as well as the militaristic rhetoric concerning the 
“threat” to its future integrity. The slave morality that is nationalism, in other words, 
demands the working of an immanent body, fused into the commonality of 
ressentiment by way of an outside against which it can then constitute itself. Nietzsche, 
we recall, defines “slave morality” as that which “from the outset says No to what is 
“outside,” what is “different,” what is “not itself” … this need to direct one’s view 
outward instead of back to oneself—is of the essence of ressentiment” (Genealogy, 
I:10). 
That this essence must become the body’s own work—an organic setting 
itself to work in order to accomplish itself, that is to say, a setting itself through its self 
the work of becoming purely its self—demands a specific concept of the border: that of 
the “living membrane.” This is because, in a working towards the purity or immanence 
of a strictly delimited “body,” the immanent body thus requires a “natural” border. It 
requires, that is, a hymen through which impurities may be expelled, but which at the 
same time admits only what is assimilable within, or consumable by, the organic 
system in its work towards perfect autonomy and thus immortality that is the work of 
pure immanence. However, as Derrida points out, for such a “living body” to achieve 
this immortality of autonomy “it would have to die in advance, to let itself die or kill 
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itself in advance, for fear of being altered by what comes from outside, by the other, 
period. Hence the theatre of death to which racisms, biologisms, organicisms, eugenics 
are so often given” (“Artifactualities,” 18-9). Here then, we can begin to discern the 
autodestructive tēlos—its structural “suiciding”—of the totalitarian body, be it the 
human body, the delimited body politic, or the global body of “humanity,” a suiciding 
intimately connected with that which Derrida elsewhere calls the “autoimmunitary 
structure.”111  
It is a tēlos, moreover, which renders death as the truth of undying, death as 
the truth of an ecstatic “One-ness” beyond all division, and thus, pathic and undying, 
its lifeless perfection, the tēlos of the immanent body, becomes the truth of “the 
Animal” as traditionally conceived. We will return to this in a moment, but here it 
suffices to note that its work of oppression, of immanence, functions in the same way 
as the pathic, undying essence of “the Animal” serves to stage the theatre of death that 
is the contemporary zootechnical holocaust. Nancy puts it as follows: 
 
immanence, if it were to come about, would instantly suppress community, 
or communication, as such. Death is not only the example of this, it is its 
truth. In death … there is no longer any community or communication: 
there is only the continuous identity of atoms. This is why political or 
collective enterprises dominated by a will to absolute immanence have as 
their truth the truth of death. Immanence, communal fusion, contains no 
other logic than that of the suicide of the community that is governed by it. 
… The fully realised person of individualistic or communistic humanism is 
the dead person (Inoperative Community, 12-13). 
 
This suicidal logic, which Schmitt’s conserving concept of the political inevitably 
gestures towards, can only produce a body of ressentiment, can only reproduce a 
private hatred for the improper, for the foreign body corrupting the purity of the Same, 
which henceforth comes to be seen in terms of a destiny. Such destiny must be 
understood in contrast to an abstract enmity justified by a publicly sanctioned “enemy” 
which claims to render such intense—intensely produced and intensely productive—
hatred as “passionless,” that is, as senseless. Rather, destiny, by definition, requires 
neither action nor passion, neither decision nor responsibility, and indeed, in the 
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promised fulfilment of its auto-immanence, ultimately has as its goal the elimination of 
action and passion as such in the fusion of ecstatic One-ness.  
It is not by chance that Derrida, in his discussion of the autoimmunitary 
structure, refers to what goes by the name of public health and military security as the 
“two great forms of immunity” (Rogues, 155). “The immune” here concerns nothing 
less than the immanent, self-determined and self-determining body which seeks, in its 
work and as its working towards perfect health, to expel in suicidal fashion that upon 
which it depends for its founding-conserving function: “the autoimmunitary haunts the 
community and its system of immunitary survival like the hyperbole of its own 
possibility. Nothing in common, nothing immune, safe and sound, heilig and holy, 
nothing unscathed in the autonomous living present without a risk of autoimmunity” 
(Derrida “Faith and Knowledge,” 82). 
Setting itself through its self the work of becoming its self, death for the 
immanent body, continues Nancy,  
 
is not the unmasterable excess of finitude, but the infinite fulfilment of an 
immanent life …. Since [Gottfried Wilhelm] Leibniz there has been no 
death in our universe: in one way or another an absolute circulation of 
meaning (of values, of ends, of History) fills or reabsorbs all finite 
negativity, draws from each finite singular destiny a surplus value of 
humanity or an infinite superhumanity. But this presupposes, precisely, the 
death of each and all in the life of the infinite (Inoperative Community, 13).  
 
The reference to Leibniz is instructive here, namely because the notion of the pathic, 
undying animal receives perhaps its most explicit formulation in Leibniz’s 
“Monadology” (1714). According to Leibniz, nonhuman animals, lacking reason, 
constitute a continuum of unfolding and enfolding, an unending reconfiguring with 
neither beginning nor end, neither birth nor death (a vitalism whose echo can still be 
found in Deleuze & Guattari and beyond112). Paradoxically then, the “fully realised” 
body of individualistic or communistic humanism, constituted in its negation of “the 
Animal,” turns full phantasmatic circle, presupposing in its mythical perfection the very 
pathic, undying animal against which it sought to found its essential difference. Thus, 
the dialectical teleology of humanism collapses in on itself, the fall of the Fall. The life 
of the fully-realised body is thus the perfection of the nonliving beyond finitude. It is in 
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this sense that Derrida can write of “absolute evil” as “absolute life, fully present life, 
the one that does not know death and does not want to hear about it” (Spectres, 220).  
In summary, the impossibly immanent and immune body of both 
individualistic and communistic humanism is an originary absence of life, a nonliving 
body which must nevertheless be protected from contamination, which must thus turn 
against itself, extirpate itself of all finitude and thus of all life. Here again, it is 
necessary to recall, and to which we will return once again in the next chapter, 
Nietzsche’s insistence that any way of being which excludes itself from all other ways 
of being necessarily degenerates, having excluded itself from that which reserves the 
possibility of its regeneration. As we have seen, however, Nietzsche is by no means 
attempting to restart the machinery of dialectical opposition and overcoming. Rather, 
he seeks to interrupt exactly that movement of Hegelian totality which must subsume 
or exclude all “particularity” within its “universality”—the former constituting for 
Hegel in Philosophy of Nature a danger analogous to a contagious disease within a 
body. 
Throughout this chapter we have inevitably being thinking, with Arendt and 
with Schmitt, the placeless place of “the Jew” as figured within Nazi ideology, but also 
of that placeless place which, so intensely produced and productive today, is marked 
both by the terms “immigrant,” “asylum seeker” and “terrorist,” and by the rendering 
insensible and invisible rendering of nonhuman animals. The reference to Hegel, 
however, is vital to a further understanding of both the suicidal structure of the Nazi 
“theatre of death” and of the organicism which ultimately serves as the justification for 
the Shoah.  
First of all, it is only insofar as the living organism serves as the figure, the 
isomorphic model and the proper of the Nazi State, that it is therefore possible for its 
racist and patriarchal—at base, ethnico-religious—hierarchy to be naturalised by way 
of its conflation with the discourse of biology. This is evident, for example, in the 
words of Ernst Haeckel, who “often spoke of groups of people as cancerous growths or 
malignant viruses,” and of the Nazi physician Fritz Klein, whose claim that “[t]he Jew 
is the gangrenous appendix in the body of mankind” was typical (Sax Animals in the 
Third Reich, 105). For the Nazis as for Hegel, therefore, the “natural(ised)” body of the 
state has to be protected from disease understood as an organic lesion that is both a hurt 
and an abnormality. One which, at least in the case of the former, results in “the 
medicalisation of virtually all ethical and social questions. … The medical profession 
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fighting disease became an image of absolute ruthlessness” (105). Moreover, this 
absolute privilege accorded to the notion of public health justifies that other “great 
immunity” identified by Derrida, that of military security. As Boria Sax writes, the 
subordination of the individual organ113 to the biotic community— 
 
served for an era of total war, of conflict that was waged through 
technologies of mass destruction. The idea complemented a militaristic 
nationalism, since it fused the entire population together with the landscape 
into a single body. Furthermore, it directed the aggression not only against 
enemy soldiers but also against civilians and entire environments (Animals 
in the Third Reich, 109; emphasis added).  
 
Nazi Germany, however, was not, as Sax suggests (and by way of another animal 
trope), “meant to be an enormous predator” (109). Rather, it is best figured by what 
Arendt terms “the banality of evil”: by the mundane directors of public “health” 
programmes, of biopolitics in the most deadly sense—civil servants like Eichmann 
who manipulated people and corpses as if transporting freight. Under Hitler, “the 
Aryan race” was constituted at once as both the proper and the proper future of 
“humanity”—destined, if only its impurities could be eliminated, to approach 
perfection and thus immortality (as figured by the thousand-year Reich). In this sense 
then, given the impurity that was “the Jew,” insofar as it figured that which must be 
eliminated in order for humanity to achieve its predestined perfection, this meant that 
the Jewish people were not, and could never be, “human.”114  
As that which humanity must overcome in order to become absolutely—
integrally and immanently—human as such, the Jews thus find themselves 
reconfigured both as animals (as rats, as pigs, etc.) within a rigid zoological hierarchy 
and also, more specifically, as parasites (Jews were to be exterminated, Hitler 
announced, “as lice”). “The Jew,” in other words, is reconfigured as ontologically 
distinct, a nonhuman species. Hence, in the official media the Jewish people are 
stripped of their generic human appearance, thus marking them out as excluded from 
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the category “humanity.” In this way, “the Jew” (and always recalling that this is an 
identification in advance which actual Jews then have to live) within the body of 
Nazism comes to be reconstituted as inassimilable, rendered at once alien, threatening, 
insidious, corrupt and corrupting. Reproduced along with and alongside “the animal” as 
a priori discontinuous, “the Jew” is, in other words, beyond incorporation, a nonhuman 
contagion and a contagious inhumanity. As such, “Jewish-ness” becomes a disease 
which cannot be overcome, and hence must be exterminated for the Reich to achieve its 
destiny and purity—irradiated like a cancer or cut away like a gangrenous limb. In this, 
the proper body of the human and the proper body of the human community thus 
require each other for their articulation, a relation marked by the nationalist privilege of 
blood and soil: the pure human body and the pure geophysical body. 
What in Hegel ostensibly leads to a doctrine of tolerance, for the Nazis leads 
to the gas chambers. And yet, relying as they both do on the organic work of a body 
becoming purely its self, the two cannot be so easily separated. In the Philosophy of 
Right, as Andrew Benjamin demonstrates, Hegel has recourse to the will in positing the 
nonrelation of the “person” and the “animal,” insofar as “[t]he absence of a willed 
relation between the ‘I’ and its life or body in the animals” means that for Hegel “it 
[sic] does not have ‘a right’ [Recht] to that life” (Of Jews and Animals, 81). 
Furthermore, this “entails that the continuity of animal life has a necessarily distinct 
form” (82). Here then, the absence of a willed relation between “body and soul” serves 
to deny a right to life, which simultaneously justifies a putting to death.  
At the same time, such a justification finds its echo in the figure of “the Jew” 
as a distinct form of life which, once removed to the Lagers, is stripped of the willed 
relation which connects person and life—this is in one sense the “logic” of the camps. 
In this way, the absence of the Jewish “right” to life is retroactively “proved,” thus 
providing the Nazis with the “right” of putting to death. Again, what is disclosed is the 
operative machinery of animalisation, the refusal of an abstract “humanity” which 
opens the way to slaughter without murder: killing as animals. In other words, insofar 
as Hegel identifies animality as a disease to be overcome by the will to become human, 
his discourse always already risks the camps, a risk all too clearly marked by the figure 
of the “inassimilable Jew” which haunts his philosophy of tolerance.115  
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Nevertheless, and despite this complicity, the difference which actualises the 
Lagers is, as Nancy and Lacoue-Labarthe write, that the Aryan “Subject” transcends 
Hegel’s speculative thinking “in an immediate and absolutely ‘natural’ essence: that of 
blood and race. The Aryan race is, by this account, the Subject; within it, self-
formation is realised and incarnated in ‘the sacred collective egoism which is the 
“nation”’” (“The Nazi Myth,” 310). The Nazi regime transcends Hegel’s idealist 
philosophy, in other words, in the mythical fusion of “human” and “community” into a 
suicidal material body. 
 
 
Shame, Guilt, and Analogising the Holocaust  
 
There is no direct analogy, it should be noted, being posited in the previous section 
between the intense pain and suffering undergone by those nonhuman animals, living 
and dead, within industrialised feedlots, slaughterhouses, and laboratories, and those 
human animals, living and dead, who were and are victims of the Shoah. Rather, what 
is being argued is their necessary interrelation or reciprocity, at once their absolute 
historical singularity and their indissociability. While not an analogy, therefore, there 
nonetheless remains a relation—the relation of humanism and nationalism—, one 
which I propose to mark here with the improper phrasing “animal holocaust” (and 
without proper noun status).  
It is this, I argue, which makes permissible, if not accurate, the holocaust 
analogy, insofar as the animalisation of Jews in Nazi Germany has as its operative 
condition the machine which reproduces nonhuman animals as killable. Taking a cue 
once again from Derrida, this strategy could be figured as plus un “Holocaust”: more 
than one / no more one “Holocaust,” insofar as the term recalls always more than one 
(and thus) no more one community (that is, no immanent or immune body), which is 
what must be learned if we are to ensure no more Holocaust(s). There remains, 
however, considerable controversy surrounding the use of the Holocaust analogy, 
which will be explored in this section. Entering into this debate, which will be sketched 
below, I argue that even if the relation remains implicit, the shock of its implied 
comparison is nevertheless strategically important (as too, as we shall see, is the 
comparison with slavery), insofar as it opens “the question of the animal” to the related 
concerns of shame and guilt. We have already touched on the former in the discussion 
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of Kafka’s investigator, and here I will suggest, by way of Susan Buck-Morss’s recent 
project, that the latter is precisely the guilt of humanism itself. 
Proposed most notoriously by Martin Heidegger who, whilst remaining silent 
as to his own complicity, in 1949 compared the death camps to “mechanised 
agriculture,” the Holocaust analogy is most often condemned on the basis that its 
equation, in reducing humans to animals, in fact repeats the movement of 
animalisation which served to legitimise the genocide in the first place.116 In response, 
however, David Wood acutely notes that, “while the apparent comparison of the 
treatment of Jews with the fate of animals … may be obscene, so too is the implication 
that these sort of practices would call for a quite different judgment if we were ‘just’ 
talking about nonhuman animals” (The Step Back, 49). He then recalls the strong 
argument that— 
 
the architecture and logistical organisation of the death camps … was 
stolen, or borrowed from the successful designs of the Chicago stockyards, 
also fed directly by the railway system. If the industrialisation of killing 
was first perfected on cattle [sic], and then applied to humans, we have not 
an obscene analogy, but an obscene piece of history (49). 
 
The analogy has been put forward at its most basic level by Elisabeth Costello 
in Coetzee’s novel, which Donna Haraway describes as “a common, powerful, and in 
my view powerfully wrong approach” (When Species Meet, 336n23). This is not to 
say, however, and as Haraway makes clear, “that the Nazi killings of the Jews and 
others and mass animal slaughter in the meat industry have no relation [emphasis 
mine],” but only that such an “analogy culminating in equation can blunt our alertness 
to irreducible difference and multiplicity and their demands. Different atrocities 
deserve their own language” (336n23). Carol Adams too, in rare agreement with 
Haraway, refuses the analogy on similar grounds, claiming that it rips “experience 
from its history” which thus “does harm to Holocaust survivors. We must locate our 
ethic for animals so that it does not hurt people who are oppressed” (Neither Man Nor 
Beast, 83). Finally, Susan Coe in Dead Meat (1996) notes that— 
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My annoyance is exacerbated by the fact that the suffering I am witnessing 
now cannot exist on its own, it has to fall into the hierarchy of a “lesser 
animal suffering.” In the made-for-TV reality of American culture, the only 
acceptable genocide is historical. It’s comforting—it’s over. Twenty 
million murdered humans deserve to be more than a reference point. I am 
annoyed that I don’t have more power in communicating what I’ve seen 
apart from stuttering: “It’s like the Holocaust” (72) 
 
The clear link between these critiques is not that the comparison is inaccurate or 
irrelevant, but rather that the positing of an analogical equation is inappropriate—on 
both sides—only insofar as it effaces the specific differences between them. However, 
not positing such an analogy can equally result in blindness. As Wood writes, “[i]f 
there is a worry that the distinctiveness of the human gets lost in such a comparison, 
there is an equal worry that the refusal of such analogies perpetuates our all-too-human 
blindness to the systematic violence we habitually inflict on other creatures” (The Step 
Back, 49).  
In addition, such a critique of the trope of analogy in general (reasoning from 
parallel cases) fails to address the chance imperative of an improper metonymy holding 
open the place by which previously effaced singular differences actually come to make 
sense. It fails, that is to say, those forbidden, unheard-of phrasings explored throughout 
this thesis. It is just such a chance imperative which adds weight to Wood’s warning 
that the “expression may well provoke the very resistance it seeks to overcome, but the 
expression is not used unthinkingly, or irresponsibly” (49). 
In The Animal That Therefore I Am, Derrida famously—and carefully—refers 
to “animal genocides” (26), with the proviso that, “concerning the figure of genocide, 
one should neither abuse nor acquit oneself [ni abuser ni s’acquitter] too quickly” (26, 
trans. modified). He then proceeds to compare the “monstrous” suffering undergone by 
nonhuman animals with that of the Shoah, albeit ensuring, with all he has written on 
the subject of the prefatory “as if,” that there can be no simple relation of identity or 
analogy:  
 
As if, for example, instead of throwing a people into ovens and gas 
chambers [dans des fours crématoires et dans des chambers à gaz] (let’s 
say Nazi) doctors and geneticists had decided to organise the 
overproduction and overgeneration of Jews, gypsies, and homosexuals by 
means of artificial insemination, so that, being continually more numerous 
and better fed, they could be destined in always increasing numbers for the 
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same hell, that of the imposition of genetic experimentation, or 
extermination by gas or by fire. In the same abattoirs (26). 
 
Here it is clear that Derrida is not proffering a simplistic, reductive analogy between 
the millions of Jews exterminated in the Nazi death camps and the billions of 
nonhuman animals slaughtered in the death camps of capitalism.  
All this is, however, noted only by way of a contextualising preface. In fact, I 
would argue that the necessarily blunted edge of any posited comparison is neither the 
sole, nor even the main, cause of controversy.  
To begin with, it must be understood that the term “Holocaust,” referring to 
the extermination of the Jews during the Nazi period (“the Shoah,” from so-ah meaning 
“devastation” or “catastrophe,” is the Jewish term), is itself a trope. At once analogical 
metaphor and euphemism (in the strong sense of a palliative), it is one which moreover 
remains controversial to this day. Giorgio Agamben has traced this figure, and indeed, 
its “essentially Christian” history, in a number of his texts, and offers a convincing 
argument as to the “irresponsible historiographical blindness” of its positing, a 
blindness and blinding concerned precisely with the question of analogy (Homo Sacer, 
114). Arguing that the term “holocaust” (from the Greek holocaustos, signifying 
“completely burned”) is “from its inception anti-Semitic” and thus “intolerable” 
(Remnants, 31), Agamben notes how it marks an attempt “to establish a connection, 
however distant, between Auschwitz and the Biblical olah and between death in the gas 
chamber and the ‘complete devotion to sacred and superior motives’” (31).117  
It is here that the figure of analogy is identified as the origin of its 
intolerability: “the term impl[ies] an unacceptable equation between crematoria and 
altars” (31). Indeed, with this “wish to lend a sacrificial aura to the extermination of the 
Jews by means of the term ‘Holocaust’” (Homo Sacer, 114), it becomes clear that the 
term is if anything more appropriate as a figure for the extermination of animals for 
consumption, whether by gods or by men, than it is for the Shoah. And again, in terms 
of the meaning of the original Greek term, it is the industrialised genocide of 
nonhuman animals which most befits the adjective holocaustos, echoed by the 
industrial slaughterer’s familiar boast (a boast already worn smooth with overuse in the 
Chicago stockyards of the late 19th century) that they “use everything but the squeal.” 
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Returning to Agamben, the important and necessary desacralisation of the 
Shoah serves, as is well known, as the zero point—marked by the camp Muselmann—
for his notion of “bare life.” Jews under Nazism, he writes, were constituted as “a 
flagrant case of homo sacer in the sense of a life that may be killed but not sacrificed” 
(114). Bare life is, moreover, only actualised in its putting to death, which is “neither 
capital punishment nor a sacrifice, but simply the actualisation of a mere ‘capacity to 
be killed’ inherent in the condition of the Jew as such” (114). There was, in other 
words, no “mad and giant holocaust” but rather only the actualisation, enacted only 
through extermination, of “mere” life, mere subsistence. That is, in being-killed “the 
Jew” is reconfigured as pure animal remains (“‘as lice,’ which is to say, as bare life” 
(114)), for which the mute Muselmann is the figure, the “staggering corpse” (Jean 
Améry) or “the living dead” (Wolfgang Sofsky) without the capacity to die, but only to 
be killed.  
We can now begin to discern a more nuanced relation than a superficial 
equation marked by the phrasing “animal holocaust.” Under the Nazis, Jews are thus 
reproduced as walking dead flesh, a related, but nonetheless singular, transformation 
into “pure” corporeality, into bodily-shaped collections of dead zombie flesh ready to 
be disarticulated. Not into “meat,” however, as we have seen with the so-called “food” 
animals of the previous chapters, but into “mere” animal remains. In other words, by 
way of a structurally interrelated spectral disembodiment through mimetic 
displacement, we find here too the instrumentalised “walking ghosts” which reproduce 
a symbolic logic of oppression that ultimately serves to constitute subjugated beings 
who are precisely deserving of oppression. Not an analogy, therefore, but an inter- and 
intra-relation—a founding reciprocity. 
Furthermore, the reciprocal relation of these singular historical genocides 
serves to highlight the specificity lacking in Agamben’s conception of “bare life.” As 
Andrew Benjamin clearly demonstrates, and in contrast to the “undifferentiated 
ontology” which founds Agamben’s “bare life,” such a reconfiguration always 
involves— 
 
the violent imposition of identity. It is imposed in this way on Jews, thus 
underscoring the vacuity of the claim that such a position involves “bare 
life,” as though within such a life the particularity of being a Jew—that 
which prompted the figure’s work in the first place—was not itself already 
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marked out. In being there originally, that mark would always have been 
retained (Of Jews and Animals, 186-7). 
 
It is this ineffaceable mark which calls to the guilt which, according to Primo Levi, 
must bear upon “almost all” the Germans of the Nazi period, precisely because they 
failed to bear witness to what they could not not witness. The question—a related, even 
an analogous question—turns in a circle: Why do the majority choose not to see, to 
turn away and to refuse to hear, let alone to touch, taste or smell, the contemporary 
maltreatment of animals if not because of an unremarked sense of guilt and shame? An 
experience, in other words, that is the murmur of the always restrained yet retained 
mark of constitutive exclusion. One recalls here Elisabeth Costello, who cannot not 
conceive of everyone but as “participants in a crime of stupefying proportions” 
(Coetzee Elisabeth Costello, 114). This brings us to yet another important aspect of the 
holocaust analogy: in “Thinking With Cats” (2004), David Wood argues that the 
posited relation is nonetheless— 
 
wholly justified even if politically divisive. The reasons for this are deep, 
and connected with the difficulty most of us have in coming to see that some 
social practices we take part in clear-headedly might be utterly 
contemptible. This contrasts with our shared condemnation of all Nazi 
genocidal activity. The attempt to connect these events produces extreme 
reactions (215n37, emphasis added). 
 
Here then, the impropriety of the metonymy “animal holocaust” discloses the sharing 
of community based upon the guilt of exclusion, and marked by a failure to witness 
that which cannot not be witnessed (this latter despite its euphemistic effacement in the 
concept of “meat,” an effacing figured by the sterile, plastic-wrapped tropes of flesh on 
supermarket shelves). In this, another sense of the phrasing “animal holocaust” is made 
manifest, its disconcealing power becoming evident when Primo Levi’s absence is 
articulated together with a dialogue between Jacques Derrida and Elisabeth 
Roudinesco entitled “Violence Against Animals.”  
In the midst of this latter dialogue, Roudinesco professes an attachment to 
“the idea of a certain division between the animal and the human” (72). This 
“attachment” is, I believe, exactly what Derrida attempts to interrupt when, 
immediately prior to this statement of attachment (in response to a question about the 
apparent “excess” of prohibitions against cruelty), he asks Roudinesco what she would 
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do if she “were actually placed every day before the spectacle of this industrial 
slaughter” (71). Roudinesco replies somewhat brusquely,  
 
I wouldn’t eat meat anymore, or I would live somewhere else. But I prefer 
not to see it, even though I know that this intolerable thing exists. I don’t 
think that the visibilility of a situation allows one to know it better. 
Knowing is not the same as looking (71).  
 
Derrida insists, however, that she consider the situation more deeply: 
 
But if, every day, there passed before your eyes, slowly, without giving you 
time to be distracted, a truck filled with calves leaving the stable on its way 
to the slaughterhouse, would you be unable to eat meat for a long time? 
(71) 
 
To which Roudinesco responds:  
 
I would move away. But really, sometimes I believe that, in order to 
understand a situation better and to have the necessary distance, it is best 
not to be an eyewitness to it (72). 
 
The point, of course, is that Roudinesco is already a witness, that it is not that she can 
choose not to witness, but rather that she can only choose not to be a witness to that 
which she cannot not witness—the sole form of guilt which, according to Levi, cannot 
be absolved. It is the guilt, in other words, of disavowal, of the refusal to bear witness 
to the trace which remains to interrupt every metaphysics, every oppressive structure 
of dependence-exclusion.  
What Derrida’s questioning in fact draws attention to is the refusal of a 
possible encounter through the conserving safety of a theoretical separation within the 
calculability of moral, economic, or religious discourse. One which serves to double 
the separation on the ontological level. In this way, contemptible socioeconomic 
practices becomes habitually—academically—denoted as “intolerable,” and which in 
so doing are thus rendered tolerable insofar as the unremarked guilt is neatly and 
conveniently assuaged. In other words, that which cannot not be witnessed is safely 
displaced onto the level of everyday facts. Indeed, there is nothing more factual and 
everyday than what for Roudinesco is the apparent “necessity for industrial 
organisation in raising and slaughtering animals” (71).  
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By contrast, as we have already seen in the discussion of Elizabeth Costello, 
intolerability is precisely an injunction—never a choice—which displaces this bodying 
outside of the everyday and into the impossibility of continuing to be, and which is at 
once the affirmation of, and attestation to, the encounter. That which cannot be 
tolerated, that deafening blare of silent music from the furthest proximity, is never the 
tolerable-intolerable, but rather the most undeniable and the most material, that which 
can be no longer missed and not yet mis-taken. 
 
 
Animal slavery and the guilt of humanism 
 
Finally in this chapter, we explore via the “unapologetic” humanism of Susan Buck-
Morss’s latest project, the relation—perhaps analogical—to that other improper 
metonymy or “dreaded comparison”: that of “animal slavery.”  
In Hegel, Haiti, and Universal History (2009), Buck-Morss asserts an 
“undeniable political experience of guilt that we humans feel when witnessing 
something deeply wrong with the principles that govern our everyday world” (83). 
Here again, the question clearly concerns the relation of guilt and bearing witness, a 
witnessing which happens to a body before any possibility of choice and which, while 
it can indeed be spoken about, it cannot, however, “be known” insofar as it contradicts 
the “official order.” The “truth,” writes Buck-Morss, while “available to conscious 
perception, is at the same time ‘disavowed’” (83). As a result, this “experience of 
guilt,” an experience which for Buck-Morss presupposes the existence of universal 
moral truths, potentially places an individual in conflict with its community, and as 
such “entails being a traitor to the collective that claims you (through nation or class, 
religion or race [and, I would add, through species])” (83).  
More than this, however, Buck-Morss claims that such “guilt has its source in 
the gap between reality and social fantasy, rather than between reality and individual 
fantasy. It can turn interpretative analysis into political critique by breaking the official 
silence that sanctions the wrong state of things” (83-4). Here, I argue, it is in fact the 
very espousal of an “unapologetically humanist project” of universal history (xi) which 
prevents Buck-Morss from engaging with the encounter which renders such guilt 
undisavowable—the guilt of humanism itself.  
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It is all too easy, Buck-Morss suggests, to share in the “moral outrage” over 
the way European Enlightenment philosophers responded to the ongoing systematic 
oppression that was slavery, and yet— 
 
we cannot deny that a comparable moral outrage is occurring at this 
moment, one that future generations will find just as deplorable (this is our 
moral hope), the fact that political collectives proclaim themselves 
champions of human rights and the rule of law and then deny these to a 
whole list of enemy exceptions, as if humanity itself were the monopoly of 
their own privileged members—their war a just war, their terrorist acts a 
moral duty, their death and destruction legitimated by reason, or progress, 
or the divine (149).  
 
As we have seen, Schmitt argues that the claim to a universal humanity is always a 
particularly brutal ruse of war, passing off a specific interest as universal. Indeed, the 
evocation of a universal concept is in a certain sense always a usurpation, given the 
impossibility of a presuppositionless position. What, for example, might be the criteria 
for identifying “humanity” without implying a whole determinate culture and, in this 
case, moving as it does via Hegel, an explicitly Christian culture? Irrespective of 
Buck-Morss’s attempts to evade its implication in focussing upon “the experience of 
historical rupture as a moment of clarity” (147), the claim to humanity is nonetheless 
always to proclaim inhumanity, and thus repeat inversely the denied humanity which 
the claim claims to reclaim. 
In other words, Buck-Morss misunderstands that humanism is only insofar as 
it sets up a limit between the human and the animal. Such is the demand for line-
drawing which humanism can never avoid, and which ever again founds that 
animalisation of the other which is the very condition for those political collectives she 
imagines her humanism will overcome, simply by its focus on the transitory. Without 
ever asking the question of the animal, Buck-Morss never questions the very conditions 
of humanism. As a result, and while she would no doubt refuse any claim to a universal 
(essentialist) race or gender, in positing a “new” humanism she in fact falls prey to that 
very thing for which she berates those Enlightenment philosophers. That is to say, to an 
absolute blindness to the slavery that literally exists all around her, and to the 
contradictions which remark our shared political guilt, a blindness which future, and 
indeed present, generations “will find just as deplorable” (although it is not a hope I 
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would define as moral). The irony of Buck-Morss’s “unapologetically humanist 










Previously, we encountered Nietzsche’s insistence that any way of being that is cut off 
from, or that cuts itself off from, all radically other ways of being can only de-generate, 
insofar as it thus excludes itself from that which reserves the possibility of its own 
regeneration. Throughout this chapter, and in one form or another, I aim to read this 
claim again and again with the hope of gaining a deeper insight into what I am calling a 
“community beyond the human.” With this in mind, I explore in the first sections the 
important notion of the promise as it is found in Nietzsche’s On the Genealogy of 
Morals (1887). In this, I argue that, for Nietzsche, to become animal, that is, to become 
an animal with the right to make promises, and with the right to constitute the future 
therefore, is to become a futural being beyond “the human,” an out-living in and as an 
animal encounter which, moreover, is always already shared with other animals.  
Recalling too the necessity of giving death—and thus both finitude and 
nonsubstitutabilty—to nonhuman animals, this will lead in the final section to a 
consideration of the centrality of death, and of finite negativity, to any thinking of a 
community beyond the human. Further engaging with texts by Jean-Luc Nancy and 
Maurice Blanchot, I attempt thus to approach that which Georges Bataille famously 
calls the “community of those who have no community”—that of an impossible 
community which marks an ineffaceable rupture within those paranoid theatres of 
death whose sole hysterical demand is the a priori absence of life. 
From our earlier reading of Nietzsche’s “On Truth and Lie,” we recall that, in 
marking the originary porosity of being-with—this sharing of the proximal distance 
from the as such, and thus from each other and from the world—, a division is 
inscribed in and as language. Such is the division of finite beings imposed by a touch in 
which no limit, no separation, can be discerned, but rather only and habitually imposed. 
Responsible conduct for Nietzsche is thus the affirmation in the face of blind universals 
of that responsive touching–being-touched which, exceeding the transcendental, 
remains always to come—that is to say, is always unheard-of and yet already 
forbidden. We recall too that the Nietzschean individual neither lives nor exists, but 
228 
 
rather “is” only that which exceeds every determinable form, which out-lives [über-
leben]: an overhuman demand which, still to come, thus withdraws from all recognition 
in and as a silent announcing which necessarily out-lives any enclosure of the properly 
“human.” As a result, responsible, affirmative (the two terms being synonymous) 
conduct is always a conducting towards the other, an abyssal mark and remark of 
being-in-common which, in a creative forgetting of being, holds the place of the 
impossible encounter in which something comes to be that which it is as such.  
In following Nietzsche therefore, an originary being-with shared by all living 
beings prior to any making of sense is disclosed (albeit without, however, ever being 
able to draw a simple line between “living” and “non-living”). In short, being-with—
the pure potentiality of being as such—bears its withdrawal in and as tropes marking a 
shared finitude. In this double movement of in and as—this double distancing that is at 
once the repeatability of language and the singularity of being-there—each is divided 
from, and shared with, every other.  
Moreover, inasmuch as such ways of being in language—differential ways of 
being-with, of being-together as always already related in difference—can never be 
securely delimited, the spacing of ethical encounters which, in (re)inventing the new, 
constitute unrecognisable phrasings is thus reserved. Such phrasings, we recall, which 
only retain their inaugurating intensity insofar as they both no longer and not yet make 
sense, are no longer and not yet parodic. In opposition to the dominant legislation of 
value, and thus against the Law, such a phrasing manifests itself as a singular being, an 
individual animal. That is, as an (out)living being refusing to recognise the sense of the 
Law which functions to exclude the sense of its being and, who or which, in coming to 
being, thus betrays the map of its site of exclusion.  
And yet, we must recall too from the first chapter that, according to Maurice 
Blanchot at least, “community” is nonetheless always and only human, inasmuch as 
becoming-human is the necessary condition of both community and communication 
(and if these terms are ever distinct). Finitude, writes Blanchot, is the distance that 
separates but which also prevents separation. Indeed. And yet, without death—undying 
and thus “merely” existing—nonhuman animals can be neither separate nor can their 
separation be prevented. Put in this way, one begins to wonder if perhaps these 
ontologically opposed ways of being are not in fact indistinguishable. For Blanchot, as 
we know, this vertiginous proximal distancing serves to displace nonhuman animals, 
negatively defined as the excluded who cannot be excluded. By contrast, I would 
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suggest that this uncanny reciprocity in fact describes a community of those who share 
the incapacity to share. In this way, Blanchot thus recalls us to a being-in-common 
which is at once prior to, and interruptive of, any “community service” and, indeed, of 
any working (in the sense given to the term by Nancy). This is, in short, the sharing of 
an impossible promise, which returns us once more to the Nietzschean überanimal. 
 
 
Prehistorical mnemotechnics and the community of animals 
 
First of all, in the second essay of The Genealogy of Morals, Nietzsche does not, as is 
often taken to be the case, define “Man” as the animal who promises. Being human, in 
other words, is not simply to be an animal with the additional ability to promise. 
Rather, writes Nietzsche, “To breed an animal with the right to make promises—is not 
this the paradoxical task that nature has set itself in the case of man?” (II:1, latter 
emphases mine). Such a task—a task, moreover, which remains outstanding—is not 
paradoxical insofar as it juxtaposes animal + promise, but rather because it identifies 
promise with right. In other words, the entire history of humankind, of “culture” 
traditionally conceived, is reducible to the preparation by “nature” (and recalling here 
Nietzsche’s ambivalent deconstruction of the nature-culture binary) for the coming of 
the animal, of the “emancipated individual,” who not merely promises, but rather 
possesses the “actual right to make promises.”  
The ability to promise is thus not a property which marks out the human, but 
is rather that which marks “the human” as simply a prehistoric breeding project. Such 
is a production and a labour which, even if we imagine ourselves placed “at the end of 
this tremendous process” (and Nietzsche makes sure to mark that “if”), by no means 
marks its completion, the being with this right still not yet having arrived in the present. 
“Man” is the prehistory of this right, and thus, so long as there is “Man,” the task 
remains outstanding. How then, is this task to be done with, so as not to render “us” 
eternal dyspeptics?  
This tremendous prehistory, perhaps “to a large extent” complete, that is, if 
“we” are at its end or are its end (and recalling too that the addressees of Nietzsche’s 
texts were always “the posthumous ones”), is, writes Nietzsche, the development of an 
“active desire” not to forget. This desire is in direct contrast to the strong force that is at 
once active forgetfulness and repression and which, permitting a being “to remain 
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undisturbed by the noise and struggle of our underworld of utility organs,” 
simultaneously constitutes the “present” and “makes room” for the new. In short, the 
entire prehistory that is “Man” is the opposing desire “not to rid oneself, a desire for the 
continuance of something desired once, a real memory of the will” and thus, with the “I 
shall,” the memory of the future (II:1).  
Here, it should be noted, such a “willing” is not a “real” willing—“there is no 
will,” as Nietzsche writes in The Will to Power, but rather only precision or oscillation 
(§46), only quanta of force (Genealogy, I:13)—, but rather a real memory of the will, a 
memory which, as with every memory, is habitually untrue, that is, a fiction or a fable. 
With this fiction of the will, we are thus recalled to Nietzsche’s famous assertion that 
“‘the doer’ is merely a fiction added to the deed” (I:13). For Nietzsche then, there is no 
“subject,” whether “substratum” or “soul,” which is in fact simply a result of “the 
misleading influence of language” (I:13). Consequently, it becomes necessary to 
rethink, and to revalue, what Nietzsche might mean when he writes of an 
“emancipated” and “sovereign” individual.  
The opposing desire, the death-drive to remember, to repeat, is the pre-
condition of history, of the emancipated individual with the right to make promises 
who, perhaps even now at the end of the process, is yet to come, yet to completely 
arrive in the present constituted by forgetting. Repetition, in short, is thus the 
precondition of the new, of the animal with the right to promise. The human is this 
precondition, moreover, only because the way of being human is memory, is 
mnemotechnics. That is to say, the ability “in general [to] be able to calculate and 
compute,” the development of which there is “perhaps … nothing more fearful and 
uncanny in the whole prehistory of man [i.e., in the prehistory that is man]” (II:3). 
Fearful and uncanny it may be, but the task of breeding an animal with the right to 
make promises, that is, of an animal whose way of being consists of the “right to affirm 
oneself” and thus the capacity to rightfully “stand security for his [sic] own future,” 
nevertheless necessarily “embraces and presupposes … that one first makes men to a 
certain degree necessary, uniform, like among like, regular, and consequently 
calculable” (II:3). Hence, with the aid of morality and a “social straitjacket,” “Man” is 
thus produced.  
Indeed, Nietzsche continues, all the solemnity and seriousness of “man” is 
merely a holdover of “the terror that formerly attended all promises, pledges, and 
vows,” merely the gloomy stain of a prehistory which, insofar as it is necessarily that 
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which “we humans” as humans can never move beyond, is therefore “still effective” 
(II:3).  
This development of the memory is thus a prehistoric preface, an overcoming 
of forgetfulness in imposing the “demands of social existence as present realities” 
(II:3) on the way to the emancipated individual. A mere preliminary to the coming of 
an out- or over-animal whose right to make promises is the liberation from custom and 
morality, and which, no longer prefatory, is thus free to make history. The übermensch 
then, as we saw in the reading of “On Truth and Lie,” is this animal movement beyond 
“the human.” An overcoming of habit and convention held, and held to, by the memory 
of the (imaginary) will, moving thus beyond the Platonic virtues of immutability, 
beyond the “vast overrating” of the “virtue” of conviction (Human, All Too Human, 
§629).  
One thinks here of Zarathustra’s famous metaphor of “Man” as the rope 
between “animal” and “overhuman” (“Prologue,” 4). The rope in this reading is thus 
the memory of the will, of a mnemotechnics which, forever linking the singular body to 
the possibility of invention, forgets to forget in the compulsive desire to repeat. This 
figure does not, however, mark a dialectical humanist tēlos resulting in a superhuman 
sublation, that is, in the negation of the negation of the animal. While Nietzsche is 
indeed concerned with the specific mnemotechnicity which marks the way of being-
human, this is by no means to refuse to nonhuman animals other ways of being-
mnemotechnical. Rather, as we have seen with Nietzsche’s gnat metaphysician, they 
too are similarly doubly-displaced in metaphor, and thus “in” memory:  
 
The whole organic world is the weaving together of beings, each with their 
little imaginary world around themselves: their force, their lust, their habits 
are found in their experiences, projected as their outside world. The ability 
[Fähigkeit] for creation (formation, invention, imagination) is their 
fundamental capacity: of themselves, these beings have, of course, likewise 
[my emphasis] only an erroneous, imaginary, simplified representation. “A 
being with the habit of ordering in dreaming”—that is a living being. 
Immense amounts of such habits have finally become so solid, that species 
live in accordance with these orders (Nietzsche Kritische Studienausgabe, 
11:34; cit. Lemm, 25).  
 
The metaphor of “the animal” must thus be understood as a figure of the impossible 
state of being prior to mnemotechnics, that is, of being prior to habit by which a being 
comes to be. By contrast, “the human” is the privileged figure of the anoriginal 
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sedimentation of language, of the taking place which has always already taken place. 
Hence, neither “Animal” nor “Man” has the right to make promises. Moreover, in 
relation to the specific question under consideration here—that of the community 
beyond the human—what might be called “the community of animals” is thus a 
network of pure singularities prior to any determination, and thus prior to any 
“community” in the sense of the habitually imposed demands of social existence. “The 
animal” refers not to living beings therefore, but is rather a figure of that which can 
precisely take no figure, the taking place which withdraws in always already having 




Traitor to Humanity, Universally: Nietzsche 
 
The outliving of “the human,” that is, of habit, the inability not to forget, concerns, as 
we have seen, the right to promise on the one hand, and the “one” whose task of 
breeding this is, on the other. To begin with, the right to promise demands that the 
promise, insofar as it is a promise, takes time. Hence, it must not be given lightly, but 
rather “reluctantly, rarely, slowly,” as its time to come requires the sufficient strength 
to maintain its coming into being come what may, that is, “in the face of accidents, 
even ‘in the face of fate’” (II:2). The right to make promises, in short, demands an 
unwavering fidelity to that which remains to come, and which Nietzsche describes as 
“the extraordinary privilege of responsibility” (II:2).118  
Paradoxically, however, such a promise, such responsibility must, as we shall 
see, already be a betrayal, its nobility that of the traitor and its responsibility that of the 
capricious wanderer. The right to make promises, in other words, demands that the 
promise must be betrayed, and thus we must all be traitors to humanity, or rather, to its 
concept or, even better, its figure. The Law of humanity then, must be broken—this is 
the law before the Law. And yet, how might this überhuman right to promise which is 
the betrayal of that promise be understood?  
For this, the final chapter of Avital Ronell’s The Test Drive (2005) in which 
she discusses the Nietzsche-Wagner break-up proves invaluable. As Ronell makes 
                                                           
118
 Nietzschean mutability, as a result, thus contrasts with the calculable innovation of 
speculative capital, as we will see in the final chapter. 
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clear, to promise is, like the positing of universals, to be blinded by, and blind to, an 
excessive obligation, that is, “to an oppression that locks in the future: [thus] the 
promise portends madness” (312). In other words, and as Nietzsche suggests in section 
629 of Human, All Too Human, the structural excess of the promise is thus the madness 
of fidelity which, insofar as it is blind to the tragedy of finitude—to “the face of fate”—
in fact serves to render every promise conditional. The non-sense of the promise, the 
insensé of unconditionality, is in this way withdrawn in its actualisation: the excessive, 
gruesome night of its taking place always already effaced by the sober light of day of 
its having taken place.  
In one sense then, as Ronell writes, “Nietzsche sets up the promise in such a 
way as to let us escape its imperial purchase” (The Test Drive, 312). On the other hand, 
however, the right to make promises can, by contrast, only be the strength to face 
finitude, to face the face of fate—not as its master or in some Heideggerian sense of an 
authentic appropriation of being-towards-death, but in remaining faithful to the 
maddening displacement of its demand from the other. To face both the unconditional 
and the inadequacy of every response is, in other words, a responsibility to the infinite 
excess that is the unconditional, and which can thus only betray itself.119 
However, in order to understand why the right to make promises must break 
with the memory of the impossible will, in that the prehistoricity of the latter is 
overcome by the former’s inauguration of history, two things need to be noted. Firstly, 
that every utterance, that is, every making of sense, is already a promise, and thus 
always sundered by the excess of its demand. As Derrida writes,  
 
The performative of this promise is not one speech act among others. It is 
implied by any other performative, and this promise heralds the uniqueness 
of language to come. It is the “there must be a language” …, “I promise a 
language,” “a language is promised,” which at once precedes all language, 
summons all speech and already belongs to each language as it does to all 
speech (Monolingualism, 67).  
 
Here then, we see that the structural excess of the promise renders explicit the 
movement of sense already explored in the earlier reading of Nietzsche: the infinite 
promise is the taking place of language which has always already withdrawn in its 
finite having taken place. Secondly, this constitutive “in difference with itself” ensures 
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 On this, see Ansell Pearson’s excellent Viroid Life: Perspectives on Nietzsche and the 
Transhuman Condition (London & New York: Routledge, 1997), 27-8. 
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that “the fatal precipitation of the promise must be dissociated from the values of the 
will, intention, or meaning-to-say that are reasonably attached to it” (67). In fact, the 
ubiquity of the promise and its dissociation from the will are indissociable, insofar as 
the taking place of the mark necessarily exceeds every semantic intention. This is not to 
say that every such mark, as Werner Hamacher makes clear, is “thereby disburdened of 
its semantic gravitation” (“Lectio,” 196). Rather, “[n]o text has the power to exclude 
the possibility that it says the truth, or at least something true; but no text can guarantee 
this truth because every attempt to secure it must proliferate the indeterminacy of its 
meaning” (196). In other words, every promise—as an act of will—inevitably exceeds 
its own performance, making of it necessarily a mis-promise. 
We can now better understand Ronell’s assertion that for Nietzsche the 
promise necessarily “entails the act of versprechen, which means both mis-speaking 
and promising” (Test Drive, 312). More than this, however, it follows that the 
emancipated individual, the animal with the right to make promises, is thus a being 
with the right to mis-mark, that is, to rightfully mark improperly, to revalue, in contrast 
to the simple mis-speaking of those “feeble windbags who promise without the right to 
so do” (Nietzsche Genealogy, II:2).  
Moreover, the Nietzschean “individual”—that which, as we have seen, 
outlives itself in improperly remarking the unheard-of and yet already forbidden—is 
“emancipated” only in relation to the limit imposed upon what counts, what makes 
sense, within a given state of affairs. The sovereignty of the individual is, in short, 
always posthumous, insofar as it out-lives all recognised sense and thus value. The 
right to make promises therefore demands a response and a responsibility to betray 
every custom and every moral, to be a traitor to every firmly held belief.  
Such a right, moreover, entails the strength to remain faithful to this 
nomadism, to the vigilance of this wandering, which is to remain loyal and response-
able to the being-in-common. That is, to the community of others which we share and 
which shares us in the not-being-able to share, in not-being-able to fuse the more-than-
one in One. In and as the memory of the “I shall” which already congeals into habit and 
thus refuses forgetting, and which constitutes our being-shared in and across language, 
the willing subject shatters in its being already exposed in-common. Such a 
community, in other words, of traitors who affirm and betray in common. As we have 
seen, hospitality is exactly this: an affirmation which interrupts every social convention 
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and every duty to the socius, an unrecognisable, incalculable decision without 
sovereignty whose every actualisation betrays hospitality as such. 
This has profound consequences for a reading of Nietzsche’s “animal with the 
right to make promises” as the completion of prehistory in the coming to be of the 
human, or even of the superhuman. If the right to make promises promises at the same 
time to make history, then the strength to hold faithfully to an unending betrayal of the 
dominant rule becomes the rule: this is the individual’s promise and right to break 
every promise, every contract, every calculation.  
 
No – there is no law, no obligation of that kind; we must becomes traitors, 
act unfaithfully, forsake our ideals again and again. We do not pass from 
one period of life to another without causing these pains of betrayal, and 
without suffering from them in turn (Human, All Too Human, §261). 
 
If the right to make promises overcomes or outlives the prehistory that is at one and the 
same time “the human” and the development of a phantasmatic memory of the will, 
then this promise that is humanity must in its turn be overcome, must be broken. As 
animals, we must overcome the memory which prepares for, without arriving, the 
appearance of universal “humanity.” Such is the demand and a promise which calls 
forth a common betrayal of “humanity” or, rather, of its concept.  
The law of humanity, of its memory of the will which produces the uniform 
calculable subject is that which, in other words, must be broken in a being-common 
and a being-in-common of singularities. As Ronell writes, if we are to pass to another 
stage of life, “our relation to the promise needs to be a broken one. The promise can be 
counted on only to enforce its breakability” (The Test Drive, 313). Moreover, she 
continues, referring to the above citation from Human, All Too Human, the diacritical 
mark following the initial negation “can be read as an absence of a link, operating 
simultaneously as severance and connector: No, dash, there is no law. In a place where 
no law is asserted to stand, he posits law” (313). To outlive the human, for Nietzsche, 
is thus to betray humanity, to cease to be human in becoming otherwise. Only here do 
we at last approach the completion, the ends, of “the human.” Only in this way will the 
community beyond the human, a community shared by all living beings (which is not 
to say “living” organisms), have arrived: a community of the impossible perhaps 
which only comes to be with every other animal, a community whose chance of 
becoming inheres in its being exposed and disposed with others.  
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The extended consideration of the “human community” in this part sheds 
further light upon what Derrida describes as “democracy to-come [a-venir].” In 
deconstructing “the essential link of a certain concept of democracy to autochthony 
and to eugenics” (Politics of Friendship, 110n25), such a thinking, Derrida writes, thus 
excludes it from the phantasm or fiction of a genealogical tie which is always only ever 
“posed, constructed, induced, [which] always implies a symbolic effect of discourse” 
(93). In so doing, it “confide[s] it to or open[s] it to another memory, another 
immemoriality, another history, another future” (111n25). To exclude community from 
the fiction of immanence and immunity, from the appeal to birth, to nature, to nation, 
and to universal humanity, is thus to move beyond the human, and thus beyond the bad 
dream of “a determined politics” (93). 
In contrast to an all too common ressentiment which says No to what is 
“outside,” to what is “different,” the opening to another memory and another 
immemorality calls to a community that can only ever be posthumous, the mark of 
which “is” to suffer the agonies of outliving. Thus, writes Nietzsche, “the more a 
present-day individual determines the future, the more he will suffer” (Will to Power, 
§686). To outlive our walking ghosts, to live on in the tragedy of our shared finitude 
and thus to refuse the living death of zombie slaves, “I” must therefore “die several 
times while still alive” (Ecce Homo, §5 on Zarathustra). Loyalty and responsibility 
demands that, as living beings, we must always again turn against the self-
congratulatory “purity” of ressentiment. Must always again turn against the suicidal 
machines of immanent-immunity which, having cut itself off from itself in cutting itself 
off from all radically other ways of being, can thus only ever turn against itself, can 
only extirpate itself. This latter, as we have seen, necessarily degenerates, having 
excluded itself from that which reserves the possibility of its regeneration: such is the 
compulsive suiciding of gated, bounded communities.  
In the end then, it is no surprise that, in a no longer extant preface to The 
Twilight of the Idols, Nietzsche affirms that “the individual”—this being with the right 
to promise—is recognised, marked out, by a creative relation to nonhuman others: 
“His love of animals—men have always recognised the solitary by means of this trait” 






Meeting Our Solitude: Making Friends 
 
In contrast to the bad dream of a determined politics then, such a posthumous 
community is, in common with the human being, a singular bodying which is neither 
nameable nor substantial. It is, in short, undetermined. To name a community, for 
example, is necessarily to determine a community in opposition to another, and it is for 
this reason that Alain Badiou calls the community and the collective “the unnameables 
of political truth,” insofar as “every attempt ‘politically’ to name a community induces 
a disastrous Evil … to force the naming of the unnameable. Such, exactly, is the 
principle of disaster” (Ethics, 86).120 Hence, an infinite community—that is, being as 
such—can neither be, nor be named, but rather, inasmuch as it is beyond completion 
and incompletion, can only and always have already withdrawn. A withdrawal which 
is, moreover, its demand. As Maurice Blanchot writes, 
 
There it is: something had taken place which, for a few moments and due to 
the misunderstandings peculiar to singular existences, gave permission to 
recognise the possibility of a community established previously though at 
the same time already posthumous: nothing of it would remain, which 
saddened the heart while also exalting it, like the very ordeal of effacement 
writing demands (The Unavowable Community, 21). 
 
While it is indeed the case that nothing of this community would remain, at the same 
time, however, the trace of this community remains. It is its demand, in other words, 
which remains, that of “the very ordeal of effacement” imposed by writing by the 
taking place of spacing having always already taken place. Demanding a response, 
demanding responsibility, its withdrawal is nothing less than an injunction of 
existence: the imperative to give place to, and to be given place by, that which is 
refused sense within a given “community affect.” Such is the place out of place of a 
shared commonality, understood as sharing in the politicisation of the individual 
ethical demand.  
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Sharing comes down to this: what community reveals to me … is my 
existence outside myself. Which does not mean my existence reinvested in 
or by community, as if community were another subject that would sublate 
me, in a dialectical or communal mode. Community does not sublate the 
finitude it exposes. Community itself, in sum, is nothing but this exposition. 
It is the community of finite beings, and as such it is itself a finite 
community. In other words, not a limited community as opposed to an 
infinite or absolute community, but a community of finitude, because 
finitude “is” communitarian, and because finitude alone is communitarian 
(Nancy The Inoperative Community, 26-7). 
 
Given death, a giving finitude, nonhuman animals must thus take part, ek-sist, only in 
exposing themselves in and as this community of finitude. Community “is” the sharing 
that is being as such, without memory and without forgetting, beyond completion and 
incompletion. As we learned in chapter three, its ethical injunction interpellates other 
beings who come to be in sharing the disorientating call of its encounter which, only 
insofar as it remains unnameable, that is, only insofar as it no longer and not yet makes 
sense, resonates in the clothes of an improper phrasing. Thus is constituted a 
nonreactive affirmative micropolitics which, tracing a community to come, opens a 
potential emergent trajectory of escape that is the redoubled space of respond-ability: 
the excessive recursivity between concept and singular experience, between the 
deafness of a given state of affairs and the inaudible clamour of infinite community.  
In summary then, “community”—infinite ethos, unconditional hospitality—is 
that which must withdraw in the opening of the finite space of politics. In withdrawing, 
its trace of displacement composes the senseless ethical demand, calling forth the 
placeholding phrasing that is political nomination, a nomination which presupposes 
neither identity, nor substance, nor proper meaning.121 
Here, we at last approach the sense of “community beyond the human,” of a 
community of finite beings always already beyond “the human.” Such a community 
affirms itself only in its withdrawal in and as the political, and in so doing it interrupts 
the phantasmatic effect of every genealogical tie and silences the everyday mis-
speaking of those “feeble windbags who promise without the right to so do” 
(Nietzsche Genealogy, II:2). It is community which, in withdrawing, “is” the distance 
that separates, or rather spaces—i.e. finitude, or the shared incapacity to share—but 
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which also prevents separation in the trace of its withdrawal, marking the irreducible 
porosity that is exposition. It is this which gives us to understand the Nietzschean 
community of solitary friends as an announcing of those who, as Derrida writes, 
 
love in separation. The invitation comes to you from those who can love 
only at a distance, in separation [qui n’aiment qu’à se séparer au loin]. 
This is not all they love, but they love; they love lovence, they love to 
love—in love or in friendship—providing there is this withdrawal. Those 
who love only in cutting ties are the uncompromising friends of solitary 
singularity. They invite you to enter into this community of social 
disaggregation [déliaison]’ (Politics of Friendship, 35-6). 
 
We are now in a position to define this “community without limit” as an infinite 
commonality of singularities which shares and in which is shared all finite living 
beings. Hence, to affirm the community of separation, of withdrawal, is to love 
without limit in the greatest possible proximity: that is, in sharing the inability to share, 
in sharing an unbridgeable displacement from immanence, in sharing the withdrawal 
of community, in sharing the demand of an impossible hospitality, and in sharing the 
ethical demand which opens the space of the political.  
Such a community of separation thus stands in direct contrast to the exclusion 
by which the man of ressentiment figures the other as “evil” and thence himself as 
“good,” a division which, insofar as it depends upon exclusion, necessarily de-
generates. Rather, it is only in the withdrawal of community that can be found, in 
Blanchot’s words, “the friendship that discovers the unknown we ourselves are, and 
the meeting of our own solitude which, precisely, we cannot be alone to experience 
(‘incapable, by myself alone, of going to the limits of the extreme’)” (The Unavowable 
Community, 25). Only in this way might “crimes against the human status” become 
impossible, having rendered inoperative, unworking, the greasy workings of the 
brutalising machineries of animalisation which serve to render “brutes” on both sides 
of the imaginary division.  
Betrayal then, is the very condition of community, and thus paradoxically of 
vigilance, responsibility, and loyalty. A betrayal which, exemplified by Kafka’s 
Investigator, takes the figure of a nomadic animal, of a lone wanderer ever seeking 
community and commonality. Such is the futural being who or which bears the 
strength to outlive “the human.” Such fidelity, I propose, must hold itself to a giving 
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finitude which, in bearing witness, responds to the nonsubstitutable deaths of living 
beings in re-marking the shared proximal distance that is being-with. 
So it is that here too we find the disjunctive space of the phrasing “animal 
holocaust”: for friends of a community beyond the human, there can be neither death 
camp nor slaughterhouse, and it is to the slaughterhouse, to the degenerate basement of 
capitalism, which we turn in the final chapter. There, I will further explore the notion 
of the promise and mutability, revisiting along the way various arguments from earlier 
chapters, in considering the increasing centrality of biotechnology to so-called “post-
Fordist” capitalism.  
By way of yet another reading of “animal holocaust,” here recapitulated in the 
short form of a fable, let us conclude this part however, although still in the context of 
both the slaughterhouse and the laboratory, by briefly recalling Bobby. Bobby was the 
name given to the dog who recognised, despite the enforced degradation which marked 
so-called “life” in the camps, the “humanness” of a group of Jewish POWs in Nazi 
Germany, a group which included philosopher Emmanuel Levinas among their 
number. The “free” men who gave the orders, as well as the children and women who 
passed by and sometimes raised their eyes, recalls Levinas, “stripped us of our human 
skin,” that is to say, stripped them of their recognisable human status, thus rendering 
them “subhuman, a gang of apes” (“Name of a Dog,” 48). Bobby—the “last Kantian in 
Nazi Germany” who, “unable to universalise maxims and drives” and thus no Kantian 
at all—was not fooled however: “For him, there was no doubt that we were men” (49).  
In the holocaust of animalisation, therefore, in which the skin is stripped both 
metaphorically and literally from the bodies of Jews, only this singular way of being-
dog amid the determined territory and determining theatre of war, only this 
nonsubstitutable dog to whom these men give the proper name “Bobby,” could, in the 






Part Five: Bio/Capital 
 
10. Capital After Life and Life After Capital 
Transhumanism, Posthumanism, and the Pharmacology of the Promise 
 
 
Sadism is about the structure of scientific vision, in which the body 
becomes a rhetoric, a “persuasive” language linked to social practice.  






In The Jungle (1906), a novelistic exposé of exploitative working practices in the 
Chicago stockyards at the beginning of the twentieth century, Upton Sinclair describes 
the industrialisation of “meat” as “the spirit of Capitalism made flesh” (376-7). A 
century later, however, it would be more accurate to say that the spirit of Capitalism 
promises to transcend all flesh, even as animal bodies are exploited and consumed 
ever more intensely. This shift within agribusiness is in fact symptomatic of the much 
broader transformation undergone by capitalism in recent decades. A shift which is at 
once both discontinuous with, and yet dependent upon, the industrial capitalism it 
nonetheless claims to leave behind.  
In particular, the shifting site of the slaughterhouse (which I am using here as 
a general term to refer to the large disassembly factories in which living nonhuman 
animals are killed, disarticulated, and transformed into “meat,” be that as “cuts,” offal, 
pastes, etc., and other component parts such as skin, eyes, teeth, hair, and bone, as well 
as into “by-products” such as glue, gelatine, fertiliser, and so on) offers a particularly 
compelling example of both the discontinuity of “postindustrial” capitalism as well as 
its continuing dependence upon an increasingly marginalised industrial underbelly. 
One immediate way to perceive this is through the changing ways the slaughterhouse 
in the West is framed for, and consumed by, the public gaze. In Sinclair’s day, 
slaughterhouses offered popular tours in which a “visceral, affective response … [was] 
arguably integral to the spectacle of slaughter” (Shukin Animal Capital, 95). Should an 
American “socialist whistleblower” publish such a book today, however, she might 
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well, as a result of the USA PATRIOT ACT (2001) and its successors, end up having 
to defend herself in court against a charge of domestic terrorism. While I will return to 
this shortly, for the moment I just want to suggest that “new” postindustrial capital 
intersects with the “old” industrial capital most explicitly in the penetration of animal 
bodies—human as well as nonhuman. 
Prophetically defined by Marx as “the abolition of the capitalist mode of 
production within the capitalist mode of production itself” (Capital, III:569), the 
contemporary transformation of capitalism has since been marked in a variety of 
ways—as the movement from Fordism to post-Fordism, from disciplinary societies to 
societies of control, from national industries to trans- and multinational corporations, 
from commodity capital to “fictitious” or speculative capital, from geophysical 
colonialism to economic neocolonialism, and from petrochemical to biospheric modes 
of accumulation. To this list I would also add the movement from stockyards and 
packingtowns to factory farms and so-called “pharm” animals, of which a transgenic 
sheep named Polly, albeit less famous than her kin Dolly, is still the best-known 
example. Finally, as we will see, this historical shift is also a shift in the conception of 
time itself. 
A less immediate, but perhaps more significant way of tracing this shift is 
through the transformed notion of reproduction itself. It is, of course, by no means 
incidental that control over the reproduction of bodies—of nonhuman animals, of 
human and nonhuman workers, and of capital itself—finds one of its most contentious 
sites in the female gendered body of the nonhuman animal. It is here, for example, that 
we find the figure of Dolly, the first cloned sheep who, born in June 1996, was 
scientifically “fathered” by human males by way of her “parent” company PPL 
therapeutics. As we will see, Dolly’s emergence similarly marks the transformation of 
capitalist relations as well as their continuing dependence upon the industrial mode of 
production. On the one hand, one of the aims of the Dolly “experiment” was to show 
that her “natural” (i.e., germinal) ability to reproduce could be bypassed in favour of a 
more efficient (i.e., patriarchal) means of reproduction. Indeed, it is here that cloning 
crosses most clearly with slavery insofar, as Sarah Franklin notes, they share “this 
recognition of the shame and disempowerment that occasions the loss of reproductive 
power” (“Dolly’s Body,” 355). On the other hand, however, it remains essential that 
Dolly should continue to produce spring lambs who are perceived as “natural” in every 
sense, thus serving, inter alia, to ensure that cloning would not thereby deny 
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postindustrial capitalism of its slaughterhouses. Furthermore, it is here, inscribed in the 
consumable flesh of Dolly’s offspring, that I locate the danger of an incomplete or, 
rather, a stalled deconstruction of the nature-culture dichotomy—a deconstruction 
traced throughout this thesis as quite literally the “grounding” question of “the 
animal.” 
The “post” of post-industrialism or post-Fordism is thus in a strict sense a 
misnomer, yet it remains a very productive one insofar as it further marginalises 
contemporaneous industrial modes of production as therefore “primitive” or 
“backward.” This, I suggest, is experienced most clearly by those who find themselves 
ground under the wheels of agribusiness “wet work.” Indeed, the biotechnological 
revolution—the flagship of postindustrial capitalism—both demands and effaces an 
ever increasing exploitation, alienation, and consumption of both factory workers and 
factory animals. Moreover, in the process, the distinction between the two becomes 
increasingly blurred.  
At the same time, however, the transformation marked by the “post” is in 
another sense absolutely discontinuous with industrial production, a sense which must 
be understood as a shift from the conditioned to the unconditioned. A shift, that is to 
say, from a determined linear temporality (exemplified somewhat ironically by the 
slaughterhouse disassembly line) to an undetermined, pharmacological movement of 
reversibility and “recapacitation.” By “pharmacological,” I am here following both 
Derrida and Bernard Stiegler to denote that which structurally reserves for itself the 
function of both remedy and poison at once. The pharmacological, therefore, is always 
already both promise and threat. Here, it will be shown, this rupturing of linear 
determinism not only interrupts traditional notions of patriarchy and genealogical 
descent with the promise of a material “transhuman” immortality, but also interrupts 
any possible recourse to the all too familiar response-reaction dichotomy so often 
employed to exclude nonhuman animals.  
This is not to say, however, that postindustrial “biocapitalism” is therefore 
more responsive as far as actual, nonsubstitutable nonhuman animals are concerned. 
Rather, we find instead that “the animal” is once again represented—albeit in a 
transformed and indeed, patentable sense—as both pathic and undying, and thus 
excluded from the shared concerns of finitude. This results from the fact that the 
promise of biotechnology remains dependent upon a rhetoric of genetic determinism, 
both for its moral justification and in order to efface the threat of its necessary 
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indeterminism. Nevertheless, what Dolly demonstrates is precisely the impossibility of 
biological determinism insofar as, at both the cellular and the organismic level, she 
interrupts, and even reverses, the arrow of time in what is, I argue, a writing of and on 
the body, and which as such is necessarily subject to dissemination. It is this which 
allows us to better engage with Stiegler’s ongoing attempt to reinstall a secure human-
animal distinction through an exploration of the notion of “life always already freed 
from life.” Here, I will argue that, insofar as human psychotechnics cannot in fact be 
separated from what Stiegler calls “animal vigilance,” this necessarily renders 
inoperative the very human-animal distinction which serves to ground Stiegler’s 
promise of a technical remedy to the poison of technology. 
By virtue of a reworked notion of Stiegler’s core concept of 
“epiphylogenesis,” however, I will argue that the “new” science of biotechnology 
nonetheless produces new possibilities for interrupting the sadistic reduction of 
nonhuman animals to reactive machinery, as well as the very rhetoric of genetic 
determinism required for their biotechnological capitalisation in the first place. Finally, 
by way of the dispersed temporality of promissory capital, I will conclude this thesis 
by exploring the notion of biotechnology as a redoubled pharmakon of excessive 
mutability, allowing me in turn to draw together the various threads of my argument. 
Thus, on one hand excessive mutability provides the promised remedy of an immortal 
transhumanist assemblage and the poisonous threat of life-consuming zoonoses. On 
the other, however, it promises both a posthumanism of vigilant betrayal and at once 
threatens always to collapse into the poison of absolute nihilism. Moreover, these two 
positions are diametrically opposed: the remedy of Nietzschean betrayal is the poison 
of the transhuman, just as the transhuman curative is the poison of posthumanism. 
 
 
Marginalisation and the industrial underbelly 
 
In “Postscript on the Societies of Control” (1990), Gilles Deleuze, following Michel 
Foucault, offers a broad sketch of the key markers of the shift from “disciplinary 
societies” to “societies of control.” Whereas disciplinary societies, evidenced by the 
standardisation imposed by large-scale industry, institute a “capitalism of 
concentration, for production and for property,” societies of control rather constitute 
“essentially dispersive” circuits which are “continuous and without limit” (6). Thus, 
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writes Deleuze, in the disciplinary period, the enclosing of space and the Taylorist 
disciplining of time and motion finds its exemplary figures in the factory and the 
prison, whereas control societies by contrast are characterised by an open-ended 
rhizomatic network populated by “undulatory” orbiting subjects always in debt and 
dominated by corporations (6).122 
However, Deleuze is right to emphasise the fact that, in his analyses of the 
disciplinary societies which constitute the industrialising period of the eighteenth, 
nineteenth, and early twentieth-centuries, Foucault nevertheless insists on the uneven 
and gradual transition from one order to another. The emergence of disciplinary 
societies, in other words, constitutes but one historical epoch, both subsequent to, and 
overlapping with, earlier “societies of sovereignty,” and prior to, and overlapping with, 
the “societies of control” instituted following World War II. There is, therefore, no 
abrupt discontinuity of such epochs, but rather an always uneven topography of 
transition. Despite this, Deleuze nevertheless goes on to assert that, even while 
Foucault was writing, “a disciplinary society was what we already no longer were” (3). 
By contrast, the multiply-penetrated bodies of nonhuman animals serve today to 
explicitly demonstrate both the continuing overlap, and the mutual dependence of, the 
two later orders or modalities—an overlap that tends broadly to coalesce along the 
global North/South divide. The financialisation of postindustrial capitalism is, in short, 
both supported and constrained by an increasingly marginalised industrial mode of 
production. 
Industrial capitalism is itself characterised by two distinct yet continuous 
stages. Firstly, there is the large-scale division of labour that institutes manufacture 
and which, in the process, “mutilates the worker, turning him [sic] into a fragment of 
himself” (Marx Capital, I:482). In the place of specialised knowledge, in other words, 
all that is required of the worker is the endless automatic repetition of a single simple 
task. Secondly, industrial capitalism comes into being when, in addition to the division 
of labour, the application of machines for producing surplus value further reduce 
workers to mere “organs” in the service of “a productive mechanism” (457). In 
manufacture, labour was thus for the first time concentrated or assembled in one place 
at the same time as the workers themselves were disassembled or, better, disarticulated 
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in every sense. Thereafter, with the introduction of industrial machinery, workers were 
increasingly reduced to simple organic—yet infinitely reproducible and substitutable—
parts of the great machinery, both literal and symbolic, of capitalist reproduction. To 
this we can further add the institution of the assembly line in the Ford automobile 
factories of the early twentieth-century, which can be considered as an 
intensification—in the sense of both increased productivity and increased 
fragmentation and evisceration—of both of these processes, the product as well as the 
worker being rationalised and standardised.  
The fact that it was the slaughterhouse which, with its literal as well as figural 
fragmentation and evisceration, so fittingly provided the model for Fordism helps us to 
understand the co-constitutive reduction of human and nonhuman animals to “mere” 
organs. A co-constitution, that is to say, formed by their interpenetration as fragments 
of “merely” living flesh, and by their consumption for profit. This can be seen, for 
example, in the largely overlapping discourses supporting economic neocolonialism 
(as described below) on the one hand, and the exclusion of the foreign in the Same on 
the other (as explored in part four). Moreover, it is not by chance that it is within the 
windowless walls of Western slaughterhouses and “meat”-packing factories that, more 
than anywhere else today (or at least more explicitly, if that term can be used to refer 
to something systematically hidden), the apparently outmoded forms of a capitalism of 
enclosure are maintained right alongside, and meshing with, the most futural 
informatic and control networks, exemplified by both the transnational giants of 
agribusiness and the so-called “pharm” animals of biotechnology. In this way, while 
all the excesses of the industrial period are retained within the slaughterhouse, 
agribusiness production is nonetheless thoroughly postindustrial, depending as it does 
upon venture capital and stock market investment, rather than vice versa.  
This apparent contradiction of transition is perhaps most clearly evident in the 
neocolonialism underwriting so much of the so-called “Green Revolution.” Beginning 
in the 1960s, wealthy countries of the North used economic and legislative power to 
force farmers in poorer countries such as India, Argentina, Paraguay and Brazil to 
maximise acreage productivity by planting monoculture cash crops such as soybeans 
and corn for export (the former almost entirely used to feed “livestock” in the EU, 
China, and the US). This in turn required the importing of high-priced pesticides, 
herbicides, and chemical-based and petroleum-driven fertilisers from the North at the 
cost of a spiralling debt and dependency. Similarly, throughout the 1970s and beyond, 
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the US and the World Bank only offered loans to countries such as Mexico, Nicaragua 
and Costa Rica on the condition that huge areas of rainforest were to be cleared to 
provide grazing for “cattle.” Since the 1980s, however, as the Western markets for 
meat consumption began to decline as a result of health concerns, agribusiness 
behemoths such as Smithfield and Tyson have sought instead to open up new markets 
in developing countries, again with the help of the World Bank. This is achieved in 
part by framing notions of “development,” “progress,” and “modernity”—and by way 
of such terms as “nutrition,” “health,” “status,” “virility,” “need,” “demand,” and so 
forth—in terms of an increased consumption of animal protein.123 
All of this goes into the enormous “housings” of industrialised death and 
disarticulation which, masked and yet releasing the unmistakable odours of industrial 
pollutants, are invariably constructed on the outskirts of towns already devastated by 
poverty and racial tensions. In this way, the slaughterhouses of the ghettoised North 
continue to render explicit the contemporary wound of the West’s colonial past, 
highlighting its structural racism and—implicit or explicit—discourses of eugenics, as 
we will see in the later discussion concerning the apocalyptic rhetoric of a cross-
species pandemic. Indeed, I suggest that part of the reason for the movement from the 
spectacular guided tours of the slaughterhouses of Sinclair’s day to the blank walls, the 
accusatory rhetoric of sentimentality, and the guards whose explicit function is to 
block the public gaze, is in fact in order to conceal this remnant of something 
supposedly long past. Such a degree of concentration, enclosure and exploitation, in 
other words, is no longer considered acceptable in the “clean” information age of 
postindustrial society—at least, that is to say, for the “civilised” citizens of the North.  
Hidden thus within the enclosure of the slaughterhouse, the various modes of 
capitalist reproduction remain clearly visible. The fragmentation inherent in the 
concentrated division of labour common to manufacture is clearly evident in the 
devalorisation of the slaughterer’s labour, coinciding with the replacement of 
individuals possessing specialist knowledge as to the killing, bleeding, and butchering 
of nonhuman animals by a labour process divided into a number of single, endlessly 
repeated tasks. This remains today the modality of slaughter, for the simple reason that 
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large and, for the most part, healthy nonhuman animals are unpredictable: they resist 
and they fight for their lives. Not yet rendered sufficiently docile by selective breeding, 
the labour of slaughter thus requires that these still-living beings be physically 
dominated by other, technologically-assisted living beings. Thus, one worker fires a 
retractable bolt into the brain of one cow after another. A second worker attaches a 
chain to one hind leg after another. A third, the “sticker,” cuts one throat after another, 
and so on. Within the same windowless enclosure, the unstoppable disassembly line 
further transforms hundreds of other, “less skilled” workers into animate organs of its 
machine, compelled by its relentless speed to cut out a set number of kidneys every 
hour, to slice off so many feet and to empty out so many stomachs.  
The disassembly line remains today identical in all but scale to those of the 
Chicago slaughterhouses which, in his 1922 autobiography My Life and Work, Henry 
Ford describes as the inspiration for his factory assembly line. The general idea, he 
writes, came from the mechanised chain by which the suspended corpses of nonhuman 
animals were moved from worker to worker, each of whom repeatedly performed one 
step in the process of “dressing beef.” It was, claimed Ford, “the first moving line ever 
installed” (cit. Patterson Eternal Treblinka, 72). This process, at once technological 
and disciplined and disciplinary, introduced something new, as Charles Patterson 
notes, into the ongoing industrialised exploitation of labour: that of “the neutralisation 
of killing and a new level of detachment” (72), further reducing workers to mere 
adjuncts of the machinery of capitalism.124 
Nevertheless, the “less-skilled” operations—the labour performed upon 
corpses, in short—are increasingly coming to be carried out today by machines 
utilising the same knives as the “less efficient” workers once did. Hence, a single 
machine now carries millions of chickens, suspended upside-down from hooks, 
through an electrocution bath. A second machine then automatically chops off their 
heads. Meanwhile, a third machine scrapes clean the skins of a million pigs, and 
another immerses them in a tank of boiling water, and so on, each of these machines 
being for the most part overseen by a single worker. Along the length of the 
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contemporary disassembly line, therefore, the disciplinary modalities of manufacture, 
large-scale industry and Fordism all continue to coexist.  
It is not by chance, however, that, in addition to the countless numbers of 
domesticated animals, the human animals who find themselves exploited by these 
“older” yet contemporary modalities of capitalist production are almost exclusively 
those figured as “less than (properly) human”: illegal immigrants, asylum seekers, 
people of colour, women, the dispossessed and the globally disenfranchised. Excluded 
as the foreign in the Same, the various devalorised groupings are then pitted against 
each other (and the Other) in a cynical displacing exercise of corporate capitalism.125 
As Deleuze writes, in the postindustrial era of control societies, the corporation 
protects itself from mass resistance—through trade unionising, for example—insofar 
as it “constantly presents the brashest rivalry as a healthy form of emulation, an 
excellent motivational force that opposes individuals against one another and runs 
through each, dividing each within” (“Postscript,” 5). Indeed, in this can be perceived 
how the myth of a “state of nature,” of a war of each against the all, continues to 
naturalise—perhaps ever more effectively—neoliberal individualism on behalf of the 
“new” societies of control.  
 
 
Postindustrial factories: bioreactive bodies and manimals 
 
Postindustrial capitalism, with its new technologies of dispersion, nonetheless seeks 
contemporaneously to construct entirely new types of factories which instantiate not 
only a new reproductivity and a corresponding new paternity, but also a “new” 
temporality. Whereas the industrial factory discretised time, dividing up the working 
day into hours, minutes, and seconds, timing every step, every movement, in the search 
for the most efficient automaticisation of its worker-tools, the new factory aims to 
employ and to embody life itself, deconstructing the linear irreversibility of “natural” 
chronological time and instituting an unconditioned network in its place. These 
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postindustrial factories are the so-called transgenic animals themselves—also known 
as “bioreactors” or “pharm” animals—whose bodyings contain man-made genetic 
modifications (and which Sarah Franklin very deliberately calls “manimals” rather 
than the more neutral “humanimals”). It is no coincidence that the term “bioreactor” 
also names the machines which both culture cells and subject them to physical stimuli 
in order to incite a nonspecific “protoform” to self-assemble into a specified 
morphology. “Pharm” animals, in other words, are “bioreactors” because they are 
considered instruments of fabrication. For example, a transgenic “dairy” animal may 
be constructed so as to carry and express a human gene in order to manufacture certain 
proteins in her milk or blood which can then be used to make pharmaceutical 
commodities for rare genetic diseases as well as for common metabolic disorders such 
as diabetes. 
While Polly the sheep was one such “manimal,” her more famous queer kin 
Dolly was not, insofar as she wasn’t a pharm animal, but rather served to validate 
through her being the very experimental technology which promised to produce 
“manimals” in the future. Nevertheless, Dolly too, as Franklin says, can be “thought of 
as a nuclear breeder reactor in that she, too, is a model of a specific kind of 
manufacture—not through her milk, but in her embodiment of the viability of [somatic 
cell] nuclear transfer using differentiated adult cells from culture” (Dolly Mixtures, 
210-211n3). In this, Dolly in fact exemplifies the functioning of the “promise” not 
only within the biotechnological domain, but in the neoliberal financialisation of the 
globe in general. 
More than even this, however, Dolly embodies the ability to reverse time and 
thus, as we will see, promises nothing less than a potential immortality—a claim by no 
means contradicted by her untimely death in 2003 as a result of lung disease common 
to animals kept in close confinement. For the moment, however, it is sufficient to note 
that, in the context of the transformation from disciplinary societies to societies of 
control, the shift to postgenomics— 
 
has been occasioned by changes in how the gene is imaged and imagined, 
whereby the language of genetic codes, messages, and information has 
yielded to discourses of genetic pathways, switches, or constructs to be 
downloaded …. It is these transformations—at once conceptual and 
technological, as well as commercial and political, and nationally 
specific—that the making of Dolly the sheep both demonstrates and 




It is this postgenomic shift—that is to say, a movement subsequent to, and dependent 
upon, the mapping of the human genome—away from an understanding of the gene as 
determined and determining which permits, among other things, an ever more intimate 
experimentation speculating upon the conversion of nonhuman bodies into innovative 
forms of capital. In this way, biotechnology finds itself, by way of available funding 
opportunities, changes in patent law and so forth, increasingly entwined with both the 
pharmaceutical industry and agribusiness in the quest to capitalise on farmed animals 
in ever more innovative ways.  
However, as a number of theorists have pointed out, Richard Twine perhaps 
foremost among them, this speculative venture requires, in addition to favourable 
regulation and a promissory rhetoric, “a reductive view of the animal as genetic 
knowledge” (Animals as Biotechnology, 61). The reasons for this are quite simple: in 
order to justify the instrumentalisation of other animals, those animals must first be 
objectified as instruments. Such animals, that is, must first be reduced to “mere” 
mechanisms entirely determined by cause and effect, and in stark contrast to the “free 
will” attributed only to the human animal. Such a view, in other words, reduces 
nonsubstitutable living beings to Cartesian factories of reproduction. Moreover, 
biotechnology, continues Twine, not only perpetuates the factory metaphor, but in fact 
realises it: 
 
Under biopower, the factory metaphor is unsurprising—the emphasis is on 
the controlled productivity of the body, be that in the form of meat, labour, 
fitness or new offspring. … In a reductionist sense, animal bodies are 
factories for the production of protein for human consumption, for the 
conversion of plant material into animal commodities. The 
commercialisation of animal bodies for the production of 
biopharmaceuticals serves to bring this literal “body as factory” explicitly 
into relief. … Whereas the conversion of the animal body into information 
takes the organic into an inorganic media, the body as factory and 
laboratory reverses this, but similarly blurs the boundaries between organic 
and inorganic, and between body and technology (93-4). 
 
In this, the cloned or “pharm” animal-as-factory is symptomatic of the more general 
shift from life conceived metaphorically as information, to life understood practically 
as its literal actualisation which can be patented and thus commodified. Constituted as 
an accumulation of determined genetic knowledge, such a body is thus re-constituted 
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as a mediated and distributed materiality entirely suited to the highly mobile, 
geographically dispersed networks of telecommunication and commercial capital.  
In contrast to industrial model of selective breeding, Dolly as a standardised 
product is no longer what matters. Rather, it is only as a promise, as a venture of 
capital, that she counts. Her value, in other words, resides only in her potential to 
generate innumerable and unpredictable future life forms, and thus infinite surplus 
value. It is in this way that the promise of biotechnology is promoted as the answer to 
apparent limits of capitalist growth, a claim which parallels, and depends upon, the 
shift beyond the “biological barrier” formerly considered as a “natural” boundary 
beyond which only God could trespass. In this context, the promissory value of both 
bioremediation and “extremophiles,” for example, is obvious. By way of the former, 
new microbes can be designed which will “clean up” industrial—even radioactive—
waste, whilst at the same time reproducing surplus value for their “owners.” 
Extremophiles, meanwhile, are microorganisms who thrive in environments previously 
thought impossible to support any life—environments without oxygen and light, for 
example.126  
Reproducible at the genetic level, manufactured and manufacturing cyborg 
bodyings—neither wholly living nor wholly organic, and forever working towards 
their own consumption—are thus by definition infinitely replaceable. Thus, while no 
longer constituted as a mass pathic body at the level of the species, individual 
nonhuman animals nonetheless remain resolutely undying, eminently “lose-able” and 
thus killable. Indeed, somewhat ironically, actual nonsubstitutable animals such as 
Dolly and Polly are now considered so individual as to be patentable, but only insofar 
as they are identically reproducible, a process which thus both presupposes and 
extends the naturalisation of “the animal” as property.  
Such bodies, never entirely alive, have no value in being. Their value resides 
entirely in the informatic promise articulating their fleshly materiality, a value which 
can only be actualised in their disarticulation, be that into “cuts” or into cells. The 
nonhuman animal thus becomes at once informatic network and speculative capital, 
already calculated as fragments for consumption before being born and already 
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commodified for future consumption in as yet unknown forms. More than this, 
corporate capitalism comes to control, and indeed own and institute, the transnational 
flows of a new form of techno-bio-logical reproduction. As a result, the actual clinical 
trialing of biopharmaceutical products, for example, is increasingly being outsourced 
to the South. Similarly, the unregulated global trade in unfertilised human eggs is 
increasingly a feature of the marginalised South (and must thus be studied in their 
specific, locally situated emergences). Typically, in both of these instances it is women 
who must bear the brunt of this implicit notion of a lesser value placed upon the lives 
and bodies of the nonWestern “other.”  
At the same time, the old industrial-model slaughterhouse remains. Only, as I 
have suggested, it is deregulated and displaced into the margins by way of an 
increasing immigrantisation of “meat.” Moreover, the promise of ever-larger feedlots 
and industrial slaughterhouses remains dependent in many ways upon the 
postindustrial promise of biotechnology. This is not just in order to produce more cost-
effective “food” animals such as genetically-engineered blind hens who would 
apparently “benefit” from not having to witness their own conditions, but also to 
justify the continuing slaughter on environmental grounds. If bioremediated microbes, 
for example, can be built not only to clean the enormous and enormously toxic lagoons 
of fecal matter that are the inevitable by-product of mass slaughter, but moreover to 
flourish in doing so, then a major “natural” limit on the industrialisation of “meat” will 
have been overcome. Indeed, like the capitalist appropriation of “green” concerns like 
recycling, the massive overproduction of cowshit promises to become a profitable 
venture in itself. 
 
 
The promise of new times: serpents and sheep 
 
With this interarticulation of two modalities of capital, we thus discover two 
contradictory temporalities. For the poor countries of the South, the North exports, as a 
rationale for market and geophysical coercion, an evolutionary narrative of “progress” 
and “modernity.” For the North by the North, however, a second narrative is 
constructed: that of post-modernist reversibility, recapacitation, and immortality. On 
the one hand, this pushes the South ever further into the margins of “base” industrial 
production figured by a myth of redemptive temporality: the promise of a “modern” 
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future for which the poor must sacrifice themselves today. On the other, the poor of the 
North are reduced to desolation on the basis of the capitalist promise of an incalculable 
future which nonetheless remains dependent upon the historical limits of capitalism, 
limits which “unfortunately” but inevitably impoverish the present. Whereas Deleuze 
writes that societies of control have as their emblematic animal the “undulatory” 
serpent (“Postscript,” 5), I would argue that it is rather a certain postgenomic sheep 
who best embodies the postindustrial narrative. This is because Dolly, at both cellular 
and organismic levels, not so much undulates or orbits but rather interrupts, and even 
reverses, the arrow of time itself, and it is around this promised reversal that the 
imaginary of a certain neoliberal transhumanism coheres.127 
“Developed” by Ian Wilmut, Dolly was not fashioned with the intention of 
producing a clone, but was rather part of a large, heavily-funded corporate project to 
build more efficient transgenic animals (Dolly herself was not transgenic) capable of 
expressing pharmaceutical products for human commodification and consumption. In 
fact, her status as a “clone” is largely irrelevant to her promise (indeed, she is arguably 
not a clone anyway, insofar as she was generated from the merger of two cells from 
two female parents, a Finn Dorset ewe and a Scottish Blackface). Rather, Dolly’s value 
is as a technique, that of somatic cell nuclear transfer (SCNT)—a technique which 
transforms the very notion of the biological.  
Recalling here that the promise of biotechnology depends upon a reduction of 
“the animal” to determined genetic knowledge for its moral justification, what the 
“viability” of Dolly teaches us, however, is that it is precisely such a notion of genetic 
determinism that can no longer be maintained. For so long considered self-evident—at 
least as far as nonhuman beings are concerned—prior to Dolly the genetic was 
“defined by its one-way instructional, coding or determining capacity” (Franklin Dolly 
Mixtures, 33).128 According to such an understanding of genetic function, however, 
Dolly constitutes a biological impossibility. This is because deterministic gene 
function presupposes that in its development each cell must irretrievably “commit” 
itself to becoming a specific type, be it a heart cell or a skin cell or whatever and, in 
thus committing itself, it loses the capacity to become any other type of cell.  
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According to this linear schema, therefore, cells must “decide” once and for 
all at each stage of their teleological differentiation, with each decision being 
irreversible and irrevocable. Coincident with its differentiation, these decisive steps 
lead immutably to the aging and death of the mortal cell. Hence, the determinist view 
of the gene insists, by virtue of an irrevocable unidirectionality, on an uninterrupted 
progress towards a specificity of function. Any given cell can therefore become 
nothing other than what it already is, that is, it can neither reverse time to become 
newly totipotent (i.e., an undifferentiated cell with the potential to become any form of 
tissue, of which the embryonic stem cell is the most celebrated, and controversial, 
example), nor can it reverse direction in order to embark upon a specific new trajectory 
of development. 
What Wilmut, Keith Campbell and the team at the Roslin Institute 
established, however, is that biological development can in fact be reversed, even in 
fully differentiated adult cells. Indeed, this is the main reason why Dolly herself is seen 
as breaching an apparently “natural” boundary. “Produced” from a mortal adult 
mammary cell, the very bodying of Dolly demonstrates that such cells can indeed re-
function as immortal reproductive germline cells. Dolly the sheep, in short, embodies 
this pluridirectional movement at the most elemental level. Initially described by 
Wilmut as a process of “de-differentiation,” Franklin more accurately describes it as a 
“recapacitation” of cell functionality (41). In this, a capacity thought to be decisively 
lost in the temporalising of specialisation either turns out never to have been lost, or 
else such “decisions” never in fact take place. Thus, Franklin points out, “another way 
to describe what the Dolly technique enables is a retemporalisation of biology. In other 
words, through biotechniques, the temporality of the biological is being rescaled, or 
even recreated” (41).  
Cell recapacitation, in other words, promises cell immortality. While various 
implications of this, specifically in the domain of tissue engineering, will be 
considered in detail later insofar as it informs the utopian discourse of “transhuman” 
enhancement, for the moment I want to consider how this impacts specifically upon 
the ways of being—and their removal—of nonhuman animals. Most importantly, 
recapacitation promises to transform the lived temporality of domesticated animals—
so-called “livestock”—insofar as breeding stock in the form of actual nonhuman 
animals, or even just the eggs and the sperm (which still require actual animals, 
however distanced in space and time), are no longer required for viable reproduction. 
256 
 
Rather, a single animal, living or dead, in whole or in part, can now be transformed 
into a gene bank from which an entire herd of cloned animals can be produced in the 
space of a few months, rather than over several years. This compression of 
genealogical time, as Franklin explains, simultaneously “offers total nuclear genetic 
purity, in perpetuity, and under patent” (“Dolly’s Body,” 353) and is thus considered 
an advance over the unpredictability of sexual reproduction. Hence, whereas Fordist 
breeding techniques reproduce genealogy as a source of individual value and thus 
surplus value, somatic cell nuclear transfer instead deranges this temporality and 
spatiality entirely. In short, no actual animals are required to achieve a perpetual 
germline repository and thus a certain form of immortality—what Franklin terms “life 
stock.”  
While no “actual” animals are required to produce a genetically pure herd, 
however, the actual “identical” nonhuman animals of that herd must nonetheless 
continue to produce viable offspring—“viable” here referring to “natural” sexual 
reproduction as well as to the process of commodification itself. Bioengineered 
animals, in short, must also be able to “naturally” reproduce, if only to reassure 
potential consumers concerned with the question of their “naturalness.” In this way, 
the viability—in the sense of their literal consumability—of the herd’s “natural” 
offspring serves to retroactively naturalise the bioengineered herd at the same time as 
ensuring that all the “old” industrial disassembly lines hidden behind blank 
slaughterhouse walls continue to run at top speed.  
We can now further understand the viability—that is, the promise—
performed by Dolly. A singular, nonsubstitutable materiality that is at once patentable 
and infinitely reproducible, she brings together in and as one body the promise of the 
industrial and the postindustrial, discipline and control in a mutual articulation of 
informatics, biotechnology and immortality on the one hoof and, on the other, a global 
agribusiness dealing in biotechnologically-accelerated death. Dolly intersects here too 
with the biotechnological pharmacology of health: life-enhancing pharmaceuticals 
crossing with death-accelerating antibiotics and growth hormones. At one extreme 
there is a perpetually-extended human lifespan, and at the other there is the accelerated 
death of the slaughterhouse. Further, just as “meat” serves to efface the more difficult 
human-nonhuman interactions behind an unidentifiable, plastic-wrapped trope, so too 
biotechnology continues to efface its most problematic human-nonhuman interactions 





Owning emergence, determining the undetermined 
 
To reiterate, Dolly’s value lies not in her actual, nonsubstitutable being, but rather in 
the technique of which she provides the proof of viability. In this, Dolly herself is 
without value. Unlike in the case of the stud animal, as Franklin makes clear, 
 
neither her own genes nor her own generative capacity are valuable. … In 
this sense, cloning by nuclear transfer enables genetic capital to be removed 
from the animal herself—and doubly so. … Dolly’s own ability to produce 
lambs is merely a subordinated sign of her individual viability as a natural-
technical product of corporate bioscience. … The aim of producing Dolly 
was to demonstrate the viability of a technique that bypasses her own 
reproductive capacity, which is too inexact (“Dolly’s Body,” 352-3). 
 
It is exactly here, by way of these new temporalities, that biocapitalism indeed seeks 
yet again to bypass its own “natural” biological and temporal limits. The vertical 
linearity of genealogy is thus rewritten as a postindustrial rhizomatic network at the 
level of both genes and bodies. Moreover, these two “levels”—as we shall see in the 
critique of Stiegler’s philosophical anthropology in the next section—in fact coexist on 
the same plane, reciprocally articulating one another in a transductive relationship.  
Furthermore, Dolly here embodies, as both engineered technique and 
organism, the promise of regenerative medicine at the level of tissue engineering. This 
is because it is only the (patentable) generative process, not its actualisations, which 
counts: an informatic and material speculation, the biological promise is the future 
which remains to be both ventured into and upon. A promise, moreover, of future 
property rights regulated by an ever-looser patent law, and of a newly-instituted 
paternity beyond all limits—what Melinda Cooper terms “a not yet realised surplus of 
life” (Life as Surplus, 140). It is the promise, in other words, of the transformation of 
life into a patentable property of origin and infinite potential, in which one holds the 
rights to all possible future forms. It is, in short, the promised ownership of “the 
moment of emergence” itself (127). 
That this premise depends upon the deconstruction of biological time 
understood as a determined linearity has an enormous array of consequences, not least 
for the presupposition—that nonhuman animals are reducible to genetic information—
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which serves to “ground” the promissory discourse of biotechnology in the first place. 
The promise of an infinite surplus of life, that is, contradicts the very reduction of life 
which functions to justify its use as property. As we have seen, a rhetoric of genetic 
determinism is employed so as to morally enable the ongoing experimental practice of 
genetic indetermination. This, however, is not its only purpose. In addition, the 
discursive reduction of nonhuman life to an instinctive, unidirectional mechanism, to 
the transmission of a simple code, serves at once to efface the threat of excessive 
mutability inherent in the post-Dolly practices of biotechnology. In short, the rhetoric 
of genetic determinism—what Kaushik Sunder Rajan calls both a “conventional 
fiction” and a “fetish”—serves at once to ground the promise of biocapital in moral 
terms and to efface the very real danger attending its excessive indeterminism. Lastly, 
one should also consider the supportive role played by the “old” patriarchal and 
Platonic economy of genetic determinism—in which the male imprints its DNA upon 
the passive female egg—in the constitution of Dolly’s “new” scientific “paternity.” 
While the Dolly technique, insofar as it is the egg cytoplasm which serves as the 
“instructor” within what is always a “situated biological communication” (Franklin 
Dolly Mixtures, 42), thus overturns the original patriarchal determinism, Dolly herself 
is nonetheless reappropriated within a scientific paternity founded upon a (male 
human) mastery of the (female animal) body. 
Most important here, however, is that Dolly embodies an explicit refusal of 
genetic determinism, a repudiation of behaviourist biological conditioning, performing 
instead a biological plasticity. Moreover, insofar as pathways of genetic development 
can be reversed and reinstructed by external stimulus, this means that, in addition to 
their newfound flexibility, genes have become thoroughly “situational and contextual” 
(44). As a result of the singular bodyings of Dolly, Polly, and their queer kin, in other 
words, the undetermined process of biological life must henceforth be understood as 
the mutual articulation of genetic and epigenetic effects within positive feedback 
loops. It is this process which Bernard Stiegler terms epiphylogenesis—a way of being 








Countering reactive epiphylogenesis 
 
As we have seen, and as is already marked by the term “bio-technology,” the 
nonhuman animal body increasingly unsettles the boundary between the organic and 
the inorganic—between body and technology—from both directions, animal-as-
information on the one hand, animal-as-factory on the other. In what I am calling the 
pharmacology of the promise, this can perhaps be considered as both the dark side and 
the dystopian material support of the tranhumanist utopia. This unsettling of the limits 
between technicity and animal bodies, in this case both human and nonhuman, 
inevitably calls to mind Stiegler’s recent philosophical and anthropological attempt to 
yet again install an apparently secure human-animal dichotomy.  
For Stiegler, this boundary is re-drawn through the concept of 
epiphylogenesis, denoting the transmission of both inherited and newly-learned 
knowledge beyond the lifespan of the individual in the form of artefactual memory 
aids. By way of these artefacts, insofar as they are an exteriorisation by way of 
hypomnemata, the technical and the human are co-constituting. This is because, writes 
Stiegler, exteriorisation and interiorisation (consciousness) necessarily originate in a 
transductive relation, that is to say, a relation in which the elements do not precede 
their relation. In this sense, the evolutionary appearing of “the human” as 
consciousness (interiorisation) only emerges in its relation to a technics, just as the 
technological (exteriorisation) only comes into being in its relation to the human. 
Hence, according to Stiegler, animals can never be technical bodies. 
Moreover, not only do nonhuman animals not exteriorise, and thus not conserve 
epigeneses, nor can they therefore possess any form of “internal” consciousness 
whatsoever. As a result, nonhuman beings, insofar as they possess neither collective 
heritage nor the capacity to teach others, can never respond, but only and always 
react.129 A nonhuman living being, writes Stiegler—albeit with the prefatory proviso 
that this is the case only “[i]f molecular biology is correct”—“is defined by the somatic 
memory of the epigenetic and the germinal memory of the genetic, which in principle 
do not communicate with each other” (Technics and Time, II:4; final emphasis added). 
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In other words, nonhuman animals are determined solely on the level of species and 
entirely by their genetic—as opposed to technical or symbolic—characteristics which 
precede any actual appearing of an individual nonhuman being. Such an “individual” 
thus exists in a state of something akin to the non-consciousness of perpetual 
forgetting (in the blackest darkness, Stiegler will say).130  
Such a determinism, it should be noted straight away, inscribes nonhuman 
beings as entirely substitutable and reproducible: every newborn is indistinguishable 
from any other of the same species at the same stage of evolutionary development, the 
only possible differentiation being in the species as a whole across the aeons of 
evolutionary time. By contrast, for Stiegler the technical-body that is the human 
constitutes an absolute rupture with this “pure life” of animals. The problem, however, 
is that Stiegler nonetheless maintains his agreement with Jacques Derrida as to the 
différance which constitutes “life” itself—here understood by Stiegler as the “pure 
life” which is to be devoid of technicity—and which thus inscribes every living being 
as always already ruptured by the trace. While Stiegler, in drawing his human-animal 
distinction, then goes on to argue that the emergence of “the human” as a technical-
body constitutes a further, utterly discontinuous rupture, what needs to be remarked 
here is that the differantial trace in fact already inscribes the bodying of “pure life” as 
a co-constitutive (transductive) technical-body. Indeed, this last is further supported by 
the very practice of molecular biology upon whose authority Stiegler would otherwise 
like to found his claim. As Sunder Rajan explains, while “a central source of authority 
for genomics” stems from genetic determinism, the relationship of genes to traits is 
rather “a set of complex, multifactorial interactions (which are multifactorial both at 
the genetic level and in the interactions of “genetic” and “environmental” factors)” 
(Biocapital, 145; emphasis added). Paradoxically, Stiegler thus reduces nonhuman 
animals to non-conscious causal mechanisms while at once affirming that such “pure 
biology” or “pure life” is always already différant from nonliving automata.  
We have, by way of Nietzsche’s notion of an auto-ordering and mutually 
forming memory, to a large degree already engaged with this latest charge by Stiegler, 
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of being prior to mnemotechnics. 
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one in which the latter denies all consciousness, and thus all sense, to nonhuman 
animals. We have briefly noted too the historicity and historiology of the Addo 
elephants, who have transmitted down through the generations of their specific 
sociocultural group a learned hatred for human animals. We might also recall the 
famous troop of Japanese macaques studied by Itani Junichiro and Kawamura Syunzo. 
One of the troop, a young female, began washing her sweet potatoes clean of grit and 
sand before consuming them in order to protect her teeth. This habit, which is 
undoubtedly a technique as well as a gestural writing, was quickly transmitted to other 
youngsters and females via female-lineage hierarchies, with the sub-adult males being 
the last to learn. In this way, Donna Haraway notes, “social and technical innovation 
emerged from the practices of youngsters and their mothers” (Primate Visions, 253-4). 
It of course follows that, if such new habits can be learned by contemporaries in the 
group, they can therefore also be passed on down the generations insofar as one’s 
contemporary may also be one’s child.  
However, the bodying of Dolly, and at once the Dolly technique, has direct 
consequences at the genetic level for Stiegler’s re-founding of the human-animal 
distinction insofar as he proposes the origin of the human in and as its exteriorisation 
as retentional technologies, of which writing is the privileged example. Here, I suggest, 
recapacitation is already a writing, a retentional technology of and on the body. It is a 
writing, that is to say, which, in contrast to the one-way signalling presupposed by 
genetic determinism, is transmissible both intergenerationally and, indirectly by way of 
epigenetic recapacitation in situ, to one’s contemporaries.  
There is iterability, in other words, always already at the genetic level, and 
thus sedimentation, habit, and encounter. Indeed, this reiterates the notion of “life 
already outside of itself” traced throughout this thesis. This is further supported by the 
increasing focus within contemporary molecular biology on epigenesis, and hence on 
interaction and relation. As such, this necessitates a focus on singularly situated, 
nonsubstitutable way(s) of being, that is to say, upon this actual, irreplaceable and 
nonreplicable animal, and not upon the species in general. Similarly, this focus is 
increasingly coming to inform laboratory as well as ethological studies of nonhuman 
animal behaviours. Such studies attempt to think with, rather than for, or even as, those 
beings with whom human scientists engage by focusing upon the reciprocal relations 
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which co-constitute in part the experience of both individual nonhuman animals and 
the individual human animals, who thus both study and respond to each other.131 
However, despite calling upon the authority of microbiology, Stiegler 
nonetheless refuses just such an “experience” to all other animals. Moreover, this 
human-animal distinction, already hugely problematic, further serves as the basis of 
Stiegler’s critique of human audiovisual and informatic “psychotechnologies” which, 
he claims, break up the “long circuits” of generational time at the behest of speculative 
capital. This is because, as we shall see, it is “the animal”—or else an “aspect” of 
animality—to whom or to which such psychotechnologies end up reducing “the 
human.” In other words, in order to ground this devolutionary movement of 
postindustrial capital, Stiegler must reduce—at least for the most part, as we will see—
nonhuman animals to the level of “mere” instinctive (i.e., genetically determined) 
anticipation. He names this way of being, which is the permanent forgetting of non-
consciousness, “vigilance.” And yet, what Dolly, inter alia, makes explicit is precisely 
that the postindustrial breaking up of generational time, both symbolically and 
literally, characterises societies of control in general, rather than being something 
which, as Stiegler contends, can only happen to human animals by way of 
psychotechnologies.132 
Whereas Stiegler bases his account on the paleontology of André Leroi-
Gourhan, here I have chosen to leave aside the considerable amount of recent 
ethological findings which refute Stiegler’s claims for a human exceptionalism. 
Rather, I have decided instead to focus on the questions which Dolly’s way(s) of being 
raises for the notion of exteriorisation understood as a break with “pure life.” By 
further considering the implications of the “simple” nonhuman body as being already a 
technical body, this will in turn permit us to further rethink the notion of “life” as 
always already freed from life. More importantly, however, what this engagement with 
Stiegler’s discourse also provides is a way to understand, by way of a reworking of 
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 This is not to suggest there was no manipulation of generational time within Fordist 
agribusiness—one thinks of artificial insemination and the chemical synchronisation of 
menstrual cycles. I am rather referring here to the institution of a new, post-Fordist temporality 
no longer defined by the modernist paradigm of linear progress. 
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epiphylogenesis, what I have called the pharmacology of the promise from the position 
of actual animals.  
Brought together with the dispersed temporality of promissory capital, I will 
argue that we find here a doubling of the pharmakon: while the promised remedies of 
both the transhuman and the posthumanist must somehow control the threat of a 
poisonous mutability, this poison is figured in different ways. Whereas the promise of 
an immortal transhuman assemblage fears the poison of a potential zoonotic (i.e. inter-
species) pandemic, the monstrous zoogenetic promise of a Nietzschean posthuman 
animal must rather contend with a self-interested nihilism which inevitably finds its 
place within a rigorously deconstructed Nature-Culture binary. 
 
 
A darkness as black as one will 
 
Despite being increasingly dispelled, it nonetheless remains a common 
misapprehension that cloned beings (irrespective of species) will not only be 
genetically identical, not only physically identical, but also will be somehow 
condemned to lead identical lives—a misunderstanding which, knowingly or 
otherwise, presupposes that every being is therefore entirely reproducible and thus 
substitutable. This in part accounts for the anxiety cloning inspires, insofar as it 
explicitly puts into question both the uniqueness of the individual human subject and 
the exceptional status of the human being. The basis of both the misapprehension and 
the anxiety is thus the presupposition that living beings are entirely determined by their 
DNA, and are thus entirely predictable—that is, machinic. In this schema, all 
epigenetic variation, before any question of transmissibility, is rendered a priori 
impossible insofar as behaviour is rather programmed in advance at the genetic level 
and is thus independent of the being-there of existence. According to such a schema, 
evolution therefore progresses not by adaptation, but only by accidental genomic 
mutation. At the same time, and against overwhelming empirical evidence, this 
presupposes that no actual animal, including a human, can respond in any way to 
significant unprecedented and relatively sudden environmental change, but can do so 
only as the passive recipients of chance “aberrations” over the immense evolutionary 
time of speciation.  
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While this is patently not the case—cloning, precisely because of genetic 
plasticity, will rather result in a proliferation of individual mutations133—one can 
nonetheless wonder how Stiegler’s reduction of nonhuman animals to a non-conscious 
“vigilance” differs from such an absolute privileging of “nature” at the cost of 
“nurture.” On the one hand, Stiegler indeed affirms that “the tracing of any simple 
boundary [frontière] between humanity and animality must be called into question” 
(Technics and Time, I:151), and yet, on the other, insists upon “the simple automatic or 
programmatic-genetic behaviour of a fabricating animal [animal fabricateur]” (151).  
How might these contradictory statements be resolved? For Stiegler, I would 
suggest, the “simple boundary” necessarily refers to a peculiar kind of “creationist” 
humanism, in which “a forthrightly recognisable human” appears fully-formed amid an 
otherwise genetically programmed animal landscape. In this way, he indeed refuses the 
essential and timeless human subject, but only so as to reinscribe the division within 
time, insofar as the human both evolves from the animal, and yet, in a single technical 
blow (coup), becomes absolutely other. This is the moment in which the human 
appears in and as its transductive relation with technicity, whose uniqueness consists in 
its potential to free itself from “socioethnic” constraints, in contrast to the animal who 
rather “has no possibility [n’a pas de possibilité] of freeing herself from genetic 
constraints [de s’affranchir des contraintes génétiques]” (171, trans. modified).  
This blow dealt to life, this difference (or différance) is, writes Stiegler, the 
“modality of programming of, and by, memory, the consequence of the passage from 
liberation to exteriorisation, [which] concretises its new possibilities at the individual 
level, reinserting them, when they are totally realised, into the socioethnic level” (171-
2). This “idiomatic differentiation,” in other words, is not only the ability both to learn 
and to transmit possibilities beyond the individual lifespan, but it is also the condition 
of the “new” itself. This constitutes— 
 
an essential shift [déplacement essentiel] from the level of the species to 
that of the individual, who is undetermined in its behavioural possibilities, 
if not in its zoological limits and in the already-there of the world in which 
it lives, from which it inherits, to which it must answer [enchaîner], and 
which it appropriates by altering it (172). 
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Desire (London & New York: Continuum, 2004). 
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The human, in other words, is relatively undetermined, as a result of cultural 
(symbolic, technological) inheritance, in contrast to the animal who is instinctively 
determined as a result of genetic (natural, material) inheritance. This is of course a 
very traditional gesture: the positing of an originary “liberation” of the human as 
(relative) free-will from the programmed machinery of animality.  
Indeed, at times Stiegler himself seems to draw back from this absolute 
position when, in what is a very Heideggerian gesture, he suggests that there is 
nonetheless “certainly a kind of ‘privative’ form of anticipation” available to 
nonhuman animals (163). Anticipation, it should be noted, is for Stiegler the futural 
way of being which defines the human alone insofar as it possesses a “unique and 
incontestable relation to death” (164)—a claim which is itself, as we have already 
seen, eminently contestable. Stiegler is not, however, so much as offering some kind of 
limited consciousness to nonhuman animals as he is rather organising a necessary 
precondition so as to ensure the consistency of his exceptionalist argument. In fact, this 
hesitant “privative” anticipation is necessary for Stiegler so as to maintain the division 
it appears to put back into question. The positing of a “privative,” instinctive form of 
anticipation for base survival is, in other words, that which preserves, by way of a 
simultaneous evolutionary continuity and discontinuity, the possibility of the human 
itself. It is a possibility, as Stiegler writes, “that is opened however minutely, in a 
darkness as black as one will [une pénombre aussi opaque que l’on voudra], but that is 
already the possibility of a divergence and therefore something of a projection [une 
sorte quelconque de projection] of a ‘symbolic’ type rather than of a type of ‘survival 
behaviour’” (163, emphases added).  
Absolute genetic determinism, as we have seen, not only denies all possibility 
of epiphylogenesis, but also of epigenesis as well, in contrast to both empirical 
evidence and scientific argument. This “minute opening,” however, permits a 
nonhuman animal “some sort of” or “something like” a symbolic projection, 
something which seems to exceed determinism, but which is nonetheless only a 
“privative” version of what remains uniquely human. Much the same as Heidegger’s 
“worldly poor” animals, Stiegler’s animals might appear to have access to the 
symbolic, might appear to “have” the “as,” but in reality they remain dissolved within 
the “pure life” of the darkest non-consciousness. As a result, Stiegler’s attribution of 
privation concedes that while one may encounter a “clever” nonhuman animal (albeit 
this in fact only appears to be the case), the species is nonetheless condemned to 
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perpetual dumbness, never able, whether as a whole or within specific social 
groupings, to learn either from their individual mistakes or their triumphs. “Privative” 
anticipation is, in short, simply the possibility of a human rupture in an otherwise 
absolutely determined biosphere. 
As we will see, however, there is more at stake here than a simple, unthinking 
reiteration of a traditional culture-nature dichotomy. The exclusion of “the animal” in 
fact serves an essential function in the construction of the postindustrial posthuman 
dystopia which Stiegler’s critical philosophy seeks to combat. As such, nonhuman 
animals become rather a mere tool within Stiegler’s anthropocentrism. Here, let us 
recall how the “fetishist” rhetoric of genetic determinism permits an instrumentalising 
of nonhuman animals which in turn justifies the promise of biocapital in moral terms, 
whilst at the same time effacing the threat of genetic flexibility which organises the 
promissory discourse of biotechnology. We can now see how Stiegler’s reductive 
notion of animal “vigilance” parallels that of biotechnology itself. Just as genetic 
determinism serves both to secure and efface a transductive relation of interior and 
exterior within the discourse of biotechnology, so too genetic determinism serves both 
to secure and efface epiphylogenetic variation within Stiegler’s philosophical 
anthropocentrism. Indeed, this might well help explain the recurrent references to 
agribusiness, embryology, and biotechnology that populate Stiegler’s texts. To 
understand its importance, however, one must understand how the exclusivity of 
human epiphylogenesis permits Stiegler’s own promissory rhetoric of psychotechnics, 
in which the potentiality of an inventive breaking with “socioethnic constraints” is 
constructed in opposition to an (impossible) regressive becoming-animal at the behest 
of postindustrial psychotechnologies.  
Nonhuman animals are genetically determined, human animals are relatively 
undetermined. This is Stiegler’s argument. Culture is defined by a transductive 
organic-technological relation, in contrast to a state of Nature defined as an “absence 
of all relation” (128). The question then, is who or what, or who and what, are 
transgenic animals according to this founding exclusion which underpins Stiegler’s 
philosophy? Given that they are both human and animal at the genetic level, itself a 
writing of and in the body, do they become human artefacts, or do they produce 
human, or animal, artefacts? Are they technological beings, or simply “pure life”? 
Dolly, Polly, and the others all promise, in short, to highlight the ungrounded 





Stepping into, and falling from, the light: being human becoming animal 
 
In considering the structural undecidability of such ways of being, it is first of all 
necessary to recall one last time Andrew Benjamin’s discussion of the two dominant 
forms of the human-animal distinction as drawn along a teleological dialectic. In the 
first form, as we know, the human depends upon the death or the ceasing to exist of the 
animal and, in the second, the human is required to repeatedly overcome the animal in 
a constant struggle both to become and to remain human. Stiegler, it is clear, founds 
his thinking of the co-constitution of the human and the technical upon an evolutionary 
dialectic of the first type. In other words, the coming into being-exteriorised of the 
human is a coup in which the human is always already not animal, insofar as the 
human is only in ceasing to be an animal. Such a blow or coup thus takes place once 
and for all.  
Indeed, Stiegler locates the precise moment of anthropogenesis in the technics 
of the Zinjanthropian period. Responding, for example, to Leroi-Gourhan’s suggestion 
that the Zinjanthropian is still in fact a “quasi-zoology,” Stiegler states with absolute 
certainty that “it is already no longer anything of the kind, otherwise one could not 
speak of exteriorisation” (142). It is rather the case, he says, that it is in the 
intermediary period between “the Zinjanthropian who is already a man, and the 
Neanthropian opening onto the human that we are” (142), that the human “free[s] itself 
[se dégageant] slowly from the shadows like a statue out of a block of marble” (141). 
Here, I am assuming that this notion of the shadow [ombre] refers to the darkness 
[pénombre] which marks the animal’s absence of relation from which the human, 
already a man by virtue of technicity, emerges into the full light of humanity. 
The obvious question, at this stage, is what of the numerous technological 
forms employed by nonhuman animals, from carefully prepared (and subsequently 
retained) wooden levers and sharpened stones (the use of flint tools, claims Stiegler, 
constitutes the origin of the human) to the construction of complex dwellings and the 
sharing of meanings by way of otherwise arbitrary signifiers? What of the gestural 
language of chimpanzees, of the ritualised enactments of social status combined with 
the imparting of site-specific knowledge, that is, information localised in both space 
and time? Are all of these not also material artefacts, repositories of knowledge and 
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conventional languages, and thus also exteriorisations? To my knowledge, Stiegler 
offers nothing on this question, despite its relevance to his own claims and to the 
ongoing debates in related fields.  
The second point is that, despite this insistence on the absolute exceptionalism 
of the human by way a co-constitutive technicity, in Taking Care of Youth and the 
Generations (2008), Stiegler nonetheless seems to suggest that the human can be 
somehow reduced to, or even returned to, an animal way of being. It is a reduction, or 
perhaps devolution, moreover, which is a consequence of exteriorisation in general, 
and of those biotechnologies in particular which Stiegler calls “psychotechnologies.” 
This then, would suggest a supplemental—and mutually exclusive—humanist 
teleology of the second form.  
How then, can exteriorisation—the defining property of the human—effect an 
(ontologically impossible) reduction of “the human” to “the animal”? Stiegler in fact 
attempts to evade this contradiction by suggesting that this post-human animal is rather 
only one “aspect” or “side” [pan] of animal vigilance. Vigilance, it should be recalled, 
is the reactive will to survival lived instinctively from within the utter darkness of non-
consciousness, the latter consisting in the absence of both unconsciousness and 
preconsciousness. Here, after again acknowledging only that his argument is founded 
upon the assumption that “human attention is defined as separate from nervous system 
vigilance” (Taking Care, 96), Stiegler then suggests that the capture of human 
attention by postindustrial marketing systems results in “a regression to instincts” (97). 
A regression, that is to say, to animality.  
Attention capture, he argues, results specifically from the abandoning 
exteriorisation of the human psychic realm onto psychotechnological or computational 
devices. The human, in other words, in delegating both memory and decision to 
artefactual computers (in the broadest sense), no longer exists in a transductive relation 
with technicity, but rather abandons that very interiorisation which marks the human 
out from the animal. Whereas properly human transductive relations with exteriorised 
(inherited) knowledge constitute what Stiegler calls “long circuits” or circuits of 
“transindividuation,” the contemporary marketing system, he argues, thus “short 
circuits” this relation in the abandonment of the interior to the exterior. Together, these 
constitute for Stiegler the pharmakon of human-technical becoming. Here, Stiegler 
names the curative transindividuation psychotechnics, in order to distinguish it from 
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the poisonous psychotechnological short-circuit. The question, however, remains: how 
can “the human” regress to that being which he or she never was? 
For Stiegler, it is the combination of marketing systems, speculative capital, 
and psychotechnologies which constitutes societies of control in contrast to the 
disciplinary societies of “modernity” (103). As a result, the capture of attention 
requires— 
 
the biological model of a human central nervous system technologically 
produced by technologies of control; this kind of nervous system is an 
attribute of a gregarious, disindividuated mass whose brains have been 
stripped [énucléés] of consciousness … a nervous system forever enclosed 
within strict neurological limits, significantly constraining both training and 
consciousness (97-8). 
 
The difficulty here concerns the contrast between the human “aspect” of animality and 
animality as such, as well as the animal him- or herself, whom Stiegler deems 
genetically incapable of taking on any aspect of humanity whatsoever. With this notion 
of a no longer conscious human mass reduced to the biological, to the animal, by way 
of disindividuating psychotechnologies, Stiegler in fact suggests a symbolic 
animalisation that is actually a literal becoming-animal in its reduction to non-
conscious vigilance. In other words, how can these two “aspects” of biological short-
circuit be differentiated, except perhaps by reference to pre-existing classification 
systems?  
However, it would seem that, despite being thus reduced to the darkness of an 
animal enclosed within “strict neurological limits,” Stiegler’s non-conscious post-
human nonetheless appears to retain a specific—albeit significantly constrained—
capacity for both epiphylogenesis (training) and consciousness, which Stiegler will 
later call “the most minimal human ‘subject’” (100). How can this be? Without that 
consciousness which Stiegler, by way of an explicit misreading of Derrida’s Of 
Grammatology in the first volume of Technics and Time, claims is the appearing of the 
grammē as such, the human must thus necessarily become “pure life” in an originary 
transformation that can never be a regression to instincts.134  
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 Stiegler cites Derrida in support of his claim that the “emergence of the grammē as such” is 
at once the emergence of a uniquely human consciousness—it marks, in other words, the 
second coup, the “the différance of différance” (Technics and Time, I:137). However, there is 
no suggestion whatsoever of this in Derrida’s text. In fact, the opposite is the case. Derrida 
rather makes clear in the passage cited by Stiegler that the originary movement of différance—
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Again, Stiegler must attempt to separate the two “aspects,” that is, if he is to 
continue to assume a “separation” between attention and vigilance. 
Psychotechnologies, he suggests at this point, do indeed eliminate consciousness, “but 
through the elimination of attention, not its capture [captation]” (102, my emphasis). 
But again, how can these “aspects” be differentiated, insofar as the human, defined 
futurally, must have attention and thus anticipation eliminated in order to become a 
captured animal. The difference, in short, concerns only the process by which “the 
human” becomes what “the animal” always already is. Moreover, it is this question of 
how such a reduction takes place which will return us to the question of pure life, of 





Firstly, writes Stiegler, the human is made “minimal” insofar as attention is delegated 
to “automata that then become its captors, meters, gauges, warning signals, alarms, and 
so on. Attention in this sense is precisely folded back [rabattue] on its automatisable 
behaviours of vigilance, the psychic having been reduced to a pure function of the 
biological” (Taking Care, 101; trans. modified). Here then, “pure biology” is the 
equivalent, or at least a variant, “another side or aspect of [tout un pan de],” of an 
alarm clock telling you to brush your teeth or, better, of a pop-up telling you consume 
some “meat,” this latter irrespective of whether it takes place within limits imposed by 
agribusiness or by the availability of prey.135  
In Stiegler’s terms, both the “minimal” (post)human and the vigilant animal 
are determined, and condemned, to retention without protention; the différance of 
grammatisation limited absolutely by a fully-automated archive retrieval which offers 
no possibility of individuation. In other words, both nonhuman animals and posthuman 
animals can only react, but never respond, insofar as they lack the necessary lack. This, 
                                                                                                                                                                        
“the trace as the unity of the double movement of protention and retention”—always “goes far 
beyond the possibilities of ‘intentional consciousness’” (Of Grammatology, 84). It is, he makes 
clear, already this “first” coup, this “new structure of nonpresence,” which “makes the grammē 
appear as such” (84). 
135
 One can thus better understand why Stiegler’s primary example of this animalising process 
is the way the marketing systems of agribusiness exclude, a priori, “the possibility of any 
choice of foodstuffs outside of the intelligence associated with agriculture and of food itself” 
(Taking Care, 213n8). 
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insists Stiegler, is the poisonous aspect of the pharmakon which is technological 
becoming, the danger indissociable from its promised remedy. And yet, this is also the 
very negation of technical becoming (as transindividuation), which Stiegler posits as 
the very essence of the human. The human is, in short, at once indissociable and 
dissociable from technical becoming. Moreover, I will argue, insofar as human 
psychotechnics cannot be separated from both animal and posthuman vigilance, the 
latter effected by psychotechnologies, this necessarily undoes Stiegler’s founding 
human-animal distinction which promises a technical remedy to technological poison. 
To understand this contradiction at the heart of technical becoming, it is 
necessary to explore in more detail exactly how it is that psychotechnologies produce 
the posthuman. In abandoning the psychic realm to artefactual computers, claims 
Stiegler, the unconscious and preconscious (i.e., habitual) interiorisation of “the 
structure of inheritance and transmission” is interrupted (Technics and Time, I:140). In 
this way sociocultural inheritance is replaced by “tertiary retentions,” that is to say, by 
exteriorised memory aids which have been standardised so as to be “formalisable, 
calculable, and finally controllable” (Taking Care, 99). In other words, both nonhuman 
animals and their posthuman aspect are reduced to a calculable uniformity. However, 
whereas for the former this takes place at the level of speciation through the “natural” 
biotechnologies of their genes, the latter are rather transformed into a “disindividuated 
mass” through the psychotechnologies that are computational devices, and which are 
thus also biotechnologies. Here then, this notion of the human as that which is made 
calculable through memory returns us yet again to Nietzsche, and it is from there, 
finally, that we can approach Dolly once more. 
As we have seen, Stiegler agrees with Derrida’s understanding of différance 
as “the history of life in general” (Technics and Time, I:137), only then to shift the 
terms of Derrida’s argument so as to posit a second, supplemental “stage of différance” 
from which the possibility of human consciousness emerges. Derrida, however, 
explicitly refuses any such “second coup.” Rather, he affirms that the “double 
movement of protention and retention” is precisely the mark, or the trace, of living 
being (which is not necessarily to say organic being) and at once “the becoming-time 
of space and the becoming-space of time” (“Différance,” 8). This trace of being-futural 
we located too in Nietzsche’s philosophy, through the notion of translation that is at 
once a re-cognition of sense. It is this recognition which, irreducible to cogitating 
activity, inscribes both finitude and memory—understood as the sedimented, habitual 
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“already-there”—in and as every living being. It is precisely this notion of finitude and 
memory, however, which Stiegler seeks to reserve for the human alone. 
Despite this, there remain interesting parallels between Nietzsche and 
Stiegler. Both, for example, insist on the importance of memory aids—whether these 
are called mnemotechnics or tertiary retentions. For both, they make possible a 
calculation and computation which is necessarily pharmacological: at once poisonous 
threat and curative gift. For Stiegler, tertiary retentions reserve the possibility of 
inventive transindividuation as well as posthuman disindividuation. For Nietzsche, 
they represent the precondition for breeding an animal with the right to make promises 
as well as that most fearful development whereby “ghostly schemata” efface the 
appearing of radical particularity. The major difference, however, concerns 
calculability. For Nietzsche, “the human”—in common with all living beings—must 
first be produced as uniformly calculable as the immanent condition for the taking 
place of posthuman invention beyond calculability and uniformity. By contrast, this 
production of the calculable human is, for Stiegler, the reduction to a nonhuman 
animal, and thus the elimination of all possibility of invention. Stiegler’s animal, in 
other words, is Nietzsche’s human, and vice versa.  
Whereas Stiegler fears that technology threatens to poison the exceptional 
status of the human, I suggest that, for Nietzsche, the threat which is indissociable 
from its curative promise is that of the exceptional transhuman. Furthermore, it is here 
that the pharmacology of the Nietzschean promise, explored in its creative aspect in 
the previous chapter, intersects with Stiegler’s by way of the notion of “infidelity.”  
The major difference, however, is that Nietzsche does not require a reinstalled 
human-animal, culture-nature dichotomy in order to articulate the threat within the 
promise of technicity, the inseparable poison-remedy of its pharmakon. Insofar as for 
Stiegler “computational psychotechnology always aims at substituting for attention, 
theorising and modelling attention and its institutions, destroying them by seeming not 
even to imagine an attention beyond vigilance” (Taking Care, 102), what I am 
suggesting here is that together Nietzsche and Derrida allow us to see that it is Stiegler 
himself who seems unable to imagine an attention beyond “mere” vigilance.136 By way 
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 It is therefore something of an irony that Stiegler collapses the “cybernetic reductionism” of 
psychotechnologies—a reductionism identical to that through which he figures nonhuman 




of a prefatory gesture, let us recall that everything which Stiegler reserves for the 
human, both Nietzsche and Derrida extend to every living being—that which, in 
Stiegler’s words, 
 
comes from an originary forgetting, ēpimētheia as delay, the fault of 
Epimetheus. This becomes meaningful only in the melancholy of 
Prometheus, as anticipation of death, where the facticity of the already-
there that equipment is for the person born into the world signifies the end: 
this is a Promethean structure of being-for-death, a structure in which 
concern [pré-occupation] is not the simple covering-over [occultation] of 
Eigenlichkeit. This is the question of time (Technics and Time, I:142). 
 
Rather than requiring an instauration of human exceptionalism, it is the very 
deconstruction of the human-animal and nature-culture binaries which installs the 
curative promise of invention. Such a promise, moreover, always already retains 
within itself not the threat of a poisonous animality, but rather the threat of an 
excessive mutability. Furthermore, as the “Dolly technique” demonstrates, this 
pharmakon of technical becoming is found at the genetic as well as at the sensory 
level: a writing, a technicity, of and on the body. It is already there, in other words, in 
the iterability that is recapacitation.  
 
 
Taking care with the generations 
 
Let us recall that, for Stiegler—and only insofar as one can assume molecular biology 
is correct—“the somatic memory of the epigenetic and the germinal memory of the 
genetic … in principle do not communicate with each other” (Technics and Time, II:4). 
Even at the time of Stiegler’s writing, however, this claim was already becoming 
increasingly untenable within the praxis of molecular biology, as we have seen in our 
discussion of the Dolly technique.  
Basically, Stiegler here subscribes, at least as far as nonhuman animals are 
concerned, to August Weismann’s theory of generation. Hugely influential during the 
“industrialising” period of disciplinary society, generational inheritance is here 
conceived of as vertical movement only through the germ line, with germ line cells 
understood as distinct from somatic cells insofar as, while they reproduce themselves 
in the finite bodies of living beings by way of linear differentiation, they themselves 
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remain undifferentiated and thus immortal. Indeed, it is far from surprising that the 
legacy of Weismannian theory functioned most explicitly in the notion of industrial 
selective-breeding programmes. In our brave new postindustrial era of complex 
multifactorial interactions, however, it is instead “becoming plausible,” as Melinda 
Cooper writes, “that ‘life itself’ might be more comprehensively defined by the 
proliferative, self-regenerative powers of the ES [embryonic stem] cell rather than the 
Weismannian theory of the germ line” (Life as Surplus, 139). 
As we have seen, the discovery of an inherent potentiality of cellular 
recapacitation interrupts the notion of a linear temporality moving irrevocably towards 
a specificity of function. It interrupts, that is to say, a causally determined genetic 
movement, replacing it with a biological plasticity or flexibility. Hence, it is only 
insofar as genes are situational and contextual that there can be at once a reversal, a 
transversal, and re-becoming of genetic initiation as the result of “external” or 
“environmental” factors. In short, the genetic (germen) and the epigenetic (sōma) are 
co-constituted in a transductive relation—the elements of which do not precede their 
relating—which can be transmitted both genetically and epigenetically. Put as simply 
as possible, what this notion of “situated biological communication” implies is that 
what is “learned” has an affect at the cellular level, and vice versa, in positive feedback 
loops. The epigenetic can be transmitted genetically, and the genetic epigenetically, 
albeit with the necessary translations which result from the “overleaping” of 
discontinuous, yet reciprocally determining, domains. 
This is, of course, worded in such a way as to recall Nietzsche’s notion of 
translation as discussed in chapter two. However, instead of “beginning with a nerve 
stimulus,” as Nietzsche does in “On Truth and Lie,” there is rather already before and 
beyond that singular touch an overleaping both from the cell to the epigenetic-as-
metaphor, and from recognition (the iterative making of sense) to the genetic-as-
metaphor, in a complete disorientation of linear temporality. Every differentiated cell, 
in other words, constitutes a stammering “material” translation or exteriorisation of the 
habitual “already-there” of an (epigenetic) experienced context. Every “experience,” 
every apprehension, constitutes a stammering “sensible” translation or exteriorisation 
of the habitual “already-there” of a genetic context. Both genesis and epigenesis are 
thus reciprocally articulated, each acting as tenor to the other’s stimulus, that is, each 
losing itself and each other in a movement of errant transmission, of dissemination. 
Such is “life” that “has freed itself from life” (Derrida Demeure, 89) or, in an extension 
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and transformation of Stiegler’s definition of epiphylogenesis, it is “living by other 
means than life [vivant par d’autres moyens que la vie]—which is what the history of 
technics consists in” (Technics and Time, I:135).  
Writing—Stiegler’s privileged example of exteriorisation—is here always 
already a writing of and on the body. The dislocating movement of différance, the 
trace as the unity of the double movement of protention and retention, is thus indeed 
that “new structure of nonpresence” which Derrida describes as the emergence of the 
living from the amoeba to homo sapiens and beyond. Such is the movement which 
both “makes the grammē appear as such” and at once “makes possible the emergence 
of the systems of writing in the narrow sense” (Of Grammatology, 84). There is, in 
short, at every level—and, indeed, more precisely when and where such levels can in 
fact no longer be distinguished—the denaturalising movement of life that is the 
originary technicity of living being. Why should exteriorisation be restricted to 
“organised albeit inorganic matter,” as Stiegler repeatedly claims? Is language organic, 
or inorganic? Is the organised matter of the cell “interior” to living being or “exterior,” 
exteriorised or interiorised, or are they rather co-constituted feedback effects?  
What then, is Dolly for Stiegler? Who then, is she for Nietzsche? Who and 
what, such is Dolly insofar as she is. As a result, it is no longer necessary to evade the 
question of nonhuman tool use, or to get bogged down in the interminable “nature 
versus nurture” debate. Recalling the historicity and historiology of the Addo 
elephants, we can now perhaps better understand how their memory of the 
murderousness of humans comes to transmitted through the generations at both the 
genetic and epigenetic (and thus epiphylogenetic) levels, the elephants having become 
both “instinctively” nocturnal as a result of their relations with human animals, and 
“socially” aggressive in their relations with human animals. Barbara Noske highlights 
this undecidability in her description of the third- and fourth-generation post-event 
elephants as “the cultural heirs of the fear and hatred among their ancestors for our 
species” (Beyond Boundaries, 155). Interesting here, is that fear is traditionally 
conceived as “instinctive,” whereas hatred is generally considered to be a “cultural” 
manifestation. And yet, can such fear be considered instinctive to the species? As 
genetically determined? Or is it rather a learned fear? And what of hatred? Is it taught 
and learned, passed along, over and over again in the elephant equivalent of an oral 
tradition? Or has this hatred in actuality pervaded these nonsubstitutable living beings 
at the cellular level of their very way(s) of being?  
276 
 
Indeed, I completely agree with Stiegler’s description of epiphylogenesis as 
that which “bestows [accorde] its identity” upon an individual: “the accents of his [or 
her] speech, the style of his [or her] approach, the force of his [or her] gesture, the 
unity of his [or her] world” (Technics and Time, I:140). I would, however, insist upon 
a single—but by no means minor—coda: such an individual is never “the human,” but 
“is” rather the way of being as such and, as such, being is always already being-with. 
One result of this is that Stiegler’s founding human-animal distinction, in its attempt to 
distinguish the psychotechnics of transindividuation from the reductive vigilance 
effected by psychotechnologies, promises a technical remedy to the poison of 
technology which can no longer be maintained. In its place, however, the originary 
technicity of living being—the iterative writing of and on the body—founds both the 
pharmacological promise of postgenomics and the promissory discourse known as 
transhumanism. In the next section, we will see how just such a doubling of the 
promise helps us to understand the dangers of a prematurely stalled deconstruction of 
the nature-culture and human-animal dichotomies.  
 
 
The transhuman promise 
 
Transhumanism, such as espoused by philosopher Nick Bostrom and referred to briefly 
in the introduction to this thesis, can be schematically described as both the desire and 
the promise of enhancing the human by way of technological, informatic, and 
bioengineering developments.137 In the main, however, transhumanist discourse is 
equally characterised by a dogmatic refusal to put into question the supreme value it 
attributes to “the human” as well as its belief in a sovereign human agency. Moreover, 
I agree with Richard Twine when he claims a close relation between the transhumanist 
imaginary as organico-technical assemblage and “the capitalist desire to reinvent itself 
… through the biotechnological trumping of ecological and material limits” (Animals 
as Biotechnology, 14). This relation is, I would argue, that of a spatiotemporal 
mapping: mutually articulating both a topography and a temporality. Indeed, it is with 
the notion of cell recapacitation and especially, as suggested above, in its relation to 
the heavily speculated and highly speculative field of tissue engineering (TE), that the 
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 See, for example, Bostrom’s “A History of Transhumanist Thought” in Journal of 
Evolution and Technology, 14:1 (2005), 1-25. 
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promise sustaining the utopian transhumanist imaginary comes most clearly to the 
fore. As Melinda Cooper writes, TE is, in principle at least, 
 
capable of perpetuating embryogenesis, of reliving the emergence of the 
body over and over again, independently of all progression. Here it is not 
only spaces, forms, and bodies that become continuously transformable, but 
also the divisible instants of a chronological lifetime, so that any one body 
can be returned to or catapulted into any point in its past or future, and into 
any past or future it could have and could still materialise. In other words 
TE not only seeks to “return” the body to nonmetric space but also to 
nonmetric time—and to recapitulate the various chronologies of 
morphogenesis from here. In principle, then, the adult body will be able to 
relive its embryogenesis again and again—including those it has never 
experienced before (Life as Surplus, 121). 
 
Here then, is the dream—and the promise, itself necessarily temporal, that capital is 
being ventured on—of the transhuman: not only would the human form be 
continuously updatable and editable, but death itself would cease to impose its limit. 
Temporality thus promises its own overcoming, and hence the overcoming of finitude, 
the humanness of being having become immortal and without limit, able to relive its 
own life eternally as well as the infinite number of lives otherwise denied to it by the 
fleshly finite necessity of choice and chance. The transhuman utopia is, in other words, 
Nietzsche’s reactive ascetic ideal (Genealogy, III:28). Seeking to overcome the 
constraints of life itself, the transhuman is rather the absolute irresponsibility of an 
unconditional infidelity, with being itself having become endlessly reversible, 
reproducible, revisable, and transmutable. 
It is not by chance that this description can, mutatis mutandis, be applied to 
the constant innovation of speculative, “fictitious” capital, which Stiegler describes as 
the “systemic organisation of infidelity” (New Critique, 83). No longer materially 
dependent upon commodity production, and thus upon constant and variable capital, 
for speculative capital the stake is rather time itself, that is to say, the risk inherent in 
the undetermination of the temporal. Its promise is thus a promise because it is without 
material reality. The future, in other words, determines the present.  
At the same time, however, speculative capital seeks to overcome time—and 
thus finitude—by its constant innovation, exemplified above all by the promise of 
speculative biocapital and of supply-siding (the economic theology so beloved of 
neoliberals which states that supply will create demand, if we only have faith), and 
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thus melds with the promise of the transhuman. Indeed, the transhuman consumer 
promises, and is promised by, biocapital to modify itself precisely so as to enable itself 
to consume that undemanded supply.  
For example, an individualised therapeutics deploys a rhetoric of genetic 
determinism in order to justify its promised utility by way of a promised threat (of 
future disease), and as such performs genetic determinism so as to constitute fetishised 
individuals as “consumers-in-waiting.”138 In increasingly constructing such 
therapeutics as preventative, that is, as speculative, the potential market for drugs is 
thus massively enlarged from the “sick” to the “potentially sick”—that is, to every 
single living being with sufficient purchasing power—in a further fragmentation of 
sociopolitical groupings into pharmaceutically mediated individuals. At the same time, 
this speculation upon future health and future illness also serves to “prove” the 
determinist rhetoric as scientific “fact,” but only insofar as no material consequences 
of “effective” preventative medicine—which itself is based entirely on probability—
can be recorded.  
The individual, in other words, in remaining healthy, at once both justifies the 
founding rhetoric of genetic determinism while at the same time must put into question 
the notion of just how determined such determinism can therefore actually be. 
Personalised therapeutics thus feeds into the transhumanist promise of technological 
enhancement or even immortality, a sacrifice for salvation which at the same time ties 
in with the promissory, messianic discourse of the “old” industrial notion of 
“modernity.” Such a rhetoric, as we have seen, employs a teleological determinism in 
order to demand that the imperfect countries of the South sacrifice themselves today 
for the promise of a perfect First-World Tomorrow. 
All of this, perhaps, is promised by Dolly—both as a technique and as a 
rewritten body, a supply to be literally consumed and a supply for the consumerist 
need for constant innovation. And as too with Dolly, within the transhumanist dream-
promise of a technologically mediated immortality, the future constitutes at once the 




                                                           
138
 On this, see chapter four of Sunder Rajan’s Biocapital. 
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The pharmakon is double: immortality and mutability 
 
Initially, I suggested that the pharmacology of the promise consisted of the remedy of 
betrayal and the poison of the transhuman. This, however, is not sufficient. Rather 
schematically, we can now say that the pharmacology of the promise is itself double: 
on one hand, there is the promised remedy and poisonous threat of biocapital and, on 
the other, there is the promised remedy and poisonous threat of a Nietzschean betrayal. 
More precisely, the promise of a transhuman utopia necessarily brings with it the threat 
of a catastrophic and cancerous zoonosis, just as the promise of the right to make 
promises must at once threaten to collapse differences in the cynical nihilism of an 
absolute relativism. This latter, as we shall see, will return us, by way of a conclusion, 
to the question of the revolutionary animal encounter and of its congealing into an 
interested parody of itself. 
For both then, the promised cure concerns a deconstruction of human-animal, 
nature-culture and organic-inorganic binaries, while the threat is thus the poison of 
excessive mutability. The difference, however, is between a neoliberal appropriation 
which seeks to stall, and thus master, that very deconstructive movement, and the 
vigilance of a deconstruction which seeks always again to respond.  
In this, it comes as no suprise that the economically-invested rhetoric 
deployed to justify the promise of biotechnology depends upon a reductive notion of 
the nonhuman animal as genetically determined, even as the promise of biotechnology 
resides in the potential capitalisation of genetic indetermination. This is because, 
insofar as the transhuman promise seeks to gift to itself—albeit at a price yet to be 
determined—an ever greater mastery of so-called “nature,” it must therefore at the 
same time install a “humanism beyond humanism.” It must maintain, in short, an 
absolute culture-nature dichotomy in order to justify the promise of its ongoing 
deconstruction.  
Such an incomplete, or stalled, deconstruction of the human-animal and 
nature-culture binaries, such as one finds too in the genetic determinism brought in to 
“ground” Stiegler’s philosophy, thus permits a naturalising discourse which effaces 
flexibility so as to pre-empt (or short-circuit) any possibility of unconditional 
hospitality. In this way, both discourses reproduce an exclusive hierarchy which, in 
refusing the nonsubstituability and thus the value of other beings, renders them mere 
instruments in the production and reproduction of commodification. It serves, in other 
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words, to close down the ethical opening (as discussed in the third part of this thesis) 
in order to justify an ongoing mastery—a determined mastery of life operating with the 
authority of facts. At the same time, it underwrites the transhumanist promise in 
effacing the threat of excessive mutability—of the non-mastery of life—figured by the 
incalculable emergence of zoonotic (inter-species) disease and by the media spectacle 
of ever more catastrophic killings of nonhuman animals. It is, in this sense, the master 
which only ever reacts, and who never responds.  
To better understand this, let us return, with the help of Melinda Cooper, to 
the Weismannian theory of generation. Charles Minot, who helped to secure the 
influence of the theory, did so by contrasting the “normal” linear and irreversible 
differentiation of cells by reference to the pathological exception that is, in Cooper’s 
phrase, the “indifferent divisibility” of cancer. For Minot, “abnormal growth” such as 
tumours and cancers constitute the “familiar” phenomenon “of things escaping from 
inhibitory control and overgrowing” (Minot; cit. Cooper Life as Surplus, 137). Such 
growth power, he maintains, results from cells remaining in the undifferentiated 
“immortal” state insofar as they have somehow “got beyond the control of the 
inhibitory [i.e. differentiating] force, the regulatory power which ordinarily keeps them 
in” (cit. Cooper, 137). The cancerous cell is thus pathological as a result of “its 
indifference to the normal limits to differentiation and division” (Cooper Life as 
Surplus, 138). 
Recalling here how tissue engineering (TE) can be considered as sustaining 
the promise of the utopian transhumanist imaginary, Cooper points out that with TE 
there is “the distinct possibility, in particular, that the extremely plastic, mutable cells 
of the early embryo may end up proliferating too well, giving rise to cancerous 
growths rather than restoring health” (125). Genes, in other words, insofar as they 
cannot be determined, always reserve the risk of an incalculably errant dissemination.  
Hugely important to the discussion here, Cooper then goes on to write that it 
is here, with the promise and threat of excessive mutability, that one can locate once 
again the move from Fordism to post-Fordism, and from disciplinary societies to 
societies of control. “Where the machine body of the industrial era,” she writes, “was 
plagued by the problems of fatigue, depletion, or entropy …, the postindustrial body is 
more likely to be overcome by a surplus productivity that is indistinguishable from a 
surplus of life—that is, crises of overproduction or the dangerous, excessive vitality of 
cancer” (125). One thinks here again of those “extremophiles” who, potentially 
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developed to consume industrial waste such as the gigantic cowshit lagoons generated 
by agribusiness feedlots, in fact constitute a “surplus of life” engineered to survive on 
the crises of overproductivity, but whose very vitality, or liveliness, may well result in 
ever more dangerous metastasising diseases.  
The pathological therefore, is also that which refuses differentiation, refuses 
finitude, that which “refuses to submit to the limits of generational time and death” 
(139). It is thus no surprise that during the industrial, disciplinary period cancerous 
cells were considered unproductive and “inherently sterile,” whereas today the “quasi-
cancerous properties of the ES [embryonic stem] cell line are in fact enormously 
productive” (139).139 (And it is here, of course, that one must mention the patented, 
cancer-bearing OncoMouse.) With such postindustrial crises of capitalist 
overproduction, however, what Marx describes in the third volume of Capital as the 
tendential fall in the rate of profit must henceforth be resituated at the level of the 
biosphere itself. 
The promise of excessive mutability—and thus of the organic-technological 
assemblage of transhuman immortality—that is located in the recapacitation of stem 
cells, and located too in Dolly and Polly’s bodyings, is thus at once the threat of 
excessive mutability, of the cancerous overabundance of life which ends up consuming 
all life in its relentless pursuit of its own accumulation. One can only think here of its 
parallels—both topographical and temporal—with the current financialisation of the 
globe: of the relentless accumulation of speculative capital concealed behind an 
apparently “neutral” rhetoric of the market as merely instrumental, and of an 
incalculable future which both determines and impoverishes the present. As Sunder 
Rajan writes, 
 
Excess, expenditure, exuberance, risk, and gambling can be generative 
because they can create that which is unanticipated, perhaps even 
unimagined. But this can only be so if the temporal order of production is 
inverted, away from the present building toward the future and instead 
toward the future always been called in to account for the present 
(Biocapital, 116).  
 
Here then, I have argued that the promise of a transhumanist organic-technological 
assemblage is explicitly disclosed in the promise of tissue engineering—a promise of 
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 As Cooper notes, the term “embryonic stem cell” was in fact initially interchangeable with 
that of “embryonal carcinoma cell” (Life as Surplus, 140). 
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excessive mutability and mobility equally valorised in neoliberal discourses of 
telecommunications and postindustrial capital. Turning in the next section to focus on 
the threat of excessive mutability, and of the future being called in to account for the 
present, I aim to show that the latter is just as clearly disclosed in the contemporary 
discourse of zoonotic pandemics. 
 
 
Making sense beyond species: zoonoses 
 
Diseases such as HIV/AIDS, foot-and-mouth disease (FMD), bovine spongiform 
encephalopathy (BSE) and its human variant Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease (CJD), severe 
acute respiratory syndrome (SARS), avian flu, and swine flu are all termed zoonoses, 
meaning that they fracture the imaginary boundaries between species for so long held 
to be impregnable. They mark then, sites of excessive mutability that are also in a 
sense “transgenic.” While it may transpire that zoonoses are in fact far from 
uncommon, they are at present the “natural” equivalents of rogue states, in the sense 
that both serve to interrupt the “smooth” Western discourse of free market 
globalisation constituted as the transcendence of neoliberalism over the barbarism of 
primitive nature.  
Zoonoses are, in other words, diseases of mutability and mobility at the levels 
of biology, class, and geography, exceeding the imaginary limits of both the 
homogeneous species and the homogeneous nation-state and just as likely to infect the 
affluent as the poor (which is by no means to suggest a parity of treatment, in every 
sense). Paradoxically, one result of this rupturing of the human-animal division is that, 
while the rhetoric of genetic determinism preserves nonhuman animals as automata 
and thus instrumentalisable, the accompanying rhetoric of imminent zoonotic 
pandemic functions to support and further reinforce that very division. There emerge, 
in other words, “new discourses and technologies seeking to secure human health 
through the segregation of human and animal life and finding in the spectre of 
pandemic a universal rationale for institutionalising speciesism on a hitherto 
unprecedented scale” (Shukin Animal Capital, 184).  
Most obvious here are the holocausts of nonhuman animals which 
accompanied the recent announcements of the apparent threat posed to human health 
by foot-and-mouth disease, avian flu, and swine flu. Interestingly, FMD in particular 
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makes explicit the economic interests which underwrite such announcements. Once 
one realises that foot-and-mouth is a disease which is dangerous neither to human nor 
to nonhuman animals, but only to productivity, it becomes all too clear that the mounds 
of corpses were simply nodes in a network of political and economic strategies 
concerned with protecting export revenue.  
Indeed, this renders explicit the performative dimension of the fear produced 
by the promised threat of zoonotic irruption. Alongside the constitution of a global 
humanity united by the threat of pandemic, what also gets constituted, as Shukin notes, 
“are those populations, both human and animal, perceived as compromising its 
survival and therefore at risk of being socially ghettoised or materially sacrificed” 
(Animal Capital, 183). There are any number of examples, but two will here suffice: 
that of the unfounded narratives of HIV originating in “unhygienic” and “primitive” 
Africa, and of BSE-CJD originating in “backward” India, both figured as a result of 
overly intimate relationships between human and nonhuman animals (rather than 
being, as in the case of BSE at least, a result of the Western industrial practice of 
feeding herbivorous farmed animals the “waste”—that is, previously non-
commodifiable—body parts of their own kin).140  
In this, one can see how the promised threat of excessive mutability can both 
justify a racist pre-emptive interventionist national strategy, such as that recently 
implemented by US neoconservatives, as well as further increasing the value of, and 
thus the financial speculation upon, an individualised therapeutics and the promise of 
biotechnology in general. In short, the promise of excessive mutability is, in a further 
pharmacological twist, both a poison and its own remedy. This then constitutes the 
threat and promise of neoliberal capitalism as it seeks, yet again, to reproduce itself 
beyond its own limit: the technological promise of a material human transcendence 
and the threat of an unending imperialist war against a newly hostile “nature.” 
Here then, we have located a number of mutually articulating discourses 
which together help to mark the shift from industrial disciplinary societies to 
postindustrial societies of biopolitical control. It is a shift, however, which nonetheless 
retains within its borders an (albeit marginalised) industrial commodity production, 
which carries the mark both of “backwardness” and of a (mythic) promise of 
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 Similar “ghettoising” discourses of origin can be seen accompanying the mediatisation of 
the SARS outbreak (China), as well as avian flu (China, in particular the Guangdong province) 
and swine flu (South America).  
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modernity to be further exploited. Together, the transhumanist biotechnological 
promise and the threat of biological mutability thus authorise an ever greater 
institutionalisation of “life as such,” a self-authorisation exceeding every nation-state 
boundary and extending beyond an imagined “universal humanity” and on through all 
levels of the biosphere. In this way, “life itself” is figured as that which must be 
controlled at all costs.  
To summarise then, the pharmakon of mutability supplies the rationale for an 
ever more intensive capture of the contingencies of biological life within the calculus 
of power: the promise demands control at the microbiological level, the threat demands 
control at the globalising level—all of which is intimately bound up with financial 
speculation and the promise of astronomical returns. Further, the very incalculability of 
the promise-threat is precisely that which authorises both an imperial violence in the 
name of the “humanitarian” and a pre-emptive violence in the name of the future. 
 
 
The pharmacology of betrayal: the over-animal and collapsed animality 
 
Contrast this, however, with the posthumanist promise demanded by Nietzsche, and 
with the animal encounter as a process and a fidelity which demands a promise of 
excessive responsibility. On the one hand, as we have seen, the pharmacology of the 
promise is at once the transhuman and the posthumanist, with each being the remedy 
and the poison of the other. On the other hand, however, the posthumanist promise too, 
as I have argued, is the promise of excessive mutability, and as such it must also, whilst 
promising a cure, simultaneously threaten to poison. The difference, I would suggest, 
is that this latter demands an unwavering fidelity to that which remains to come, while 
the neoliberal promise requires an unwavering infidelity to that which already is.  
Nietzschean mutability—otherwise known as will to power—contrasts, in 
other words, with the constant and calculable innovation of speculative capital. The 
difference, rather than the opposition, is, in short, between responsibility and 
irresponsibility. While the latter seeks to master time and finitude by way of a 
calculation which can thus never be inventive, the former must, in opening itself to the 




Similarly, while the excessive mutability underpinning the transhuman 
promise of immortality—the mastery of “nature” itself—seeks both to efface and to 
pre-emptively remedy the threat of a poisonous cancerous mutability, so too the 
promise of the zoogenetic animal encounter in which the new comes into being, 
insofar as it depends upon the mutability of sense, must at once contend with the 
poison of nihilistic parody. In other words, it is, as we have seen, the simultaneous 
mutability of recognised sense into habit and dogma—bringing at once the possibility 
of a cynical, self-interested play which seeks to reinstall mastery—which haunts every 
inventive phrasing. Indeed, we should recall in this context Werner Hamacher’s 
reference to the “still undrained, still unexhausted decay” which must always live on 
(“Disgregation,” 160). Hence, the pharmakon of mutability demands, if we are to be 
responsible, the vigilance of an eternally returning demand which must “take leave of 
all faith and every wish for certainty” (Nietzsche The Gay Science, §347). This is the 
chance, the threat and the promise, to interrupt the nihilism of economic interest and 
the sedimented investiture of power. 
Another way to understand this pharmakon of mutability is by way of 
iterability, synonymous throughout this thesis with both recapacitation and being as 
such. In this sense, the threat of an ever vigilant deconstruction is also that of excessive 
mutability—that of collapsing difference(s), rather than encountering singular ways of 
being. To collapse the singularities of difference amid a generalised indifference of 
equality is to render everything equally without value, and thus to fall into the nihilism 
of absolute relativism. A fall, in other words, into infidelity—a negation of the world in 
advocating the parodic play of cynical self-interest.  
 
 
Conclusion. Giving death to other animals: an ethics of vigilance 
 
The poison of mastery demands the remedy of vigilance—a pharmakon which must 
ever again be renegotiated. It demands too, as we have seen, the strength to face 
finitude in remaining faithful to the maddening displacement of its demand from the 
other. Such is the animal encounter which calls forth those tropes which function in the 
opposite direction to the reactive ordering of animalisation, marking instead with the 
borrowed costume of a forbidden metonymy the coming into being of a monstrous, 
unheard-of relation, thus staging the creation of an indecipherable and unmasterable 
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materiality. While excessive mutability interrupts the phantasmatic effect of every 
genealogical tie—its promise and its threat, its poison and its remedy—it demands too 
the strength to outlive “the human” in attesting to the precarity of a shared finitude, 
and thus to the nonsubstitutable deaths of all living beings. Only in this way might it 
become unthinkable that other animals—whether human or nonhuman—can be put to 
death with impunity.  
The dead zombie flesh of the instrumentalised animal is, I have argued, the 
inverse of the “revolutionary spirit” of the living corpse that returns. Whereas the latter 
dismantles the machinery of animalisation, the former serves only to reproduce a 
symbolic logic of oppression which ultimately constitutes subjugated beings 
“deserving” of their oppression. While a giving finitude does not necessarily prohibit 
the production of cloned or “pharm” animals, it does however displace the relation, 
demanding as it does an ethical encounter in place of that sadistic mastery defined so 
well by Donna Haraway in the epigraph to this chapter. At the same time, such 
vigilance inevitably demands that we engage in the wider question of whether 
nonhuman animals should indeed be farmed at all. This is not mastery, but fidelity to 
being together: a post-humanism rather than a transhuman-ism. For actual animals, 
human and nonhuman, the transhuman promises only an ever increasing exploitation 
and control, whereas a vigilant posthumanism promises to open itself to the zoogenetic 
encounter, and thus to the incalculability of the future.  
In this, one must, as Nietzsche insists, take leave of all certainty in order to 
dance even at the edges of abysses (The Gay Science, §347). Only then will the 
genocidal economy be interrupted, and only in this way might there come an 
unbounded community of those who love, of those who share their inability to share 
and who must ever again risk everything in search of asylum. Such is the promise of 
zoogenesis which resides in the responsibility of a vigilant betrayal, called into being 
in and as a thinking encounter with animals which interrupts the instrumentality of the 
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